JUDGMENT
S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J.
1. Heard Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Sr. Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.D. Agrawal, learned GP II for the respondents and with their consent both the review applications are being disposed of by this common order at this stage itself.
2. Though in both these applications a common prayer has been made to review the judgment dated 12.3.96 passed in Cr. WJC Nos. 90 of 1989 (R) 91 of 1989 (R), the petitioners are different whereas in Review application No. 1/96 (R) petitioner is Brij Kishore Jhawar, in Review application No. 2/96 (R) Om Prakesh Kapila is the petitioner. They have prayed for reviewing the judgment and order dt. 12.3.96 Reported in (1997) 1 BLJR 433 passed in aforesaid writ applications and to restore the same on Board and, therefore, allowing the said review applications by quashing the proceeding in Special Case No. 30/89 pending before the Special Judge (Vigilance) Ranchi arising out of Patna Vigilance P.S. Case No. 5/89 under Section 409, 420, 471, 120-B and 221 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corporation Act and Sections 39 and 39-A of the Indian Electricity Act. Further prayer has been made to stay all further proceedings in the said criminal case and also to restore the interim order dated 4.8.89 passed in the aforesaid writ application.
3. By aforesaid two criminal writ applications, the petitioners moved this Court for quashing the entire proceeding as well as the investigation and also the order issuing warrant of arrest. By order dated 4.4.89 the said writ applications was admitted for hearing and interim protection was granted. Subsequently the matter was heard on merit and by judgment dated 12.3.96 the both the writ applications were dismissed.
4. As the Stamp Reporter has pointed out the question of maintainability of the review applications, the counsel for the parties have addressed me at length both on the question of maintainability as well as on the merits of the case.
5. Mr. Subramanium has contended that the objection raised by the Stamp Reporter is of no consequence inasmuch as when the High Court has exercised its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in relation to a criminal case, review applications are maintainable. According to him, the petitioners did not move this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as such, when the Court has exercised its power under plenary jurisdiction, it has ample jurisdiction to review an order/judgment even passed in a criminal case. In support of the contentions, learned Counsel has relied on the following decisions: (i) .
6. On the merits of the review applications, Mr. Subramanium has submitted that when the matter was heard by me and judgment was delivered on 12.3.96, neither the State nor the petitioners could produce before the Court a vital document which goes to the root of the case. According to him, a high power committed was constituted which gave his report on 18.1.96 and 19.1.96 with a clear finding that there was no connivance by the officers/staffs of the Board for improper functioning of the meter and due to wrong selection of proper fitting responsibility could not be fixed on any officer or staff. According to Mr. Subramanium if these facts would have been brought to the notice of this Court, then the Court would have certainly quashed the criminal proceeding against the petitioners merely on the basis of this report. In support of its contention, the said report of the High Power Committee has been annexed as Annexure-1 to both the applications.
7. Mr. P.D. Agrawal, on the other hand, has strongly contended that it is well settled that when the High Court exercises its powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution in relation to a criminal proceeding, it has to be held that exercising of that power was similar to the power as envisaged under Section 482 Cr.PC According to him, it can not b disputed that a criminal court cannot review its judgment or order once it its signed. Only because, instead of invoking the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.PC the petitioners had filled writ applications for quashing the criminal proceeding, it cannot be said that the High Court exercised its plenary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. He submits that if the High Court entertains such review applications against the judgment and order passed in a criminal case, anomalous situation will arise and the High Court will be burdened with such frivolous applications. To substantiate his stand, Mr. Agrawal has referred to the following decisions: (i) .
8. As arguments on the merits of the review applications have been advanced at length by the learned Counsel for the parties, without going into the question of maintainability of the review applications, the same may be disposed of on the merits.
As indicated above, the petitioners moved this Court in Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 90 and 91 of 1989 (R) with a prayer to quash the entire proceedings as well as the investigation and order issuing warrant of arrest. After, discussing the facts and laws, this Court dismissed the aforesaid writ applications by judgment dated 12.3.1996. See, the decision in (1997) 1 BLJR 433. At the time of hearing of the said writ applications neither of the parties could inform the Court as to the result of the investigation. On dismissal of the writ applications, it appears, that the petitioners moved the Special Judge, Ranchi for grant of pre-arrest bail but without any success. Thereafter, the petitioners moved this Court for anticipatory bail and by order dated 17.4.96, while calling for the case diary, a learned single judge granted interim protection to the petitioners. Subsequently, after receipt of the case diary, when the matter was placed before another single judge of this Court, after elaborate discussion, the learned Single Judge by order dated 14.5.96 dismissed the Cr. Misc. Nos. 1998 and 1999 of (R) by refusing to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners.
9. The argument of Mr. Subramanium is that the report of the High power committee dated 19.1.96 could not be brought to the notice, while the aforesaid writ applications were being heard. He contends that if this report would have been scrutinised by this Court, the writ applications would have been allowed. According to him, in order to do justice, this Court should accept the aforesaid report as subsequent events.
10. In my considered view, the argument of Mr. Subramanium is not sustainable in law. Even assuming that High Court can exercise power of review which inherits in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave palpable error committed by it but I am of the opinion that there are certain limitation in exercising such power.
11. In the instant case, before the writ court argument was advanced mainly on the ground that the FIR does not constitute an offence against the petitioners and, as such, continuation of criminal proceeding against them was an abuse of the process of the Court. In support of this contention my attention was drawn towards several provisions of the Indian Penal Code as well as the Indian Electricity Act. At that juncture no whisper was made regarding the report of the High Power Committee.
12. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma and Ors. , even though who relevant documents which were part of the records, were not considered by the High Court at the time of issue of a writ under Article 226, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have categorically held that the same cannot be a ground for review especially when these two documents were not even relied upon by the parties before the court in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In view of this well established principle, in my view, the report, which was admittedly not a part of the writ applications, cannot be looked into for entertaining the review applications.
13. The matter can be viewed from another angle. It is well settled that while exercising its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing of a FIR, complaint or criminal proceeding, the High Court will not look into any other document which were not annexed either in the FIR or in the petition of complaint. Thus, even assuming that the said report would have been there before me, I could not have, as a matter of law, considered the said report while hearing the said writ applications. Moreover, the learned Single Judge, while rejecting the prayer for anticipatory bail by order dated 14.5.96, considered the said report and has held that :
For and on behalf of the petitioners, much stress has been laid on the report of the sub-committee of the B.S.E.B. which was constituted for the purpose of considering the extent of liability and responsibility of the officials of the Board towards the crime alleged.
I do not find that report gives any sort of benefit to the petitioners.
15. In the aforesaid premises when this Court even refused to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioners on consideration of the said report, it is futile for Mr. Subramanium to urge that this report should be considered in these review applications,
16. There is no dispute regarding law of limitation for filing review which is 30 days from the date of the decree order. In the instant case, whereas the judgment in the aforesaid criminal writ applications was delivered on 12.3.96, these review applications were filed on 5.7.96. There is no explanation for such delay. Though Mr. Subramanium has tried to impress that the report of the High Power Committee dated 19.1.96 was not known to the petitioners earlier, but in my view the said ground is also not available for the simple reason that at least when the petitioners moved this Court for anticipatory bail in Cr. Misc. Nos. 1998 and 1999 of 1996(R), this report was known to the petitioners. Their anticipatory bail was refused on 14.5.96 but even then the petitioners did not file the review applications within 30 days from the date of aforesaid.
17. In the case of Shanti Kumar Jain and Ors. v. Anil Kumar Datta, , a learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held that an order/judgment which is appealable or revisable either under the Code of Civil Procedure or under the Constitution, the review application is not maintainable.
18. It may be mentioned here that after the order was reserved in the case, learned Counsel filed a photostate copy of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, SIU(X), New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. Calcutta, JT 1996(6) SC 227, in order to suggest that the Apex Court has affirmed the judgment of the Calcutta High Court quashing the F.I.R. at its thresh hold lodged for an offence under Sections 120-B read with Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code.
I fail to appreciate how this decision has any bearing on the facts and circumstances of the present case. The answer to the argument sought to be advanced by the counsel is already there in paragraph 29 of the said judgment where, inter alia, it has been observed :
In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case was basically – matter of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned companies. Even if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is compoundable offence and compromise decree passed in the suits instituted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating-”’ In the present case the facts are entirely different.
19. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the petitioners have failed to make out any ground for reviewing the judgment dated 12.3.96 passed in Cr. W.J.C. Nos. 90 and 91 of 1989(R).
20. In the result, I find no merit in these review applications which are, accordingly, dismissed.