High Court Kerala High Court

Claramma vs Thresiamma on 5 February, 2009

Kerala High Court
Claramma vs Thresiamma on 5 February, 2009
       

  

  

 
 
  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

SA.No. 367 of 1996(B)



1. CLARAMMA
                      ...  Petitioner

                        Vs

1. THRESIAMMA
                       ...       Respondent

                For Petitioner  :SRI.P.R.VENKATESH

                For Respondent  :SRI.A.KRISHNAN

The Hon'ble MR. Justice P.N.RAVINDRAN

 Dated :05/02/2009

 O R D E R
                          P.N.RAVINDRAN, J.
         ======================================
                         S.A.No.367 of 1996
          ======================================
              Dated this the 5th day of February 2009

                             JUDGMENT

The legal heirs of the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 on the

file of the Court of the Munsiff of Alappuzha are the appellants in

this Second Appeal. Respondents 1 and 2 are the defendants

therein. The third respondent is yet another legal heir of the

deceased plaintiff.

2. The suit property in O.S.No.283 of 1986 is a parcel of land

51.25 cents in extent, situated in Sy.No.72/9B of Purakkad

Village, Ambalapuzha Taluk, Alappuzha District. It admittedly

belonged to four brothers, Sri.Mathew Thomas, Sri.Mathew

Sebastian, Sri.Mathew Mathew and Sri.Mathew Joseph. Mathew

Joseph got a release of the rights of his three brothers as per

Ext.B1 release deed dated 16.5.1978 and became the absolute

owner thereof. The plaintiff claimed that he was put in possession

of the suit property by the four brothers, even before the

execution of the release deed and that after Sri.Mathew Joseph

became the absolute owner, his power of attorney executed

Ext.B3 assignment deed dated 11.10.1983 conveying the suit

property to him. The plaintiff contended that he thus obtained

title to and is in possession of the suit property. According to the

plaintiff, the suit property and the lands lying to its north having a

similar extent, situated in Sy.No.72/9AB lie as one compact block

S.A.367 of 1996 2

without a boundary separating the two different parcels of land.

He instituted O.S.No.283 of 1986 contending that the defendants,

are attempting to trespass into the suit property and interfere

with his possession and enjoyment thereof.

3. In respect of the very same suit property, the defendants in

O.S.No.283 of 1986 had earlier instituted O.S.No.1031 of 1983 on

the file of the Court of the Munsiff of Alappuzha wherein they

claimed possession of the suit property under Ext.A1 agreement

dated 17.5.1978 executed by Sri.Mathew Joseph, the plaintiff’s

vendor in favour of Thresiamma, the first defendant in O.S.No.283

of 1986. The plaintiffs in O.S.1031 of 1983 contended that the

plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 had earlier instituted O.S.No.509

of 1979 against the first plaintiff in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 and

Sri.Mathew Sebastian, one among the four co-owners for a

permanent prohibitory injunction restraining them from

interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit

property. They contended that though by Ext.A4 judgment

delivered on 26.6.1980, the Court of the Munsiff of Alappuzha

decreed the suit, on appeal filed by the first plaintiff in

O.S.No.1031 of 1983, the Court of the Subordinate Judge by

Ext.A5 judgment delivered on 30.6.1982 reversed the decree

passed by the trial court and dismissed the suit holding that the

S.A.367 of 1996 3

plaintiffs in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 are in possession of the suit

property. They also contended that S.A.No.523 of 1982 filed by

the plaintiff in O.S. No.283 of 1986 was dismissed by this Court

as per Ext.A2 judgment delivered on 29.11.1982 and therefore

the present suit is barred by resjudicata.

4. The plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986, who is the first

defendant in O.S.No.1031 of 1983, resisted the said suit,

claiming title to and possession over the suit property as per

Ext.B3 assignment deed dated 11.10.1983. The plaintiffs in

O.S.No.1031 of 1983 resisted O.S.No.283 of 1986, re-iterating

the contentions raised in the plaint O.S.No.1031 of 1983. They

also contended that they are entitled to the protection of Section

53A of the Transfer of Property Act.

5. The two suits were jointly tried and disposed of by a

common judgment. In the trial court, the first plaintiff in

O.S.No.1031 of 1981 was examined as PW1, one of his workers

was examined as PW2, the scribe of Ext.A1 agreement was

examined as PW3 and Exts.A1 to A5 were produced and marked

on their side. The plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 examined

himself as DW2, his vendor (the executant of Ext.B3 assignment

deed and Ext.A1 agreement) as DW1, one of the workers engaged

by him as DW3 and produced and marked Exts.B1 to B8 on his

S.A.367 of 1996 4

side. The trial court on an analysis of evidence oral and

documentary available in the case held that Ext.A1 agreement put

forward by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 is a genuine

document and that it was validly executed by DW1. Though the

trial court found that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 are in

possession of the suit property, it was held that the plaintiff in

O.S.No.283 of 1986 has title to the suit property. In view of the

finding that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 are in

possession of the suit property, O.S.No.1031 of 1981 was decreed

and defendants therein were restrained by a permanent

prohibitory injunction from trespassing upon the suit property.

O.S.No.283 of 1986 was partly decreed declaring the title of the

plaintiff over the suit property. The relief of declaration of

possession and injunction was declined and the suit was

dismissed in relation to the said relief.

6. The plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 filed A.S.No.36 of 1989

challenging the decree and judgment in O.S.No.1031 of 1983 and

A.S.No.37 of 1989 challenging the decree and judgment in

O.S.No.283 of 1986. A.S.No.36 of 1989 and 37 of 1989 were

presented on 25.7.1989. Nearly two years after A.S.No.37 of 1989

was filed, the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 filed I.A.No.1179 of

1991 in A.S.No.37 of 1989 seeking an amendment of the plaint in

S.A.367 of 1996 5

O.S.No.283 of 1986 to incorporate the relief of recovery of

possession of the suit property on the strength of title. By order

passed on 17.10.1992, the Court of the Subordinate judge of

Alappuzha dismissed the said application holding that the

application is belated and that if the amendment prayed for is

allowed, it will alter the nature of the suit. By a common judgment

delivered on 31.10.1995, the Court of the Additional Subordinate

judge of Alappuzha dismissed both the appeals, affirming the

decision of the trial court. He thereafter filed S.A.No.368 of 1996

in this Court challenging the decree and judgment in O.S.No.1031

of 1983 and A.S.No.36 of 1989. By judgment delivered on

6.8.1996, S.A.No.368 of 1996 was dismissed illimine. Though

S.A.No.368 of 1996 was dismissed in limine on 6.8.1996, this

Second Appeal filed from the decree and judgment in O.S.No.283

of 1986 and A.S.No.37 of 1989 was admitted on the very same

day and notice ordered to the respondents on the question

whether the appellate court acted legally in dismissing the

application for amendment of the plaint, viz.I.A.No.1179 of 1991

in A.S.No.37 of 1989.

7. I have heard Sri.P.R.Venketesh, the learned counsel

appearing for the appellant and Sri.A.Krishnan, the learned

counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2. Sri.P.R.Venketesh,

S.A.367 of 1996 6

the learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that

the order passed by the lower appellate court on 17.10.1992

dismissing I.A.No.1179 of 1991 in A.S.No.37 of 1989 wherein the

plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 had prayed for an amendment of

the plaint by incorporating the relief of recovery of possession of

the suit property on the strength of title, is not sustainable in law

and is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the

appellants contended that as title to the suit property had been

found in his favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 and as

admittedly the defendants in the suit do not have title, and as the

essential pleadings entitling the plaintiff to the relief of recovery

of possession on the strength of title had been set out in the

plaint originally filed, the lower appellate court ought to have

allowed the application for amendment and remanded the suit to

the trial court for fresh disposal. He also contended that in the

written statement filed by the defendants in O.S.No.283 of 1986,

they had raised a contention relying on Ext.A1 agreement that

they are entitled to the protection of Section 53A of the Transfer

of Property Act. The learned counsel for the appellant further

contended that no prejudice would be caused to the defendants in

the suit if the amendment prayed for is allowed and the suit

remanded to the trial court for fresh disposal on the question

S.A.367 of 1996 7

whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the suit

property on the strength of title.

8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 1

and 2 contended that defendants in O.S.No.283 of 1986 had

instituted the suit even in the year 1983 asserting that they are in

possession of the suit property under Ext.A1 agreement for sale,

that the suits were disposed of only on 6.12.1988, that the

plaintiffs in O.S.No.283 of 1986 did not move for amendment of

the plaint though the suit was pending for a period of two years

after it was instituted, that even after the first appeal was filed

they waited for nearly two years to move for an amendment of the

plaint, that the application for amendment is highly belated and

was rightly rejected by the lower appellate court. The learned

counsel also contended that if the amendment passed for is

granted, it will alter the very nature of the suit.

9. From the pleadings and the evidence on record and the

concurrent findings of the courts below, it is crystal clear that the

appellants in this Second Appeal, (the legal heirs of the plaintiff in

O.S.No.283 of 1986) have exclusive title to the suit property. The

defendants in O.S.No.283 of 1986 have been found to be in

possession of the suit property under Ext.A1 agreement executed

by the vendor of the plaintiff. The assertion of the title by the

S.A.367 of 1996 8

predecessor in interest of the appellants in this Second Appeal, is

evident from the plaint in O.S.No.283 of 1986 and also the

written statement filed by him in O.S.No.1031 of 1983. In fact

the defendants in O.S.No.283 of 1986 had in their written

statement claimed protection under Section 53A of the Transfer

of Property Act contending that they were put in possession of

the suit property by the plaintiff’s vendor under Ext.A1 agreement

dated 16.5.1978, that they have paid a substantial portion of the

agreed sale consideration, that they have effected improvements

in the suit property and are in possession and enjoyment thereof.

Though the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 had asserted title over

the suit properties, he did not seek recovery of possession of the

suit property on the strength of title, but prayed for a declaration

that he has title to and is in possession of the suit property and

also for a consequential injunction based on such possession.

10. From the pleadings and the evidence on record, the finding

of the courts below that the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 has

title to the suit property, cannot be faulted. As title to the suit

property had been found in favour of the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of

1986 by the trial court and as the necessary pleadings regarding

the plaintiff’s title to the suit property had been set out even in

the plaint originally filed in O.S.No.283 of 1986, the finding of the

S.A.367 of 1996 9

lower appellate court in the order passed on 17.10.1992

dismissing I.A.No.1179 of 1991 in A.S.No.37 of 1989 that if the

plaintiff is permitted to amend the plaint by incorporating the

relief of recovery of possession on the strength of title, it will alter

the nature of the suit, cannot be sustained. The suit as laid was

one for declaration of title, possession and consequential

injunction. The appellate court was therefore in my opinion not

right in taking the view that the amendment sought by the

plaintiff would alter the nature of the suit. The suit would still be

one on title. The lower appellate court rejected the application for

amendment also for the reason that the application is belated and

was filed nearly two years after the appeal was presented. The

lower appellate court also took the view that the plaintiff could

not have moved an application to amend the plaint in the

appellate court.

11. The courts below have concurrently found that the

defendants in O.S.No.283 of 1986 are in possession of the suit

property under Ext.A1 agreement executed by the plaintiff’s

vendor. The courts below have also found that the plaintiff in

O.S.No.283 of 1986 has title to the suit property. The defendants

had also understood the case set out by the plaintiff and

attempted to resist his claim of title over the suit property,

S.A.367 of 1996 10

relying on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Though an

issue had been framed by the trial court as regards the right of

the defendants under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act,

the said issue was deleted for the reason that the plaintiff had not

prayed for recovery of possession on the strength of title. In the

facts and circumstances obtaining on the case on hand, especially

the concurrent finding of title in favour of the plaintiff, I am

persuaded to take the view that the lower appellate court ought to

have enabled the parties to have the entitlement of the plaintiff to

recover possession of the suit property on the strength of title

resolved in the present suit itself, instead of driving the parties to

another round of litigation involving additional expenditure and

waste of time. On the facts that emanate from the pleadings and

the evidence on record, it cannot be said that any serious

prejudice would be caused to the defendants if the amendment

of the plaint as prayed for by the plaintiff is allowed.

For the reasons stated above, I allow this Second Appeal, set

aside decree and judgment passed by the Court of the Additional

Subordinate Judge of Alappuzha in A.S.No.37 of 1989.

I.A.No.1179 of 1991 in A.S.No.37 of 1989 is allowed and the

appellants are permitted to amend the plaint in O.S.No.283 of

1986 by incorporating the relief of recovery of possession on the

S.A.367 of 1996 11

strength of title. Consequently, the suit O.S.No.283 of 1986 is

remanded to the Court of the Munsiff of Alappuzha for the limited

purpose of deciding whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover

possession of the suit property on the strength of title and

whether the defendants are entitled to the protection of Section

53A of the Transfer of Property Act. It will be open to both sides

to adduce fresh evidence in support of their respective

contentions, limited, no doubt, to these two issues. The finding of

the trial court that the plaintiff in O.S.No.283 of 1986 has title to

the suit property shall stand. The parties shall appear before the

Court of the Principal Munsiff of Alappuzha on 31.3. 2009. The

appellants shall carry out the amendment proposed in

I.A.No.1179 of 1991 within two weeks therefrom. The defendants

will be free to file an additional written statement to the amended

plaint. The registry is directed to transmit the records to the trial

court along with a copy of this judgment expeditiously.

The Second Appeal is allowed as above. No costs.

P.N.RAVINDRAN, JUDGE

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