Andhra High Court High Court

Chinnappa U. vs Cotton Corporation Of India And … on 3 August, 1995

Andhra High Court
Chinnappa U. vs Cotton Corporation Of India And … on 3 August, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1997 (3) ALT 556
Author: P V Reddi
Bench: D Nasir, P V Reddi


ORDER

P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.

1. The question that falls for our consideration in this writ petition is whether a workman employed by a corporation, industry or an authority of State or Central Government can invoke the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (inserted by A.P. Act 32 of 1987), and straightaway file an application before the Labour Court inviting adjudication of the dispute relating to his termination without seeking reference of the dispute by the Central Government under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The petitioner who was a Cotton Purchase Officer in the 1st respondent-Corporation was removed from service on August 3, 1987 as a result of disciplinary enquiry. On appeal, the order passed by the disciplinary authority was confirmed. Thereafter he filed I.D. 73 of 1988 in the Labour Court, Guntur under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. On a preliminary objection raised by the Management, the Labour Court, Guntur by its order dated April 13, 1989 came to the conclusion that in the absence of reference by the Central Government under Section 10(1) read with Section 2-A of the Act, the petitioner cannot maintain the I.D. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court held that the Cotton Corporation of India Limited (1st respondent) is an ‘industry’ carried on under the authority of the Central Government as all the shares are owned by the Government of India and that the ultimate authority to control the entire adiministration vests with the President of India. On this premise the Labour Court further held that in the absence of reference of the dispute by the Central Government, the Labour Court cannot entertain and adjudicate the dispute. Adverting to Sub-section (2) of Section 2-A, the learned Judge was of the view that it applied only to “employees working under the control of the State Government, but does not apply to the employees working in the Central Government undertakings”. This order has been questioned by the aggrieved petitioner. Though the petitioner sought for the relief to set aside the order of removal, the same has not been pressed before us and the learned Counsel for the petitioner has rightly stated that propriety or otherwise of the removal order could be agitated before the Labour Court when once the matter is remitted to the Labour Court.

2. It may be mentioned that four other workmen of the respondent-Corporation filed I.Ds. at about the same time and they were all disposed of by a common order which covers the I.Ds. filed by the petitioner as well. It appears that those employees questioned the common order by filing writ petitions. Our learned brother S. R. Nayak, J., upheld the order of the Labour Court and dismissed the writ petitions holding that sthe provisions of Section 2-A(2) of the Act cannot be invoked and that the workmen could only seek reference by the Central Government under Section 10 of the Act. When this writ petition came up before our learned brother T.N.C. Rangarajan, J., he felt that the decision rendered by S. R. Nayak, J. in the aforementioned W.Ps. required reconsideration, and therefore referred the matter to the Division Bench and that is how this writ petition is before us.

3.The finding of the Labour Court that the respondent-Corporation is a Central Government undertaking and it is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government has not been challenged before us. We agree with the said finding which has met the approval of S. R. Nayak, J. in the writ petitions aforementioned.

4. The crux of the controversy herein whether, notwithstanding the provision for reference of the dispute by the Central Government as per Section 10(1)(c) of the Act, a person claiming to be a workman could straightaway move the Labour Court under sub-section (2) of Section 2-A of the Act. Sub-section (2) was introduced by Andbra Pradesh Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act (A.P. Act 32 of 1987). Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 2-A read as follows :

“Sub-section (1) : Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute :- Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between the workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.

Sub-section (2) : Notwithstanding anything in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may make an application in the prescribed manner direct to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein; and on receipt of such application the Labour Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter in the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to or pending be fore it, in accordance with the provisions this Act; and accordingly all the provision of this Act, shall apply in relation to such dispute as they apply in relation to any othe industrial dispute.”

5. Thus, while sub-section (1) provides that the dispute between the workman and his employer connected with discharge, dismissal, termination or retrenchment shall be deemed to bo an industrial dispute though it pertains to a single individual, sub-section (2) enables the workman to approach the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute of the nature referred to in sub-section (1). One crucial and significant aspect to be noted is that sub-section (2) was introduced by the A.P State Legislature alfter the Bill was reserved for consideration of the President of India and aftre the assent was given by the President.

6. Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India provides that :

“Where a law made by the Legislature of a State …… with respect to one of the matter, enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State :

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same. matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.”

7. ‘Trade Unions, industrial and labour disputes’ is in List III of the VII Schedule as Entry No. 22. Inasmuch as the subject-matter falls within the Concurrent List, it is open to the State Legislature to legislate on the subject so as not to conflict with the Central law covering the same field. However, in order that such a law should prevail over the law passed by the Parliament in case of conflict, the legislation proposed must receive the assent of the President as contemplated by Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. That is what exactly happened here. The scope of Section 254(2), and the effect of Presidential assent given under the said provision has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions. Suffice it to refer to the judgment in Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of karnataka, . Propositions (2) and (4) at paragraph of the majority judgment (Per Ranganath Misra, J.) are relevant :

“2. Where, however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.

3. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in its applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.”

8. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. M. R. K. Choudary that there is really no conflict between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 2-A of the Act, and both are complementary to each other inasmuch as sub-section (2) provides an additional remedy to the workman. However, it is not necessary to dilate on this issue further. We will assume that insofar as the dismissed or retrenched workman is able to approach the Labour Court straightaway, the power of the Central Government to make a reference of the dispute may be whittled down prolanto and in that sense there is a conflict or repugnancy with sub-section (2) of Section 2-A and Section 10(1) read with sub-section (1) of Section 2-A and Section 3 of the Act. Even then, the Presidential assent given under Article 254(2) makes the State law prevail over the provisions of the Central law to the extent of repugnancy. The fact that A.P. Amendment Act received the assent of the President was obviously not brought to the notice of our learned brother S. R. Nayak, J. and therefore the learned Judge took the view that the State law cannot abridge or restrict the power of the Central Government to make a reference under Section 10(1) in respect of the industries owned and controlled by it.

9. The next aspect is whether the operation of sub-section (2) of Section 2-A shall be confined only to the workmen employed in the industrial undertakings of the State Government, as interpreted by the Labour Court or it would govern all workmen irrespective df whether he is a workman engaged in an industry run by or under the authority of the Central Government or the State Government or any other industry located in the State. We find no warrant to restrict the scope and amplitude of the wide phraseology “any workman” employed in sub-section (2) of Section 2-A of the Act so as to hamper the right of ably workman who was discharged, dismissed, retrenched or terminated from employment or service. We do not think that any incongruity or anomaly would result by applying sub-section (2) to the cases of discharge, dismissal, termination or retrenchment of the workmen employed in an industry run by or under the authority of the Central Government. On the other hand, the purpose of the Act will be better served in placing an interpretation that it would apply to all categories of workmen. It is to be remembered that the State Government is as much concerned as the Central Government with the maintenance of industrial peace and welfare of the workmen. That is why the subject of Labour and Industrial disputes is assigned to the Concurrent List. Within the State, there need not be diversity approach in the matter of providing remedies to the aggrieved workmen. There is no good reason why the ambit and operation of Section 2-A should be restricted only to the workmen other than those employed in an industry run by or under the authority of the Central Government.

10. Viewed from any angle, we are unable to uphold the order of the Labour Court. We hold that the industrial dispute raised by the petitions under sub-section (2) of Section 2-A is maintainable Of course, we do not like to express any view on the merits of the case. The writ petition is therefore allowed and the impugned order. dated April 13, 1989 passed in I.D.No. 70 of 1988 by the Labour Court is set aside. The Labour Court is directed to restore I.D. No. 73 of 1988 on it file and decide the matter expeditiously as possible within a period of four months from date of receipt of this order. No costs.