High Court Orissa High Court

Chitta Ranjan Sahu vs State Of Orissa. on 8 January, 2002

Orissa High Court
Chitta Ranjan Sahu vs State Of Orissa. on 8 January, 2002
Author: R K Patra
Bench: P Balasubramanyan, R Patra


JUDGMENT

R. K. Patra, J.

1. This is a writ petition filed byway of public interest litigation. The petitioner who claims to be an inhabitant of Angul Town seeks quashing of the orders passed by the Tahasildar and Sub-Collector (opposite parties 6 and 5) and the final order passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (opposite party No. 3) granting lease to Talcher-Angul-Meramundali Regional Improvement Trust (opposite party No. 7). His further prayer is that the lands covered under the orders should be kept reserved as per the Master Plan and should be given to the Notified Area Council, Angul (opposite party No. 8) on the basis of its application to utilise the name for public purposes.

2. Briefly stated the petitioner’s case is that the disputed lands are government lands which have been included in the Master Plan of Angul town and are kept reserved in Category – III, i.e. for future requirement of the Government and other public purposes as envisaged under Clause (iii) of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Rules, 1983. The Notified Area Council, Angul (opposite party No. 8) on 31.12.1992 applied to Tahasildar (opposite party No. 6) for grant of lease of lands to the extent of five acres appertaining to plot Nos. 1611, 1723,1724, 948 (Part) and 948/2091

(Part) for establishment of Women’s Poly-Technic Centre, Kendriya Vidyalaya. When these applications were pending consideration, the Talcher-Angul-Meramundali Regional Improvement Trust-opposite party No. 7 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TAMRIT’) in January, 1993 applied for the self-same lands for grant of lease to provide house sites by way of doing business. These applications were registered as lease case Nos. 3/1993,4/1993 and 5/1993. The Tahasildar without giving proclamation and inviting objections from general public and without following the procedure laid down under the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962 and rules framed thereunder, illegally granted lease in favour of TAMRIT. According to the petitioner, since the disputed lands have been kept reserved in the Master Plan to be utilised in future for public purposes and when the Notified Area Council had applied for grant of lease in respect of the same, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner illegally sanctioned grant of lease in favour of TAMRIT ignoring the Master Plan. The TAMRIT would convert the lands to small plots and sell them out to private individuals who would construct their private houses which cannot be said to be for public purposes.

3. The TAMRIT has filed counter affidavit. Its case is that it is a statutory authority which came to be constituted under the provisions of the Orissa Town Planning & Improvement Trust Act, 1956 and is an instrumentality of the State. Its primary objective is to provide decent living facilities, sanitary amenities and to take up various public purpose schemes described in Chapter-IV of the said Act. The residential sites carved out in a planned manner by the TAMRIT are allotted to the members of the public belonging to weaker sections which is in interest of the general community. The allegation that the TAMRIT would convert the lands and sell them to private individuals with profit motive has been denied in the counter affidavit. Keeping in view the National Housing Policy, The TAMRIT applied for grant of lease and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner after conducting spot inquiry and on being satisfied that the lands could be settled with TAMRIT under the provisions of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Act, 1962 and the rules framed thereunder passed the impugned orders.

4. On our direction, the learned State Counsel has made us available the relevant records of lease cases. On perusal of these records, it appears that the Secretary, TAMRIT made three applications for grant of Government land to the Tahasildar, Angul vide lease case No. 3 of 1993, No. 4 of 1993 and No. 5 of 1993. The lands covered under the three lease cases are as follows :

Lease Case No.3/1993 (Built In Housing Scheme)

Village
Holding No.
Plot No.
Total Area of the land
Kisam
Area applied for

Angul
1
1611
Ac. 4.20
P. Patita
Ac. 1.60

Town
 
1724
Ac. 0.12
Bandhabuda
Ac. 0.12

 
 
1723
Ac. 1.04
Bandha
Ac. 1.00

 
 
1725
Ac. 7.57
P. Patita
Ac. 1.40

 
 
 
 
Total
Ac. 4.12

Lease Case No.4/1993 (for establishment of building centre)

Village
Holding No.
Plot No.
Total Area of the land
Kisam
Area applied for

Angul
1
4
Ac. 7.51
T/ll
Ac. 2.00

Town
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
Total
Ac. 2.00

Lease Case No.5/1993 (for sites and services schemes)

Village
Holding No.
Plot No.
Total Area of the land
Kisam
Area applied for

Angul
1
948
Ac. 32.00
P. Patita
Ac. 4.57

 
 
945/2091
Ac. 1.82
Ghar
Ac. 0.43

 
 
 
 
Total
Ac. 5.00

Lease Case No. 3 of 1993 ;

The Tahasildar on receipt of applications directed to Revenue Inspector for inquiry and report. He also directed issue of general notice inviting objections from public by beat of drum. In his order dated 4.3.1993 the Tahasildar has observed as follows :

“G.N. duly served on general public by beat of drum and on the Angul N.A.C.. No objection has been received from any quarters except from the Executive Officer, Angul N.A.C.. The Executive Officer vide his letter No. 82 Dt. 28.1.1993 has endorsed a copy of the Resolution of the Council meeting dated 28.12.92 and has requested for transfer of the suit land in favour of the N.A.C. for construction of Poly Technic Centre and Maternity Centre over the suit land. Similarly an alienation application has been filed by the N.A.C., Angul for alienation of the land in favour of N.A.C. for eventual construction

of Polytechnic Centre and Maternity Centre. In this respect it will be sufficient to state that N.A.C. cannot be the requisitioning authority for alienation of land for construction of Maternity Centre and Polytechnic Centre. Therefore, the objection of N.A.C. and the alienation proposal by them are unfounded and hence not tenable …”

after rejecting the claim of the N.A.C. he submitted the records to the Sub-Collector, Angul for recommendation for allocation of the land in favour of the TAMRIT. The Sub-Collector after examining the matter, forwarded the records to the Revenue Divisional commissioner who accorded his sanction by order dated. 10.3.1993.

Lease Case No. 4 of 1993 :

After issuing general notice inviting objections, the Tahasildar in his order dated 4.3.1993 has observed as follows ;

“G.N. duly served on general public by beat of drum and on the Angul N.A.C., No objection has been received from any quarters except from the Executive Officer, N.A.C., Angul. The Executive Officer, N.A.C., Angul vide his letter No. 81 dt. 28.1.1993 has endorsed a copy of the resolution of the Council meeting dated 28.12.92 and has requested for transfer of the suit land in favour of N.A.C. for establishment of cold storage and Children park. Similarly, an alienation application has been filed by the N.A.C., Angul for alienation of the said land in favour of N.A.C. for eventual construction of Cold Storage and Children Park. In this respect it will be sufficient to state that N.A.C. cannot be the requisitioning authority for alienation of land for establishment of Cold Storage and Children Park. Therefore, the objection of the N.A.C. and the alienation proposal by them are unfounded and hence not tenable.

After rejecting the objection of N.A.C. the Tahasildar transmitted the records to the Sub-Collector, Angul who in turn forwarded the same to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner for sanction. On 23.3.1993, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner sanctioned the lease.

Lease Case No. 5 of 1993 :

After issuing general notice inviting objections, the Tahasildar in his order dated 4.3.1993 has observed as follows :

“G.N. duly served on general public by beat of drum and on the Angul N.A.C., No objection has been

received from any quarters except from the Executive Officer, Angul N.A.C., The Executive Officer vide his letter No. 83 dt. 28.1.1993 has endorsed a copy of the Resolution of the Council Meeting dt. 28.12.92 and has requested for transfer of the suit land in favour of the N.A.C. for construction of Central School over the suit land. Similarly an alienation application has been filed by the N.A.C., Angul for alienation of the said land in favour of N.A.C. for eventual construction of Central School. In this respect it will be sufficient to state that N.A.C. cannot be the requisitioning authority for alienation of land for construction of Central School. Therefore the objection of the N.A.C. and the alienation proposal by them are unfounded and hence not tenable.”

After rejecting the objection of N.A.C., the Tahasildar forwarded the records to the Sub-Collector, Angul who in turn transmitted the same to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner for sanction. On 10.3.1993 the Revenue Divisional Commissioner accorded his sanction.

From the orders extracted above. It would appear that the Tahasildar considered the applications of the TAMRIT as well as that of the Notified Area Council, Angul and for the reasons recorded, rejected the applications of the Notified Area Council and accepted the applications of the TAMRIT. Therefore, the allegation of the petitioner that the Tahasildar did not consider the application of the Notified Area Council is baseless.

5. The TAMRIT is a statutory authority constituted under the provisions of the Orissa Town Planning & Improvement Trust Act, 1956. It may be noted that the aforesaid Orissa Town Planning & Improvement Trust Act, 1956 has been repealed by the Orissa Development Authorities Act, 1982 and the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 3(1) of the 1982 Act has declared the Talcher-Angul-Meramundali Complex shall be assigned the same “Talcher-Angul Development Area” with effect from 12.12.1989.

6. It is the admitted case of all parties that the lands in question within Clause (iii) of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 of the Orissa Government Land Settlement Rules, 1983. It reads as follows :

“Rule 3(3): The plots in urban area shall be divided into five categories and assigned for the following purposes, namely :

(i)*****

(ii)******

(iii) land reserved for future requirements of Government
and other public purposes :

(iv)*****

(v) *****

The question that arises for consideration is whether the leases granted to TAMRIT or Talcher-Angul Development Area for built in Housing Scheme for housing complex, establishment of Angul Building Centre and Site and Services Scheme can be said to be for public purpose. In this connections, we may profitably refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Ranganath Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 216. In his separate opinion, Justice V. R. Krishna lyer in his inevitable style elucidates the meaning of ‘public purpose’.

“… Does the purpose subserve some public use or interest or produce some public good or utility ? If it does, the purpose becomes public. ‘Public’ qualifies the object. Black’s Legal Dictionary elucidates the expression :

” The term is synonymous with Governmental purpose, (State v. Dizon). As employed to denote the objects for which taxes may be levied, it has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the extent of the public benefit which is to follow : the essential requisite being that a public service or use shall affect the inhabitants as a community, and not merely as individuals (Stavenson v. Port of Portland). A public purpose or public business has for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division, as, for example, state the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote such public purpose or public business. (Green v. Frazier).”

A public purpose is vastly wider than public necessity, even as a mere purpose is more pervasive than an urgency. That which one acts before him to accomplish; and end intention or aim, object, plan, project – is purpose (Black’s Legal Dictionary). A need or necessity is compulsive, urgent, unavoidable. In purpose, there is dires; innecessity, there is imperative demand. The presumption is that a use is public, if the legislature has declared it to be such and the decision of the legislature must be treated with the consideration due to a co-ordinate department of the government of the state. Its effect is not conclusive

but considerable. ‘Public purpose’ should be liberally construed, not whittled down by logomachy.”

In State of Gujarat v. Musamigan Imam Haider Bux Razvi, AIR 1 977 SC 594, it has been held that the Housing Scheme for a limited number of persons is also for public purpose.

7. In view of what has been stated above, we have no hesitation to hold that the leases granted in favour of TAMRIT (now designated as Talcher-Angul Development Area) (opposite party No. 7) is for public purpose and, therefore, the sanction made by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner in this regard cannot be faulted with TAMRIT (now designated as Talcher-Angul Development Area) – opposite party No. 7 is a statutory authority and is an instrumentality of the State and, therefore, no exception can be taken if lease is granted to such an authority.

8. There is no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. No costs.

P. K. Balasubramanyan, C.J.

9. I agree.

10. Writ petition dismissed.