ORDER
P.S. BAJAJ
1. This order will dispose of two appeals; A.No. E/2365/2000-C filed against the order dated 28.4.2000 and A.No. E/2366/2000-C filed against the order dated 20.4.2000 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals). Both these appeals have been filed by the Revenue being dissatisfied with those orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) vide which he affirmed the order-in-original and allowed the respondents benefit of notification no. 15/94-CE dated 1.3.1994 in respect of the plastic household goods including orbit trollies.
2. The learned DR has assailed the validity of both these impugned orders before us on the ground that the provisions of notification no. 15/94-CE dated 1.3.1994 had not been discussed by the Commissioner (Appeals) while affirming the order of the Asstt. Commissioner and that the goods manufactured by the respondents were squarely covered under Tariff Heading NO. 39.15 during the period in question i.e. 1.3.1994 to 15.3.1995 when the said notification was not in operation at all. Therefore, the impugned orders in both these appeals deserve to be set aside and the matter must be sent back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for re-examining the matter.
3. In reply the learned counsel, Shri A.R. Madhav Rao, has not disputed that in the impugned order dated 28.4.2000 the Commissioner (Appeals) has not recorded any finding about the availability of benefit of notification no. 15/94-CE dated 1.3.1994 to the respondents in respect of the goods in question. He had only followed his earlier order dated 20.4.2000 which was passed in the case of another assessee having no connection with the present respondents. The learned counsel has not opposed the prayer of the learned DR for remand of the matter. However, he has disputed the Revenue’s stand that the notification in question was not applicable to the goods in question of the respondents and also contested the classification of the brass and scrap under Tariff Heading No. 39.15 as claimed by the Revenue.
4. Same arguments have been raised by both the sides in the other appeal which has been filed against the impugned order dated 20.4.2000
5. We have heard both sides and have gone through the impugned order-in-appeals. In the first appeal no. E/2365/2000-C, the Commissioner (Appeals) in the impugned order, has neither recorded any findings about the classification of the goods in question which according to the Revenue were covered by Tariff Heading No. 39.15 nor regarding the applicability or non-applicability of the notification no. 15-94-CE dated 1.3.1994, the benefit of which had been sought by the respondents. He has affirmed the order-in-original of the Asstt. Commissioner simply by following his earlier order dated 20.4.2000 which he happened to pass in the case of some other assessee and had no relevance in the present case before us. Therefore, the impuged order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in this appeal apparently suffers from legal infirmity being non-speaking and as such cannot be permitted to stand.
6. This takes us to the second appeal no. E/2366/2000-C. The bare perusal of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) in this appeal also shows that he had failed to record cogent reasons for affirming the order-in-original of the Asstt. Commissioner. No sufficient reasons have been put forth by him for holding that the goods in question were not covered by Tariff Heading NO. 39.15. No finding that these goods were exempt from payment of duty under notification no. 15/94-CE dated 1.3.1994 during the period in question (1.3.1994 to 15.3.1995) had also been recorded by him. Therefore, we find that the impugned order is quite creptive, non-speaking, and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
7. In view of the discussion made above, in both these appeals, the impugned orders are set aside and the matter is sent back to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh decision after giving an opportunity of hearing to both the sides to present their case. Consequently, both the appeals of the Revenue stand allowed by way of remand.
(Dictated & pronounced in the open court)