JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, C.J.
1. The appellant (petitioner in the original petition) was working as security assistant. Vide order dated January 25, 2002, appellant was relieved from Tiruvananthapuram to report for duty at Vishakapatnam. The appellant challenged this order by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. O.P. No. 5997 of 2002 filed by the appellant was disposed of, vide order dated March 13, 2002. It was noticed that the appellant had already been relieved from Thiruvananthapuram. He was on leave. The petitioner, till the disposal of the representation he may remain on leave.
2. The representation was rejected, vide order dated March 26, 2002. A copy of this order is annexed at exhibit P-11. Aggrieved by the orders dated January 25, 2002, and March 26, 2002, the appellant filed O.P. No. 10981 of 2002. It was dismissed by the learned single judge, vide order dated May 31, 2002.
3. Aggrieved by this order the appellant filed Writ Appeal No. 1522 of 2002. It was dismissed by a Bench of this Court, vide order dated June 28, 2002. However, on August 14, 2002, Review Petition No. 561 of 2002 was allowed. Thus, the appeal has been listed again for hearing.
4. We have heard Mr. Gopakumaran Nair, learned counsel for the appellant. He contends that there was no allegation against the appellant. There was no charge of misconduct. The order of transfer was wholly mala fide. Thus, it is vitiated.
5. Admittedly, the appellant had been posted at Thiruvananthapuram, vide order dated January 4, 1997. Thus, he had continued at Thiruvananthapuram for a period of more than five years when, he was transferred to Vishakapatnam. No rule, instruction or order of the Government has been produced to show that a security assistant cannot be transferred after the lapse of more than five years. Thus, the order of transfer was not per se arbitrary or illegal.
6. Learned counsel contends that the action is mala fide. The third respondent was not happily disposed towards the appellant.
7. This contention is misconceived. It cannot be accepted. The Station Manager, Indian Airlines, Thiruvananthapuram, has been impleaded as the third respondent. The person has not been impleaded by name. Nothing specific has been pointed out to show that the third respondent was not happily disposed towards the appellant.
8. In any case, there is no basis for the allegation that the action was mala fide. In this context, it deserves notice that the order for the appellant’s transfer from Thiruvananthapuram to Vishakapatnam had been issued by the General Manager (Personnel), Chennai. This fact is clearly mentioned in the order dated January 25, 2002, a copy of which has been produced as exhibit P-8. There is no allegation against the officer who had directed the appellant’s transfer. Thus, the allegation that the order suffers from the vice of mala fides cannot be sustained.
9. Faced with this situation, learned counsel submits that, vide order dated March 13, 2002, this Court had directed that the appellant’s request for a posting at nearby station shall be taken into consideration. Counsel, thus, submits that he should have been posted at a station close to Thiruvananthapuram.
10. Transfer is an incidence of service. Station of posting has to be chosen by the competent authority. The mere fact that the appellant’s request for posting at Kochi or Kozhikode has not been accepted cannot mean that the order rejecting his representation is vitiated. It was only a matter to be kept in view by the authority. The order shows that the representation had been duly considered. His request was duly noticed. It was observed that the appellant could not be adjusted at Kochi or Kozhikode.
11. Counsel contends that various other persons have continued to remain posted at Thiruvananthapuram for more than five years. It may be so. These are matters which have to be considered and decided according to the exigencies pf the situation by the competent authority. An employee has to serve at the place where he is posted. The writ Court can interfere only when a patent case of mala fides is made out. In the present case, there is not even an iota of evidence which may cast any doubt about the bona fides of the authorities.
12. A perusal of the writ petition shows that the appellant claims compassion on the ground that “he is a chronic diabetic patient and is undergoing treatment for diabetic peripheral neuritis”. If the appellant is not physically fit to perform his duties he may choose to resign or take such other steps as he may be advised. However, while in service he is bound to serve at a station where he is posted. The fact that the appellant has continued to remain on leave since January, 2002, does not reflect well on his sense of discipline. Mr. Gopakumaran Nair states that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the. appellant on account of unauthorised absence. We are not surprised to hear this. In fact, the appellant has to thank himself for the initiation of proceedings. On account of an interim order of stay of proceedings granted by a Bench of this Court, no action could be taken against him.
13. Learned counsel contends that on account of the interim order passed by this Court the appellant had continued on leave. The disciplinary proceedings had also been stayed. Thus, a direction may be given to the respondents now to allow him to join at Vishakapatnam and the disciplinary proceedings may be dropped. The contention is misconceived. A perusal of the order dated March 13, 2002, shows that the Court had only observed that “in case the petitioner wants to remain on leave till the disposal of his representation, he may submit suitable application for leave and the respondents shall consider the same and grant him eligible leave till the date of disposal of his representation”. It is the admitted position that the appellant’s representation was disposed of, vide order dated March 26, 2002. Thereafter, he had no reason to either ask for leave or to remain absent from duty. Still further, the appellant’s claim that the disciplinary proceedings should be dropped cannot be sustained. Vide order dated September 9, 2002, it was directed that no disciplinary action shall be continued for unauthorised absence on the basis of the transfer order challenged. This interim order cannot be interpreted to mean that any unauthorised absence on the part of the appellant was condoned by this Court. Thus, the contention as raised cannot be sustained.
14. No other point has been raised.
15. In view of the above we find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Resultantly, the interim order dated September 9, 2002, by which the disciplinary proceedings were stayed against the appellant shall stand vacated.