ORDER
Suhas Chandra Sen, J.
1. Md. Gulzar Ahmed and Md. Munir Ahmed are partners of a partnership firm, M/s. Bright Trading Company, and were given licence by the Rubber Board in Form No. C to buy or otherwise acquire rubber from any registered estate or any licensed dealer and sell rubber to another licensed dealer or licensed manufacturer subject to the terms and conditions of the licence. The petitioner was carrying on its business as a licensed rubber dealer for a number of years. The licence was issued annually and the last such licence was issued on 14-2-1980 and was valid from 1st April, 1980 to 3lst March 1981. The petitioner’s licence was suspended by the Assistant Secretary, Rubber Board, the Respondent No. 2, with effect from 10th Sept. 1980 and was ultimately revoked by an order dated 13th Feb. 1981. By this writ petition the petitioners have challenged the aforesaid order of suspension and revocation of licence.
2. The petitioner as a licensed dealer had to carry on business in rubber strictly in accordance with the terms and conditions laid down in the licence and also the provisions of the Rubber Act, 1947 and the Rubber Rules, 1955. Under the provisions of the Act and the Rules and also the terms of the licence, the petitioners were obliged to maintain accounts and records of all transactions showing details of daily purchases and sales and daily balance had to be kept without fail. The petitioner had to keep its place of business open to inspection by the Board or its representatives. Monthly returns had to be submitted regularly. It was also essential for the petitioners to make declaration regarding inter-State transport of rubber in the prescribed forms.
3. The petitioner was licensed to deal in rubber at premises No. 62, Phears Lane, Calcutta. On 2nd Aug. 1980 the Rubber Board received information that the petitioner was maintaining three other godowns located at 43, Phears Lane, 63, Phears lane, and 12, Gopal Chandra Lane, Calcutta. On 2nd Aug. 1980 the petitioners godown at 43, Phears Lane, Calcutta was inspected. The godown at 63, Phears Lane, Calcutta could not be inspected because the godown could not be opened. The godown was placed under police custody and was opened on 4th Aug. 1980. On inspection unaccounted stock of 2080 Kgs. of rubber was found. From the books of accounts and records it was not noticed that a stock of 150 Kgs. of rubber was stored at 62, Phears Lane, Calcutta, on 2nd Aug. 1980. It was further directed from the books, of accounts that since 29th July, 1980 the petitioner firm did not make any purchase of rubber. The last purchase recorded was from M/s. Usha Commercial Corporation on 29th July, 1980 and the quantity was 2000 Kgs. of sheet rubber.
4. The Accountant of the petitioner company stated that the stock of 2080 Kgs. of rubber had been purchased from M/s. Royal Rubber Company on 2nd Aug. 1980.
5. This story of purchase from M/s. Royal Rubber Company on 2nd Aug. 1980 was highly unlikely because the godown was under police custody on and from 2nd Aug. 1980.
6. It was also revealed that the petitioner had done inter-State transactions in rubber without issuing the requisite N. 2 declaration forms prescribed under Rule 43B of the Rubber Rules, 1955.
7. With the help of the police, the godown at No. 12, Gopal Chandra Lane, Calcutta, was also opened and 100 bundles of reclaimed rubber were found. The case of the Rubber Board is that the petitioner did not try to establish by evidence or otherwise at any time that the godowns at Nos. 12, Gopal Chandra Lane and 43 and 62, Phears Lane, Calcutta, belong to some friends and relatives of the petitioner; nor did they disclose the full particulars of such friends and relatives. The case of the petitioner is that no rubber has been purchased by the petitioner since 29-6-1980. This statement tallied with the records maintained by the petitioner. It has been stated on behalf of the Rubber Board that M/s. Royal Rubber Company has wound up its business in raw rubber at Calcutta as early as April, 1980. They did not hold any valid licence to deal in rubber. The alleged purchase of rubber from M/s. Royal Rubber Company, even if true would amount to violation of the provisions of the Rubber Act and the Rules. The petitioner’s licence thereupon was suspended and a show cause notice was issued for revocation of the licence on the ground of storing of rubber in unauthorised godowns, refusal to open the godown for inspection when demanded by Board’s Officers, keeping unaccounted stock of rubber and non-issuance of purchase bills and transportation of rubber from one State to another without furnishing the requisite N. 2 declaration forms.
8. The reply to the show cause notice was considered in detail by the Assistant Secretary to the Rubber Board. After considering the explanation furnished by the petitioner and also considering the explanation forwarded, the Assistant Secretary revoked the licence of the petitioner by an order dated 13th Feb. 1981.
9. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Ministry of Commerce. The Ministry of Commerce passed a speaking order on 16th Dec. 1983. In that appellate order it was noted that the records of the Rubber Board had been examined along with the appeal petition. It was observed that the Government of India was satisfied that the contention of the Rubber Board appeared to be correct and the order should be upheld.
10. On behalf of the petitioner, an argument was advanced that in effect the petitioner’s argument had been accepted by the Appellate Authrotity because it has been observed that at the time of inspection on 2-8-1980 the Rubber Board Officials should have obtained the signatures of those persons so as to obviate doubts about who were the persons present at the time of inspection.
11. This observation, in my opinion, does not support the contention of the petitioner. This observation was merely about the desirability of obtaining signatures of those present at the time of inspection. This does not go to show that the case of the Rubber Board was being disbelieved by the Appellate Authority.
12. The Appellate Authority has stated that “the contention of the appellant that he did not know the licence of M/s. Bright Trading Company Calcutta had been cancelled cannot be easily accepted because there were a large number of cases pending against this firm.”
13. From this the petitioner has tried to argue that the Appellate Authority has really not studied the case or applied its mind. The case was really that M/s. Royal Rubber Company’s licence had been cancelled. This goes to show totally non-application of mind on the part of the Appellate Authority. I am unable to uphold this contention. The mention of M/s. Bright Trading Company must have been made by mistake. The case of non-application of mind cannot be made out by the fact of a printing error or a simple mistake. In the latter part it has been stated “further M/s. Royal Rubber Company has wound up its business in April 1980 four months before the alleged purchase.”
14. Therefore, reading the entire order it clearly appears that the Appellate Authority had the dealing of M/s. Bright Trading Company with M/s. Royal Rubber Company in mind and the allegation was that the petitioner could not have purchased rubber lawfully from M/s. Royal Rubber Company which had wound up its business in 1980 four months before the alleged purchase and the licence of which had been cancelled before the date of the alleged purchase.
15. Lastly, the Appellate Authority has noted that the explanation of the petitioner regarding non-issuance of declaration forms in Form N. 2 for sales to parties outside the Slate was very weak and cannot be accepted.
16. The facts remain that inter-State sales were transacted without furnishing the requisite declaration forms. This by itself is an offence. The petitioner could have satisfied the Appellate Authority that there were mitigating circumstances. The Appellate Authority might have accepted the explanation of the petitioner. But the Appellate Authority has not accepted that explanation on the facts of this case. It is a question of appreciation of the materials produced before the Appellate Authority. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate how this decision was erroneous in law.
17. It has been stated in the appellate order:
“The records of the Rubber Board have been examined along with appeal petition. The Government of India is satisfied that the contention of the Rubber Board appears to be correct………..”
18. The Appellate Authority has not discussed the entire evidence on which the findings of the order under appeal were based. But the entire record of the case was before the Appellate Authority. There is nothing to suggest that all the materials were not present to the mind of the Appellate Authority except which were mentioned in detail. It is well settled that in a case like ihis. it must be held that the Appellate Authority has affirmed the order under appeal having regard to all the facts and circumstances mentioned in the order under appeal.
19. In a similar case under the Income-tax Reference, the Supreme Court observed in the case of Hooghly Trust Pvt. Ltd. v. Commr. of Income-tax, West Bengal and Andaman & Nicobar Islands 73 ITR 685 at 690 : (AIR 1969 SC 946 at p. 950) :
“The Tribunal does not appear to have discussed the entire evidence on which the findings were based but the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and his findings as also ihe entire record were before it and there is nothing to suggest that all the material facts were not present to its mind except that they are not mentioned in detail.”
20. In my opinion, this writ petition is without merit and should be dismissed.
21. The petitioner’s licence has already expired. The petitioner cannot carry on its business without obtaining a fresh licence. The petitioner has apparently been carrying on its business by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court on 25-1-1984. The interim order is vacated. The rule is discharged.
22. The writ petition as well as the application for vacating the interim order are both disposed of finally as above.
23. There will be no order as to costs.
24. Oral prayer made on behalf of the petitioner for slay of operation of this order is refused.