Prem Narayan Barchhiha vs Hakimuddin Saifi on 31 July, 1999

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Supreme Court of India
Prem Narayan Barchhiha vs Hakimuddin Saifi on 31 July, 1999
Author: S S Quadri
Bench: V.N.Khare, Syed Shah Quadri
           PETITIONER:
PREM NARAYAN BARCHHIHA

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
HAKIMUDDIN SAIFI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:	31/07/1999

BENCH:
V.N.Khare, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri,




JUDGMENT:

SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI,J.

These appeals, by special leave, are from the
judgments and decrees of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at
Jabalpur in Second Appeal Nos.408/89 and 409/89 passed on
9.7.1997. The appellant is the landlord and the respondent
is the tenant of two shops in house Nos.23/507 and 508
situated at Azad Chowk Handipara, Raipur (hereinafter
referred to as ‘suit premises’).

On 2.5.85, the appellant filed two suits in the Court
of IInd Civil Judge Class II, Raipur, against the respondent
for his eviction from the suit premises on the ground of
bona fide requirement of his unemployed son for establishing
a Provision Store under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya
Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short ‘the
Act’). He stated that he had no alternative reasonable
suitable non- residential accommodation in the city of
Raipur for the said purpose. The respondent’s plea was one
of denial of bona fide requirement of the landlord. After
framing necessary issues and considering the evidence on
record, the learned Trial Judge came to the conclusion that
the appellant failed to prove his bona fide requirement and
observed that he had only a desire to establish the business
for his son. However, he recorded the finding that the
appellant had no reasonable suitable accommodation in the
Raipur city. Consequently both the suits were dismissed by
the learned Trial Judge by a Common judgment on January 27,
1987. Dissatisfied with that judgment and decree of the
Trial Court the appellant filed two appeals in the Court of
Ist Additional Distt. Judge, Raipur. The learned District
Judge, on appreciating the evidence, held that the appellant
had proved bona fide requirement for establishing a business
for his son. In that view of the matter he allowed the
appeals and decreed the suits against the respondent on
September 6,1989. The tenant questioned the correctness of
the said judgment and decree of the learned District Judge
before the High Court in Second Appeal Nos.408- 409 of 1989.

The High Court, at the time of admission of the Second
Appeals, framed the following question of law for
determination :-

“Whether the Court below was justified in granting a
decree under Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, 1961, under the facts and circumstances of the
case?”

At the stage of final hearing of the Second Appeals,
the following additional substantial question of law was
formulated :-

“Whether respondent has proved all the ingredients of
Section 12(1)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act,
1961 in order to get a decree of eviction against the
appellant?”

The answer to these questions recorded by the High
Court, is that the appellant failed to prove all the
ingredients of Section 12(1)(f) of the Act and his claim
that he bona fide required the suit premises, cannot be
sustained as he suppressed the fact that he was in
possession of an alternative vacant accommodation in the
same building. The High Court thus allowed the appeals of
the respondent and dismissed both the suits of the appellant
for the same reasons but by separate judgments dated 9.7.97.
It is against those judgments and decrees of the High Court,
the present appeals are filed. Mr. S.S. Khanduja, learned
counsel for the appellant, contended that the High Court
fell into an error in re-appreciating the evidence and
answering the questions in the negative – against the
appellant. The High Court should have, submitted the
learned counsel, recorded answer to the questions on the
basis of the facts found by the Ist Appellate Court.

Mr.B.S.Banthia, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent, argued that the appellant/landlord, before
filing the eviction petition, had in his possession two
residential portions of the house which he let out to others
but he did not plead that he was in possession of other
accommodation and that it was not suitable for
non-residential purposes so the High Court was right in
coming to the conclusion that as the appellant suppressed
the facts his plea for bona fide personal requirement could
not be accepted.

On the contention urged before us, the question that
needs to be adverted to is :-

“Whether it is incumbent upon a landlord, seeking
eviction of the accommodation let out for non-residential
purposes under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act to disclose if he
is in possession of residential accommodation and further
prove that it is not suitable for non-residential purposes.”

The definition of ‘accommodation’ in Section 2(a) of
the Act, reads as under :-

“2(a).”accommodation” means any building or part of a
building, whether residential or non-residential and
includes –

(i) any land which is not being used for agricultural
purposes;

(ii) garden, grounds, garages and outhouses, if any,
appurtenant to such building or part of the building;

(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of
a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof;

(iv) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in
such building or part of a building.”

The word ‘accommodation’ takes in both residential as
well as non-residential building or part of a building. In
Section 12(1)(e)&(f), the expressions ‘accommodation let for
residential purposes’ and ‘accommodation let for
non-residential purposes’ are used distinctly in clear and
unmistakable terms.

Now, it will be apt to refer to Clauses (e) and (f) of
Section 12(1) of the Act which run as under :

“12(1). Restriction on eviction of tenants – (1).
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any
other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil
Court against a tenant for his eviction from any
accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds
only namely :-

(a) to (d). **** **** ****

(e) that the accommodation let for residential
purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for
occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of
his family, if he is the owner thereof or for any person for
whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the
landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable
residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in
the city or town concerned;

(f) that the accommodation let for non- residential
purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the
purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any
of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner
thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person
has no other reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned.”

A plain reading of the provisions, extracted above,
makes it clear that the Act maintains a clear distinction
between the accommodation let for residential purposes and
the accommodation let for non-residential purposes. Clause

(e), deals with ground of eviction of a tenant from
accommodation let for residential purposes. Under this
clause eviction of a tenant can be sought if the landlord
bona fide requires the accommodation let for residential
purposes for occupation as a residence for himself or for
any member of his family, provided he is the owner thereof
or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is
held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in
his occupation in the city or town concerned. Clause (f)
which deals with ground of eviction of a tenant from
accommodation let for non-residential purposes and provides
that the tenant can be evicted if the landlord requires
accommodation let for non-residential purposes bona fide for
the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that
of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the
owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the
accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person
has no other reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned. They [clauses (e) and (f)] are thus
distinct and independent grounds having different
ingredients and are thus mutually exclusive. That, this is
the purport of the said provisions, has been endorsed by
this Court in Firm Panjumal Daulatram Vs. Sakhi Gopal [1977
(3) SCC 284] and in Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Raghunath
Prasad [AIR 1981 SC 1711].

Now the ingredients of clause (f), with which we are
concerned here, are :

(1) the accommodation from which the tenant is sought
to be evicted has been let out for non-residential purposes;

(2) the landlord is the owner thereof and requires
that accommodation bona fide for the purpose of continuing
or starting (i) his business or (ii) business of any of his
major sons or unmarried daughters; or

(3) the landlord requires the accommodation for any
person for whose benefit the accommodation is held by him;
and

(4) the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own
in his occupation in the city/town concerned.

Admittedly, here requirements (1) and (2) are
satisfied (2 and 3 are alternative). In regard to (4) what
is necessary for the appellant is to satisfy the Court/Rent
Controller that he or such person for whom eviction is
sought, has no other reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or
town concerned. On this aspect the learned Distt.Judge
correctly recorded the finding in favour of the appellant.
It follows that the landlord seeking eviction of a tenant
from non-residential accommodation on the ground that he
required the same for the purpose of continuing or starting
his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried
daughters, has to prove that he has no other reasonably
suitable non- residential accommodation of his own in his
occupation in the city or town. It is no part of the
obligation of the landlord seeking eviction of a tenant
under Clause (f) of Section 12(1) of the Act to aver in his
plaint/petition the facts that he is in occupation of
residential accommodation and that it is not suitable for
non-residential purposes. These facts are not the
requirement of Clause(f) and are irrelevant to make out a
case under that clause. To read such a requirement in the
said clause (f) would amount to doing violence to the
language of the clause nay rewriting the clause which is far
beyond the principle of ironout the creases and is clearly
impermissible.

It is futile to contend that accommodation is a
neutral word taking in its fold both residential as well as
non-residential purposes, the landlord ought to disclose the
residential accommodation in his possession and show that it
is not reasonably suitable for non- residential purposes
when he is seeking eviction of the tenant from accommodation
let for non-residential purposes. The Court cannot burden
the landlord with additional conditions of disclosing
particulars of residential accommodation in his possession
and proving that it is not reasonably suitable for
non-residential purposes. Non-suiting him on such grounds
will mean non-suiting him on extraneous grounds. It follows
that the appellant has fulfilled the fourth requirement of
clause (f) also.

It is, however, contended that there is no provision
in the Act which prohibits use of the residential
accommodation let for non- residential purposes, therefore,
it is the duty of the landlord to show if he has in
possession residential accommodation, even when he is
seeking eviction of tenant for non-residential
accommodation. Neither on principle nor on authority can
such a contention be countenanced. We have no hesitation in
rejecting the same.

From the above discussion, it follows that the
appellant has satisfied all the requirements of clause (f)
of Section 12(1) of the Act. The impugned judgments and
decrees of the High Court on this aspect are, therefore,
erroneous and are liable to be set aside.

We accordingly set aside the impugned judgments and
decrees of the High Court and restore the orders of the Ist
Appellate Court dated 6.9.89. The appeals are allowed and
the suits of the appellant for eviction of the respondent
from suit premises are decreed. There shall be no order as
to costs.

……………………J. (V.N.Khare)

……………………J. (Syed Shah Mohammed
Quadri) New Delhi, August 3, 1999.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE
JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.999-1000 OF 1998

Prem N.Barchhiha … Appellant

versus

Hakimuddin Saifi … Respondent

Draft Judgment in the above matter is sent herewith
for perusal and kind consideration.

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