JUDGMENT
Usha Mehra, J.
(1) Leave to defend was sought by Sh.Chander Mohan Saigal, petitioner herein (respondent before the Rent Controller). The said application was dismissed by the Controller vide his order dated 15th September. 1993 and an order of eviction under Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988, (hereinafter called the Act) was passed, with direction to handover the possession of the premises in question.
(2) The impugned order has been assailed inter alia. .on the ground that the respondent No. 1 herein (petitioner before the Rent Controller) being neither the owner nor landlord of the property in question had no locus standi to file eviction petition under Section 14-B of the Act. The present petitioner was inducted as tenant by one Mr.Inder Mohan Trehan. Rent was used to be received by him. He in fact was the landlord. There did not exist any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parlies. Thus friable issue had been raised for which Controller ought to have granted leave. If this issue had been decided on merits it would disentitle the present respondent No. I from claiming recovery of possession. Moreover the premises in question was let out for residential- cum-commercial purpose. The same was not required bonafide by the respondent No. 1. The trial court erred in relying upon the documents filed by respondent No. I as well as placing reliance on the affidavit of Shri Inder Mohan Trehan. which are ex-facie inadmissible at the stage of deciding the application for leave to defend. The eviction petition was had for non impending other legal heirs of late Bawa Harsaran Singh. Complete particulars in the eviction petition were not disclosed. Even otherwise under Section 25-B (5) of the Act. the Rent Controller was duty bound to grant the leave to defend.
(3) In order to appreciate the challenge to the impugned order, the brief facts of the case as set up arc that the properly No.7-A/77, Western Extension Area. Karol Bagh. New Delhi, was let out to the present petitioner in the year 1980, through respondent No.1’s agent Inder Mohan Trehan. Respondent No.1’s father Bawa Harsaran Singh was the owner of this property, he died on 21st August. 1965 at Jallandhar leaving behind four sons and daughters. Respondent No. I being a son inherited this property Along with other sons of late Bawa Harsaran Singh. Out of four sons two sons of late Bawa Harsaran Singh namely Dr. H.S. Bawa and J.S. Bawa died in February-March 1992 respectively. Their shares in this property devolved on their legal heirs. Sh. S.S. Bawa, respondent No.3 herein, is co-owner Along with respondent No. I of this property. The premises in question was let out to the present petitioner for residential purposes. Mr. Inder Mohan Trehan had been instructed to collect the rent on their behalf and then disburse the same to the respondents herein. Respondent No. 1 retired from defense service w.e.f. 31st August, 1992. After his retirement he requires this premises for his residence and for the residence of his family members. Being a retired army officer he filed the eviction petition under the special provision prescribed under Section 14-B of the Act. It was further pleaded that the present petitioner (Respondent before the Rent Controller) had acquired his own house at 24. Ashoka Appartments. Pa.schim Vihar. New Delhi, and has in fact shifted in his said house w.e.f. 1st January. 1993.
(4) In response to the notice issued by the Controller, the present petitioner filed leave to defend application with his affidavit in which he denied the relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties and also denied the factum of letting purpose as residential. That other legal heirs of late Bawa Harsaran Singh namely daughters having not been imp leaded as party the petition was liable to be dismissed and that the accommodation under tenancy of the present petitioner was not sufficient for the respondent No. 1 and his family. Respondent No. 1 was neither the attorney nor authorised by other respondents to file this eviction petition. Respondent No.3, Sh.S.S. Bawa. had claimed himself to be the owner of the premises when he filed a suit for injunction against the petitioner. With these allegations parties filed their affidavit and reply affidavits.
(5) The basic right of seeking eviction by a retired armed personnel is given under the Amendment Act, 1988. The right conferred by section 14- B of the Act is a special riglit. It is not dependent upon the need of bonafide of the landlord. It accrues on and from the dale the landlord is released or retired from any armed forces. The only restriction placed by Section 14-B is-that the petition must be filed within one year from the date of release or retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, 1988. A tenant cannot be allowed to take up defense under Section 14(1) (c) as against application under Section 14-B. That would be against the intentions of the Legislature which brought on the statute hook, the special provisions like Section 14-B. The Supreme Court in the case of S.Surjit Singh Kalra Vs. Union of India & another. 1991 (1) Rcj 357 observed that it is unlikely that the legislature intended that sub section 4 and 5 of Section 25-B of the Act preserves the tenant’s right to contest an application of even a classified landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act. It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never found favor with ihe courts which have always adopted a purposive approach lo Ihe interpretation of Ihe statutes. Section 14-B and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and sub section 5 of Section 25-B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of Section 14-B. It is ihe duty of Ihe Court to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in Section 14-B. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlord nor such a landlord would be absolved from proving that his requirement is bonafide.
(6) Two requirements which have to be fulfillled in order to attract Ihe provisions of Section 14-B are-(1) the person seeking eviction is a landlord and (2) that he has retired from armed forces. It is art admitted fact on record that respondent No. 1 retired from armed forces on 31 st August, 1992. The eviction petition was filed within one year of his retirement. Therefore, so far as this condition is concerned, that stood satisfied.
(7) NOW. the question for consideration is whether respondent No. 1 is the “landlord” of Ihe premises in question. According to petitioner. Inder Mohan Trehan inducted him as tenant and it was he who had been received the rent. Moreover, Sh.S.S.Bawa, respondent No.3 had been claiming himself to be the owncr/ landlord. To strengthen his arguments. the petitioner placed reliance on the rent receipts issued by Inder Mohan Trehan from 1st October. 1980 to 8th January.1990 which he filed Along with his affidavit seeking leave to contest. By relying on these rent receipts trial court came to the conclusion that respondent No. 1. being co-heir of late Bawa Harsaran Singh, was the landlord of the premises. Mr. Singhla. counsel for ihe petitioner contended that trial court had no right or power to scrutinise these documents nor he could have placed reliance on these documents at the stage of deciding his application. By discussing and placing reliance on these rent receipts as well as the documents produced by respondent No.1 would amount to scrutinising and using these documents as evidence which is clearly against the decision of Supreme Court in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. Vs. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal and of this Court in Capt. (Retd.) Ravi Guptu Vs. Smt. Vidya Wati 1993(1) Rcj 214. There cannot be any quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in the above cases. But I am afraid Ihe observations made in the above cases are not applicable to the facts of this case. Supreme Court in Precision Steel (supra) was dealing with a case under Section 14(1)(c) of Ihe Act and not under the special provisions enacted by the Legislature in the form of Section 14-B. Section 14(1) starts with a non-obstante clause which would necessarily imply that the Controller is precluded from passing an order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises in favor of the landlord against the tenant unless the case is covered by any of the clauses of the proviso. One such enabling provision is the one enacted in Section 14(1) Proviso (e). Upon a true construction of proviso (c) to Section 14(1), it would unmistakably appear that the burden is on the landlord lo satisfy the Controller that the premises of which possession is sought was: (i) let lor residential purposes: and (ii) possession of the premises Was required bonafide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family etc.: and (iii) that the landlord or the person for whose benefit possession was sought had no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. This burden the landlord is required to discharge before the Controller gels jurisdiction to make an order for eviction. But that is not the case under Section 14-B. The requirement under Setion 14-B(1)(a) is that the person claiming eviction is landlord and that he has been released retired from armed forces and that the premises let out by him arc required for his own residence. The purpose of letting is significantly unlikely Section 14(1)(e). Section 14-B is silent about the purpose of letting. It is not the requirement of Section 14-B that the premises with regard to which eviction is sought must have been let out for residential purpose only. The requirement of thelandlord under Setion 14-B must be for residence meaning thereby that the premises are required for residence of the landlord released/ retired from armed forces. The need of the landlord is only to be established that he has no oilier reasonable alternative accommodation available with him. He has to prove only the need which may commensurate with his circumstances. Whereas in case under Section 14(l)(e) like that of Precision Steel (supra), the landlord had to establish bonafide requirement, purpose of letting etc. In that case the tenant had disputed the bonafide requirement of the landlord which is an essential requirement to be established for seeking the possession. But under Section 14-B he has only to prove that his need exisis. Therefore, the observation in Precision Steel with respect would not apply as such to a case under Section 14-B. Factum of respondent No. 1’s retirement from the armed forcc.s on 31st August,1992 is not disputed nor it is the defense of the present petitioner that respondent No. 1 has any of her reasonable suitable accommodation available with him at Delhi. It is also not disputed that he is one of the legal heir of late Bawa Harsaran Singh, original owner of the property in question.
(8) Even otherwise the observation of Supreme Court in Precision Steel thereby restricting the Controller from scrutinising the documents at that stage would not adversly effect the case of respondent No. I because the documents namely the rent receipts were produced by the petitioner himself Along with his affidavit. He cannot now agitate as to why those rent receipts had been relied upon and discussed by the Controller. Hence, on facts also the decision of Precision Steel and Capt. (Retd.) Ravi Gupta are not applicable. The rent receipts filed by the present petitioner and admitted by respondent No. 1 herein go to prove that Inder Mohan Trehan was neither the landlord nor the owner. The Controller did not commit any error by looking into these rent receipts for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion regarding the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parlies. Perusal of these rent receipts clearly reveal that Inder Mohan Trehan made it known to the petitioner through these receipts that he was neither the owner nor landlord of the premises in question and that he was collecting (he rent for and on behalf of the owner i.e. Bawa Harsaran Singh. Naturally after Bawa Harsaran Singh’s death, respondent No. 1 Along with other co-heirs stepped into the shoes of Bawa Harsaran Singh by inheriting the property and thus became owner/ landlord of the premises in question.
(9) Similarly in the case of Capt.(Rcld.) Ravi Gupta (Supra) Santosh Duggal, J. observed that only affidavits of the parties are to be taken into consideration while deciding application for leave to contest. These observations were made by placing reliance on the decision of Precision Steel (Supra). I have already pointed out that requirements under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act are quite distinct than that under Section 14-B of the Act. Therefore, the observation in Capt.(Retd.) Ravi Gupta’s case would also not apply to the facts of this case. Even as per Precision Steel an admitted document can always be relied upon by the Controller for deciding the application for leave to contest. For this reason also. I say that placing of reliance on rent receipts which had been admitted-by the parties, the Controller did not commit any error. The other contention of the petitioner that respondent No. I being the co-owner had no right to file an eviction petition is also without merits. The mere fact that respondent No.3 filed a petition claiming himself to be the owner/ landlord would not act as a bar for respondent No. I to file this eviction petition. He being co-heir has a right to claim eviction for the premises in question particularly after his retirement from the armed services. The co-owner is as much a owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the properly is. In the case of Smt. Kanta Goel Vs. B.P. Pathak & Others, , Supreme Court observed that co-owner can sue for eviction in the absence of other co-owners who have no objection. In this case other co-hairs co-owners were imp leaded as party. They have not filed any objection to respondent No. 1’s petition. Therefore, the objection of the petitioner that respondent No.1 being the co-owner could not have filed the petition, to my mind, deserves to be rejected.
(10) PETITIONER’S contention that premises was not let out by respondent No.1 himself hence he could not seek eviction is also without force. What is significant to know is that in Section 14-B although expression landlorsd’ has been used, it is circumscribed by the word let out by him. Use of these words in section 14-B(1)(a) is of a great significance. Under Section 14-A also the words let out by him’ have been used and these words came up for consideration in Smt.Kanta Goel (Supra). The Supreme Court observed that these words mean [hat the lease must be under the landlord directly. In Kanta Goel’s case father of the petitioner therein had let out the premises being the owner. Father died, petitioner therein inherited the property and thus sloped into the shoes of his father, It was held that the said petitioner was covered by the words “let out by him”. In the case in hand the premises was owned by the father of the respondent No.1. He died, the respondent No. 1 being co-heir inherited the property in question. The premises in question was let out to the petitioner by the legal heirs of deceased Bawa Harsaran Singh through their agent Inder Mohan Trehan. These facts clearly establish that qua the present petitioner, it is present respondents who had let out the premises through their agent but under their direct control.
(11) The respondent No. I had with his reply affidavit placed on record the/Will of his father bequeathing the property to his sons in exclusion of his daughters. He also placed on record a letter written by respondent No.3 to Inder Mohan Trehan on 5th April. 1976 besides producing on record the affidavit of Inder Mohan Trehan dated 28th June.1993. The Controller look into consideration the ‘Will’, the letter and the affidavit. The contention of counsel for the petitioner that these documents could not have been looked into,.to my mind, has no force, firstly these documents formed part of respondent’s reply affidavit, hence the Controller could rely the same and secondly these documents were produced to clarify the position regarding inheritance of the property after the death of his father Bawa Harsaran Singh, owner of the property and how Inder Mohan Trehan was asked to let out the premises in question and to receive the rent on their behalf and thereafter the collected rent to be disbursed amongst the respondents. Even if these documents had not been relied by the collector, still to my mind, the present petitioner had not made out any case disentitling respondent No. I from recovering the possession of the premises in question. For arriving at this conclusion, I am supported by the admitted facts, namely, Bawa Harsaran Singh was the original owner of the property. He died in 1965 leaving behind four sons including respondent No.1. Respondent No.1 is co-heir in the property. After his father’s death he stepped into his father’s shoes. Hence being co-heir he is legally within his right to claim eviction subject to fulfillling the conditions as stipulated under section 14-B of the Act. It is well settled principle of law that one of the coheirs, without impleading the other co-heirs can ask for the eviction. Therefore, even in the absence of the ‘Will’, the respondent No.1 had locus standi to file the petition under Section 14-B. As regard the letter dated 7th April,1976 , is of no consequences,. By that letter, one of the co-heirs intimated to Inder Mohan Trehan to collect the rent on their behalf and disburse the same to them. This contention of the respondent No. I is fully fortified by Ihe rent receipts produced by Ihe petitioner himself. The reading of these rein receipts clearly show that Inder Mohan Trehan was receiving the rent for and on behalf of the owners/landlords. Therefore, the rent receipts produced by the petitioner negates his contention that respondent No. 1 was not the landlord or that Mr. Trehan was. Nor this plea, which is against the documents produced by the petitioner himself, would disentitle the landlord from seeking the eviction. In the present case Mr.Trehan as of right was not entitled to receive the rent. He had no right except which was given to him by the respondents/ owner of the property and that too subject to conditions that after receiving the rent, he was to disburse that rent amongst the respondents, owners/ landlords. This shows Mr.Trehan had no right as such to receive the rent. Thus the mere fact that Mr.Trehan was collecting the rent, would not make him the landlord vis-a-vis the respondents who are the owners and have right and entitle to receive the same.
(12) Mr. Singhla further contented that even if respondent No. I is declared owner, still he cannot be construed to under Section 2(e) of the Act. It is Mr. Trehan who would be the landlord of this premises. This argument has no force. Section 2(e) of the Act defines the word “landlord” which means a person who, for the time being, is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, any other person or as a trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent if the premises were let to a tenant (underlining is mine).
(13) Reading of the definition of “landlord” shows that a person would also be a landlord who is entitled to receive rent for the benefit or on behalf of other persons.ut the mere fact of receiving such a rent would not make a person a landlord as held in Smt, Balquis Jehan Begum V. Sihghalulla and another 1971 Rcr page 95 (at 97) it was observed that “the mere physical fact of receiving rent, without anything more, would not make the person who received it the landlord of the premises. The word “landlord” cannot be given such an extended meaning and the word soused therein must mean only a Lesser or a person in whom the reversion of the lease has actually vested. This is so because Section 14 (1) of the Act contemplates determination of the lease by the landlord. The relevant consideration to determine as to how the relationship of landlord-tenant was created.is as to with what animus the rent or consideration was received and that takes one, in most cases, to the doctrine of intention. Acceptance and payment of rent may be of great substance, but the same cannot be considered to be decisive regarding the tenancy particulary when it could otherwise be explained. It is in this reference that respondent No. I’s affidavit is to be seen. From the perusal of the facts and particularly the admitted rent receipts which have come on record, it can safely be said that Mr.Trehan was neither the owner nor the landlord of the premises. While issuing these receipts he did not conceal anything from the tenant rather made it clear that he was accepting the rent for the owner/ landlord. Hence the intention of the parties can be inferred from the bare reading of these rent receipts produced by the petitioner himself. Even otherwise as held by this Court in Madan Lal V, Hazard Singh, 1977 (2) Rlr 641 and Rampiari V. M/s Delhi Fruit Co.. 1980 (1) Rcj 662 that the owner of the property would .be a landlord since he is entitled to receive rent. A landlord who is holding the property for himself, and for his own benefit, is certainly the owner/ landlord. When a landlord is also owner of the property and there is no other person charming ownership of the property against the tenant, it is such a landlord who will be entitled to claim eviction and would be the landlord. In this case Inder Mohan Trehan has not claimed ownership of the property rather he clarified that he was acting for the owner. Respondent No. I and his co-heirs are in fact entitled to receive the rent and being co-heir respondent No. I is the landlord qua the petitioner/tenant even though he received the rent through his agent Mr.Trehan. The complexion of the case would have been different, if Mr.Trehan had at any stage staked the claim to be the owner/ landlord of the property. He has not staked any such claim on the contrary vide his affidavit he has denied being the “landlord”. He being agent of the principal i.e. the landlord, his affidavit has been rightly looked into by the Controller in order to infer the animus. Even otherwise the animus is clear from the reading of the rent receipts. The factum of Mr.Trehan acting for the landlord was clearly understood by the present petitioner. Therefore, at this stage it does not lie in his mouth to say that Inder Mohan Trehan is the landlord and not respondent No. 1.
(14) Mere alleging that there does not exist relationship of landlord and tenant is not a sufficient nor can be treated ex-facie a tribal issue. The affidavit of the tenant must disclose such facts which would disentitle the landlord from obtaining the order for eviction. In this case the tenant has not raised any plea which can constitute a friable issue. Moreover, Sub-section (3) of Section 48 of the Act, which has now been brought on the statute book by the Amendment Act, 1988, provides that if any landlord relent or transfer the whole or any part of any premises in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 19, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with Fine, or with both. Not only Section 19 creates a bar of three years for releting the premises but further provides that the said premises be occupied within two months after obtaining such possession and if he fails to do so, he would be liable to be punished under sub-section (3) of Section 48. In view of these stringent provisions, it cannot be presumed that respondent No. I is asking for the eviction for fun sake.
(15) It would not be out of place to mention that the tenant’s right to contest the application under Section 14-B is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the Section. He cannot be allowed to widen the scope of his defense as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sardar Surjit Singh Kaira (Supra).
(16) The contention of Mr. Singla that respondent No. I is now residing at Chandigarh is also without force. Admittedly, respondent No.1 has no accommodation available at Delhi. Merely because he is residing at Chandigarh does not mean that his need is not bonafide. Moreover this plea was not taken before the Trial Court and in revision it cannot be allowed. The argument advanced at the bar that respondent No. I has shifted to Chandigarh is irrelevant. Allegations are vague. It is nobody’s case that respondent No.1 does not need this house turn his residence. Respondent No.1’s stand through out has been consistent that after retirement from the armed forces he needs this premises for his residence and that he has no other accommodation available at Delhi. Hence his need is bonafide.
(17) For the reasons stated above, I find no merits in this petition nor any in ferity in the impugned order. Petition is accordingly dismissed.