PETITIONER:
BRIJ BHUSHAN AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF DELHI.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
26/05/1950
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
BENCH:
FAZAL ALI, SAIYID
KANIA, HIRALAL J. (CJ)
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI
MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND
DAS, SUDHI RANJAN
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
CITATION:
1950 AIR 129 1950 SCR 605
CITATOR INFO :
R 1951 SC 270 (4)
RF 1952 SC 329 (3,4)
RF 1957 SC 620 (3,5,7)
RF 1958 SC 578 (129,151)
F 1959 SC 395 (13,40)
R 1960 SC 633 (9)
RF 1962 SC 305 (25)
R 1962 SC 955 (21)
MV 1966 SC 740 (48)
RF 1967 SC1643 (227)
RF 1971 SC2486 (8,13,14)
E 1973 SC 106 (16)
RF 1986 SC 515 (22,24,33,97)
RF 1989 SC 190 (11)
ACT:
Constitution of India, Art. 19, cls. (1) (a) and
(2)--Fundamental right of freedom of speech and
expression--Law imposing pre-censorship on newspapers for
securing public safety and preventing public
disorder--Validity--Matter disturbing public safety or
causing public disorder, whether "undermines the security
of, or tends to over* throw, the State"--Scope of Art. 19,
cl. (2)--East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, sec. 7 (1)
(c)--Validity.
HEADNOTE:
Section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act,
1949, as extended to the Province of Delhi provided that
"the Provincial Government or any authority authorised by it
in this behalf, if satisfied that such action is necessary
for preventing or combating any activity prejudicial to the
public safety or the maintenance of public order may, by
order in writing addressed to a a printer, publisher or
editor require that any matter relating to a
606
particular subject or class of subjects shall before publi-
cation be submitted for scrutiny."
Held per KANIA C. J., PATANJALI SASTRI, MEHR CHAND
MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS JJ.--(FAZL ALI J. dissenting)
that inasmuch as s. 7 (1) (c) authorised the imposition of
restrictions on the fundamental right of freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed by art. 19 (1.) (a) of the Consti-
tution for the purpose of preventing activities prejudicial
to public safety and maintenance of public order, it was not
a law relating to "a matter which undermines the security of
or tends to overthrow, the State" within the meaning of the
saving provisions contained in cl. (9.) of art. 19 and was
therefore unconstitutional and void.
Romesh Thappar v. The State ([1950] S.C.R. 594) followed.
Per FAZL ALI J.-- The expression "public safety" has, as
a result of a long course of legislative practice acquired a
well-recognised meaning and may be taken to denote safety or
security of the State; and, though the expression "public
order" is wide enough to cover small disturbances of the
peace which do not jeopardise the security of the State yet,
prominence given in the Act to public safety, the fact that
the Act is a piece of special legislation providing for
special measures and the aim and scope of the Act in gener-
al, show that preservation of public safety is the dominant
purpose of the Act, and "public order" may well be para-
phrased in the context as "public tranquillity". Public
disorders which disturb the public tranquillity do undermine
the security of the State and as s. 7 (1) (c) of the im-
pugned Act is aimed at preventing such disorders it is
difficult to hold that it falls outside the ambit of art. 19
(2) of the Constitution.
Held by the Full Court.--The imposition of pre-censor-
ship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the
press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of
speech and expression declared by art. 19 (1)(a). Black-
stone's Commentaries referred to.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. XXIX of 1950.
Application under article 32 of the Constitution of
India for a writ of certiorari and prohibition. The facts
are stated in the judgment.
N.C. Chatterjee (B. Banerji, with him) for the petition-
er.
M.C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, (S. M. Sikri,
with him) for the respondent.
1950. May 26. The judgment of Kania C.J., Patanjali
Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea and Das JJ. was deliv-
ered by Patanjali Sastri J.
Fazl Ali J. delivered a separate dissenting judgment,
607
PATANJALI SASTRI J.–This is an application under arti-
cle 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of writs of
certiorari and prohibition to the respondent, the Chief
Commissioner of Delhi, with a view to examine the legality
of and quash the order made by him in regard to an English
weekly of Delhi called the Organizer of which the first
applicant is the printer and publisher, and the second is
the editor. On 2nd March, 1950, the respondent, in exercise
of powers conferred on him by section 7 (1) (c) of the East
Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, which has been extended to
the Delhi Province and is hereinafter referred to as the
impugned Act, issued the following order:
“Whereas the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, is satisfied
that Organizer, an English weekly of Delhi, has been pub-
lishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat to
public law and order and that action as is hereinafter
mentioned is necessary for the purpose of preventing or
combating activities prejudicial to the public safety or the
maintenance of public order.
Now there more in exercise of the powers conferred by
section 7 (1)(c) of the East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949,
as extended to the Delhi Province, I, Shankar Prasad, Chief
Commissioner, Delhi, do by this order require you Shri Brij
Bhushan, Printer and Publisher and Shri K.R. Halkani, Editor
of the aforesaid paper to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate,
before publication, till further orders, all communal matter
and news and views about Pakistan including photographs and
cartoons other than those derived from official sources or
supplied by the news agencies, viz., Press Trust of India,
United Press of India and United Press of America to the
Provincial Press Officer, or in his absence, to Superintend-
ent of Press Branch at his office at 5, Alipur Road, Civil
Lines, Delhi, between the hours 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. on work-
ing days.”
The only point argued before us relates to the consti-
tutional validity of section 7 (1) (c) of the impugned Act
which, as appears from its preamble, was passed “to provide
special measures to ensure public safety
608
and maintenance of public order.” Section 7 (1) (c) under
which the aforesaid order purports to have been made reads
(so far as material here) as follows :–
“The Provincial Government or any authority authorised
by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is neces-
sary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity
prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of
public order may, by order in writing addressed to a print-
er, publisher or editor require that any matter relating to
a particular subject or class of subjects shall before
publication be submitted for scrutiny.”
The petitioners claim that this provision infringes the
fundamental right to the freedom of speech and expression
conferred upon them by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitu-
tion inasmuch as it authorises the imposition of a restric-
tion on the publication of the journal which is not justi-
fied under clause (2) of that article.
There can be little doubt that the imposition of precen-
sorship on a journal is a restriction on the liberty of the
press which is an essential part of the right to freedom of
speech and expression declared by article 19 (1)(a). As
pointed out by Blackstone in his Commentaries “the liberty
of the press consists in laying no previous restraint upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal
matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public; to
forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press(1). The
only question therefore is whether section 7 (1)(c) which
authorises the imposition-of such a restriction falls within
the reservation of clause (2) of article 19.
As this question turns on considerations which are
essentially the same as those on which our decision in
Petition No. XVI of 1950(2) was based, our judgment in that
case concludes the present case also. Accordingly, for the
reasons indicated in that judgment, we allow this petition
and hereby quash the impugned order of the Chief Commission-
er, Delhi, dated the 2nd March, 1950.
(1) Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. IV, pp. 151, 152.
(2) Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, supra p. 594.
609
FAZL ALI J.–The question raised in this case relates to
the validity of ‘section 7 (1) (c) of the East Punjab Public
Safety Act, 1949 (as extended to the Province of Delhi),
which runs as follows :-
“The Provincial Government or any authority authorised
by it in this behalf if satisfied that such action is neces-
sary for the purpose of preventing or combating any activity
prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of
public order, may, by order in writing addressed to a print-
er, publisher or editor–
* * * *
(c) require that any matter relating to a particular
subject or class of subjects shall before publication be
submitted for scrutiny;”
It should be noted that the provisions of sub-clause (c)
arc not in general terms but are confined to a “particular
subject or class of subjects,” and that having regard to the
context in which these words are used, they must be connect-
ed with “public safety or the maintenance of public order.”
The petitioners, on whose behalf this provision is
assailed, are respectively the printer (and publisher) and
editor of an English weekly of Delhi called Organizer, and
they pray for the issue of writs of certiorari and prohibi-
tion to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, with a view’ ‘to
examine and review the legality” of and “restrain the
operation” of and “quash” the order made by him on the 2nd
March, 1950, under the impugned section, directing them
“to submit for scrutiny, in duplicate, before publication,
till further orders, all communal matter and news and views
about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than
those derived from official sources or supplied by the news
agencies…” The order in question recites among other
things that the Chief Commissioner is satisfied that the
Organizer has been publishing highly objectionable matter
constituting a threat to public law and order and that
action to which reference has been made is necessary for the
purpose of preventing or combating activities
610
prejudicial to the public safety or the maintenance of
public order. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners
that notwithstanding these recitals the order complained
against is liable to be quashed, because it amounts to an
infringement of the right of freedom of speech and expres-
sion guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution.
Articles 19 (1) (a) and (2), which are to be read together,
run as follows :-
19, (1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
* * * *
(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect
the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates
to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,
libel, slander, defamation, contempt of Court or any matter
which offends against decency or morality or which under-
mines the security of, or tends to overthrow, the State.”
It is contended that section 7 (1)(c) of the Act, under
which the impugned order has been made, cannot be saved by
clause (2) of article 19 of the Constitution, because it
does not relate to any matter which undermines the security
of, or tends to overthrow, the State. Thus the main ground
of attack is that the impugned law is an infringement of a
fundamental right and is not saved by the so-called saving
clause to which reference has been made.
There can be no doubt that to impose pre-censorship on a
journal, such as has been ordered by the Chief Commissioner
in this case, is a restriction on the liberty of the press
which is included in the right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitu-
tion, and the only question which we have therefore to
decide is whether clause (2) of article 19 stands in the
way of the petitioners.
The East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949, of which sec-
tion 7 is a part, was passed by the Provincial Legislature
in exercise of the power conferred upon it by section 100 of
the Government of India Act, 1935, is
611
read with Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to that
Act, which includes among other matters “public order.”
This expression in the general sense may be construed to
have reference to the maintenance of what is generally known
as law and order in the Province, and this is confirmed by
the words which follow it in Entry 1 of List II and which
have been put within brackets, viz., “but not including the
use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed
forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.” It is clear
that anything which affects public tranquillity within the
State or the Province will also affect public order and the
State Legislature is therefore competent to frame laws on
matters relating to public tranquillity and public order.
It was not disputed that under the Government of India Act,
1935 (under, which the impugned Act was passed) it was the
responsibility of each Province to deal with all internal
disorders whatever their magnitude may be and to preserve
public tranquillity and order within the Province.
At this stage, it will be convenient to consider the
meaning of another expression “public safety” which is used
throughout the impugned Act and which is also chosen by its
framers for its title. This expression, though it has been
variously used in different contexts (see the Indian Penal
Code, Ch. XIV), has now acquired a well-recognized meaning
in relation to an Act like the impugned Act, as a result of
a long course of legislative practice, and may be taken to
denote safety or security of the State. In this sense, it
was used in the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act,
1914, as well as the Defence of India Act. and this is how
it was judicially interpreted in Rex v. Governor of Wormwood
Scrubbs Prison(1). The headnote of this case runs as follows
“By section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation)
Act, 1914, power was given to His Majesty in Council ‘during
the continuance of the present war to issue regula-
tions …… for securing the public safety and the de-
fence of the realm’ :–
(1) [1920] 2 K.B. 305.
612
Held, that the regulations thereby authorized were not
limited to regulations for the protection of the country
against foreign enemies, but included regulations designed
for the prevention of internal disorder and rebellion ”
Thus ‘public order’ and ‘public safety’ are allied
matters, but, in order to appreciate how they stand in
relation to each other, it seems best to direct our atten-
tion to the opposite concepts which we may, for convenience
of reference, respectively label as ‘public disorder’ and
‘public unsafety’. If ‘public safety’ is, as we have seen,
equivalent to ‘security of the State’, what I have designat-
ed as public unsafety may be regarded as equivalent to
‘insecurity of the State’. When we approach the matter in
this way, we find that while ‘public disorder’ iS wide
enough to cover a small riot or an affray and other cases
where peace is disturbed by, or affects, a small group of
persons, ‘public unsafety’ (or insecurity of the State),
will usually be connected with serious internal disorders
and such disturbances of public tranquillity as jeopardize
the security of the State.
In order to understand the scope of the Act, it will be
necessary to note that in the Act “maintenance of public
order” always occurs in juxtaposition with “public safety”,
and the Act itself is called “The East Punjab Public Safety
Act.” The prominence thus given to ‘public safety’ strongly
suggests that the Act was intended to deal with serious
cases of public disorder which affect public safety or the
security of the State, or cases in which, owing to some kind
of emergency or a grave situation having arisen, even public
disorders of comparatively small dimensions may have far-
reaching effects on the security of the State. It is to be
noted that the Act purports to provide “special measures to
ensure public safety and maintenance of public order.” The
words “special measures” are rather important, because they
show that the Act was not intended for ordinary cases or
ordinary situations. The ordinary cases are provided for by
the Penal Code and other existing laws, and
613
with these the Act which purports to be of a temporary Act
is not apparently concerned. It is concerned with special
measures which would presumably be required for special
cases or special situations. Once this important fact is
grasped and the Act is viewed in the proper perspective,
much of the confusion which has been created in the course
of the arguments will disappear. The line of argument
advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that since the Act
has been passed in exercise of the power granted by the
expression “public order,” used in the Government of India
Act, which is a general term of wide import, and since it
purports to provide for the maintenance of public order,
its provisions are intended or are liable to be used for all
cases of breaches of public order, be they small or insig-
nificant breaches or those of a grave or serious nature.
This is, in my opinion, approaching the case from a wrong
angle. The Act is a piece of special legislation providing
for special measures and the central idea dominating it is
public safety and maintenance of public order in a situation
requiring special measures.
It was argued that “public safety” and “maintenance of
public order” are used in the Act disjunctively and they are
separated by the word “or” and not “and,” and therefore we
cannot rule out the possibility of the Act providing for
ordinary as well as serious cases of disturbance of public
order and tranquillity. This, as I have already indicated,
is a somewhat narrow and technical approach to the question.
In construing the Act, we must try to get at its aim and
purpose, and before the Act is declared to be invalid, we
must see whether it is capable of being so construed as to
bear a reasonable meaning consistent with its validity. We
therefore cannot ignore the fact that preservation of public
safety is the dominant purpose of the Act and that it is a
special Act providing for special measures and therefore it
should not be confused with an Act which is applicable to
ordinary situations and to any and every trivial case of
breach of public order,
614
In my opinion, the word “or” is used here not so much to
separate two wholly different concepts as to show that they
are closely allied concepts and can be used almost inter-
changeably in the context. I think that “public order” may
well be paraphrased in the context as public tranquillity
and the words “public safety” and “public order” may be read
as equivalent to “security of the State” and “public tran-
quillity.”
I will now advert once more to clause (2) of article 19
and state what I consider to be the reason for inserting in
it the words “matter which undermines the security of, or
tends to overthrow, the State.” It is well recognized in
all systems of law that the right to freedom of speech and
expression or freedom of the press means that any person may
write or say what he pleases so long as he does not infringe
the law relating to libel or slander or to blasphemous,
obscene or seditious words or writings: (see Halsbury’s Laws
of England, 2nd Edition, Vol. II, page 391). This is prac-
tically what has been said in clause (2) of article 19, with
this difference only that instead of using the words “law
relating to sedition,” the framers of the Constitution have
used the words mentioned above. It is interesting to note
that sedition was mentioned in the original draft of the
Constitution, but subsequently that word was dropped and the
words which I have quoted were inserted. I think it is not
difficult to discover the reason for this change and I shall
briefly state in my own words what I consider it to be.
The latest pronouncement by the highest Indian tribunal
as to the law of sedition is to be found in Niharendu Dutt
Majumdar v. The King(1) which has been quoted again and
again and in which Gwyer C.J. laid down that public disor-
der, or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public
disorder, is the gist of the offence of sedition and “the
acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder
or
(1) [1942] F.C.R. 38.
615
must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that is their
intention or tendency.” For this view, the learned Chief
Justice relied on certain observations of Fitzgerald J. in
R.v. Sullivan (1), and he also added that he was content to
adopt “the words of that learned Judge which are to be
found in every book dealing with this branch of the criminal
law.” There is no doubt that what Gwyer C.J. has stated in
that case represents the view of a number of Judges and
authors and was also the view of Sir James Stephen in regard
to whom Cave J. in his charge to the jury in a case relating
to the law of sedition JR. v. Burns(2) said :–
“The law upon the question of what is seditious and what
is not is to be found stated very clearly in a book by
Stephen J. who has undoubtedly a greater knowledge of crimi-
nal law than any other Judge who sits upon the Bench, and
what he has said upon the subject of sedition was submitted
to the other Judges, who sometime back were engaged with him
in drafting a criminal code, and upon their report the
Commissioners say that his statement of law appears to them
to be stated accurately as it exists at present.”
The decision of Gwyer C.J. held the field for several
years until the Privy Council, dealing with a case under the
Defence of India Rules, expressed the view in King Emper-
or v. Sadhashiv Narayan Bhalerao(3) that the test laid
down by the learned Chief Justice was not applicable in
India where the offence under section 124A of the Indian
Penal Code should be construed with reference to the words
used in that section. They also added :–
“The word ‘sedition’ does not occur either in section
124A or in the Rule; it is only found as a marginal note to
section 124A, and is not an operative part of the section,
but merely provides the name by which the crime defined in
the section will be known.
(1) [1868] 11 Cox c.c. 44. (2) [1886] 16 cox 855. (8) 74
I.A.
616
There can be no justification for restricting the contents
of the section by the marginal note. In England there is no
statutory definition of sedition; its meaning and content
have been laid down in many decisions, some of which are
referred to by the Chief Justice, but these decisions are
not relevant when you have a statutory definition of that
which is termed sedition as we have in the present case.
Their Lordships are unable to find anything in the
language of either section 124A or the Rule which could
suggest that ‘the acts or words complained of must either
incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable
men that this is their intention or tendency.”
The framers of the Constitution must have therefore
found themselves face to face with the dilemma as to whether
the word “sedition” should be used in article 19 (2) and if
it was to be used in what sense it was to be used. On the
one hand, they must have had before their mind the very
widely accepted view supported by numerous authorities that
sedition was essentially an offence against public tranquil-
lity and was connected in some way or other with public
disorder; and, on the other hand, there was the pronounce-
ment of the Judicial Committee that sedition as defined in
the Indian Penal Code did not necessarily imply any inten-
tion or tendency to incite disorder. In these circumstances,
it is not surprising that they decided not to use the word
“sedition” in clause (2) but used the more general words
which cover sedition and everything else which makes sedi-
tion such a serious offence. That sedition does undermine
the security of the State is a matter which cannot admit of
much doubt. That it undermines the security of the State
usually through the medium of public disorder is also a
matter on which eminent Judges and jurists are agreed.
Therefore it is difficult to hold that public disorder or
disturbance of public tranquillity are not matters which
undermine the security of the State.
617
It will not be out of place to quote here the following
passage from Stephen’s Criminal Law of England (Vol. II, pp.
242 and 243) :–
“It often happens, however, that the public peace is
disturbed by offences which without tending to the subver-
sion of the existing political constitution practically
subvert the authority of the Government over a greater or
less local area for a longer or shorter time. The Bristol
riots in 1832 and the Gordon riots in 1780 are instances
of this kind. No definite line can be drawn between insur-
rections of this sort, ordinary riots, and unlawful assem-
blies. The difference between a meeting stormy enough to
cause well-founded fear of a breach of the peace, and a
civil war the result of which may determine the course of a
nation’s history for centuries, is a difference of degree.
Unlawful assemblies, riots, insurrections, rebellions,
levying of war, are offences which run into each other, and
are not capable of being marked off by perfectly definite
boundaries, All of them have in common one feature, namely,
that the normal tranquillity of a civilised society is in
each of the cases mentioned disturbed either by actual force
or at least by the show and threat of it.
Another class of offences against public tranquillity
are those in which no actual force is either employed or
displayed, but in which steps are taken tending to cause it.
These are the formation of secret societies, seditious
conspiracies, libels or words spoken.
Under these two heads all offences against the internal
public tranquillity of the State may be arranged.”
This passage brings out two matters with remarkable
clarity. It shows firstly that sedition is essentially an
offence against public tranquillity and secondly that
broadly speaking there are two classes of offences against
public tranquillity: (a) those accompanied by violence
including disorders which
618
affect tranquillity of a considerable number of persons or
an extensive local area, and (b) those not accompanied by
violence but tending to cause it, such as seditious utter-
ances, seditious conspiracies, etc. Both these classes of
offences are such as will undermine the security of the
State or tend to overthrow it if left unchecked, and, as I
have tried to point out, there is a good deal of authorita-
tive opinion in favour of the view that the gravity ascribed
to sedition is due to the fact that it tends to seriously
affect the tranquillity and security of the State. In
principle, then, it would not have been logical to refer to
sedition in clause (2) of article 19 and omit matters which
are no less grave and which have equal potentiality for
undermining the security of the State. It appears that the
framers of the Constitution preferred to adopt the logical
course and have used the more general and basic words which
are apt to cover sedition as well as other matters which are
as detrimental to the security of the State as sedition.
If the Act is to be viewed as I have suggested, it is
difficult to hold that section 7 (1) (c) falls outside the
ambit of article 19 (2). That clause clearly states that
nothing in clause (1) (a) shall affect the operation of any
existing law relating to any matter which undermines the
security of, or tends to overthrow, the State. I have tried
to show that public disorders and disturbance of public
tranquillity do undermine the security of the State and
if the Act is a law aimed at preventing such disorders, it
fulfils the requirement of the Constitution. It is needless
to add that the word “State” has been defined in article 12
of the Constitution to include “the Government and Parlia-
ment of India and the Government and Legislature of each of
the States and all local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India.”
I find that section 20 of the impugned Act provides that
the Provincial Government may by notification
619
declare that the whole or any part of the Province as may be
specified in the notification is a dangerously disturbed
area. This provision has some bearing on the aim and object
of the Act, and we cannot overlook it when considering its
scope. It may be incidentally mentioned that we have been
informed that, under this section, Delhi Province has been
notified to be a “dangerously disturbed area.”
It must be recognized that freedom of speech and expres-
sion is one of the most valuable rights guaranteed to a
citizen by the Constitution and should be jealously guard-
ed by the Courts. It must also be recognised that free
political discussion is essential for the proper functioning
of a democratic government, and the tendency of modern
jurists is to deprecate censorship though they all agree
that “liberty of the press” is not to be confused with its
“licentiousness.” But the Constitution itself has pre-
scribed certain limits for the exercise of the freedom of
speech and expression and this Court is only called upon to
see whether a particular case comes within those limits. In
my opinion, the law which is impugned is fully saved by
article 19 (2) and if it cannot be successfully assailed it
is not possible to grant the remedy which the petitioners
are seeking here.
As has been stated already, the order which is impugned
in this case recites that the weekly Organizer has been
publishing highly objectionable matter constituting a threat
to public law and order” and that the action which it is
proposed to take against the petitioners “is necessary for
the purpose of preventing or combating activities prejudi-
cial to public safety or the maintenance of public order.”
These facts are supported by an affidavit sworn by the Home
Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, who also states among
other things that the order in question was passed by the
Chief Commissioner in consultation with the Central Press
Advisory Committee, which is an independent body elected by
the All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference and is composed
of
620
representatives of some of the leading papers such as The
Hindustan Times, Statesman, etc. In my opinion, there can
be no doubt that the Chief Commissioner has purported to act
in this case within the sphere within which he is permitted
to act under the law, and it is beyond the power of this
Court to grant the reliefs claimed by the petitioners.
In these circumstances, I would dismiss the petitioners’
application.
Petition allowed.
Agent for the petitioners: Ganpat Rai.
Agent for the respondent: P.A. Mehta.
621
