High Court Punjab-Haryana High Court

C.W.P No.10377 Of 1999 – vs Presiding Officer on 3 August, 2009

Punjab-Haryana High Court
C.W.P No.10377 Of 1999 – vs Presiding Officer on 3 August, 2009
C.W.P No.10377 of 1999                                      -1-

     IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND
                 HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

                             C.W.P No.10377 of 1999
                             Date of Decision: 03.08.2009

2.        C.W.P. No.10526 of 1999

Field Marshal Manekshaw Auditorium and another          .....Petitioner


                                Versus


Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ambala and another    ....Respondents

Present: Mr. Anil Rathee, Addl. C.G.S.C.,
for the petitioners.

Ms. Deepinder Kaur, Advocate
for Mr. Vikas Singh, Advocate
for respondent No.2.

CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE K. KANNAN

1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment ? Yes

2. To be referred to the Reporters or not ? Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?Yes

-.-

K. KANNAN J.

1. The twin writ petitions challenge the order of the Labour

Court directing reinstatement of the workman and 40% back wages

with continuity of service at the instance of the management in respect

of two different workmen and are being disposed of together.

2. The workmen’s contention was that they had been appointed

as Sweepers on temporary basis in the Manekshaw Auditorium that

was run by the HQ, Western Command, Chandimandir and their

services were terminated due to alleged non-availability of funds on

06.04.1995. The contention on behalf of the management was that the

Auditorium was maintained by Army as a place for recreation for Army
C.W.P No.10377 of 1999 -2-

personnel and it had no commercial activity to be attracted to the

definition of ‘industry’. The contention was, therefore, that there was

no jurisdiction for the Labour Court to determine the case. Learned

counsel appearing for the petitioner-management refers to the terms

and conditions of employment and points out to the fact that all that

was required was to serve 30 days notice for which no reasons were

required to be assigned and the termination had been effected only after

giving such notice. The workmenn are not entitled to complain about

the termination as being opposed to law.

3. The Labour Court found that the management was carrying

on a systematic activity in arranging picture shows, drama, lecture etc.

for entertainment of the Army personnel and the mere fact it was

controlled by the Army Authorities would not take out the activity from

the definition of ‘industry’. The Court also reasoned that absence of

any profit motive would be no ground to declare that the management

was not an industry. Further referring to a decision of the Bombay

High Court in Ramchandra Vithuji Kothare Vs. The Industrial Court,

Nagpur and another 1985 LIC 1786 it held that any condition of

service that had been privately entered into between parties cannot

operate to over-ride the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and

the benefit which the Act provides to persons under Section 25-F. The

award came to be, therefore, passed providing for reinstatement as well

as back wages.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is not able to

advance the case any better in the matter of reasoning than how it was

projected before the Labour Court. The definition of industry is

expansive enough to accommodate any form of systematic activity and
C.W.P No.10377 of 1999 -3-

it will be immaterial that it is run by the Army. In another decision of

the Bombay High Court in Rajendra Singh Institute No.1, Pune Vs.

Maharashtra Labour Union 2003 CLR 725, the issue was whether a

workman employed in an Army Mess could claim to be a workman and

raise an industrial dispute. The Bombay High Court referred to the

decision in The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A.

Rajappa and others etc. etc. 1978 II LLJ 73 and held that any form of

activity that was systematic in character including organization run by

Government would qualify for the definition of industry. If an Army

Mess could be an industry, a recreation centre run by the Army would

require no different treatment.

5. Admittedly, the termination had been made without issuing

notice under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour

Court was correct in stating that any terms and conditions of

employment cannot over-ride the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act

and whittle the benefit that the Act grants to a workman. The mere

offer of a month’s salary as provided in the terms and conditions cannot

substitute what the law entitles to a workman to obtain under Section

25-F. There has been a non-compliance of the statutory mandate of

Section 25-F and for the illegal termination that was effected, the

remedy by reinstatement will not be appropriate, having regard to the

nature of engagement. In my view, a compensation of Rs.1 lac each

for the number of years of service that the workmen had put in and the

length of time that the litigation had taken, would be appropriate

remedy and meet the interest of justice. The amount of Rs.1 lac to each

of the workman shall be paid within 8 weeks from the date of the

award, failing which the respective sums shall carry simple interest @
C.W.P No.10377 of 1999 -4-

7.5% per annum.

6. The awards of the Labour Court are modified and the writ

petitions are disposed of in the above terms.

(K. KANNAN)
JUDGE
August 03 , 2009
Pankaj*