JUDGMENT
B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) issued on 20.06.2007 in respect of Khasra No. 744 situate in village Badalapur, Tehsil Dadri, District Gautam Budh Nagar.
2. Large number of grievarces have been raised by the petitioners and allegations of mala fide have also been levelled against the respondents. However, Shri Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition contending that as declaration under Section 6 of the Act in respect of the land in dispute has not been issued, the writ petition is premature and should not be entertained for the reason that in case Section 6 declaration is not made, entertaining his petition would be a futile exercise.
3. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioners has vehemently submitted that the land of the petitioners has been included in the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Act for malicious reason, as after acquiring the land, it would be transferred to private institutions and, therefore, the petition is maintainable even at this stage and this Court must entertain the petition on merit.
We have considered the rival submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
4. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is a condition precedent to exercise any further powers under the Act. Therefore, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is a sine qua non for initiating the acquisition proceedings. In the absence of such a notification, the machinery provided by the Act for further action obviously cannot be proceeded. (Vide Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay and Ors. ; Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan ; Narendrajit Singh and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. ; State of Mysore v. Abdul Razak Sahib ; and Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors. ).
The declaration under Section 6 of the Act is conclusive proof for acquisition of land as it envisages that the Authority has decided to acquire the land.
5. Section 4 Notification can be challenged on limited grounds, i.e., that the mandatory requirement of the publication etc. in the official gazette or local newspapers has not been made. The description of the land sought to be acquired is not made properly. Notification, itself, suffers from some, vagueness, thus persons interested one not able to file objection under Section 5-A of the Act arid also on the ground of mala fides.
6. In the Collector (District Magistrate), Allahabad and Anr. v. Raja Ram Jaiswal , the Apex Court after considering the statutory provision of the Act held that on some limited grounds the validity of Section 4 can be examined. In the said case the amendment made by the State of U.P. in 1974 to the effect that publication in the local newspapers was not required, was considered, as the Notification involved therein was prior to the Amendment 1984 in the Act. The requirement of the law had been that after publication of the Notification under Section 4 in the official gazette, the Collector shall paste public notice and the substance of such Notification at convenient place in the said locality. Such amendment stood wiped out after the amendment of the Act in 1984. Dealing with the issue of mala fides, the Apex Court has held as under:
Where power is conferred to achieve a purpose, it has been repeatedly reiterated that the power must be exercised reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose. And in this context, any ‘good faith’ means ‘for legitimate reasons’. Where power is exercised for extraneous or irrelevant consideration or reasons, it is unquestionably a colourable exercise of power, or fraud of power, and the exercise of power is vitiated. If the power to acquire land is to be exercised, it must be exercised bona fide for the scatutory purpose and for none other. If it is exercised for a extraneous, irrelevant or non-germane consideration, the acquiring Authority can be charged with legal mala fides. In such a situation, there is no question of any personal ill will or motive.
7. While deciding the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in The State of Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdial Singh and Ors. . A Division Bench of this Court in Kashama Sahkari Avas Samiti v. State (2006) 7 AII.DJ. 133 has taken the same view.
8. However, there are large number of Division Bench judgments of this Court, e.g., Kamal Singh v. State of J.P. (2007) 3 ALJ 146 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13440 of 2007 Smt Deoki v. State of U.P. and Ors. decided on 13.03.2007; and Writ Petition No. 53329 of 2006 Sukhbir Sinah v. State of U.P. and Ors., decided on 15.03.2007, wherein, the petitions have been dismissed being premature, giving opportunity to the petitioners therein to approach the Court after publication of Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, for the reason that in case the Declaration is not made within stipulated period, the proceedings would lapse, and entertaining the petition at this stage would render in futility. Such a view had been taken following the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court in H.M.T. Ltd. and Anr. v. Mudappa 2007 AIR SCW 1058, wherein, while considering a similar issue, the Apex Court held that the High Court had erred in quashing the preliminary Notification under Sub-Section (1) of Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act 1966 (hereinafter called the Act 1966), observing as under.
To us, therefore, the parties were right in raisin a preliminary objection that the petition was premature, as by issuance of Notification under Sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act, an intention was declared by the State to acquire :he land for public purpose, i.e., for developing industry….
The Court further held that Section 28(1) of the said Act 1966 was synonymous to Section 4(1) of the Act and raising objections against acquisition at that stage and 101 to have been interfered and a preliminary Notification ought to have been quashed” overruling well-founded objections as to the maintainability of the petition raised by the State.
(Emphasis added).
9. In Kanpur Development Authority v. Mahabir Sahkari Avni Samiti Ltd. (2005) 10 SCC 320, the Apex Court held as under:
It is well settled that notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act normally cannot be quashed unless there are exceptional circumstances, like the one where the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act supers from incurable irregularity, such as total vagueness in regard to the property to be acquired and in regard to the public purpose.
10. In Daulat Singh Surana and Ors. v. First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 641, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that validity of such a Notification can be challenged only on the ground of ambiguity, indefiniteness and vagueness of public purpose.
11. Thus, the settled legal proposition remains that aggrieved persons can challenge the validity of Section 4 Notification only on the ground of ambiguity, indefiniteness and vagueness in public purpose etc. Undoubtedly, petition can be entertained challenging the said proceedings on the ground of mala fides. However, as Section 4 Notification is merely a proposal and Declaration under Section 6 is conclusive proof of the intention of the Government to proceed with acquisition proceedings. In case Section 6 Declaration is not made, any exercise undertaken by the Court becomes futile. Declaration under Section 6 can be made within the limitation prescribed in the Act which starts from the date of last publication in the newspaper. (Vide Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Anr. ; Sangappa Gurulincappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka and Ors. ; Tamil Nadu v. Vasanta Bai ; M. Ramlinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu ; and Bailamma v. Poomaprajna House Building Coop. Society ). Proceedings are to be concluded within the limitation prescribed thereafter. In such an eventuality, if the petition is entertained challenging the proposal of acquisition wherein Section 6 Declaration has not yet been made, the Court would be deciding merely an academic issue. Same remains the fate of an application made under Section 48 of the Act for exemption of the land from acquisition proceedings. A person aggrieved is not precluded from raising such issues after issuance of the Declaration under Section 6 of the Act, inasmuch as no immediate rights are affected upon publication of Section 4 Notification and the aggrieved person cannot be said to be prejudiced, as there is no diversity of interest till the Declaration under Section 6 is issued.
12. Thus, it is desirable that aggrieved person can at legally mature stage may invoke the jurisdiction of the writ Court raising all factual and legal issues challenging the validity or otherwise of the entire proceedings. This will also eliminate the possibility of multiplicity of the proceedings and shall at the same time reduce the burden of litigant as well as of the Court, without prejudice to the cause of the other side.
13. In view of the above, the matter is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H.M.T. Ltd. (supra). The petition, being premature, is liable to be dismissed at this stage.
14. Shri S.K. Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner prays and is permitted to withdraw the writ petition. The petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh, if so advised, after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act is made.