ORDER
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J
1. The order dated 5-11-1994 passed by the District Judge, Medak reverting the petitioner to the lower post of Copyist by way of punishment and the order of the High Court dated 29-6-1995 rejecting the petitioner’s appeal, are being questioned in this writ petition.
2. On the basis of the complaint given by one H.K. Vengal Rao who filed a case in the District Consumer Forum to which the petitioner was attached as Bench Clerk at the relevant point of time, the following five charges are framed.
“1. That while working as LDC in District and Sessions Court, Medak at Sangareddy and as Bench Clerk, District Consumer Forum on 21-8-1991 you have demanded a sum of Rs.30/- from Sri H.K. Vengal Rao of Korvipalli (v).
2. You have received a sum of Rs.10/-from Sri H.K. Vengal Rao of Korvipalli (v) as illegal gratification for”registering and sending notices to him for appearance
with regard to the case filed by him on 21-8-1991.
3. That you have not caused actually notices being sent to Sri H.K. Vengal Rao in the case filed by him before the Consumer Forum thereby caused the case filed by Mr.H.K.Vengal Rao, dismissed for default, without proper service on him.
4. That you have not actually caused notices being sent to Mr. H.K.Vengal Rao for the best reason known to you that Mr.H.K. Vengal Rao has not paid the balance of Rs.20/- and in collusion of the respondent in that case, extracted some money from him.
5. That you have on 22-8-1992 received a sum of Rs.50/- from the female persons who came in car and you have accompanied them and gave send off to them in the Court premises in the presence of Advocates and public.”
3. The Enquiry Officer who was appointed to enquire into the charges exonerated the petitioner and held that there was no reliable evidence to establish the charges. However, the District Judge who is the disciplinary authority differed with the Enquiry Officer and issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner as to why he should not be removed from service. The petitioner submitted his reply to the show-cause notice stating that there was no material to prove the charges as held by the E.O. Thereafter, the impugned order was passed on 5-11-1994 holding that the petitioner was guilty of the first 4 charges and imposing the punishment of reduction in rank to the lower post of Copyist to which he was initially appointed. On appeal to the High Court, the order of the D.J, was confirmed and the appeal was dismissed. The same was communicated by the Registrar on 29-6-1995. Questioning these orders, the present writ petition is filed.
4. Before we advert to the contentions of the learned Counsel, we shall briefly refer to the findings in regard to charge Nos.1 and 2 which go together because as held by us hereinafter, these two are the charges which stand proved against the petitioner. The E.O. disbelieved the evidence of PW1 who is the complainant on three grounds: (1) Evidence of PW1 is shaky and contradictory with regard to the place of demand i.e., whether it was within the Office or near the outer door of the Office; (2) There are no corroborating witnesses to PW1; (3) There is discrepancy in regard to the date of demand of illegal gratification i.e., whether it is 21-8-1991 or 22-8-1991. (4) The complainant is not in a position to give the time of demand of money. While discussing Charge No.2, the E.O. gave an additional reason that there was time lag of 15 months in lodging the complaint. He further added that the registration of the case is a judicial act and it is not within the purview of the petitioner (charged employee). As far as despatch of notices is concerned, it is within the purview of the despatch Clerk.
5. The D.J. was of the view that the evidence of the complainant was clear, cogent and convincing and unshaken by cross-examination. The D.J.rightly commented that in the circumstances, it would be difficult to expect independent corroboration. The mere fact that the exact time of payment of money could not be recollected by the complainant who was examined after two years or that he could not give the date on which the Consumer Dispute complaint was filed, was held to be immaterial. With regard to the date on which the incident took place, the D.J. found no discrepancy. The disciplinary authority also referred to the observation of the E.O. that the evidence of the complainant was partly reliable and partly unreliable and remarked that the E.O. did not specify which was the unreliable portion of the evidence. The D.J. ultimately came to the conclusion
that the petitioner took illegal gratification from the complainant for doing the official work in connection with the C.D. complaint filed by PW1.
6. The conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority – D.J. with regard to charges 1 and 2 cannot be faulted on any ground germane to Article 226 of the Constitution. It is not for us while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 to weigh and assess whether the findings of the E.O. are more acceptable than that of the disciplinary authority. It is merely a case of appreciation of evidence. It cannot be said that it was not at all possible for the disciplinary authority on the basis of the evidence on record to reach the conclusion which he did, insofar as charges 1 and 2 are concerned. With regard to charges 3 and 4, even the D.J. finds proof of despatch of notice by ordinary post. There was no evidence to show that the petitioner managed to see that the notices did not reach to the complainant in collusion with the respondent in the CD case, so that the case may be dismissed for default. The D.J. posed a wrong question – whether the notices were in fact received by the complainant or not and answered that question by saying that the complainant did not receive them; Even if the complainant did not receive the notice, that does not prove charges 3 and 4. Nor does it show that the petitioner colluded with the other side. The disciplinary authority is therefore not justified in holding that there is enough and adequate material to hold that charges 3 and 4 are also proved. The conclusion of the D.J. as far as charges 3 and 4 are concerned, is perverse and based on a misdirected approach. As regards these charges, the Committee of Hon’ble Judges also did not say anything relevant. One of the learned Judges commented that there was no reason why the notice to complainant was sent by ordinary post though notices were sent to the other side by registered post. But, that is not the charge at all and cannot form the basis for a finding of guilty.
7. We shall now turn to the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel is that the grounds on which the disciplinary authority differed with the findings of the E.O. were not set out in the show cause notice and therefore, the principle of natural justice is violated. It is pointed out that the D.J. merely indicated that the conclusion reached by E.O. was not sustainable and such a bald observation made by the D.J. is no substitute for furnishing the grounds of disagreement, so that the petitioner could have effectively represented. It is to be noted that under the A.P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1963 which were in force at the relevant point of time, there was no specific requirement to record the reasons for disagreement unlike Rule 21(2) of the new Rules. However, even without such specific rule, it is implicit in the concept of reasonable opportunity that there should be sufficient indication in the show cause notice about the proposed disagreement and the broad reasons for such disagreement should be spelt out. The legal position was thus enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar, :
“On these facts, we think, the High Court was justified in taking the view that the Government should have indicated in the notice its conclusion on the third charge. That however, does not mean that in the notice,the Government ought to state its grounds or reasons in support of its conclusion. It is the finding or the conclusion which is weighing in the mind of the Government that must, in such a case, be communicated to the public servant.”
8. In the case decided by the A.P. High Court, the Government did not concur with the Tribunal in regard to its finding on the 3rd charge. It was in that context, the aforementioned observations were made by the Supreme Court.
9. Again in State of Madras v. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827, another Constitution Bench made these pertinent observations:
“It is conceivable that when the State Government does not accept the findings of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent officer and proposes to impose a penalty on the delinquent officer, it should give reasons as to why it differs from the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a case it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed or elaborate”.
10. In the present case, applying the dicta and test laid down by the Supreme Court, we do not think that the notice suffers from any legal infirmity. In the show-cause notice, firstly, it is stated that the reasons furnished by the E.O. are neither consistent nor correct. Secondly, it is stated that there is enough and adequate evidence showing that the petitioner is guilty of all the charges. Not only disagreement of the disciplinary authority with the E.O. is recorded, it is also indicated that the evidence on record is sufficient to find the petitioner guilty of the charges. It may be noted that the main and crucial evidence is that of the complainant himself. The conclusion one way or the other depends on the appreciation of his evidence. It follows from the observations made by the disciplinary authority in the show cause notice that he was inclined to accept the evidence of the complainant. We do not therefore, think that the petitioner was in any way handicapped from effectively replying to the show cause notice. In fact in the reply filed by the petitioner, he relied on the enquiry report and commented that the disciplinary authority’s conclusion that the charges were proved was without any basis. It only shows that the petitioner did understand the implications of the show cause notice. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner did not request the disciplinary
authority to inform the reasons in more specific terms. We do not therefore think that any prejudice was caused to the petitioner, nor can we find fault with the decision of the disciplinary authority in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court.
11. We see no force in the 2nd contention too. The learned Counsel submits that in the show cause notice itself, the disciplinary authority prejudged the issue and recorded a firm conclusion that the charges were proved. It is true that the D.J. should have recorded his provisional conclusion instead of saying in categorical terms that the delinquent was found guilty of all the charges. But the inaccurate phraseology shall not in our view, vitiate the ultimate order passed by the D.J. The criticism that the D.J. acted with foreclose mind cannot be correct because he on re-consideration, dropped charge No.5 and moreover, he imposed lesser punishment than what was proposed.
12. The last contention of the learned Counsel is that the appellate order is without reasons and there is nothing to indicate that various factors set out in Rule 24 have been followed. The relevant part of Rule 24 is as under:
“24(1) In the case of an from an appeal order imposing any penalty specified in Rule 8 or Rule 9, the appellate authority, shall consider:
(a) whether the facts on which the order was based have been established;
(b) whether the facts established afford sufficient ground for taking action; and
(c) whether the penalty is excessive, adequate or inadequate and after such consideration, shall pass such order as it thinks proper”.
13. The main thrust of the argument of the learned Counsel is that the appellate authority did not apply its mind to the above factors, especially to the quantum of punishment and that the impugned order is bald and reasonless. Reliance is placed on the decision in M.A. Kalam v. Registrar (Management), . There is no quarrel with the proposition that the appellate authority should apply its mind to various factors set out in the Rule in the light of the grounds urged in the appeal and the decision of the appellate authority must be normally backed up by reasons. It is equally well – settled that in the case of affirming order, there need not be separate reasons much less elaborate reasons as pointed out by the Supreme Court In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, .
14. A perusal of the file shows that the Hon’ble Judges constituting the appellate committee did record reasons. One of the Judges appended a note running to 7 pages wherein all the aspects relating to sufficiency and reliability of evidence were discussed threadbare. The learned Judge then noted that he agreed with the disciplinary authority, Ofcourse, mere was no specific comment on the quantum of punishment imposed i.e., whether it is excessive or adequate. To what extent it vitiates the appellate order is the question, we shall advert to a little later. But what we would like to emphasise is that the appellate authority’s decision cannot be said to be vitiated merely because reasons recorded in the file or the gist thereof are not incorporated in the impugned order communicated by the Registrar. At best, it is a mere irregularity. To direct the Registrar to communicate the reasons noted in the file and leaving it open to the petitioner to question the same, would be an empty formality at this juncture. Now that the petitioner’s Counsel has access to the reasons recorded in the file while affirming the order of the disciplinary authority and arguments have been advanced both on
legal and factual aspects, non-incorporation of the reasons in the actual order communicated to the petitioner is not of material consequence. We need not in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 direct at this stage to communicate the reasons already recorded and then leave it open to the petitioner to start another round of litigation. After all, in matters of this nature, we have to look to the substance and the approach should not be too pedantic.
15. We are now left with the question of punishment. As already noted, the appellate Committee of Hon’ble Judges has not expressed any view on the question whether the punishment was adequate or excessive – which is one of the factors to be considered under Rule 24. However, the fact that the Committee agreed with the disciplinary authority implies that they have put their seal of approval on the penalty imposed. Going by any objective standards also, it cannot be said that the punishment awarded is by any means excessive. If we had not set aside the findings of the disciplinary authority as regards charges 3 and 4, we would have seriously considered whether to interfere with the appellate order merely on the ground that the question of punishment has not been specifically adverted to by the appellate Committee. Having regard to the conclusion reached by us that there is no material in support of charges 3 and 4 and the conclusion of the disciplinary authority with reference to these charges, is perverse, we consider it a fit case to remit the matter to the appellate authority to consider the limited question whether in the light of the exoneration of the petitioner vis-a-vis charges 3 and 4, the penalty of permanent reversion to the lower post of Copyist should be upheld or it should be appropriately modified. We are passing this order for the reason that the misconduct alleged under charges 3 and 4 is not trivial or negligible. Though charges 1 and 2 do establish serious misconduct, charges 3 and
4 are also fairly serious. It is for this reason we arc unable to predicate that the appellate authority would have confirmed the punishment in toto, even if charges 3 and 4 were excluded from consideration. Accordingly, we allow the writ petition partly and remit the matter to the appellate authority for disposal of the appeal in the light of the observations made above. We make it clear that the order of the disciplinary authority will stand unless and until it is modified by the appellate authority on such fresh consideration.
16. Writ Petition is allowed to the limited extent indicated above. No costs.