JUDGMENT
L. Narasimha Reddy, J.
1. This second appeal is filed by the defendant in O.S. No. 77 of 1992, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Proddatur, which was subsequently transferred to the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Proddatur, and renumbered as OS No. 5 of 1999.
2. The 1st respondent herein filed the suit against his two brothers, Appellants 1 and 2, for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction, in respect of the suit schedule property. He pleaded that the properties of joint family, comprising of three brothers, was partitioned about 40 years prior to the filing of the suit, and that each of them was enjoying the lands which fell to their shares. He stated that after the partition, he purchased the suit schedule properties with his own funds, and that his brothers started interfering with the possession. Alleging that he was dispossessed from the suit schedule properties, during the pendency of the suit, he amended the plaint and claimed the relief of recovery of possession.
3. Respondents 1 and 2 filed written statement, pleading that the partition, which has taken place 40 years prior to the filing of the suit, was the one, between the three brothers on the one hand, and one Mr. Challa Pedda Subba Reddy, on the other. It is stated that themselves and the 1st respondent remained joint till 1964. According to them, Item No. l of the suit schedule property was purchased with the joint family funds, and in the partition that took place in the year 1964, the 1st respondent relinquished the rights over the said land by receiving a cash of Rs. 20,000/-. Reference was made to an agreement, dated 31-3-1978, said to have been executed, in that connection. As regards the other items, it was pleaded that even while the family was joint, they were sold in favour of Akula Bala Ramaiah and Akula Laxmaiah of Gaddamvaripalli Village, and about 15 years thereafter, the said purchasers have sold them in favour of Respondents 1 and 2, after partition.
4. The trial Court dismissed the suit through judgment, dated 13-3-2000. Aggrieved thereby, the respondents filed A.S. No. 51 of 2002, in the Court of II Additional District Judge, Kadapa, at Proddatur. The appeal was allowed on 16-2-2006. Hence, this second appeal.
5. Sri M.N. Narasimha Reddy, learned Counsel for the appellants, submits that the lower appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court, absolutely without any basis. He submits that the lower appellate Court did not choose to frame points for its consideration, and except making certain vague observations, at the end of the judgment, it did not assign any reason, worth its name, while reversing the findings, recorded by the trial Court. Learned Counsel points out that there is clear violation of Rule 31 of Order 41 CPC, inasmuch as no points were framed by while disposing of the appeal. On merits, the learned Counsel submits that the 1st respondent failed to prove his case.
6. Sri M.R.K. Chowdary, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that though no specific and individual points were framed, the lower appellate Court covered the entire area of controversy, and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court, it cannot be said that there was any serious lapse. He further submits that the lower appellate Court had undertaken extensive discussion, on every aspect of the matter, and that the findings of fact, recorded by it cannot be interfered with, in a second appeal under Section 100 C.P.C.
7. The dispute in relation to the suit land was among three brothers. While the 1st respondent pleaded that a partition between himself and the Appellants 1 and 2 took place, 40 years prior to the filing of the suit, the latter stated that they continued to remain joint till 1964. Initially, the suit was filed for the relief of declaration and perpetual injunction and subsequently, the relief of recovery of possession was prayed for. In view of the detailed pleadings before it, the trial Court framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title to suit schedule property?
(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for?
(3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of possession of Item No. l of the plaint schedule from D.3 to D.6? (additional issue)
The 2nd issue had been redundant, in view of the amendment to the plaint.
8. On its behalf, the 1st respondent examined PWs.l to 3 and filed Exs.A-1 to A-14. On behalf of the appellants, DWs-1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-21 were marked. The documents are mostly certified copies of the adangals, registration extracts, pattedar passbooks, etc., telling upon the nature of title and enjoyment over the suit land. The trial Court bestowed most of its attention to Issue No. l, and held it against the 1st respondent. At one place, it was observed that both the parties to the suit have suppressed the real facts, as to the partition. The other issues were also held against the 1 st respondent, and the suit was dismissed.
9. In the appeal preferred by the respondent herein, the lower appellate Court framed only one point as under:
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of possession of Item No. 1 of plaint schedule from Defendants 3 to 6.
10. As a final Court of facts, an appellate Court is expected to bestow its attention to various aspects of the matter and record its findings. An appeal is treated as continuation of the suit, mostly in the sense that the appellate Court has to undertake a detailed examination of the pleadings and evidence, uninhibited by the findings, recorded by the trial Court. For all practical purposes, the appellate Court has to deal with the entire suit, as though it is deciding it for the first time. The only limitation is that if the appeal is confined to only a part of the dispute in the suit, the consideration in the appeal must be to that extent.
11. The requirement under Rule 31 of Order 41 C.P.C., as to the framing of points before appellate Court, is not without significance. The points to be framed in an appeal, assume the same significance, as do the issues, framed in a suit. If the whole controversy in the suit is carried to the appeal and the parties reiterate their respective stands, almost the entire issues must be reflected in the points. On the other hand, if the suit was partly decreed, or if the appellant gives up part of the claim, the points must reflect the actual area of controversy in the appeal. Framing of a wholesale issue, would reduce the requirement under Rule 31 of Order 41 C.P.C., to an empty formality.
12. It is true that the Supreme Court and this Court held that, if, from a perusal of the judgment rendered by lower appellate Court, it is evident that the Court had bestowed its attention on all the points of controversy; failure to frame individual points cannot be treated, as fatal. Therefore, it needs to be seen as to whether the lower appellate Court followed the said principle.
13. From a perusal of the issues, framed in the suit, it is evident that two important aspects fell for consideration in it, viz.
(a) Whether the 1st respondent is entitled for declaration of title, in respect of the suit schedule properties; and
(b) Whether he is entitled for a decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties.
Each of these aspects has its own independent connotation. The suit was dismissed, as a whole. The point framed by the lower appellate Court covered the second aspect alone. That could not have been decided in isolation. In fact, it is a sequel to the first one. It is apt to refer to Rule 5 of Order XX C.P.C, It reads as under:
Court to state its decision on each issue:- In suits in which issues have been framed, the Court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons therefore, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issue is sufficient for the decision of the suit.
The same requirement applies to the judgments of the appellate Courts also.
14. After extracting the pleadings of the parties almost verbatim, and the issues framed by the trial Court, the lower appellate Court had reproduced the entire grounds of appeal, without even changing from direct to indirect person. This can be demonstrated by extracting the last ground, and the concluding part in the grounds of appeal, which reads as under:
The lower Court failed to consider the evidence of appellant during the pendency of appeal having died his L.R. daughter 2nd appellant oral to documentary and no proper reasons are given in rejecting the same. Therefore prays the Hon’ble Court be pleased to allow the appeal, setting aside the decree and judgment and award costs throughout.
15. The only difference is that in the Memorandum of Appeal, the grounds were mentioned with the individual numbers and paragraphs, whereas they were condensed into one paragraph, in the judgment. Coming to the discussion of the matter on merits, by the lower appellate Court, this Court is constrained to observe that it did not bestow any attention, either as to the scheme of judgment, or the language to be employed in it, much less in paraphrasing it. About 20 typed pages of the judgment are devoted to restatement of the evidence of the witnesses and making reference to documents in a language, that does not befit a Court, not to speak of an appellate Court. This Court feels sorry and distressed to note that the judgment is verbose and violated all possible norms of grammar. Reasoning and analysis became the casualties. The learned Presiding Officer would have done better, had he reproduced the evidence also verbatim, as he did with the grounds of appeal. In stating the evidence, in his own words, he made a mess of it and appears to have forgotten that language is regulated by certain rules and norms. For instance, the discussion undertaken by the learned Judge on the evidence of DW-1 commences with the following sentence:
Further defendants’ version examined DW.1 and stated regarding the particulars of the property and brothers relations and they stated that they were divided in the year 1974 and mentioned of 1964 in his written statement is a mistake evidently committed by his Advocate.
It is also apt to refer to his discussion, on the evidence of PW.1. It reads as under:
It is not true to say that he did not execute the relinquishment deed dated 31-3-1978 by taking an amount of Rs. 20,000/- from the defendants, and he is deposing falsely for the purpose of this suit and he purchased the suit land. Likely of this case of the defendant that he asked suggestions and all suggestions are denied.
While the first sentence appears to be true extract from the deposition of the witnesses, the second sentence seems to be the effort of the learned Judge, to summarize the other part of the deposition. Similar samples can be drawn from almost every page.
16. It is only in the last part of Paragraph 22, that the learned Judge expressed his view. Rest of the judgment is devoted to reproduction of pleadings, grounds of appeal, and the reference to evidence, without expressing any opinion about the same. It is apt to reproduce the same, to appreciate the nature of adjudication, particularly, in the context of reversing a decree, passed by the trial Court. It reads as under:
In all these it is appearing that the documents filed by defendants showing as there is right in claiming on the property. But whereas regarding this property already mentioned above in the case of the plaintiff and for regarding defendants in cross-examination it is not clearly stating that they executed sale deed and appearing this regarding Revenue Records is nothing but prepared for the sake of this case, but the plaintiff side documents is appearing to consider this case. In all the above aspects what they stating defendants is clearly mentioned above and taken into consideration of the evidence of the plaintiff and the version of the defendant is not clearly corroborated in chief and cross-examination, on that I find the case of the defendants is not correct and the plaintiff version is taken into consideration. The trial Court is not clearly observed this aspect of the documentary aspects of the plaintiff and subsequently developed all the documents on the defendants side, on that I feel the plaintiff has got right and title over the property and to set aside the judgment of the trial Court and to decree the suit and to declare the right of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property.
17. Only two factors can be identified as the cause for the adjudication of such a nature. Either the learned Judge did not bestow the attention even to frame proper and correct sentences, much less, to reflect his views on the basis of his examination of the matter, or he did not possess a better expression and language than what is reflected in the judgment. Either way, it cannot be countenanced, since what are at stake are the rights of the parties over a valuable property.
18. This Court is conscious of the requirement that a superior Court must always be cautious and careful in making observations about the quality of judgments rendered by the Subordinate Courts. This note of caution must always be borne in mind, and at the same time, if some glaring irregularities are noticed, and where the only correct sentences in a judgment, running into 30 typed pages, are the verbatim reproduction of pleadings and the grounds of appeal, the Superior Court would be failing in its duty, if its disapproval is not indicated. The effort is only to point out that substantial improvement is required, than targeting the individual officer. Unless such tendencies are curbed, there is every likelihood of percolation of a message to the various levels that one does not have to be serious about the form of judgment, or the language employed therein.
19. If, in the ultimate analysis, the judgment of a Court creates more confusion, as to the nature of rights of the parties; apart from not subserving the avowed object of rendering respectable, enduring and just resolution of disputes, such an exercise would turnout to be counterproductive. One does not expect exquisite prose, or poetry from a judgment. But, the parties can legitimately and certainly insist that the judgment rendered in their dispute is expressed in simple and meaningful sentences. If there is no specific provision in Order XX C.P.C., insisting that the judgment must be written in sentences, which conform to grammar, it is because of the reason that it was not, and in fact, can never be contemplated that a Judge is at liberty to ignore the basic principles of grammar.
20. This Court is of the view that the judgment rendered by the lower appellate Court does not conform to the requirements of law, such as those under Rule 31 of Order 41 and Rule 5 of Order XX C.P.C. These provisions constitute substantial question of law. In all fairness, the learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the respondents, stated that the judgment under appeal, is far from satisfactory, in its form. Since it is contemplated to remand the matter to the lower appellate Court for fresh consideration, this Court has chosen not to delve into the merits of the matter.
21. For the foregoing reasons, the second appeal is allowed, and the matter is remanded to the lower appellate Court for fresh consideration and disposal. It is directed that the lower appellate Court shall frame separate points, touching on the reliefs of declaration of title and recovery of possession, in addition to what, it may feel appropriate. The appeal shall be disposed of by 31-12-2006. There shall be no order as to costs.
