JUDGMENT
G.C. Bharuka, J.
1. These revision petition have been filed under section 23(1) of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (“the Act”, for short) against the order dated October 31, 1996 passed by the Tribunal refusing to interfere with the order of the first appellate authority, dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation.
2. The appeals before the first appellate authority-Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes were filed against the orders of an escaped assessment for the year 1989-90 made under section 12A of the Act as also imposing penalty under section 12-A(1-A) thereof and under section 12A read with section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act. These orders were passed on February 24, 1995 and the same had been served on the assessee on March 1, 1995. Though the limitation for preferring the appeal as provided under section 20 of the Act was 30 days but the same were filed on August 25, 1995. Thus, there was a delay of more than 140 days. For condonation of delay, the petitioner had filed medical certificate dated April 25, 1995 which was to the following effect :
Dr. B. R. Kamath, M.D., (Med), Ganapathi High School Road, D.R.M. (Nucl. Med.), Mangalore-575 001 Consultant Physician Timings : 9-00 a.m. to 12.00 p.m. Phone : 427309 4.30 p.m. to 7.00 p.m. Resi : 23904 Sunday Holiday Dt. 25-4-1995 Certified that Mr. Aravind Thakur is suffering from extensive psoriasis. Not responding to allopathic treatment. He is advised to take recourse to other English medicine. Sd/- Dr. B. R. Kamath, M.D. (Med), D.R.M. (Nucl. Med), Consultant Physician Mangalore - 575 001. 3. Section 20(2) of the Act provides for limitation and its condonation on being shown sufficient cause for the delay. The said section reads thus : "20. Appeals. -......... (2) The appeal shall be preferred within thirty days, - (i) in respect of an order of assessment, from the date on which the notice of assessment was served on the appellant, and (ii) in respect of any other order, from the date on which the order was communicated to the appellant :
Provided that the appellant authority may admit an appeal preferred after the period of thirty days aforesaid, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.”
4. The first appellate authority, on consideration of the placed before it, concluded that the materials brought on record did not constitute the “sufficient cause” since according to him, expect the medical certificate there was nothing to show that because of the ailment mentioned in the certificate all the business activities of the petitioner had been paralysed.
5. The Tribunal, on second appeal by the appellant, by a detailed order has concluded that :
“By going through the medical certificate, nowhere it discloses as to from what date the appellant was under treatment and whether he was unable to move or unable to attend to his day-to-day business activities. The date of the certificate is April 25, 1995. The assessment order was served on him on March 1, 1995. It dose not disclose that during the period from April 1, 1995 to April 25, 1995, the appellant was so seriously ill which prevented him from attending to any of his business activities. Further there are no materials to show that from April 25, 1995 he was under constant medical check-up and unable to move or attending to any business activity. Further there are no materials to show that the appellant was prevented from travailing to Bangalore till August 17, 1995. By this the first appellate authority has rightly observed that he is not convinced that the ill health of the appellant was a condition beyond his control which prevented him from filing the appeals in time.
6. The Tribunal has further held that the material discloses that the delay in filing the appeal was due to negligence and the negligence cannot be a “sufficient cause” to condone the delay.
7. Mr. B. P. Gandhi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Kaji , the appellate authorities including the Tribunal should have taken liberal view in the matter of condonation of delay since taking of any other view and thereby refusing to entertain the appeal on the technical plea of limitation will amount to denial of justice which is not the purpose of establishing of appellate bodies. He also relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Laxmi Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., Lucknow [1997] 105 STC 291 for the said very purpose. On the other hand, Mrs. Sujatha, learned High Court Government Pleader, has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh v. State of Gujarat in support of her contention that unless good cause is shown for condonation of delay even the High Court will be committing error of jurisdiction in showing any such indulgence. She also placed reliance on the Bench decision of the Gauhati High Court in the case of State of Manipur v. All Manipur Regular Post Vacancies Substitute Teachers’ Association AIR 1996 Gauhati 1 wherein the law regarding condonation of delay has been succinctly explained by taking into account the said Supreme Court Judgments.
8. On going through the judgments cited at the Bar, we have no hesitation in accepting the proposition that while considering the issue pertaining to the “sufficient cause” as shown by the litigant for seeking condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, the courts and the Tribunals cannot be hyper technical and it will be more advisable to take liberal view so as to promote the cause of justice instead of defeating the same on insisting for each day’s delay. But, nonetheless, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat there has to be “sufficient cause” which can be made available for exercise of sound discretion. Moreover, on the given facts, it is for the fact finding authority to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and reach its conclusion regarding “sufficient cause” as a finding of fact, acting as is expected of reasonable and prudent person.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the impugned orders. We do not find any error in the inference drawn by the Tribunal on the basis of the materials placed before it. Neither the Tribunal has taken into account any extraneous material nor any relevant material has been ignored in coming to the conclusion. The inference drawn cannot also be accused as being perverse or impermissible. In the said view of the matter, this Court cannot interfere with the finding of the fact arrived at by the Tribunal. This Court’s jurisdiction under section 23 is restricted only to the question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal which, in our opinion, does not arise in the present case.
10. For the said reasons, we do not find any occasion to interfere with the impugned order. The revision petitions are accordingly dismissed.
11. Petition dismissed.