ORDER
Shri.G.A. Brahma Deva
These three appeals are filed by the above appellants with reference to Order in Original No.13/90 dt.2.4.90 passed by the Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Cochin under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968.
2. The Learned Counsel for the appellants have submitted that appeals could not be filed within stipulated time as they were pursuing the remedy before the High Court of Kerala. As thee is not order against these appellants and also appellants are not a party to the proceedings, they filed O.P.No.5459/90 before the High Court of Kerala on 15.6.90. O.P.No.5459/90 was dismissed against which Writ Appeal (W.A.No.1036/94) wad filed and same had been dismissed by confirming order the High Court. On obtaining the certified copy, the appeal was filed in the Office of the Registry of the Tribunal on 14.10.94. It was submitted by them that there was no negligence or latches on the part of the parties. Since they were pursuing the remedy by way of Writ before the High Court and further more the appeal was filed as per the observations made by the High Court and they referred to the relevant portion in the Order (O.P.No.5459/90) which is as under:-
“It should be remembered that Ext.P15 Order is one against which an appeal lies to the Central Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal. On the ground that there is an effective alternate remedy, this Original Petition is not maintainable. On this ground also the Original Petition has necessarily to fail”.
3. To a query from the Bench as regards maintainability of the appeal, as no adjudication order was passed against them nor parties to the proceedings, it was submitted that summons were duly issued to these appellants in connection with the sized goods and in response to that it was claimed by them that goods belonged to them. It was contended on behalf of the appellants since there was a claim of ownership, the adjudicating authority ought to have issued notice and to adjudicate thereof as specified under Section 79 of the Gold Control Act. It was submitted that party being aggrieved, gets a right to file an appeal and further appeal was filed as per the observations of the High Court.
4. It was argued on behalf of the Revenue that these appeals are not maintainable as the appellants were neither parties to the notice or the adjudication order. Para 27 of the Order in Original deals with this issue specifically giving reasons why the appellants were not made parties and the order of the High Court is in explicit agreement with this issue. Assuming but not conceding that an order is appellable, there is a inordinate delay of 1589, 1733 and 1733 days respectively. The remarks of the High Court that an alternative remedy exists is not accompanied by any directions to entertain the appeal despite the time bar. Further there is sufficient delay in filing the appeals even after dismissing the petition before the High Court, which has not been explained properly. It is settled position now that each day’s delay should be accounted for.
5. We have carefully considered the matter. Two issue are to be considered in these appeals.
(i) whether appeal is maintainable.
(ii) If so, whether sufficient cause has been shown to condone the delay.
A right of appeal is not a natural right or an inherent right. Any person aggrieved with an order passed by any authority does not have any natural right to question that decision by way of an appeal, even if that decision may have adverse civil consequences affecting his rights. An appeal cannot be preferred unless the concerned statute has provided for a right to appeal against that decision. (See Ganga Bai Vs. Vijayakumar (A.I.R. 1974 S.C 1126)
Unless a right of appeal is specifically given under a statute such a right cannot be claimed or exercised. If such a right is given under the statute the exercise thereof cannot be denied. Conversely such a right cannot be inferred by implication. (AIR 1977 Kerala 32). A right of appeal being a right to be traced under the statute it can be neither conferred nor taken away on a consideration of the question whether the remedy will or will not be convenient or adequate. (See AIR 1959 Patna 121).
6. Section 81 provides for filing an appeal to the Tribunal.
a) A decision or order passed by Collector of Central Excise or of Customs as an adjudicating authority.
b) An order passed by the Collector (Appeals) under See. 80 A.
c) An order passed by the Administrator, Collector of Central Excise or of Customs or the Appellate Collector of Customs under Sec. 80 as it stood immediately before the appointed day;
d) An order passed by the Administrator, either before or after the appointed day, under Section 81, as it stood immediately before that day.
7. Accordingly any person aggrieved by any decision or order by the Collector or Collector (Appeals) may prefer an appeal against the same. All judicial or quasi-judicial orders would, in their nature, be appealable. Of course this would not necessarily mean that an appeal could, on that score itself, be maintained, since, as already seen, no appeal would lie against such orders unless the statute itself provides for a right of appeal. Thus under Section 81 of the Act no appeal can be filed unless the person filing the appeal is aggrieved by the impugned order. Issue of summons or treating a person as witness in the particular proceedings, that itself will not give a right to such person to file an appeal against an adjudication order being aggrieved. In the present case they were issued summons and they were aware of the fact that their belongings were liable to be confiscated and hence best course open to them was to ask the adjudicating authority to adjudicate the proceedings against them and having failed it is not open to them to question the adjudicating proceedings against others as party to the appeal. We find that petition was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala on several grounds. While dismissing on various grounds it was observed that order is one against an appeal lies to the Tribunal. With respect to this observation was without reference to statutory provisions i.e. Section 81 of the Act and further more the remark of the High Court that an alternative remedy exists is not accompanied by any direction to entertain the appeal despite the time bar, as it was rightly pointed out by the Department Representative. There is also force in the argument advanced on behalf of the Revenue that parties did not come to Tribunal immediately. On passing the order of the High Court and no sufficient cause has been shown for further delay in filing the appeal. In any view of the matter we do not find any valid reason to entertain these appeals at this stage. In view of foregoing conclusion all these three appeals are dismissed as not-maintainable.
(Pronounced on)