ORDER
B. Seshasayana Reddu, J.
1. This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is directed against the order dated 16-12-1997 passed in I.A. No. 630 of 1997 in O.S. No. 76 of 1997 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Machilipatnam, whereby the learned Senior Civil Judge allowed the application of the plaintiffs filed under Order 40 Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC partly and directed the defendants to pay Rs. 3,000/- per annum etc.
2. The appellants herein are the plaintiffs in O.S.76/97. They fifed the suit for partition and separate possession of their shares in the suit schedule properties. They also moved I.A.630/97 under Order 40 Rule 1 read with Section 151 CPC to appoint a receiver to take possession of A, and B schedule lands and C schedule tractor. It is the case of the appellants/ plaintiffs that 1st and 2nd plaintiffs are the children of 3rd plaintiff who is wife of Satyanarayana and that the plaint A schedule property belonged to late Satyanarayana. It is also the case of the plaintiff that plaint A and B schedule lands and C schedule tractor are joint family properties and therefore they are entitled to claim share. The claim of the plaintiffs is resisted by the defendants by filing counter. The defendants pleaded that most of the items in plaint schedule are their self acquired properties and therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any share. It is the case of the defendants that item No. 2 in the plaint A schedule and item 1 of the plaint B schedule are not the joint family properties and therefore the plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any share. On behalf of the plaintiffs Ex.A-1 was marked and on behalf of the defendants Exs.B-1 to B-6 were marked. On considering the material brought on record and on hearing Counsel for both the parties, the learned Senior Civil Judge held that the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case so far as item 2 of plaint A schedule and items 1, 2, 7 to 9 of plaint B schedule lands. At the same time the learned Senior Civil Judge held that plaintiffs proved prima facie case in respect of item 1 of plaint A schedule and items 3, 4, 5 and 6 of plaint B schedule and therefore issued certain directions to the defendants such as depositing a sum of Rs. 3,000/-. I feel it apposite to refer the directions issued by the learned Senior Civil Judge to the defendants and they are as follows:
(1) To deposit a sum of Rs. 3,000/- to the credit of the suit every year commencing from December, 1997;
(2) To file accounts at the end of every year in respect of the income from item No. 1 of the plaint C schedule i.e., tractor showing the income of tractor, expenses towards maintenance of the tractor and the loan amount etc., to PACS Mukkolla.
Dissatisfied with the impugned order, the plaintiffs have filed this appeal.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellants/ plaintiffs contends that the Trial Court having found that the plaintiffs have prima facie case in respect of certain items in plaint A and B schedule lands ought to have appointed a receiver to take possession of the same. He would further contend that the quantum of amount fixed by the Trial Court is very meager and it is not based on any material.
4. The Madras High Court in Krishna Swamy v. Thangavalu, , laid down five principles which are described as panchasadachar of Court exercising equity jurisdiction and they are as follows:
(1) The appointment of a receiver in a pending suit is a matter resting in the discretion of the Court.
(2) The Court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof that prima facie the plaintiff has a very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit.
(3) Apart from the conflicting claims to the property the plaintiff must show some emergency or danger or loss demanding immediate action and therefore the element of danger is an important consideration.
(4) Where the properly is shown to be in media, that is to say in the enjoyment of none and
(5) The conduct of the party who made the application shall be free from blame.
Generally speaking the appointment of a receiver is recognized as one of harshest remedies, which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is allowable only in extreme cases and in circumstances where the interest of the person seeking the appointment of a receiver is exposed to manifest peril. In K. Mangamma v. K .Bramha Reddy reported in 1989(1) ALT 331 our High Court reiterated the five principles enunciated in Krishna Swamy’s case. In Venkata Swamy v. Kotayya a Bench of our High Court held explaining the words waste and damage as follows:
“What is required is that the Court should not merely exercise the power vested in it under this rule in an arbitrary or unregulated manner but according to legal principles after consideration of the whole of the circumstances of the case and the Court has complete discretion in this matter.” In C.H. Rajamma v. P.V. Reddy, , relying upon Krishnaswamy’s case and Venkataswamy’s case referred to above it has been held as follows:
(1) The appointment of receiver cannot be resorted to lightly without considering the entire facts and circumstances.
(2) The party seeking the appointment of a receiver must make out a case that he/ she was not only kept out of possession of the properties unauthorisedly, but the party in possession is indulging in acts of waste leading to the inference of incompetence.
(3) If prima facie the plaintiff has excellent chance of succeeding in the suit, the conduct of the opposite party in keeping the plaintiff out of possession of the properties will be a relevant consideration for directing the opposite party to deposit a sum of money approximately representing the value of the yield pertaining to the share of the plaintiff pending disposal of the suit and even in such circumstances a receiver should not be appointed to oust the possession of the opposite party from the joint family properties.
It has been further held that the protection of the properties and safeguarding of the rights of the parties shall be the twin objectives impelling the appointment of a receiver.
5. I have gone through the impugned order and the connected record. There appears to be no pleading that the defendants are going to cause damage to the suit schedule lands. When there is no danger or imminent loss to the property, the question of appointing receiver does not arise. While appointing the receiver the Court must exercise great caution and circumspection. The Trial Court has considered the documentary evidence placed on record and found that the appellants/plaintiffs failed to place on record, prima fade, that item No. 2 in the plaint A schedule and items 1, 2, 7 to 9 of the plaint B schedule belonged to joint family. Keeping in view the relationship between the parties and prima facie claim of the appellants/plaintiffs in respect of item No. 1 in the plaint A schedule and items 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 in the plaint B schedule lands and tractor shown in item No. 1 of plaint C schedule the Trial Court directed the respondents/defendants to deposit Rs. 3,000/-per month. The order passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge is just and proper in the circumstances of the case. I do not see any valid ground to interfere with the impugned order.
6. In the result, this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal fails and the same is dismissed confirming the order dated 16-12-1997 passed in IA No. 630 of 1997 in OS No. 76 of 1997 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Machilipatnam. Since the suit is of the year 1997, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.