ORDER
V.P. Gulati, Member (T)
1. This is an appeal filed by the Collector of Customs, Bombay against the order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondents imported Darey Con-card blankets of different sizes and the respondents by refund application claimed benefit of Notification No. 169/77-Cus., dated 6-8-1977 claiming that the blankets imported were for printing fabrics and therefore were covered by the terms of the notification which allowed exemption in respect of rubber blankets falling under Chapter 40 of the First Schedule when imported into India for use in the printing industry. The Assistant Collector held that the goods were for use in the textile industry and not in the printing industry and turned down their plea. The Collector (Appeals) in his order, however, held that term ‘printing industry’ was wide enough to cover textile printing also and allowed the appeal with consequential relief. The Revenue have come up in appeal against his findings and have urged in the grounds of appeal as under :
“The relevant Notification in force on the date of import was 169/77 dated 6-8-1977 under which rubber blankets for ‘Printing Industry’ were eligible for concessional rate of duty at 40%.
Goods in question were for use in textile industry (textile printing) and as such were not eligible for the concession under the said Notification. Goods were correctly assessed at standard rate because textile printing is not printing industry.”
3. The learned SDR for the Department, Shri Sunder Rajan laboured for some time to prove that the goods were assessable under 40.05(16)(I) and cited the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Swadeshi Mills Company Limited, Bombay v. Collector of Customs, Bombay 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1839.
4. The learned advocate for the respondents, however, pointed out while he was not urging this ground and that so far as the basic classification under Customs Tariff is concerned, the same was not at issue and what was at issue, was the applicability of Notification No. 169/77. Shri Sunder Rajan urged that the rubber blankets were used in the printing presses as also in the textile printing units. He stated that the specifications of the same differed depending upon the use to which these were put. He clarified that the rubber blankets used in the printing presses were not inter-changeable with those used in the textile printing. He pleaded that under Notification No. 169/77-Cus., the benefit of the exemption was available only in respect of such of those rubber blankets as were used in the printing industry alone and not in the textile industry. He read out the Notification No. 169/77-Cus. applicable at the relevant time and the same is reproduced below for convenience of reference :
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), the Central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts rubber blankets, falling within Chapter 40 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975}, when imported into India for use in the printing industry, from so much of the duty of customs leviable thereon which is specified in the said First Schedule as is in excess of 40% ad valorem.”
[No. 169/77-Cus., dated 6-8-1977]
He stated that this notification was later superseded by Notification No. 192/78 under which the scope of the notification was broadened to cover all rubber blankets used in printing of any surface. The said notification is also reproduced below for convenience of reference :
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962) and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, No. 169-Customs, dated the 6th August, 1977, the Central Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby exempts rubber blankets when imported into India for use in printing on any surface from so much of the duty of customs leviable thereon as is in excess of 40 per cent ad valorem.”
(No. 192/F. No. 355/11/78-Cus.I)
He pointed out that in place of the wording ‘for use in printing industry’, the words ‘for use in printing on any surface’, were replaced. He pleaded that the benefit under Notification 192/78 could not be given retrospective effect and only such rubber blankets as were used in the printing industry were eligible for the exemption at the relevant time, and the rubber blankets imported by the respondents were not eligible for this concession. He stated that the Tribunal has in the context of item 68 given a number of decisions as to what were the products of the printing industry. He cited the case of Golden Press v. Deputy Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad and Anr. -1987 (27) E.L.T. 273 (A.P.). This decision, he conceded, was given in the context whether the printed cartons are the products of the printing industry or not. He pointed out that the Hon’ble High Court posed the following questions :
(i) What is the meaning of printing industry?
(ii) Whether printed cartons are products of printing industry?
He stated that the Court had answered the questions as under :
“The question is one of drawing the line. If tomorrow a printing press undertakes not only printing on metal cans but also the manufacture of cans in which food products or other products are sold, can it be said that printed cans are the products or other products of printing industry? Can a printer be allowed to say, that because the cost of printing is more than the cost of cutting the metal sheets and preparing metal cans it must be treated as a product of printing industry? Would any common man go to a printing press for purchasing printed cartons, or printed cans, as the case may be? Cartons and cans are more properly products of packaging industry.”
4A. He pleaded that for interpreting the term ‘printing industry’ as used in Notification No. 169/77-Cus., common parlance test would have to be applied and according to which in his view the printing of textile would not fall under the ambit of the printing industry. He drew our pointed attention to the observations of the Collector of Customs (Appeals) which are reproduced as under :
“The term ‘printing industry’ was broad enough to have taken into its ambit ‘textile printing’ since textile printing was part of an industry and since textile industry was an industry where printing process was involved. Therefore, in my candid opinion, the new notification No. 192/78-Cus., dated 26-8-1980 which elaborated the scope of ‘printing’, as printing on any surface to include in its ambit textile printing, was redundant. In other words, even under the old notification, i.e., Notification No. 169/77-Cus., dated 6-8-1977, the term ‘printing industry’ was wide enough to cover ‘textile printing’ and since the imported rubber blankets were meant for use in the textile printing industry, these were covered under the old Notification No. 169/77-Cus., dated 6-8-1977. My observation as above will be buttressed by the definition of ‘printing’ as given in the Webster’s Third International Dictionary, which defines printing as a reproduction (on paper or clothing) of an image from a printing surface typically by contact impression that causes a transfer of ink.”
He pleaded that the Collector (Appeals) had not appreciated the import of the words used in the notification properly. He also cited the case of Coronation Litho Works v. Collector of Customs – Order No. 326/83-C in Appeal No. CD/888/79/C. From the reading of this order it is seen that the Tribunal was not called upon to pass orders on the availability of Notification No. 169/77 in that case as this notification was not available to the appellants at the time the import was made and issue was not decided in the context of applicability of the said notification.
5. Shri Nankani, the learned advocate for the respondents pleaded for the respondents’ plea for benefit of the exemption based on the Notification No. 169/77-Cus. He pleaded that thrust of the argument of the Revenue is that the scope of the printing industry should be only confined to the printing of paper. He drew out attention to the term ‘printing’ as held by the Tribunal in the case of Metagraphs Private Limited, Bombay v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay – 1986 (26) E.L.T. 66 (Tribunal) para 14 onwards. He conceded in that case of Metagraphs, the question was whether the aluminium labels which were printed were the products of the printing industry. He pleaded that the Tribunal had taken note of the fact that the word ‘printing’ covers within its scope printing of textile fabrics also. In this view of the matter, he pleaded, the printed fabrics should be considered as product of the printing industry. He stated that so far as the word ‘industry’ is concerned, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.S. Company Ltd. v. Union of India -1985 (19) E.L.T. 15 (S.C.) have held that the word ‘industry’ has many meanings and that in the absence of definition of the same in a notification, it should be taken to be as it is understood in the sense in which people ordinarily understand it. His plea is that since the textile printing is a recognised process of printing, to that extent the goods imported should be treated as the product of the printing industry. He pleaded that the Revenue has not shown that the term ‘printing industry’ did not cover printing on articles like textiles, etc., other than paper. He stated that in fact this Notification No. 169/77 was issued at the behest of the textile printers and the notification was also replaced by Notification No. 192/78 on the representation made by the textile printers as the customs authorities were denying them the concessional benefit in view of the wording of the Notification No. 169/77. He pleaded that in the case of Golden Press referred to supra the dispute was limited to the consideration as to whether the printed cartons were the products of printing industry. He pleaded that High Court of Andhra Pradesh has not given any ruling on the scope of the term ‘printing industry’ in the context of printing of fabrics. He stated that the printing machinery for textiles and the paper falls under same Chapter 84 of the Customs Tariff and therefore it should be presumed that the concession was intended for blankets used both in the printing of textiles as also paper. He drew our attention to the findings of the Tribunal in the case of Commercial Ahmedabad Mills Company Limited, Ahmedabad v. Collector of Customs, Bombay : 1983 (14) E.L.T. 1842 (CEGAT) (para 3) in which the Tribunal has taken note of the fact that the blankets of the type imported were for printing of textiles. It is seen from this order that the ques- tion of applicability of this notification was not an issue before the Tribunal.
6. The question which arises for consideration is as to whether the textile printing is covered within the ambit of printing industry. We observe that so far as the word ‘printing’ is concerned, this relates to the process of reproduction of an image. The word ‘print’ as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary is as under :
“Indentation in or mark on surface preserving the form left by pressure of some body (fingerprint; footprint); Printed cotton fabric.”
The word ‘Printing’ as defined in Webster’s Third New Dictionary as submitted by the learned Advocate is as under :
“Printing n-s often attrib (ME printing, prenting, fr. gerund of printen, prenten to print-more at PRINT) la : reproduction (as on paper or cloth) of an image from a printing surface made typically by a contact impression that causes a transfer of ink-compare LETTERPRESS, INTAGLIO, PLANO GRAPHY, STENCIL, ELECTRONOGRAPHY ; b: the process of producing a positive or negative photographic image on a light sensitive material from a negative or positive by contact or projection : the process of making photographic prints; c: the process or art of decorating pottery by means of transfer papers printed with mineral colors or of gelatin sheets printed in oil with the colors being fixed by firing; 2: the art, practice, or business of printer; 3: the number of copies or the amount of material printed in one continuous operation : IMPRESSION 6c : 4 printings pl: paper to be printed on.”
The term “Printing” as set out in the New Encyclopaedia Britannica (15th Edition) is as under :
“Printing traditionally has been defined as a technique for applying under pressure a certain quantity of colouring agent onto a specified surface to form a body of text or an illustration…. Printing is used not merely for books and newspapers but also for textiles, plates, wallpaper, packaging and billboards. It has even been used to manufacture miniature electronic circuits.”
It is further stated that word printing is used not merely in the context of books and newspapers but also for textiles, wallpaper, packaging and billboards. It is even used in the context of manufacture of miniature electronic circuits. It is seen from the above that so far as the term ‘Print’ is concerned, this covers not only printing on paper but also textiles and even electronic circuits. The scope of the term Print as seen from the aforesaid definitions is ‘Indentation in or mark on surface preserving the form left by pressure or language embodied in printed form.
7. The question for our consideration is whether the various sectors of the industry in which this process is employed can be taken to be falling within the ambit of Printing Industry. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MS Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. – 1985 (19) E.L.T. 15 (S.C.) have held that the word Industry should be interpreted in the commercial sense as used in ordinary parlance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
“The expression ‘industry’ has many meanings. It means ‘skill’, ‘ingenuity’,’dexterity’, ‘diligence’, ‘systematic work or labour’, ‘habitual employment in the productive arts’, ‘manufacturing establishment’, etc. But while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument, in the absence of any definition in that very document, it must be given the same meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or understood in the sense in which people conversant with the subject matter of the statute or statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous to interpret a word in accordance with its definition in another statute or statutory instrument and more so when such statute or statutory instrument is not dealing with any cognate subject. Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn.) says thus at page 164 :
‘In construing a word in an Act, caution is necessary in adopting the meaning ascribed to the word in other Acts. “It would be a new terror in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some Act which is not incorporated or referred to, such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone.” Macbeth v. Chislett (1910) AC 220,223.’
When the word to be construed is used in a taxing statute or a notification issued thereunder it should be understood in its commercial sense….”
“…It is true that in the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajjappa and Ors. (1978) 3 SCR 207, this Court has held that hospitals would also come within the definition of the expression ‘industry’ given in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which is as wide as the legislature could have possibly made it. But that definition cannot be used for interpreting the word ‘industry’ in a notification granting exemption from customs duty under the Customs Act, 1962.”
8. We observe that the word ‘industry’ is not defined in the notification nor anywhere in the Tariff nor can its definition be adopted from any other statute wherein the same may be defined in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (supra). The scope of the term Printing Industry in view of the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has to be construed based on how it is understood in its commercial sense and not because the process employed in the technical sense is printing. It is well known that the different sectors of the industry acquire a name depending upon the range of the products that are produced in that sector. The popular nomenclature of the segments is based on the history of the products which have been manufactured in a particular sector. While this will certainly depend upon the processes that are carried out in the production of the goods but the nomenclature is decided primarily by the products manufactured. Technically, broadly speaking, the process which gives character to a number of end-products may be the same, like in the present case the transfer of an impression on a surface, yet the products on which it is carried out are different and it cannot be said that the sectors in which it is carried out, all are covered by one industry. In the case of machines we have different sectors like machine tool industry, textile machinery industry, tea machinery industry, etc. While in all these cases the basic processes of fabrication are the same, yet in view of the different product range manufactured, the group of the industries which produce the different types of machines are known separately in the trade. Likewise, in the case before us, the printing of photograph belongs to the photographic industry, the printing of printed circuits to the electronic industry. The printing of textiles is a part of the textile manufacturing units as in the trade the printing of textiles is understood as a part of textiles industry. The printing of fabrics is related to the process of manufacture of fabrics and this process, therefore, as argued by the Revenue can be considered to fall within the scope of the term textiles industry. In the Encyclopaedia Britannica, there is a separate Chapter on Textile Industry and various processes relating to the manufacture of textiles have been dealt with in this and printing of textiles figures as one of the process employed as a part of finishing process and is described as under :
“Printing is a process of decorating textile fabrics by application of pigments, dyes, or other related materials in the form of patterns. Although apparently developed from the hand painting of fabrics, such methods are also of great antiquity….
The four main methods of textile printing are block, roller, screen and sublistatic printing. In each of these methods, the application of the colour, usually as a thickened paste, is followed by fixation, usually by steaming or heating, and then removal of excess colour by washing….”
“Roller Printing. This technique is used whenever long runs of fabrics are to be printed with the same design. The modern machine, based on one originally devised in 1783, consists of a large central cast iron cylinder over which passes a thick endless blanket providing a resilient support for the fabric. Backing fabrics, called back grays, are placed between the blanket and the fabric to prevent undue staining of the blanket. Although formerly made of cotton fabric, most modern back grays are continuous belts of nylon. The blanket and back gray are appropriately tensioned, so that the fabric moves through the machine as the central cylinder rotates.”
The blankets are used in the roller printing process of textiles. The Encyclopaedia Britannica can be taken to bring out the commercial understanding of the scope of the textile industry and in this view of the matter the printing of textiles can be considered as a part of textile industry. In the chapter on printing in Encyclopaedia Britannica, the scope of printing covered is only in the context of printing presses which employ the process generally employed for the printing of paper. In the above view of the matter, we hold that Collector (Appeals) was in error in holding that the printing industry covers within its ambit textile printing also. Since the imported rubber blankets were meant for use in the textile printing these cannot be taken to be covered by Notification No. 169/77-Cus. No intention can be read into the notification as pleaded by the respondents and it is now well settled that the notification has to be construed strictly based on the words used in it. We therefore set aside the order of the Collector (Appeals) and restore the order of the Assistant Collector. The appeal is thus allowed.