JUDGMENT
T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
1. The landlord is the petitioner. He applied for eviction of his tenant, namely, respondent No.2 on the ground of non payment of rent of Rs. 3300/-. The Assistant Collector First Grade, Narnaul, decreed the suit and directed the tenant to pay the rent of Rs. 3300/- along with proportionate costs and gave six months time to the tenant to deposit the rent as decreed. In accordance with the terms of the decree, tenant-respondent No.2 deposited the sum of Rs. 4116/- within the said period of six months but the petitioner contended that the total amount including the costs to be deposited by the tenant amounted to Rs. 4290/-. Thus, a short fall of Rs. 174/- in making the deposit was there and, therefore, the tenant made himself liable to be evicted. The Assistant Collector First Grade vide his order dated July, 8, 1981, directed the ejectment of the tenant-respondent No.2 from the land as he failed to deposit the entire amount of Rs. 4290/- as he deposited only a sum of Rs. 4116/- within the stipulated period thereby leaving a balance of Rs. 174/- and accordingly directed the eviction of tenant respondent No.2 from the land. The tenant preferred the revision petition before the Financial Commissioner Haryana, who allowed the revision petition and allowed the tenant-respondent No. 2 to deposit the remaining amount of Rs. 174/- along with the counsel fee of Rs. 100/- by his order dated May 26, 1982. Challenging the order of the Financial Commissioner, the landlord filed this writ petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Financial Commissioner has no jurisdiction to revise the order as the tenant failed to avail the remedy of appeal as provided under Section 39(1)(2) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. 1955. He further argued that the costs include within the term of rent. Though the tenant-respondent No.2 deposited over and above the amount of Rs. 3300/- which was determined as rent but he failed to satisfy me entire decree within the stipulated period of six months by making a deposit of the entire amount including costs and thus there is a default in payment of rent and, therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted and the Financial Commissioner erred in allowing the revision petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the Financial Commissioner has no power to extend the time for making deposit and, therefore, the orders of the Financial Commissioner are liable to be quashed.
3. It is no doubt true that Section 39(1)(2) of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 provides for filing an appeal against the orders of the Assistant Collector to the Collector and also to the Commissioner against the orders of the Collector. Sub-section 3 of Section 39 empowers the Financial Commissioner to Call for, examine and revise the proceedings of the prescribed authority or the Assistant Collector First Grade or the collector or the Commissioner as is provided under Section 84 of the Pepsu Tenancy Act, 1887. A reading of the Sub-section 3 of Section 39 clearly shows that it does not debar the Financial Commissioner from entertaining the revision petition unless the aggrieved party files an appeal. A reading of Sub-section 3 clearly makes out, even if the aggrieved party does not prefer an appeal nevertheless the Financial Commissioner has got the power to -exercise his revisional jurisdiction. As held by the Full Bench of this Court in Gurnam Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1992-2)102 P.L.R. 746 (F.B.) that revisional power can be exercised suo-motu or at the instance of interested or aggrieved parties. It has been observed in the above decision as follows :-
“The aforesaid provision does not specifically mention that such powers could be exercised by the Commissioner or by the Financial Commissioner suo moto or at the instance of the interested or the aggrieved parties. In the absence of use of such phraseology, it cannot be said that the Financial Commissioner or the Commissioner could not set under the provisions aforesaid. Rather, the statute is to be interpreted in such a manner that it fulfills the object for which the same is framed. As and when the Financial Commissioner acts under Section 84 referred to above, he would be acting in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. It would be immaterial whether he was moved by the Department or by any person un-interested, interested or aggrieved.”
Thus, the Financial Commissioner can exercise his suo motu powers of revision even at the instance of the aggrieved party.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Financial Commissioner has to exercise his revisional powers as provided in Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887. If after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of the opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground, the Financial Commissioner, may, at any time call for the record of any case pending before or disposed of by any Revenue Officer or Revenue Court subordinate to him. Basing on this Sub-section 5 of Section 84, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the revisional powers can be exercised only in terms of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the revisional powers can be exercised by the High Court in case where no appeal lies but a reading of Sub-section 5 of Section 84 of the Act does not debar the Financial Commissioner from exercising his revisional powers, if no appeal is preferred against the impugned order. Under Sub-section 5 of Section 84, the Financial Commissioner can exercise his revisional powers on any of the grounds on which the High Court can exercise his revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, it is only the grounds which enable the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure that are applicable to suo motu powers of revision to be exercised by the Financial Commissioner. The requirement “in which no appeal lies thereto” in Section 115 C.P.C. is not directed to revisions to be filed before the Financial Commissioner. The only requirement for the Financial Commissioner to exercise his revisional jurisdiction is that if it appears to him that the authorities below exercised the jurisdiction not vested in them by law or failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or to have acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. If any one of these three grounds is present, then the Financial Commissioner can certainly exercise his revisional powers even though no appeal is preferred by the aggrieved person. A reading of Section 39(c) and Sub-section 5 of Section 84 makes it clear that even in the absence of an appeal filed by the aggrieved party, the Financial Commissioner can exercise his suo motu powers of revision even at the instance of the aggrieved party. This view of mine also gets support from the decision of this Court in Amir Chand v. State of Punjab, 1969 P.L.J. 484. Therefore, the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any merit.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner next argued that there is a failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the entire decretal amount which came to Rs. 4290/-. He deposited only a sum of Rs. 4116/-. Thus, there is a default in satisfying the entire decretal amount by non payment of Rs. 174/-.. In this context, it is useful to refer Section 7 of the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Land Act, 1956 :-
“No tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of this Act or except of any of the following grounds namely :-
(a) * * * * * * * * *
(b) that the tenant has failed to pay rent within a period of six months after it falls due :
Provided that no tenant shall be ejected under this clause unless he has been afforded on opportunity to pay the arrears of rent within a further period of six months from the date of the decree or order directing his ejectment and he had failed to pay such arrears during that period.”
Admittedly, the tenant deposited more than Rs. 3200/-. The Assistant Collector determined the rent at Rs. 3300/-. Therefore, the rent as determined by the Assistant Collector has been deposited by the tenant. No doubt true, there is a default in paying the entire decreetal amount including the costs by non deposit of Rs. 174/- only. The question, therefore, is whether the costs include in the term rent. Rent is defined in Sub-section 3 of the Section 4. According to the said definition, whatever is payable to the landlord in terms of money or service of kind on account of use or occupation of the land held by him is rent. Thus, it is clear that the rent is the amount payable by the tenant for the beneficial enjoyment of the land leased out. Costs which were awarded in a decree for recovery of the arrears of rent will not and cannot be included in the definition of rent. Under Section 7 of the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Land Act, 1956, the tenant is made liable to be evicted only if he fails to pay the rent within the time stipulated. He is not liable to be evicted for non payment of costs awarded in the decree. In my view rent can be termed as debt., due from the tenant to the landlord. Costs cannot be included in the debt. It has been held in S. Rajyalakshmi v. Smt. S. Sitamahalakshmi, A.I.R. 1976 A.P. 361, that costs included in the decree is not a debt and, therefore, no succession certificate under Section 214 of the Indian Succession Act is necessary for recovery of the costs as it does not include within the term debt. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the tenant has paid the entire amount of rent as determined by the Assistant Collector First Grade. Therefore, there is no arrears of rent payable by the tenant to the landlord under the decree so as the make him liable to be evicted under Section 7 of the Pepsu Tenancy Agricultural Land Act 1956.
6. The third contention of the learned counsel is that neither the Assistant Collector nor the Financial Commissioner has got the power to extend time for payment of the rent beyond the period stipulated in the statute. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition of law.
7. In view of my foregoing discussion, I do not find any ground warranting interference with the impugned order of the Financial Commissioner. The writ petition is, therefore liable to be dismissed.
8. Result is, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. However there will be no order as to costs. Order of the Financial Commissioner, is hereby confirmed.