JUDGMENT
Venkatachala, J.
1. Questions of somewhat importance arise for our consideration and decision in this petition filed under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (“the Act”).
2. Material facts giving rise to such questions are briefly these –
The complainant in this petition is plaintiff in a suit pending before the Court of Munsiff at Haveri – a subordinate Court. The person arrayed as an accused in this petition is an Advocate who has filed vakalath for the defendants in that suit. The complainant filed an interlocutory application (I.A.) in that suit seeking from the subordinate Court an order of termination of the accused’s vakalath which had been filed on behalf of the defendants therein. Two reasons given in support of such termination were – (i) Complainant’s earlier consultation with the accused on matters involved in the suit; and (ii) Attestation by the accused of the signatures of deponents to affidavits filed in support of an other interlocutory application which had been filed in the suit at an earlier stage. The said I.A., which sought for termination of the accused’s vakalath, was contested by the accused by means of a statement of objections filed thereto. Complainant’s application for termination of the accused’s vakalath filed for the defendants in the suit, it was alleged in that statement of objections, had been made at the instigation of his (complainant’s) Advocate Sri S. R. Nilavagi. Professional jealousy and political rivalry existing between S. R. Nilavagi and the accused, the accused having appeared on behalf of the prosecution in a criminal proceeding before a Magistrate’s Court in which Sri Nilavagi had been arrayed as an accused were stated to be the causes for such instigation. The complainant (plaintiff), who treated the contents of the accused’s statement of objections as aspersions made against his Advocate Sri Nilavagi, being of the view that they constituted criminal contempt of subordinate Court, sought consent in writing of the Advocate General, as required under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S. 15 of the Act, for making a motion in the matter before this Court. The consent so sought from the Advocate General being refused, the complainant has filed the present petition before this Court purporting to be under S. 15(1) of the Act, the prayer therein being to initiate proceedings against the accused for criminal contempt of the subordinate Court finding that the contents of the statement of objections relating to instigation attributed to his Advocate Sri Nilavagi were aspersions made against him and they constituted criminal contempt of a subordinate Court. On the petition so filed by the complainant, the registry of this Court having raised an objection regarding its maintainability under S. 15(1) of the Act and a notice being ordered by this Court to the accused thereon, the accused has come to be represented by a learned Advocate of this Court. At the time the petition was listed for orders on the question of the maintainability of the petition, by consent of learned counsel appearing on both sides, we heard them not only on the question of maintainability, but also on the question of initiating action on the accused for contempt of the subordinate Court on the basis of the contents in his statement of objections filed in the subordinate Court regarded by the complainant as aspersions on his Advocate.
3. The questions which, on the basis of the said facts and in the light of the arguments addressed before us by learned counsel appearing for the opposing parties arise for our consideration and decision may be formulated thus :
(i) Whether this Court (High Court) can take action against a person for criminal contempt of subordinate Court on a motion made by a party to a proceeding before such Court ?
(ii) Whether the matter in the statement of objections of the accused filed in opposition to an interlocutory application seeking termination of his services as an Advocate for the defendants would constitute criminal contempt of the subordinate Court as would warrant initiation of criminal contempt proceedings by this Court against him ?
Re. Question (i) :
It may be stated at the outset that the complainant cannot make a motion to this Court to take action against a person for criminal contempt of a subordinate Court under sub-section (1) of S. 15 of the Act as is purported to have been done, in that, the operation of sub-section (1) is confined to cases of criminal contempt of the Supreme Court or the High Court itself, as held by the Supreme Court in S. K. Sarkar v. V. C. Misra, . However, as the correct provision in the Act which enables the High Court to take action for criminal contempt of its subordinate Court is sub-section (2) of S. 15 of the Act, it has to be seen whether the present contempt petition could be treated as the one maintainable under sub-section (2) of S. 15 of the Act, ignoring the label under which it has been filed.
The scope and ambit of sub-section (2) of S. 15 of the Act having been considered by the Supreme Court in S. K. Sarkar’s case (supra), it has been ruled that sub-section (2) of S. 15 does not deprive the High Court of the power of taking cognizance of criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion. Further, in that decision, while considering the basis or source of information on which the High Court can act on its own motion in taking cognizance of or punish contempt of a subordinate Court, it has expressed its view thus :
“19. It is, however, to be noted that S. 15 does not specify the basis or the source of information on which the High Court can act on its own motion. If the High Court acts on information derived from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records of a subordinate Court or on reading a report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech, without there being any reference from the subordinate court or the Advocate General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on its own motion. But if the High Court it directly moved by a petition by a private person feeling aggrieved, not being the Advocate General, can the High Court refuse to entertain the same on the ground that it has been made without the consent in writing of the Advocate General ? It appears to us that the High Court, has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis of the information supplied to it in that petition. If the petitioner is a responsible member of the legal profession, it may act suo motu, more so, if the petitioner-advocate, as in the instant case, prays that the court should act suo motu. The whole object of prescribing these procedural modes of taking cognizance in S. 15 is to safeguard the valuable time of the High Court or the Supreme Court from being wasted by frivolous complaints of contempt of court. If the High Court is prima facie satisfied that the information received by it regarding the commission of contempt of a subordinate court is not frivolous, and the contempt alleged is not merely technical or trivial, it may, in its discretion, act suo motu and commence the proceedings against the contemner. However, this mode of taking suo motu cognizance of contempt of a subordinate Court, should be resorted to sparingly where the contempt concerned is of a grave and serious nature. Frequent use of this suo motu power on the information furnished by an incompetent petition, may render these procedural safeguards provided in sub-section (2), otiose. In such cases, the High Court may be well advised to avail of the advice and assistance of the Advocate General before initiating proceedings.”
From the above view expressed by the Supreme Court, we are not left in doubt that a contempt petition moved before the High Court by a private party to take action for contempt of its subordinate Court cannot be said to be unmaintainable though the High Court may refuse to act suo motu and commence the proceedings for contempt of subordinate Court on the basis of the information furnished in that petition.
Re. Question (ii) :
It is pointed out earlier that the matter contained in the statement of objections filed by the accused in resisting an application made against him in a suit before the subordinate Court seeking termination of his services as an Advocate for the defendants, is what is sought to be made use of by the complainant to initiate proceedings against him (accused) for criminal contempt of subordinate Court by filing the present petition. As to what is that matter is of importance in deciding whether the same warrants initiation of proceedings against the accused for criminal contempt of subordinate Court. The English version of the Kannada passage, which constitutes the matter of the objection statement of the accused, as given in the present petition, may be usefully reproduced :
“What the true facts are : “in my profession as Advocate, I have filed proceedings of a complainant on behalf of Sri S. R. Vardimath in C.C. No. 31/85 on the file of the Court of Munsiff and JMFC Court, Haveri against Sri S. R. Nelivigi, Advocate as accused-5 and it is pending. Therefore Sri S. R. Nelivigi, Advocate taking an attitude of revenge, merely upon the fact of signing the affidavits of the witness as persons known to me, at his instigation I.A. III has been got filed. Sri S. R. Nelivigi, Advocate has instigated plaintiff to file I.A. II on account of his professional jealousy in my Advocate’s profession and political rivalry between me and him.”
What now needs examination is whether the above matter respecting the conduct of the Advocate of the complainant (plaintiff in the suit) found in the statement of objections of the accused, could be regarded as aspersions on that Advocate which would interfere or tend to interfere with the course of justice as would warrant taking of suo motu action for criminal contempt of subordinate Court against its maker, to wit, the accused. Such examination, it is needless to point out, has to be done keeping in view the warning administered by the Supreme Court in Sarkar’s case (supra) that the mode of taking suo motu cognizance of a contempt of a subordinate Court should be resorted to sparingly where the contempt concerned is of a grave and serious nature and frequent use of this suo motu power on the information furnished by an incompetent petition may render the procedural safeguards provided under the provision, otiose. On a reading of the above matter, we cannot help thinking that the Advocate Sri S. R. Nilavigi of the complainant (plaintiff) in the trial court has a serious grouse against the accused-Advocate as he is appearing on behalf of the prosecution in a criminal case before a Magistrate’s Court, in which he is arrayed as an accused. Moreover, the facts stated in the present petition by the complainant, in themselves, show that the accused-Advocate though was a junior counsel with the complainant’s Advocate at one stage, their relationship is very much strained and rivalry has developed between them not only in the professional field but also in politics. If regard is had to these facts and circumstances, it is rather difficult to think that the aspersions made by the accused in the statement of objections filed opposing an interlocutory application of the complainant seeking termination of his (accused) vakalath for the defendants can be regarded as the one interfering or tending to interfere with the course of justice. We also find it difficult to think that the aspersions, in the circumstances it is made, could be regarded by the Advocate for the complainant Sri Nilavigi as one which would embarrass him and make him refuse his professional services to the complainant. The fact that it is not the Advocate who has come forward stating that he has been embarrassed by the aspersions of the accused made against him seeking suo motu action from this Court for contempt of subordinate Court by the accused, but it is his client, itself is an indication that the aspersions concerned are not of such a nature as would interfere or tend to interfere with the course of justice. Even if the aspersions are regarded as those which have a tendency to interfere with the course of justice, they are to be regarded as whose which are not grave or serious, but ignorable, and as such they do not warrant initiation of criminal contempt proceedings against the accused by this Court. Hence, the matter in the statement of objections of the accused filed in opposition to an interlocutory application seeking termination of his services as an Advocate for the defendants, does not constitute criminal contempt of subordinate Court as would warrant initiation of criminal proceedings by this Court against him.
4. In the result, this contempt petition is dismissed without being admitted.
5. Petition dismissed.