ORDER
M.S.A. Siddiqui, J.
1. By this petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the petitioner seeks quashing of the proceedings emanating from the FIR No. 250/1990 under Sections 409/420/468/471 IPC registered at the Police Station Malviya Nagar and pending on the file of Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, on the ground that more than seven years have elapsed since the institution of the case
and no charge has yet been framed against him, thus infringing his right to speedy trial, flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution.
2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that in the year of 1989, the petitioner was employed as JE(E) in the office of the Dy. Director (Horticulture Division No. 1), DDA Seikh Saria, Delhi. Nine cheques as per details given below issued by the DDA in favour of D.E.S.U., were handed over to the petitioner for being deposited in the office of the D.E.S.U.
“S.No. Cheque No. Date of Amount issue
1. 506689 23.10.89 Rs. 12672.00
2. 469520 28.10.89 Rs. 46852.74
3. 469519 28.10.89 Rs. 39171.00
4. 469542 28.11.89 Rs. 11926.42
5. 009813 08.12.89 Rs. 24962.81
6. 009814 08.12.89 Rs. 14757.01
7. 009831 29.12.89 Rs. 37488.51
8. 009862 12.01.90 Rs. 33711.91
9. 009880 25.01.90 Rs. 13980.00
————
Rs.235522.40″
3. As per the prosecution case, the petitioner, having tampered with the aforesaid cheques, deposited them in the account of M/s. Din Eur Saj Uppal opened in the Canara Bank, Vivek Vihar and the State Bank of India, Krishna Nagar, New Delhi. Thereafter, the petitioner got these cheques encashed and misappropriated the total sum of Rs. 2,35, 522.40. On 15.6.1990, the Dy. Director (Horticulture Division No. 1), DDA lodged the FIR at the Police Station Malviya Nagar regarding the alleged offences. Investigation pursuant to the said FIR culminated into submission of a charge-sheet under Sections 409/420/468/471 IPC against the petitioner. On 26.6.1992, the Metropolitan Magistrate took congnizance of the offences and issued process against the petitioner. On 19.8.1992, the petitioner appeared before the
trial court, and thereafter, the case underwent several adjournment for supplying copies of the challan papers to the petitioner. On 26.11.1992, deficient copies of the challan papers were supplied to the petitioner and the case was posted for consideration on charges on 21.1.1993. On 21.1.1993, the learned Magistrate discovered that C.F.S.L. report was not filed along with the charge-sheet and, he therefore, summoned the Investigating Officer for 15.3.1993. Thereafter, repeated adjournments were granted for filing the C.F.S.L. report. The order-sheet dated 9.2.1995 reveals that on that day C.F.S.L. report was filed and a copy thereof was also supplied to the petitioner and the case was posted for 24.3.1995. On 24.3.1995 and 15.4.1995, no progress was made in the case. On 7.6.1995, the learned Magistrate discovered that the original C.F.S.L. report and some original documents were not on the record and he, therefore, summoned the Investigating Officer for 8.8.1995. On 8.8.1995, the Investigating Officer did not appear before the Court and the case was adjourned for 11.9.1995. On 11.9.1995, the Investigating Officer remained absent and the notice was issued to the Director C.F.S.L. for 31.10.1995. On 31.10.1995, the Investigating Officer appeared before the trial court and made a statement to the effect that original cheques were lying with the C.F.S.L. and he was, therefore, directed to collect the original documents from the office of the C.F.S.L. and produce them before the Court on 12.12.1995. On 12.12.1995, the Investigating Officer did not appear before the Court and a bailable warrant of Rs. 5000/- was issued against him for producing the original documents on 1.2.1996. Thereafter, repeated adjournments were granted till 20.7.1998 for producing the original documents but the same could not be produced. However, on 20.7.1998, the learned Magistrate heard arguments on charges and the case was posted for orders on 25.8.1998. From 25.8.1998 to 13. 5. 1999, several dates were fixed in the case for passing
orders on the charges. Surprisingly, on 13.5.1999, instead of passing orders on the charges, the learned Magistrate adjourned the case to 17.7.1999 for re-hearing arguments on charges. The status report of the case shows that on 17.7.1999. the case was adjourned to 15.9.1999 for rehearing arguments on charges. On 15.9.1999, the case was again adjourned to 1.11.1999 for filing the original C.F.S.L. report. Thus, the order-sheets recorded in the case clearly show that the prosecuting agency did not express an anxiety to have the case disposed of as expeditiously as possible. On the contrary, the prosecuting agency had adopted a lethargic attitude towards the case resulting in inordinate delay in the trial.
4. It is significant to mention that the legal position adumbrated by the S.C. in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Naik that the right to
speedy trial flows from Article 21 of the Constitution and encompasses all the stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial remains unaltered. In Kartar Singh Vs. State of
Punjab JT 1994 (2) SC 423, it was observed that:
“The right to a speedy trial is not only an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to defend
himself but also there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial. This right is actuated in the recent past and the Courts have laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming before the Courts for quashing of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment or charge.”
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the continuation of the trial for nearly seven years and more is nothing but an abuse of the process of law and further the aforesaid delay in commencing the trial by itself infringes the right of the petitioner to speedy trial. In Raj Deo
Sharma Vs. State of Bihar, , it was held that in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is who is responsible for the delay. In answering this question the Court has to balance and weigh, the several relevant factors_’balancing test’ or “balancing process” and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. As noticed earlier, a decade and more have elapsed since the alleged offences were committed and the petitioner is constantly under threat and harassment. The accused’s right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution cannot be trampled upon unless it can be shown that the delay in the trial was engineered by him. As demonstrated earlier, although the petitioner’s trial has taken more than seven years, no charge has been framed against him. There is nothing on the record to show or suggest that the petitioner was responsible for the inordinate delay in commencing the trial. On the contrary, the delay in the progress of the trial is entirely and exclusively on account of the default of the prosecution. In this view of the matter, the petitioner may be seriously jeopardised in the conduct of his defense with the passage of time as witnesses for the defense may become unavailable and their memories may fail. It is significant to mention that the petitioner has stated in his affidavit that he has been dismissed from service vide order dated 27.11.1997 and he had also deposited the amount of Rs. 2,35,522.40. These facts have not been controverted by the State.
6. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, I do not consider it just and expedient to give direction to the trial court to expedite the trial and
prolong the uncertainty and agony of the petitioner, already suffered by him for the last over seven years for no fault on his part. In a recent
decision of the Supreme Court in Raj Deo Sharma Vs. The State of Bihar, , while noticing and supplementing the propositions laid down in Raj Deo Sharma’s case ,
it was observed that no trial can be allowed to prolong indefinitely due to the lethargy of the prosecuting agency. Thus, in the instant case, the
right of the petitioner to speedy trial has been infringed and it is a fit case for quashing the proceedings.
7. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and the criminal proceedings emanating from the FIR No. 250/1990 pending on the file of Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi are quashed. The petitioner is discharged. The bail bonds furnished by the petitioner shall stand discharged._