ORDER
S.B. Sinha, CJ.
1. The short question, which arises for consideration in this application, is as to whether violation of the provisions of the bye-law would enable an aggrieved person to avail public law remedy.
2. The petitioner herein was dismissed from service on the ground that he committed the following irregularities:
(a) while crediting the loan amount paid by Smt. K. Venka Subbamma to the society account, I had altered the date of payment from 2-10-1999 to 12-10-1999, as if that she discharged the loan on 12-12-1999 even though she paid the loan amount on 2-10-1999.
(b) that myself and the Supervisor of the society recommended to grant loan to one Mr. V. Rajeswara Rao and to his brother Kesava Rao even though they are not having any landed property recommended as if they are having lands.
(c) that myself and the Supervisor recommended to grant loan to the wife of V. Rajeswara Rao recommending to grant loan showing their fish tanks as wet land in S.No.274.
(d) that myself and the Supervisor who is working along with me in the year 1996 recommended to grant loan to the member of the society B. Chenchunaidu as if that he is having Ac.2.00 land instead of Ac.0.45 cents and we also altered demarcation
numbers of the land of one K.S. Subrahmanyam.
3. An appeal preferred against the order of suspension dated 3-1-2000 being appeal No.1 of 2000 before the 3rd respondent had succeeded. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated. An order of punishment was passed. The main contention of the petitioner is that having regard to bye-law No.12 the order of dismissal could be passed only in consultation with the District Level Committee. The District Level Committee in terms of bye-law No.3 comprises of District Revenue Officer, District Co-operative Officer and the General Manager of the Co-operative Central Bank.
4. The learned single Judge having regard to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sri Konaseema Co-op. Central Bank Ltd. v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171 (FB) which has been affirmed in U.P. State Co-op, Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey, , dismissed the writ petition observing thus:
Notwithstanding some broad observations made as to the availability of judicial review against any body or person seen to have inflicted a wrong on a citizen, the preponderance of judicial opinion is seen to effectuate the principle that it is only a body or agency or instrumentality of the State that it is obligated to the constitutional and public law limitations upon its conduct. Absence of such a characteristic of a respondent or a body, no writ could be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution calling up to account for its conduct.
5. It is not in dispute that the order of termination against the petitioner was passed after holding a departmental enquiry and in the said proceedings he was
found guilty. The order of punishment dated 1-2-2001 passed by the 4th respondent reads thus:
While you are working as Secretary of Primary Agricultural Co-operative Society of Khaitepally GR No.416, you have misappropriated the funds. Your misappropriation of funds was established in domestic enquiry per the report of the enquiry officer and as per the resolution of the Managing Committee, you are hereby removed from the post of Secretary permanently from 1-2-2001.
6. In the instant case, therefore, the Managing Committee had also adopted a resolution to terminate the services of the appellant-writ petitioner. The learned Counsel, however, submits that in terms of bye-law No. 12(2) of the Special Bye-laws relating to service conditions of employees of Primary Agriculture Credit Societies, the impugned order must be held to be bad in law. Special Bye-law No.12 (2) reads thus:
No punishment shall be inflicted on any employee without proper enquiry in writing and providing him reasonable opportunity to explain his case and defend himself.
7. It does not appear that the said bye-law was made under a statute. It is not the case of the appellant nor any plea has been raised to the effect that the 4th respondent herein is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, Bye-laws made by a society will have no force of law. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a writ petition against a co-operative society will be maintainable only if the mandatory provisions of a statute or statutory rules are violated. Since the bye-laws are not framed under a statute, only because the purported consultation has not been made
with the District Level Committee by itself would not render the order of termination invalid.
8. In U.P. State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. case (supra), the Apex Court was considering the case of an employee of a Bank, which was constituted under the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank Act and the rules framed thereunder. The service conditions of an employee of the Bank were regulated by the statutory rules. In that situation, it was held that the Bank was an instrumentality of State and that exercise of power of dismissal by the society must be in accordance with the statutory regulations and with the approval of superior body. The Supreme Court referring to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Konaseema Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, Amalapuram v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 SC 171, held:
A Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Konaseema Cooperative Central Bank Ltd, Amalapuram v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171, was considering the question whether a writ petition lay against a cooperative society and if it does, in what circumstances. After examining various decisions and treatises on the subject it was stated that even if a society could not be characterised as a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 even so a writ would lie against it to enforce a statutory public duty which an employee is entitled to enforce against the society. In such a case, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the society is being treated as a ‘person’, or an ‘authority’, within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution. What is material is the nature of the statutory duty placed upon it, and the Court is to enforce such statutory public duty.
9. For the purpose of holding that a society or co-operative society is a State one of the criterion that has to be considered is as to whether it discharges any sovereign function. Some amount of control over such societies by the State or some amount of funding would not render the same as the instrumentality or agency of the State. (See Rajkumar Sardar v. Union of India, (1999) 1 Cal.LJ 125 and Chairman, West Dinajpur Shipping Mills Ltd and others v. Goutam Deb and others, (1999) 1 Cal.HN 464 = 1999 WBLR (Cal) 185.
10. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Thanikachalam, M. v. MAPCM Society, 2001 (1) LLJ 285, has also recently considered this aspect of the matter. This Division Bench in WA No.547 of 2001 rendered on 6-6-2001 has noticed the said decision. Reference in this connection may also be made to the decision of Calcutta High Court in Bholanath Roy v. State of West Bengal, 1996 (1) CLJ 502 = 100 CWN 657, M/s. NIS Corporation v. State of Bihar, 1994 (1) BLJR 559, Saikant Ghosh v. Institute of Engineers, , Parent Teacher Association v. State of Kerala, , Payandeo Dattatreya Kole v. State of Maharashtra, 1995 LIC 705. In Serjng Singh v. State of Bihar, 1994 (1) BLJR 287 and SBI Staff Assn. v Election Commission of India, 1994 (1) BLJR 128, it has been held that a co-operative society is not a legal authority within the meaning of Section 31(3) of the General Clauses Act.
11. In view of the fact that the Special Bye-laws in question do not have the force of a statute, we are of the opinion that violation thereof would not render the order of termination invalid.
12. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court in S. Venkata Ramanamma v.
Principal Secretary to Government, , in which one of us S.B. Sinha, CJ, was a member. In that case, the Court was considering a case against an employee who had been serving in the Forest Department of the State and as the order of termination had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same was held to be bad in law. The said case has no application to the facts of the present case as in the instant case; the appellant had been afforded an opportunity to defend himself in the departmental proceeding.
13. Yet again in U. Shankaraiah v. District Co-operative Central Bank, Medak, , a learned single Judge of this Court has held that termination of a paid Secretary of a society without enquiry is vitiated. As already stated, in the instant case, an enquiry has been-conducted against the appellant as per the Special Bye-laws.
14. We are, therefore, of the view that no public law remedy is available to the appellant as it has not been shown to us that any statutory regulations had been
violated.
15. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.