JUDGMENT
P.S. Brahme, J.
1. Hear Shri R. R. Mantri, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri P. M. Shaha, learned senior counsel holding for Shri S. V. Gangapurwala and Shri M. N. Nawandar, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. Perused the Judgments of both the Courts below and also the material produced by the parties.
3. This revision application arises out of the proceedings initiated by the respondent/landlord before Rent Controller, Aurangabad for seeking possession of shop premises admittedly let out to petitioners as tenant under the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to for brevity’s sake as ‘Hyderabad Rent Act’).
4. The respondent had filed an application which was registered as case No. 98/MAG/ROCR/56 on 15th May, 1998 against the petitioner/tenant under the Hyderabad Rent Act for the possession of shop premises on the ground of default in payment of rent and also for requirement of the premises reasonably and bona fide by the respondent for his personal use and occupation. This application was allowed by the Rent Controller by his Judgment and order dated 27-10-2000 directing the petitioner to vacate and hand over the possession of shop premises to the respondent, holding that petitioner committed wilful default in payment of rent and that respondent has established that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the order passed by the Rent Controller preferred rent appeal No. 18/2000 before the District Judge, Aurangabad under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act. However, the appeal was heard and decided by learned 3rd Ad hoc Addl. District Judge, Aurangabad by his Judgment and order dated 23-1- 2004, dismissing the appeal, having confirmed the order passed by the Rent Controller. Hence, the present revision application is filed by the petitioner challenging the orders passed by both the Courts below.
5. Before I consider the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, I must notice the relevant provisions of Law giving rise to several contentions of the learned Advocates. As already mentioned the matter at hand arise under the Hyderabad Rent Control Act. The Act provides for appointment of Rent Controller and under Section 9 of the Act, the Controller is empowered to fix a fair rent for a house let out to a tenant on an application made by the landlord or by the tenant after holding a summary inquiry. Section 15 of the Act provides for those cases where landlord may apply to the Controller for eviction of the tenant. The Rent Controller thus, may pass an order allowing or dismissing an application made by the landlord for eviction of the tenant under Section 15 of the said Act. When eviction of tenant is sought on the ground of default in payment of rent, Section 15(2) of the Act provides :
“Section 15(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied –
(i) that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the house, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable;………………….
Provided that in any case falling under clause (i) if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant’s default to pay or tender rent was not wilful he may, before making an order as aforesaid, give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding 15 days to pay or tender the rent to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender.”
6. Section 15(3), sub-clause (c) of the said Act provides a ground for the landlord to give possession of tenanted premises if the landlord requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. But as per the proviso to Section 15(3)(e) in case of an application under clause (e), the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord.
7. Against the orders passed by the Rent Controller under Section 15 of the said Act, there is an appeal provided under Section 25 of the Act and the said appeal has to be filed within thirty days from the date of the order of the Controller. Sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Act, is reproduced:
“Section 25. Appeal. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, an appeal from an order made by the Controller shall lie within 30 days from the date of such order to the District Judge. In computing the said period of 30 days, the time taken in obtaining a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded.”
The subsequent sub-sections of Section 25 provide briefly for the procedure which is to be followed by the appellate authority. There is also a provision in the Hyderabad Rent Act for the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court over the appellate authority. Section 26 provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other Law for the time being in force, an application for revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order passed on appeal by an appellate authority on the grounds which are mentioned in the said section. Those grounds are analogous to the grounds to be found in Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
8. Shri R. R. Mantri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has raised several contentions in his petition on the basis of which the orders passed by the Courts below have been challenged. One of the contentions raised by him, goes to the very root of the jurisdiction of the learned Addl. District Judge to hear and decide an appeal preferred under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act from an order passed by the Rent Controller. Shri R. R. Mantri, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the District Judge to whom an appeal lies under Section 25 of the Act is persona designata who must hear the appeal himself and who cannot transfer it to any other Judicial Authority though under the Bombay Civil Courts Act an Assistant Judge may hear an appeal which lies to the District Judge under the circumstances, mentioned in Section 17 of the said Act. The Addl. District Judge cannot hear an appeal like the one under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, because, it is the District Judge and the District Judge alone who has been empowered to hear and dispose of that appeal. As regards the merits of the orders passed by the Courts below, the learned counsel submitted that the orders have been passed by the Courts below without any application of mind and also without there being any evidence on record. As regards the grounds of default in payment of rent, both the Courts below have failed to hold that petitioner tenant has committed wilful default and, therefore, by the mandate in the proviso to Section 15(2)(1) of the Hyderabad Rent Act, the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority committed an error in granting decree for eviction. He pointed out that as provided under that proviso if the Controller is satisfied that the tenants default to pay rent was not wilful he may, before making an order as aforesaid, give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding 15 days to pay or tender the rent to the landlord. It is submitted that in such situation there was an irregular and illegal exercise of jurisdiction on the part of the Courts below passing the order of eviction of petitioner tenant. The learned counsel further submitted that no particular was given to petitioner tenant to lead evidence inasmuch as his right to leave evidence has been fortified without any justification for the same and for that purpose at the behest of the respondent the trial Court has fraudulently fabricated the proceeding sheet. It is contended that the Courts below failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them in not framing issue on the point of hardship, which was mandatory requirement under proviso to Clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act. It is contended that before the appellate Court, petitioner has made a grievance that opportunity was not given to the petitioner before the Rent Controller but then the appellate authority did not take into consideration that grievance made by the petitioner and decided the matter without there being proper assessment of evidence. He, therefore, urged that the petition be allowed and the order passed; by the appellate Court be set-aside and the matter be remitted back to the District Judge, Aurangabad who is the only appellate authority under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, to decide the appeal.
9. Mr. P. H. Shaha, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent repelled the submissions of learned counsel for petitioner contending that neither there is jurisdictional error on the part of the appellate authority in deciding the matter, nor the Courts below have committed any error in exercising the jurisdiction while adjudicating the matter in favour of respondent. He pointed out that the appellate authority has provided under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act i.e. “District Judge is not a District Judge persona designata and, therefore, Addl. District Judge who was competent to decide the appeals at par with the District Judge decided the appeal rightly as per the jurisdiction vested in him by the force of Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act. The learned counsel submitted that the conduct of petitioner during the proceeding before the Rent Controller was full of dilating dilatory tacticks and, therefore, the Rent Controller had to reject the request of the petitioner for adjournment and forfeit his right of defence and, therefore, appellate Court has rightly rejected the contention of petitioner that no opportunity was given deliberately by the Rent Controller while conducting the matter. As regards the default in payment of rent, the learned counsel pointed out that petitioner in the written statement has neither disputed the quantum of rent, arrears of rent, nor disputed the arrears of rent claimed even after having appeared; in response to the notice in the Court. Petitioner, on the other hand while admitting the arrears of rent as demanded by respondent, specifically contended that petitioner company being in utter financial crises, the business having almost closed would not make the payment. In such, situation it was for petitioner to show that the default was not wilful. If the tenant has not satisfied the Rent Controller that the default was not wilful, then there was hurdle in the way of Rent Controller to pass decree of eviction on the ground of default and as such the rent controller has committed no error, much less of exercise of Jurisdiction in passing the order. As regards the issue of hardship, the learned counsel submitted that though no specifically but on the basis of reasoning that is given by the trial Court as well as appellate Court in the judgment, it can be construed that the Courts below have taken into consideration the aspect of hardship to the tenant as it is mandated under the proviso to Section 15(3)(e) of the Hyderabad Rent Act. The learned counsel submitted that the orders passed by the Courts below needs no interference. He submitted with emphasis that the scope for interference in revision when both the Courts have given concurrent finding of fact on both the grounds for which eviction was sought by the Landlord, is very limited and restricted. It is only when the orders passed and reasoning given is perverse resulting into grave illegality and irregularity causing miscarriage of justice, the High Court is invested with the power for interference in revision. It is submitted that the powers vested in High Court in revision as provided under Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, are analogous to the powers under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. He therefore, urged that the petition be dismissed.
10. It admits no controversy that the findings of fact cannot be agitated in revision. Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Act which is analogous to Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code, limits the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court only to the grounds mentioned thereunder. It is only error of jurisdiction of material defects of procedural or breach of any provisions of Law which warrants the exercise of revisionary powers. It is clear, therefore, it is not open to the High Court to enter into the merits of the case and come to it’s own decision. What the Court has to see is whether the Court below exercised jurisdiction which has not been vested in it. The words “legality, regularity or propriety.” of the order in the section are wide enough to cover both question of facts and Law and the powers conferred by the section go far beyond the revisional jurisdiction strictly so called. It is needless to say that when question of jurisdictional error is raised, contending that Ad hoc Addl. District Judge who decided the appeal in the capacity as appellate authority under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, acted without jurisdiction as the appellate authority designated under the Act as “the District Judge” was persona designata, this question raised by the petitioners is of decisive nature in this revision petition. I, therefore, propose to decide this issue first. It is needless to say that if this issue is decided holding that the appellate authorities committed jurisdictional error in deciding the appeal, then other contentions raised by either side need not be gone into.
11. Shri R. R. Mantri, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the District Judge to whom an appeal lies under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, is persona designata who must hear the appeal himself and who cannot transfer it to any other Judicial Authority though under the appeal Civil Courts act as Addl. District Judge may hear an appeal which lies to the District Judge under the circumstances mentioned in Section 17 of the said Act. The Ad hoc Addl. District Judge cannot hear appeal like the one under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, because, it is the District Judge and the District Judge alone who has been empowered to hear and dispose off that appeal. He further pointed out that though the term “District Judge” has not been defined under the Hyderabad Rent Act, he is easily identifiable if one looks at the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, 1954 which was Act No. XXXVI of 1954. Though this Act has been subsequently repealed by Bombay Act No. 94 of 1958 with effect from 1st April, 1989, it was in force at the relevant time when the Hyderabad Rent Act was also in operation. Under Section 4 of the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, the Government was empowered to establish a Court of District Judge for each Districts or for more than one District and appoint a District Judge for District or Districts. By the same section the Government was also empowered to appoint one or more Addl. District Judges, for one or more, such Districts. It was clear, therefore, according to learned counsel, that there was not only a District Judge but there was also one or more Addl. District Judges who could be appointed by the State Government. As Section 4 of the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act shows, there would be a District Court consisting of District Judge and one and more Addl. District Judges. Therefore, Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act provides that an appeal shall lie to the District Judge, the District Judge alone can hear and dispose of the appeal since the appeal did not lie to the District Court.
12. Shri R. R. Mantri, learned counsel for the petitioners to support his submissions, placed reliance on a decision of Division Bench of our High Court in Nagnath Revansidhappa Cholkhane v. Osman Saheb Mohammedsaheb Pangaonkar, 1977 Mh.LJ. 491, This decision is directly on the point involved as to the jurisdiction of the appellate authority in the case at hand. The order passed by the Rent Controller on application filed under the Hyderabad Rent Control Act was challenged before Assistant Judge at Latur who entertained the appeal purporting to act in pursuance of a notification dated 1st April, 1959 issued by the District Judge of Osmanabad. When the appeal under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Control Act lay to the District Judge, the Asstt. Judge at Latur or any other place had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of the appeal under the said section. Therefore, the matter reached before the Division Bench where jurisdictional competency of the Assistant Judge for entertaining and deciding the appeal under the Hyderabad Rent Act was under challenge. Before the Division Bench basic contention raised by the counsel for the appellant was that the District Judge to whom an appeal lies under Section 25 of the Act is persona designata who must hear the appeal himself and who cannot transfer it to any other judicial authority and, therefore, the Assistant Judge Latur who decided the appeal had no jurisdiction. Accepting the contentions, our High Court held that Assistant Judge at Latur or at any other place had no jurisdiction to entertain and dispose of an appeal under the said section. The learned Assistant Judge at Latur acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal. This Court observed “The District Judge though premier of officers of the District Court was isolated and designated by the Legislature for discharging the appellate functions under Section 25(1), Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act. An appeal under Section 25(1) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease), Control Act lies to the District Judge. The District Judge acting as appellate authority under Section 25(1) is a persona designata and not a Court.”
13. Our High Court further observed. “If a special statute creates certain rights and liabilities newly or either by expanding or abridging the rights and liabilities under the general law and also creates authority for resolving disputes arising under that law then that authority should ordinarily be regarded as an authority of exclusive jurisdiction to resolve these disputes. It is however possible that a law may create rights and liabilities and same law may invest existing hierarchy of Courts with jurisdiction to deal with all questions arising under the said Act. In the latter case existing Courts through their judicial officers will be entitled to adjudicate upon the disputes arising under the said Act. If however, a statute creating new arena of duties and rights merely designates an officer of Court in the hierarchy of Courts it will have to be held that such an officer so designated must be a persona designata. Nothing prevents the Legislature from either creating a special tribunal or investing existing hierarchy of Courts with additional jurisdiction but if the Legislature chose not to do either but to designate an officer of an existing Court then this officer and not the Court which should be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide those functions under the Act.”
14. Referring to the provision contained in Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, the High Court in para 17 of the Judgment stated, “in the present case Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act specifically mentions that “an appeal from an order made by the Controller shall lie……….to the District Judge.” As we have already shown above, the District Judge is a presiding officer of a District Court and is not the whole Court. Under Section 4 of the Hyderabad Civil Courts Act, 1954, which governs the area in question, one or more Additional District Judges could be appointed for one or more such Districts and those Additional District Judges were for all purposes of judicial functions like the District Judge himself. The District Judge, though premier of the officers of the District Court, was isolated and designated by the Legislature for the discharge of the appellate functions under the Hyderabad Rent Control Act.
15. An appeal which is a creature of statute, is provided by the provisions of Section 25 and to the District Judge and not to any other person it will lie. Further it has been provided in Section 26 that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force an application for revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order passed by the appellate authority subject to certain grounds mentioned in that section. The grounds for revision are analogous to the grounds to be found in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, it was observed that if the District Judge were a Court subordinate to the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code then it was not necessary for the Legislature to make a provision for revisional jurisdiction in Section 26 of the Hyderabad Rent Control Act; the High Court would have exercised revisional jurisdiction under the Civil Procedure Code itself. The fact that separate provision had to be made by statute for revision application to the High Court indicates that the District Judge was a persona designata who was otherwise not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.
16. Section 25 further enjoins upon the appellate authority who is the District Judge to call for the records of the case from the Controller and decide an appeal after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and if necessary after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit. Sub-section (2) of Section 25 further empowers the appellate authority to stay further proceedings in the matter pending the decision. These are the provisions made specifically for the purpose of guiding the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the District Judge. If the appellate authority were the Court, then in Order 41 of the Civil Procedure Code there was enough guidance to the appellate authority and it would not be necessary for the Legislature to provide guidelines in Section 25 to the appellate authority. Therefore, the High Court was compelled because of these various factors to hold that the District Judge as appellate authority under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, is a persona designata and he is not a Court as defined in the Bombay Civil Court Act or in the Civil Procedure Code. If that is so, then he had no jurisdiction to transfer any appeal preferred to him under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act to any other Judge including the Assistant Judge. In the case before the High Court it was not that the learned District Judge who has transferred the appeals to the learned Assistant Judge at Latur. The Assistant Judge at Latur has entertained those appeals and decided the same assuming jurisdiction as appellate authority under the Hyderabad Rent Control Act. Therefore, this Court held that the Assistant Judge acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeals and also in deciding the same.
17. Shri P. M. Shaha, the learned senior counsel appearing for respondent while repelling the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that the District Judge who is appointed by the Government to perform judicial functions cannot be termed as “”persona designata” to an officer constituting the Court who could, therefore, hear an appeal by himself or transfer it to other duly authorised persons such as an Assistant Judge under Section 17 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act. The Addl. District Judge is authorised to discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under Bombay Civil Courts Act and in exercise of these functions the Addl. District Judge was authorised to exercise the same powers as those of the District Judge. He submitted that if, therefore, an appeal was provided by Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act to the District Judge, the District Judge under the provisions of Section 4(3) of the Bombay Civil Courts Act would assign an Addl. District Judge the function of the appellate authority under the Hyderabad Rent Act. He submitted that the appellate authority as provided under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, the District Judge, is not & persona designata but functions as a Court and, therefore, Addl. District Judge who can perform the same duties as that of the District Judge is empowered to entertain and decide the appeal as an appellate authority under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act.
18. Shri P. M. Shaha, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan, Appellant v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker, Respondent, . The matter was relating to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, where under Section 18 of the Act, the appellate authority constituted under that section was the District Judge. The question involved in that case was whether the appellate authority as constituted under Section 18 of that Act which functions as District Judge was entitled to condone the delay in filing appeal by invoking the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was in that context, the Apex Court was required to consider the interpretation of the word “District Judge” as appellate authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant was controverted by the respondent contending that the word “District Judge” used in Section 18 of that Act was “District Judge Persona Designata” and, therefore, the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay cannot be invoked. The appellate authority namely the District Judge has taken the view that since he is a persona designata, he cannot resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before him. The Apex Court observed “the appellate authority constituted under Section 18(1) has to decide lease between the parties in a Judicial manner and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would remain final between the parties. Such an authority is constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act has been extended. It becomes obvious that even though the concerned District Judge might retire or get transferred or may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge his successor in office can pick up the thread of the proceedings from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under Section 18. If the District Judge was constituted as an appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named person being the appellate authority as assumed in the present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act would not follow.” The Apex Court considered the observations in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, .” …… A Persona designata is a “person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character.” Therefore, applying the said test to the facts of the case before the Apex Court. It is found that the appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18 of that Act being the District Judges, they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be persona designata. Once it was held that the appellate authority functioning under Section 18 of that Act, was not a persona designata. It was found that the authority functions as a Court and, therefore, was entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the purpose of condoning the delay in filing appeal.
19. It is very difficult to hold that this decision of the Apex Court is applicable sofaras the case before hand is concerned. I do not agree with the submissions of learned senior counsel that the provisions under the Hyderabad Rent Act are pari materia with the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1965. Section 18 of that Act no doubt deals with the appeals and the appointment of the authority to decide the matter. It is useful to extract the relevant provisions of Section 18 of that Act.
“18. Appeal, – (l)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.” It is very material to note that the Government of Kerala in exercise of it’s power under Section 18(1) had issued a notification conferring on District Judges powers of Appellate Authorities for the purposes of the said Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. It is thus seen that the appellate authorities as constituted under Section 18(1) of the Act, namely the District Judge, was not a persona designata. As against that having regard to the provisions of Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, the appellate authority as District Judge has been designated as the appellate authority as “persona designata”. In other words with plain reading of Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, designation of District Judge as Appellate Authority is creation of special statute as “persona designata”. In a case before the Apex Court, discretion of Appellate Authority as provided under Section 18 of that Act was the result of authority given to the Government. Therefore, it is stated in Section 18 of that Act that the Government may by general or special order notified in the Gazette confer on such officer or authorities not below the rank of subordinate Judge, the power of appellate authorities for the purposes of that Act. The discretion of the appellate authority in that Act is not the creation of the statute. In view of this the said decision of the Apex Court is of no assistance so far as the case before hand is concerned.
20. The Apex Court has laid down that judicial discipline must be followed. Similar bench or equal bench is bound by the decision of larger bench or previous decision of equal bench. Another ratio decidendi is based only on facts actually decided. It is an authority for facts in that case. The Apex Court has time and again made it clear that judgment is the authority as applicable to the facts of that case.
21. The decision of our High Court in 1977 Mh.LJ. 491 (supra) is obviously, a decision directly on the point involved in our case. It is patently clear that the Ad hoc Addl. District Judge, Aurangabad, who decided the appeal acted without Jurisdiction. Therefore, the order passed by him in that appeal is without jurisdiction. It was imperative on the part of District Judge, Aurangabad who was designated as appellate authority under Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, as appellate authority, being persona designata, to decide the appeal. The District Judge, Aurangabad has to decide the appeal afresh giving full opportunity of being heard to the parties. In that view of the matter the revision application will have to be allowed and the appeal preferred by petitioners, is to be remitted back to the District Judge, Aurangabad. As I am remitting back the appeal to the District Judge, Aurangabad, to hear the same, it is not appropriate to consider other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding merits of the matter.
22. Having regard to the provisions of Section 25 of the Hyderabad Rent Act, it would be, therefore, necessary to allow the revision application only on this limited ground and remand the appeal for fresh decision. It would be desirable that the learned District Judge at Aurangabad himself to decide the appeal as mandated under Section 25(1) of the Hyderabad Rent Act and also by the ratio laid down by this Court in 1977 Mh.L.J. 491 (supra) as appellate authority designated as District Judge, persona designata.
23. Hence, the order.
(1) The Civil Revision Application is allowed and the order passed by Ad hoc Addl. District Judge, Aurangabad, in Rent Appeal No. 18/2000 dated 23rd January, 2004, is hereby quashed and set-aside.
(2) Rent Appeal No. 18/2000 is hereby remanded for fresh hearing and decision by the District Judge, Aurangabad himself. It is further directed that the appeal be heard and decided expeditiously and in any case within a period of 4 (Four) months, from the date of appearance and the parties to appear before the learned District Judge, Aurangabad on 23rd day of April, 2004.
(3) It is clarified that while setting aside the impugned order, this Court has not considered any other challenge or the reasoning in support of the order as advanced in this petition.
(4) The parties are at liberty to raise contentions before the District Judge, Aurangabad, challenging or supporting the findings recorded by the Rent Controller.
(5) In the circumstances, no order as to costs.