JUDGMENT
A.P. Chowdhri, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur, dismissing appellant’s petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for restitution of conjugal rights.
2. The petitioner as married with the respondent on July 3, 1983. According to the petitioner, the couple lived happily upto July 4, 1984 and the respondent was sent to her parents house in connection with the first delivery, which was expected a few months later. This was in accordance with the custom that the first delivery of the girl is arranged by her parents. A daughter named Sonia was born to the respondent on November 30, 1984. After two months of the birth of the daughter, the petitioner went to fetch his wife and child. The respondent as well as her mother insisted that the petitioner starts residing with them at village. Gazipur as their Ghar Jawai. This was not acceptable to the petitioner. With great persuasion and with the intervention of elders, the respondent and the child were brought back to the matrimonial house and there they again started living happily when the respondent conceived again. It is further averred that on May 17, 1986, the respondent went to her parent’s house in routine to meet them. While going, she took away all her gold ornaments and other valuables. The petitioner went to fetch her in the beginning of July 1986 so that the respondent could be attended to during her confinement which was due. Again the respondent and her mother insisted that the petitioner resides with them as Ghar Jawai and in these circumstances the petitioner had to come back without bringing the respondent. A second child, a son, Devinder Pal, was born on July 8, 1986. Further case of the petitioner is that he took a Panchayat consisting of about 22 persons to persuade the respondent and her relations to join the matrimonial house. The Panchayat was, however, turned away on the ground that the petitioner being a person of limited means could not provide the comforts to which the respondent was used to and the only solution was that the petitioner stays with them as their Ghar Jawai. This being not acceptable to the petitioner, the Panchayat came away without achieving any result. The respondent finally declined to resume cohabitation on December 5, 1986 and accordingly the petitioner, the panchayat came away without achieving any result. The respondent finally declined to resume cohabitation on December 5, 1986 and accordingly the present petition was instituted on December 13, 1986.
3. In the written statement, the plea of the respondent is that the relations between the parties were far from cordial from almost the beginning. Respondent’s father is a non-resident India, living in Sharjah (Dubai). He had spent Rs. 80,000/- on the marriage of the respondent with the petitioner. This, however, did not satisfy the petitioner and his other relations, who tamed out to be greedy persons and had been demanding money in order to start their business. It was denied that the respondent came to her parents’ house in connection with her first delivery in accordance with the custom. It was pleaded that, in fact, she had been sent away by the petitioner to save expenses in connection with delivery. It was specifically denied that at any stage there was any suggestion by the respondent or any other relation of hers that the petitioner lives with them as Ghar Jawai. In fact, the respondent has five brothers, three of whom are adults, besides two sisters. In order to satisfy the demand of the petitioner, the respondent brought from her mother Rs. 900/- in October 1985 and Rs. 1200/- in March 1986 and gave those amounts to the petitioner. This, however, did not satisfy him. Further case of the respondent is that she was given a beating and turned out of the house in April 1986 for her failure to fulfil the petitioner’s demands for more money in order to start his business. On May 15, 1986, about one month after she had been turned out, her mother took a panchayat consisting of Ram Lal RW-2, Mehnge Ram ex-panch and some others. The respondent was also taken by them along with the Panchayat. They tried to persuade the petitioner to rehabilitate the respondent, but they were given a point blank reply and they were further told that if they imposed the respondent on the petitioner, they would do so at their own peril. They came away without achieving any result. In July 1986 the respondent gave birth to her second child, Even though the petitioner was informed about the birth of the son, he did not come to see the child or his mother. The petitioner never made any provision for his wife or children. Left with no alternative, the respondent filed an application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the grant of maintenance on August 2, 1986. The present petition under Section 9 of the Act, which was instituted on December 13, 1986, was not bona fide and was only a counter-blast to the aforesaid application for maintenance.
The Trial Court framed the following issues :
1. Whether the wife-respondent has withdrawn from the society of the husband-petitioner on account of reasonable cause or excuse? OPP.
2. Relief.
The petitioner appeared as AW-1 and examined Garib Dass, one of the members of the panchayat, who allegedly accompanied him to the house of the respondent on December 5, 1986, as PW-2. On Behalf of the respondent, Ram Lai PW-2, one of the persons who had accompanied the Panchayat, Gurbachan Kaur PW-3, mother of the respondent, and the respondent herself appeared as witnesses.
4. In a consideration of the evidence on record, the learned Trial Court held that the petitioner was responsible for the respondent to live separately and consequently dismissed the petition. Aggrieved by the judgment, the petitioner-husband has preferred this appeal.
5. The contention of Mr. Arun Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant, is that allegation with regard to demand of dowry was a general and vague one and it had become a practice in introducing such a plea on behalf of the estranged wives in matrimonial matter these days. He submitted that if the parties lived happily during the initial period of marriage, leading to birth of a daughter in November 1984, it was hardly convincing that suddenly there sprang up a demand for dowry and the demand assumed such proportions that it made it impossible for the couple to live together. The alleged greed on the part of the petitioner and his parents was belied, it was argued from the fact that the respondent admittedly resumed cohabitation in the matrimonial house and she conceived and later delivered a second child in July 1986. Mr. Jain further submitted that the intention of the respondent in breaking the matrimonial home was evident from the fact that she refused to return to the house of the respondent even if adequate surety was given by the petitioner and his father, ensuring her safety. It was further pointed out that the learned Trial Court bad attached undue significance to the fact that the present petition had been filed a couple of months after application for maintenance filed by the respondent. Mr. Jain submitted that in matrimonial matters one had to be circumspect because broadly speaking going to the Courts in it is not looked upon with favour in our society and it reduced the chahces of future approachment between the parties. This is apart from the expenses and frustration which are natural concomitant of litigation, especially when it is in regard to matrimonial matters.
6. Mr. Jasbir Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported the judgment of the Trial Court and submitted that the conclusions reached by the learned Trial Court were based on correct assessment of the evidence and were in accordance with the peculiar circumstances of this case.
7. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the parties and am of the view that there is no merit in the appeal, which must, therefore, fail.
8. A perusal of the petition as also his statement as PW-l suggests one and only one reason why the respondent left the matrimonial home. That reason is that the respondent’s mother wanted the petitioner to live with them as Ghar Jawai. The admitted facts and circumstances of this case completely belie this suggestion. It was admitted by the petitioner himself that the respondent has five brothers. According to the respondent, three of her brothers are adults and possibly one of them is living at Sharjah (Dubai) along with their father. This is in addition to other sisters of the respondent. It is thus not a case where the respondent may be the only child of rich parents who may be wishing that the son-in-law should come and live with them in order to manage their property or business, besides providing them company and ensuring that their daughter along with her children also lived with them. I have no difficulty in rejecting the suggestion as a made up one. It follows that the petitioner is suppressing the real reason why and in what circumstances the respondent left the matrimonial home. The plea of the wife, on the other hand, is that her parents had performed a fairly good marriage by spending a sum of Rs. 80,000/-. The fact that her father was living at Sharjah appears to have given the impression to the petitioner that by twisting the arm of the respondent he can get a good amount from his-in-laws in order to start some business. It is generally believed that people who go abroad and work there earn a lot of money. It is, therefore, consistent with the probabilities of the case that the petitioner had been insisting that the respondent brings more and more money for the simple reason that her parents could afford to give more money to satisfy his requirements. The contention of Mr. Jain that it had become a usual practice for most wives to take the plea for greed of dowry does not appear to be applicable to the present case. The petitioner himself placed on record a document Mark ‘X’ dated June 14, 1986. It is copy of an application purporting to have been made by Gurbachan Kaur RW-3, mother of the respondent. The complaint is addressed to the S.H.O. It opens with a reference to an earlier complaint in writing dated September 25, 1985. It was stated in the said earlier complaint that in the presence of respectable witnesses, a settlement had been arrived at with regard to a pair of golden Karras and against payment of Rs. 6000/- which were to be paid in November 1986. The accused persons, namely, her son-in-law Chaman Lal, his brother and their father, however, failed to honour that agreement and instead of fulfilling their part of the agreement, they started threatening the complainant Ourbachan Kaur and her children. She went on to say in the complaint that she had married her daughter Pinki alias Poonam with Chaman Lal accused and that the accused persons i.e. Chaman Lal, his brother and father had given a beating to her daughter and had turned her out of the house when she was in advanced stage of pregnancy. They had also refused to give her dowry articles. The idea of mentioning these allegations is not that each word of what is stated therein can be taken as proved, but the fact remains that this type of allegations were made in the complaint dated June 14, 1986, and even on an earlier occasion on September 25, 1985. It cannot, therefore, be said that all was well with the parties and there was some sudden development which was difficult to understand.
9. No doubt, both the parties have led evidence to show that a Panchayat tried to intercede on their behalf. Both the parties have further denied about the visit of such a Panchayat on behalf of the other side. A reading of the evidence of the petitioner and his witness Garib Dass PW-2 on the one hand and the statement of the respondent Pinki RW-1, Ram Lal RW-2 and respondent’s mother Gurbachan Kaur RW-3 shows that the latter set inspires greater confidence and there is a ring of truth in the statement of the respondent.
10. The admitted conduct of the petitioner is that he did not pay any attention to the legitimate requirements of his wife and children. He admittedly did not make any provision for them. The respondent was, therefore, forced to apply for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The present petition was admittedly filed afterwards. For these reasons, the conclusion reached by the Trial Court, namely that the respondent has been made to leave the matrimonial home because of the conduct of the petitioner himself is affirmed. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs quantified as Rs. 3000/-.