JUDGMENT
S.N. Kapoor, J.
(1) These three writ petitions which raise common question of law and facts, are being disposed of by this common judgment. Common questions are as follows: I)Whether a writ could be maintained by just challenging a demand raised by Municipal Authorities? ii) Whether
(2) In all these three writ petitions, petitioners have filed writs for quashing the demand of property tax raised for the years 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 relating to flats No. 301 to 303 Avg Bhawan, 3 Connaught Place, New Delhi, and relating to flat No. 103 and 105, M-3 Connaught Place and seeking a mandamus directing the respondents to determine the house tax by arriving at the standard rent by resorting to the provisions of Section 6 of Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called the Drc Act for short) on the basis of the purchase price of flats.
(3) According to the petitioners, they purchased these flats. The petitioners, arbitrarily fixed the annual value. The petitioners again received bills followed by notices dated 25th October 1982 under Section 82 and 83 of Punjab Municipal Act (hereinafter called the Pm Act). The assessment had neither been made on the principles of Section 6 of the Drc Act nor in accordance with law laid down in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor v. Ndmc, nor they have taken into consideration the value of the price of the flat paid by them. Hence the writ petition seeking the above said reliefs.
(4) The Ndmc have contested these petitions and challenged maintainability of the petition in view of Section 88 of the Pm Act for the petitioners failed to exhaust the remedy available under Section 84 of the Pm Act for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84. These writ petitions also involve questions of fact. The petitioners have failed to pay the property tax in previous years and the recovery of unpaid property tax was justified. The assessments had been finalised in terms of Section 9(4) of the Pm Act and the bills were based thereon. The Ndmc further contested the claim of the petitioners that the annual value of the flat should be determined on the basis of the consideration amount of the flat for it did not represent the cost of construction on market value of the land at the time of commencement of construction.
(5) After having gone through the record and hearing the counsel, it is apparent that the assessment under Section 9(4) of Drc Act was not justified and in view of the judgment in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapur case (supra) and Dr. Balbir Singh v. Mcd, .
(6) As regards the plea that the property should have been assessed on the price paid by the petitioners, though it may be presumed to be true that, cost of land would be included in the amount of the price along with cost of construction, yet it includes profit of the builder also. Even in such cases the evidence would be available about the cost of the land on which such multi-storeyed building was constructed. If actual cost is not known, then Sale Deed of comparable land of date(s) nearest to the date of commencement of construction, could be relied upon for estimating the value of the land at the relevant date. Copies of sale deeds would be available in the record of the respondent relating to mutation of properties. Similarly, if actual cost of construction is not known, cost of construction could be estimated on the basis of Cpwd rates. By adding the cost of land and cost of construction thereon,the total sum could be proportionately divided for the purpose of assessing annual value and gross annual rent of individual flats under Section 6 of Drc Act. As such it is possible to assess the “gross annual rent” at which such house or building together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let from year to year” as required under Section 3(b) of Pm Act.
(7) The next point about the bar of exhaustion of the equally efficacious remedy by way of appeal etc. In ordinary course, it may not be very appropriate to resort to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 if an alternative efficacious remedy is available. However, an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of the petition where an authority has acted wholly without jurisidiction. One has to take into consideration that in case of allegation relating to infringement of fundamental rights, lack of jurisdiction in the Tribunal trying the matter and in cases where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice, it has been held that the exhaustion of alternative remedy is no bar to entertaining the writ under Article 226 the reason being that in such matters the order can be treated as void or non-est (See Himmat Lal v. State of Mp, , Babu Ram v. Zila Prasad, , Carl Still G.m.b.H v. State of Bihar, .
(8) Besides, the relief under Article 226 should not be denied where the adjudication involves pure question of determination of law (See State of Up v. Hume Pipes, ; where a number of persons each having a stake of small amount (see M/s Shiv Shanker Dal Mills v. State of Haryana & ors. Air 1980 Sc 1036 and The Nawabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. & os. v. The Union of India & ors., 1976 Sc 1152 and where the right of appeal or revision has been lost by .the time the matter was disposed of by the High Court.
(9) In these cases, the rule Db were issued more than a decade ago. The assessing authority has not fixed the standard rent as was required in New Delhi Municipal Committee v. M.N. Soi & anr., and in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor’s case (supra). If we see the present assessment in the light of Dr. Balbir Singh’s case, it would appear that the-assessing authority have failed to follow these judgments. It may be mentioned that they are binding on all of us under Article 141 of the Constitution. If any quasi-judicial authority like assessing authority in the present case fails to follow the ratio of distend of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court and if this court continued to keep the matter pending after issuing rule in these petitions for over a decade, we feel that it would be improper to refuse the relief on this ground.
(10) In view of the above, we allow these writ petitions, set aside the impugned assessment orders and the demands raised thereon. We direct the assessing authority to hear the petitioners and proceed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with the direction’s of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor (supra). Dr. Balbir Singh (supra) and in accordance with law.
(11) Parties are left to bear their own costs.