ORDER
K.Ramamoorthy, J.
1. There are ten petitioners. The first petitioner is The ‘College Section Officers’ Association (University of Delhi). Petitioner No. 2 is Delhi University Section Officers’ Association. Petitioner No. 3 is Delhi University & College Karamchari Union. Petitioner No. 4 is a Section Officer in College of Vocational Studies. Petitioner No. 5 is a Section Officer in Dayal Singh College, Delhi. These two Colleges are maintained by the University of Delhi with the granting aid from the University Grants Commission. Petitioners 6 to 10 are Section Officers in the University of Delhi.
The petitioners had been garnted the pay scale of Rs.650-1200 w.e.f. 19.2.1983. But in the writ petitioner, the petitioners claim that this should have been given w.e.f.1.1.1973.
2. In a nutshell, the case of the petitioners is that the Section Officers in the Colleges and the University are equal to the Section Officers in the University Grants Commission and the Union of India. The Section Officers in the Union of the India and the University Grants Commission have been given the pay sacle of Rs. 650-1200 w.e.f.1.1.1973 and therefore, the Section Officers in the Colleges and the University of Delhi should also be given the same pay scale w.e.f.1.1.1973.
3. In view of the nature of the controversy, it is necessary to set out the facts in some detail.
4. The petitioners have given the list of Section Officers working in Colleges in Annexure ‘A’. In Annexure ‘B’, the list of Section Officers functioning in the University of Delhi is given. The petitioners have stated in paragraph 4 of the writ petition:
“That the grievance of the petitioners in the present writ petition is that though they have been performing the same duties as ection Officers as are being performed by the Section Officers of the Government of India or of the University Grants Commission, yet while Section Officers of the Government of India and/or University Grants Commission have been getting the scale of. Rs. 650-30-740-35-810-EB-35-880-40-1000-EB-40-1200 with effect from 1.1.1973 as per Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1973 promulgated on the basis of the recommendations of
the Third Central Pay Commission, the petitiones herein have been given the said scale only with effect from 19.2.1983.”
5. It is stated that from the year 1978, the present Section Officers ere given this designation while they were previously designated as Superintendent and it is stated by the petitioners that the Executive Council of the University had recommended to maintain the parity between the Section Officers in the University Grants Commissions and the colleges.
6. It is stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition:-
“That it would be interesting to note that though, on one hand, the scale of Rs. 650-1200 which was given to the petitioners with effect from 19.2.83 was on the express ground of removing disparity in the matter of pay scales and promotional avenues between the Section Officers of the University of Delhi/various Colleges on one hand and Section Officers of the Government of India/University Grants Commission on the other hand, yet the respondents have evidently ignored that disparity which existed during the period from 1.1.1973 to 18.2.198 has not been removed for the said period and this has been in spite of the fact that the petitioners have been representing their case right from 1973
and even from a time prior to that and that the University of Delhi through its Executive Council, as already stated above, had taken the decision in favour of the petitioners as far back as 1973 and the delay of the said period of about 10 years has been wholly and solely on the part of the authorities concerned. In humble submission of the petitioners, the impugned act of the respondents in not giving the scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1.1.1973 has, thus, been wholly arbitrary and hence violative of not only Articles 14 and 16, but also Article 39 of the Constitution.”
7. The petitioners have given the history relating to the revision of scale of pay. Reference is made to the representation made by the Section Officers in the University/Colleges on the 12th of November, 1973. That is
filed as Annexure ‘C’ and the same is as under :-
“We have been provided the following scales of pay from 1.3.1968
:-
Grade I : 350-25-500-30-650
(w.e.f.1.12.1968)
Grade II: 325-15-475-EB-20-575
At the time of revision of scale of pay as noted above the Super intendents as well as the Karamchari Union had urged the University authorities for parity in the revision of scale of pay of Superintendents with those of the Superintendents in the UGC. The University had agreed to the request and had requested the UGC to sanction the scale of pay to the Superintendents of the Universi ty at par with the Superintendents in the UGC i.e. as follows.
Grade I : 400-25-500-30-590-EB-30-680
Grade II: 350-25-575
Although the grades of the Superintendents in University were not given exactly at par with those of the Superintendents of the UGC, yet the parity had been maintained to a greater extent i.e. gainst the scale of pay of Rs. 350-575 prevailing in the UGC for grade II the scale of pay of Rs.325-575 had been agreed to and against the grade of Rs. 400-680 for grade I post the scale of pay of Rs. 350-650 was agreed to. It is understood that the UGC has further revised the scale of pay of the Section Officers in the UGC as follows:-
Grade I : 620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900
Grade II : 350-25-500-30-590
In view of the fact that the Superintendents in the University are having the same responsibility and are discharging duties comparable to thier counterparts in the Government of India and UGC (this contention has already been agreed to by the Establishment Committee and the Executive Council in 1969 when the proposal for revision of pay scale had been made to the UGC) there is no reason as to why the Superintendent in the University should not be provided the same designation and the grade as are obtaining in the UGC. Therefore, the designation of the Superintendent n the University should be changed to Section Officer Grade I and Grade II and should be placed at par with the Section Offi cers in the UGC not only for the time being, but also for all further revisions.
We, therefore, request that our above-noted grievance may kindly be considered by the Executive Council under the provisions of the State G (ix).”
8. On the 19th of December, 1973, a resolution was passed by the Execuive Council of the University in the following terms :-
“The Council considered the representation of the Superintendents working in the University regarding bringing their designation and scale of pay at par with that prevailing in the University Grants Commission, (vide Appendix XXVIII).
In this connection it was noted that at present there was difference between the grades of the Superintendents of the University and the Section Officers of the University Grants Commission. The Superintendents of the University were placed in the following grades:-
Grade I : 350-25-500-30-650
(Selection Grade)
Grade II : 325-15-475-EB-20-575
Their counterparts, namely Section Officers in the University Grants Commission were in the following two grades:
Grade I : 620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900
Grade II : 350-25-500-30-590
The Council resolved that the grades of the Superintendents in the University be revised as follows subject to the approval of the University Grants Commission:
Grade I: 620-30-800-EB-30-830-35-900
Grade II: 350-25-500-30-590
The Council further resolved that the designation of the post of Superintendent in the University be also changed to that of Section Officers Grade I and Grade II, as prevailing, in the University Grants Commission, and the proposals be referred to the Commissions for their approval.
9. According to the petitioners, the University sought the approval of the University Grants Commission, the second respondent and the University Grants Commission expressed its inability to accord approval. According to the petitioner, in June, 1974 the Vice-Chancellor wrote to the University Grants Commission for the acceptance of the proposal for the revision of pay scales of the Superintendents. The Executive Council again considered the matter on the 8th of January, 1974 and decided as under :-
“(i) That the University Grants Commission be written to again, reiterating our earlier proposal that the designation of the posts of Superintendents in the University be changed to that of Section Officers Grade I and Grade II as prevailing in the University Grants Commission and that the revised scale of pay of Superintendents as Section Officers in the University Grants Commission’s Office be approved in the case of the Superintendents.
(ii) That in the meantime the new scales of pay as approved by the University Grants Commission be implemented and the University Grants Commission be informed that these had been accepted by the University provisionally.”
10. The Executive Council of the University wrote to the University Grants Commission reiterating its earlier stand. As noticed above, in 1978 the approval of the change of designation to Section Officer from Superintendent was granted.
11. On the 19th of February, 1983 the University Grants Commission accepted the recommendations of the Committee and the minutes of the meeting of the University Grants Commission are as under:-
Item No. 6.08: To consider the report of the Committee appointed by the Commission to consider the recommendations made by the UGC Committee on Disparities in scales of pay and Avenues of Promotion of different categories of non-teaching staff in the Cantral Universities.
. …………
The Commission accepted the recommendation of the Committee appointed to consider the disparities of pay scales and avenues of promotions of the different categories of non-teaching staff in the Central Universities.
S. Recommendation of the Decision of the Committee Commission
1. Allowances of various kinds Accepted. To ensure
and retirement benefits are tied to that the Universities do not
scales of pay and if scales of pay flout the guidelines laid
are varied, the UGC would be within down by the Universities
its rights to refuse payments at least Grants Commission the
in regard to additional dearness and Acts of the Central
other allowances or increased Universities be suitably
retirement benefits (Paragraph 2.3.). amended so that any
changes in pay scales and
service conditions in general
of the staff in the Central
Universities are made only
with the prior approval of
the Universities Grants
Commission and the
Government of India.
2. Each University should Accepted. The relevant
set up a work Study-cum-Cadre Statute of the Universities
Review Unit which should invariably be amended so as
vet each proposal for creation of to provide that the
posts. The Unit while making its Executive Council will
recommendations certify that the consider proposals for
scales of pay and designations are alterations in establishment
duly approved and correspond to rules only after
the duties and responsibilities of the recommendations of
the posts. The Finance Committee the Finance Committee
while examining the budget proposals are available.
should specifically examine
this aspect.
We further recommend that alternatives
in establishment i.e. creation of posts,
revision and upgradation of scales of pay
should always be examined by the Finance
Committee of the Central Universities before
the proposals are placed before the
Executive Councils (Paragraph - 2.4).
3. We are of the firm view Accepted.
that the scales of pay designations
duties and recruitment qualifications
of the posts of non-teaching staff
in the Central Universities be the
same as applicable for the
correspondent posts in the
Government of India.
In the case of laboratory
staff where necessary, the
scales/designations as are
available for the corresponding
posts in the laboratories of
the CSIR be followed. Further,
the Central Universities should
follow the same norms/rules as
are available in the Government
of India for special allowances
and other fringe benefits. There
will then be uniformity in scales
of pay and allowances of the
non-teaching staff in the Central
Universities (Paragraph - 2.6).
4. We fully endorse the stand Accepted. The revised pay
taken by the University Grants scales already introduced
Commission in consultation with may be personal to the
the Central Government that present incumbents. In
additional dearness allowances future all posts be
would be payable only in respect filled up in accordance
of those employees whose scales with the pay scales as
of pay are duly prescribed are approved by the University
not in other case. The University Grants Commission
Grants Commission has already for the concerned posts.
informed the Aligar Muslim
University to this effect.
We further recommend that this
principle should be strictly,
adhered to in respect of all
Central Universities and benefits
like house rent allowances etc.
should also be admissible only
on approved pay scales and not
on the basis of the unilateral
revisions (Paragraph - 2.8).
12. It may be noted that it is only pursuant to this the pay scales of Rs. 650-1200 was given to the Section Officers w.e.f. 19.2.1983.
13. On the 14th of April, 1983, the Deputy Secretary, University Grants Commission wrote to the Registrar, University of Delhi in the following terms :-
“Sub : Upgradation in salary scales of Ministerial and Class IV categories of staff in Central Universities.
In continuation of this office letter of even number dated 8th April, 1983 addressed to the Vice-Chancellor of Your University, I am directed to say that the University Grants Commission, on the recommendations of the Committee appointed by the Commission to identify disparity in the pay scale and promotional avenues of on-teaching staff in the Central Universities has agreed to upgrade the scale of pay of the category of staff mentioned below w.e.f. 19.2.1983 in the Central Universities:
S. Post Existing scales Upgraded scales
No. of pay of pay
as on 19.2.1983
1. Section Officer Rs.650-960
Grade-I
2. Section Officer Rs.550-900 Rs. 650-1200
Grade-II
3. Sr.Assistant Rs.425-700 Rs. 425-800
4. Stenographers Rs.425-700 Rs. 425-800
A separate communication is being sent regarding mode of fixation of pay for the above categories of staff.
A further communication will follow with regard to the scales of pay of the personal assistants.
The above orders will also be applicable to Delhi University affiliated Colleges receiving maintenance grant from the University Grants Commission.”
14. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition, it is stated:
That it would also be seen from the said representations that the scale of pay of Section Officers of the University/Colleges had been ordered to be revised as Rs.650-1200 by the UGC, but unfortunately this was done only with effect from 19.2.1983 even though this was done with effect from 1.1.1973 in the case of Section Officers of the UGC and/or the Government of India. In this connection, a copy of letter of the UGC dated 14.4.1983 is attached herewith and marked as Annexure I.”
15. In paragraphs 18 to 20 of the writ petition, the petitioners based eir claim. They are as under :-
“That it may be clarified here that so far as the Section Officers of the Government of India are concerned, they were, prior to 1.1.1973, getting the scale of Rs. 350-900 and from 1.1.1973 they were given the scale of Rs. 650-1200. So far as the Superin tendents/ Section Officers of the UGC are concerned, they, prior to 1.1.1971, as already stated above, were getting the scale of Rs.620-900 (Grade I) and Rs.350-590 (Grade II). However, the said cales were revised to Rs.840-1200 (Grade-I) and Rs.650-1040 Grade II) with effect from 1.1.1973.
That it may be mentioned that the placement from Grade II to rade I in UGC as well as in the University/College was made on the basis of seniority and the posts in Grade I were 50% of the posts in Grade II. This was ultimately found as arbitrary and unreasonable in as much as though the incumbants of Grade II performed the same duties as were performed by the incumbents of Grade I, yet some people were given the higher scale of Rs. 840-1200.
That so far as the UGC is concerned, both the said scales were erged into one i.e. Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 23rd June, 1982. The Section Officers of the UGC, though technically were given the scale of Rs.650-1040 in Grade II, but, in effect they got the scale of Rs.650-1200 with effect from 1.1.1973. Though on paper, it was said to be effective from 23.6.1982, but, in fact, by that date, the incumbents concerned could not reach the stage of Rs.1200/-. In fact, the said revision also was arbitrary. As a matter of fact, the incumbents ought to have been given the scale of Rs.840-1200 as some of the incumbents were in fact getting the scale of Rs.840-1200 with effect from 1.1.1973 when the arbitrary
bifurcation was existing and this, as stated above, was sought to be removed only with effect from 23.6.1982.”
16. In paragraph 21 of the writ petition, the petitioners have stated:
“That under the aforesaid circumstances, the Section Officers of the University/Colleges including the petitioners herein, became entitled to the scale of Rs. 640-1200 from 1.1.1973. In the alternative, they became entitled at least to the scale of Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 1.1.1973 as was being given to the Section Officers of the Government of India/UGC. Still alternative, the petitioners became entitled to the scale of Rs .840-1200 (Grade-I) and Rs. 650-1040 (Grade-II) with effect from 1.1.1973 to 22nd June, 1982 and to a common scale of Rs. 650-1200 with effect from 22nd June, 1982 as was done in the case of Section Officers of the UGC.”
17. According to the petitioners, there was some correspondence between he University Grants Commission and the University and it is not relevant. t is only on these grounds the petitioners claim pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 w.e.f 1.1.1973.
18. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed by the second respondent, University Grants Commission, it is stated:
“That it is incorrect to say that the scales of pay of Section Officers in the UGC were at par with that of the Government of India with effect from 1.1.1973, as alleged. The UGC, unlike the Government of India had two different scales for Section Officers (Grade-I) and Section Officers (Grade-II). In fact, these two grades were integrated only w.e.f.23.6.1982, and the pay revised from the said date.
As regards the averments contained in para 4 that the petitioners are performing the same duties as Section Officers in the Govern ment of India and the UGC, such comparison of duties is impossi ble in the absence of any specific details in the petition regarding the nature of such work. It would not be correct to say that the nature of work in the Government of India, the UGC, the Delhi University and the Colleges is the same. As held by this Hon’ble Court in Des Raj Vs. Lt. Governor (1982 (2) SLR 681), even the fact that the work may be of equal importance (assuming it is so) does not make it an identical work attracting the constitutional mandate of equal pay for equal work.”
19. In paragraph 12 of the counter, the second respondent made its position clear relating to the change of esignation to Section Officer which was accepted in 1978. The same reads as under :-
“That the University itself re-designated the post of Superin tendents as Section Officers and approached the UGC for the same. As may be seen from Annexure-F of the petition, the UGC expressed its no objection to the re-designation of Superintendents as Section Officers in the existing scale. It was, however, made clear that the approval did not commit the UGC to revise the scale of pay of these posts. Up to November, 1978, the scales of pay were not at par with the Government of India or with the UGC.”
20. In paragraph 15 & 16, the situation is fully explained. The same reads
as under:-
“That in reply to para 15, I say and submit that it is a fact that the UGC on a reference received from the Ministry of Education had constituted a Committee to look into the question of disparity in the pay scales of Central Universities. The Committee was constituted in August, 1982 and its recommendations were placed before the UGC on 27th January, 1983. The UGC further desired that these recommendations may be examined by another Committee vide its resolution dated 27th January, 1983. The recommendations of this Committee were further considered by the UGC at its meeting held on 19-20th Feb., 1983 and the UGC broadly agreed with the recommendations, On the basis of the decision
taken in the UGC’s meeting, the approval of the UGC was conveyed to the Delhi University for the placement of the Grade II and Grade I Section Officers in the scale of Rs.650-1200 w.e.f. 19.2.1983. The decision was made effective from the date of the decision taken by the UGC.
That in reply to para 16, I refer to the reply contained here-in-able in para 15. The date from which the decision of the UGC was to be effective was the date when the decision was taken by the UGC. It was not possible for the UGC to compare Section Officer with a Teacher in the matter of par fixation in view of the fact that the non-teaching staff of the Central Universities are governed by the rules applicable to the Government servants whereas the teachers of Central Universities were governed under he Acts and Statues of the Universities.”
21. Dealing with the comparison of the nature of work done by the Section Officers in the University Grants Commission, Government of India, University and the colleges, it is stated:
“That the contents of paras 21 and 22 seek cartain reliefs without any foundation. The UGC, the Government of India and the Delhi University are the different bodies and the employees of one cannot automatically be equated with the employees of the other for purposes of equating scales of pay. The nature of duties performed by different officials in these three bodies is not and need not necessarily be identical. To say that because Section Officers in the Government of India or in the UGC have been sanctioned a particular scale of pay and that, therefore, Section Officers in the Universities/Colleges should also be sanctioned the same scale of pay is not logical, unless it is
clearly established that all of them are identically situated. The petitioners not having considered it necessary to plead or to bring out the identity and the nature of work of Section Officers in the different establishments, they are not entitled to any reliefs as prayed for in the petition.”
22. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G.D. Gupta, submitted at the Supreme Court had laid down that when employees in different organisation coming under the control of the Government of India do the same work, they are entitled to equal pay. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. G.D. Gupta, referred to the following judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his submission:-
1. “Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India & Others”, .
2. "M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Vs. Audrey D'Costa & Another", .
3. "Y.K.Mehta & Others Vs. Union of India & Another", .
4. "Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers" Union Vs. Union of India & Others", .
5. "Chief Conservator of Forests and another, etc.etc., Vs.
Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, etc.etc.",
23. The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr.G.D.Gupta, making particu-
lar reference to "M/s.Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd Vs. Audrey D'Costa &
Another”, , submitted that the supreme Court had laid down that the financial obligation of the employer cannot stand in the way of
the grant of relief in respect of `equal pay for equal work”.
24. The learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr.Gourab K.Banerjee,
submitted the a statement with remarks explaining the situation, which is as under:-
RELEVANT UNION OF UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITY REMARKS
DATE INDIA GRANTS OF DELHI
COMMISSION
01.12.68 Section Offic- Section Off- Superinten- Even
er 350-900 icer Gr.I dent Gr-I prior to
(page 20) 620-900Gr.II 350-650 the date
350-590 Gr.II of
(page 20) 325-575 claim
(page 13) (1.1.73)
Supdts.In
Delhi
University
had deci-
dedly
inferior
pay scal-
es to
Section
Officers
in the
UGC and
the Gover-
nment.
01.01.73 Section Off- Section Off- Superinten- From th-
icer 650-1200 icer Gr.I dent Gr.I is date,
(page 20) 840-1200 650-960 the pay
Gr.II Gr.II scale of
650-960 550-900 a Grade-
(page 20,84) (page 16) I Supdt.
in Delhi
University
was equa-
ted to
that of a
Grade-II
Section
Officer
in the
UGC. The-
re was no
parity wh
-at so ev
-er Inde-
ed, the
UGC refu-
sed to gr
ant pari-
ty vide
letters
dated
9.4.74,
3.6.74,
27.8.74,
21.6.75,
4.7.75,
28.7.77,
3.1.78.
(page 53-
56).
07.10.78 Section Offi Section Off- Sec.Offi- The E.C.
cer 650-1200 icer Gr.I cer Gr.I of Delhi
840-1200 650-960 Universi-
Gr.II Gr.II ty redes-
650-960 550-900 ignated
Supdts as
Section
Officers.
UGC by
letter
dated
29.11.78
while not
Objecting
to the
redesigna-
tion, em-
phasised
that this
in no way
committed
it to re-
vise the
pay scal-
es and p-
ay scales
could not
be revis-
ed witho-
ut prior
approval
(page 43)
23.06.82 Section Offi- Section Offi- Sec.Off- Existing
cer 650-1200 cer 650-1200 icer GR.I pay scal-
(page 21) Gr. I 650-960 es of Se-
Gr.II 550-900 ction Off
icers in
the UGC
merged in
to a sing
le scale
of pay fr
om this
date pros
pectively.
(page 80)
19.02.83 Section Offi Section Offi- Sec.Offi Equalisa-
cer 650-1200 cer 650-1200 cer tion of
650-1200 pay scal-
es w.e.f.
19.2.83
for all
Central
Universiti-
es. Cut
Off date
fixed as
follows:-
Aug 1982-
Committee
to look
into dis-
parties
of pay
scales in
Central
Universiti-
es set up
(page 84)
27.1.83
initial
recommenda-
tions (re
examined)
(page 84)
19.2.83
UGC's me-
eting app
roved cer
tain re-
commendati-
ons. Cut
off date
fixed.
(page 46,85)
14.4.83
Communica-
ted to
Universiti-
es.
(page 75)
25. The learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr.Gourab K.Banerjee, referred to the following rulings by the Supreme Court :-
1. “Union of India & Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal”, .
2. “Sher Singh & Others Vs. Union of India & Others”, .
3. “Dr.P.N.Puri & Others Vs. State of UP and Others”, .
4. “University Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Oth-
ers”, .
5. “Rao Somashekara & Others Vs. State of Karnataka & Another”,
.
6. “Vice Chancellor, G.B.Pant University of Agriculture and
Technology & Another Vs. Dr.Kewala Nand & Others .
26. The learned counsel for the second responden,. Mr. Gourab K.Banerjee, submitted that the position of the Section Officers in the colleges, in the Universities, in the University Grants Commission and in the Government of India is entirely different. The nature of the work is not the same; the responsibility is not the same, and Section Officer in University or the college cannot be compared with the Section Officer in the University Grants Commission or the Government of India. The designation alone would not make them equal and on that footing the petitioners cannot claim parity
in the scales of pay. The University Grants Commission, however, after considering the matter had decided on the 19th of February, 1983 to grant the pay scale of Rs.650-1200 and that has been granted. The decision of the University Grants Commission had been given effect to with effect from the date of its resolution. The petitioners cannot claim the parity for the period from 1.1.1973 to 18.2.1983 and the University Grants Commission had taken the decision having regard to the relevant aspects of the matter. The learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr.Gourab K. Banerjee, submitted that the stand taken by the petitioners in the writ petition is not sustainable in law.
27. Having considered the matter in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the petitioners have not made out a case for the grant of pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1.1.1973 to 18.2.1983. The authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. G.D. Gupta, do not help the petitioners.
28. In “Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India & Others”, , the
facts are entirely different. The facts, as noticed by the Supreme Court, in that case are:
“The petitioner is a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force under the Delhi Administration and he demands that his scales of pay should at least be the same as the scale of pay of other drivers in the service of the Delhi Administration. The scale of pay of a Driver-Constable in the Delhi Police Force is Rs. 210- 270 in the case of non-matriculates and Rs. 225-308 in the case of matriculates. The scale of pay of a Driver in the Railway Protection Force is Rs. 260-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the non-Secretariat office in Delhi is Rs.
260-6-290-EB-6-326-EB-8-8-8-390-10-400. The scale of pay of drivers in the office of the Language Commission is Rs. 260-350. The pay scale of drivers of heavy vehicles in the Fire Brigade and the Department of Light House is Rs.330-480. The case of the petitioner is that he discharges the same duties as the rest of the drivers in the other offices; in fact he claims that he ischarges more onerous duties than the others. He complains that there is no reason whatsoever to discriminate against the petitioner and other driver-Constables merely because he and his ilk happen to be described as constables as indeed they are bound to be so described, belonging as they do to the Police Force.”
29. Referring to the Report of the Third Pay Commission, the Supreme Court bserved:
“It appears that the Third Pay Commission considered the claims of all drivers as a common category under the head “the pay scales appropriate for drivers of motor vehicles operating on roads .. … …”After considering the qualifications etc. possessed by drivers the Commission proposed pay scales for various categories of drivers like drivers of light motor vehicles, drivers of heavy motor vehicles, drivers employed in organisaions with large fleet of vehicles, drivers of staff cars etc. The pay scales were professed to be fixed with reference to the qualifications for driving, the nature and the arduousness of the duties and responsibilities, the non-availability of adequate
promotional avenues and such other usual considerations. The Pay Commission, however, while considering the question of scales of pay of drivers separated the case of constable-drivers on the ground that their case would be considered along with the cases of other police personnel. The grievance of the petitioner is that while considering the question of the scales of pay of the police personnel, the Pay Commission failed to consider the drivers as a separate category and ignored the special considerations which prevailed in the case of drivers in other departments and which should have, therefore, prevailed in the case of driver-constables also. The driver-constables were not only required to possess heavy transport driving licence, they were further required to undergo a test of proficiency in driving before they
were appointed as driver-constables in the police force. The duties were no less arduous and their responsibilities no less heavy than the duties and responsibilities of drivers in other departments. Their hours of work were long and inconvenient and there was constant exposure to security risks. The petitioner and other driver-constables made a representation to the authorities that their case was omitted to be considered separately by the Pay Commission and that their scales of pay should be the same as the drivers of heavy vehicles in other departments. As their claims for better scales of pay did not meet with any success, the present application has been filed for the issuance of a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution.”
30. It was submitted on the behalf of the Union of India that the petiioner, was no more and no less than a constable of the Delhi Police Force nd that there was no such category of Drivers in the Delhi Police Force. The Supreme Court had noticed that though he was employed as constable, he was only working as driver. The Supreme Court noticed:
“He was designated as constable because, for the purposes of the discipline of the Force and appointment as driver in the Delhi Police Force, he had to be made a member of the Delhi Police Force and had to be assigned a rank in the Force. The investiture of the petitioner with the “Powers, functions and privileges of a police officer” was a consequence of his becoming a member of the Force.”
31. Dealing with the counter-affidavit filed by the Union of India, the Supreme Court observed:
“The counter-affidavit does not explain how the case of the drivers in the police force is different from that of the drivers in other departments and what special factors weighed in fixing a lower scale of pay for them. Apparently in the view of the respondents, the circumstances that persons belong to different departments of the Government is itself a sufficient circumstances to justify different scales of pay irrespective of the identity of their powers, duties and responsibilities. We cannot accept this view. If this view is to be stretched to its logical
conclusion, the scales of pay of officers of the same rank in the Government of India may vary from department to department notwithstanding that their powers, duties and responsibilities are identical. We concede that equation of posts and equation of pay are matters primarily for the executive Government and expert bodies like the Pay Commission and not for Courts but we must hasten to say that where all things are equal that is, where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differentially in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. Of course, if officers of the same rank perform dissimilar functions and the powers, duties and responsibilities of the posts held by them very, such officers may not be heard to complain of dissimi-
lar pay merely because the posts are of the same rank and the nomenclature is the same.”
32. Referring to the concept of ‘equal pay for equal work’ under Article 9D which provides for equal pay for equal work for men and women, the Supreme Court expressed the view :
“Our attention was drawn to Binoy Kumar Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, ILR (1973) 1 Delhi 427, Makhan Singh Vs. Union of India, ILR (1975) 1 Delhi 227 where reference was made to the observations of this Court in Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Union of India, describing the principle of equal pay for equal work as an abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with
Art. 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, “equal pay for equal work”, is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi Vs. Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grades of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a
promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. The principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if
sought to be applied to them.
It is true that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims “equal pay for equal work for both men and women” as a Directive Principle of State Policy. ‘Equal pay for equal work for both men and women’ means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of inter-
pretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of
opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statue for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discrimina-
tory, whether a particular Governmental Policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature leave the millions of the people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there,
if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India in to a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word ‘Socialist’ must mean something. Even if it does not mean ‘To each according to his need’, it must at least mean ‘equal pay for equal work’. The principle of equal pay for equal’ is expressly
recognised by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czecho-slovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanina Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western labour codes too. Under provisions in S.31 (g.No.2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Aregentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgestz of the German Federal Republic and clauses 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the
principle is given universal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p.265). The preamble of the Constitu-tion of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of ‘equal remuneration for work of equal value’ as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of ‘conditions “involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperiled”. Construing Arti- cles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39(d), we are of the view that the principle ‘Equal pay for Equal work’ is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification through those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer.”
33. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held:
“There cannot be slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same function and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Govrnment. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the `power functions and Privileges of a police officer’ their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allega tion in the petition that the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a
lower scales of pay than others? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer in unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The Scale of pay shall be effective from 1st Jan, 1973 the date from which the recommen dations of the Pay Commission were given effect.”
34. The dictim laid down by the Supreme Court in “Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India & Others”., is entirely different, and I fail to see how this could help the petitioners.
35. In M/s. Mackinnon Mackenzie and Co. Ltd. Vs. Audrey D’Costa &
Another”, , the Supreme Court was dealing with claim of a lady stenographer for equal pay under Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (Act 25
of 1976). The ratio in that case is entirely different and that has absolutely no application to the instant case. It is only with reference to the claim under the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The Supreme Court observed:
“Applicability of the Act does not depend upon the financial ability of the management to pay equal remuneration as provided by it .”
This is relied on to project the claim of the petitioners without proper appreciation of the setting in which the observation was made by the Supreme Court.
36. In “Y.K. Mehta & Others Vs. Union of India & Another”, , three categories of Staff Artistes of Doordarshan under the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, namely, Cameraman Grade-II, Sound Recordist and lighting Assistant/Lightman, have claimed that they should be declared as Government servants and should be given the same pay scales as given to their respective counterparts in the Film Division under the same Ministry.
37. Referring to the nature of the work, the Supreme Court observed :
“It is the case of the petitioners that the nature of work performed by them is similar to that performed by their counterparts in the Film Division. The qualifications required for appointment to these categories of Staff Artistes, are the same as required in the cases of their counterparts in the Film Division. In the circumstances, it is submitted by the petitioners that the said Government order dated March 9, 1977 is discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, in these writ petitions it has been prayed that the petitioners should be declared as Government servants and paid the same
scales of pay as paid to their counterparts in the Film Division with effect from respective dates of their appointments.”
>38. Dealing with the case of the Government of India, the Supreme Court served :
“The respondents have opposed the writ petitions by filing counter-affidavits. It has been averred in the counter-affidavits that the Staff Artistes of Doordarshan are not Government servants, but they are engaged on contract basis. It is submitted that as they are not of the same class as of the employees in the Film Division, they are not entitled to the same scales of pay. With regard to the Sound Recordist, petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 974 of 1978, it is the case of the respondents that there is no such post in the Film Division as Sound Recordist”. It is averred that in the Film Division, there are three posts, namely, the Chief Sound Recordist, the Recordist and the Assistant Re-
cordist. It is, accordingly, contended that in Doordarshan, the organisational structure is entirely different and consists of only one category of post, that is, the Sound Recordist.”BLOCKQUOTE>
39. Further considering what is stated in the petitions and the counterfidavits, the Supreme Court observed :
“We have gone through the averments in the writ petitions and those made in the counter-affidavits filed by the Director General of Doordarshan and we have no hesitation in holding that the petitioners perform the same nature duties as those performed by their counter parts in the Film Division. When two posts under two different wings of the same Ministry are not only identical, but also involve the performance of the same of duties, it will be unreasonable and unjust to discriminate between the two in the matter of pay. One of the directive principles of State Policy, as embodied in clause (d) of Article 39 of the Constitution, is equal pay for equal work for both men and women. The provision of Act, 39(d) has been relied upon by the petitioners. The directive Principles contained in Part-IV of the Constitution, though not nforceable by any Court, are intended to be implemented by the State of its own accord so as to promote the welfare of the
people. Indeed, Article 37 provides, inter alia, that it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. Even leaving out of our consideration Art. 39(d), the principle of “equal pay for equal work”, it not given effect to in the case of one set of Government servants holding same or similar posts,
possessing same qualifications and doing the same kind of work, as another set of Government servants, it would be discriminatory and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such disrimination has been made in respect of the petitioners, who are he Staff Artistes of Doordarshan, by not giving them the same
scales of pay as provided to their counterparts in the Film Division under the same Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to the same scales of pay as their counter parts in the Film Division.”
“But the question is as to from which date they will be entitled to the scale of pay as prescribed for their counterparts in the Film Division. The petitioners have claimed that such scales of pay should be admitted to them with effect from their respective dates of appointments. After having given a careful thought to this aspect, we are of the view that ends of justice will be met sufficiently, if such scales of pay are given to the petitioners with effect from the first day of the month of the year in which each writ petition was filed in this Court except that in the
case of Writ Petition (C) No. 1756 of 1986 such scales of pay shall be given to the petitioners with effect from December 1, 1983.”
40. Eventually, the Supreme Court granted the relief in the following
terms :-
“In the circumstances, all these writ petitions are allowed. The Sound Recordists, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 974 of 1978, shall be given the pay scale of the Recordist/Sound Recordist in the Film Division i.e., Rs 550-900 with effect from January 1, 1978. The Cameramen Grade-II, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition (C) No. 1239 of 1979, shall be given the pay scale of the Cameraman of the Film Division i.e., Rs. 650-960 with effect from August 1, 1979. The Lighting Assistnts/Lightmen, who are the petitioners in Writ Petition(C) No. 1756 of 1986, shall be given the scale of pay of Assistant Cameraman in the Film Division i.e., Rs 425-700 with effect from
December 1, 1983. The petitioners in all these writ petitions will also be entitled to the substituted scales of pay and conse- quential benefits. The respondents are directed to disburse to the petitioners the arrear amounts being the difference in the pay scales within four months from today.”
Here also the ratio is entirely different and cannot be called in aid r the purpose of the claim of the petitioners.
41. In “Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers” Union Vs. Union of India & Others”, , the employees working under the Grih Kalyan Kendra
claimed parity with other employees performing similar work in NDMC and other departments of Delhi Administration. The Supreme Court reiterating the principle observed :
“Equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a fundamental right but in view of the Directive Principles of State Policy as contained in Art. 39(d) of the Constitution “equal pay for equal work” has assumed the status of fundamental right in service jurisprudence having regard to the constitutional mandate of equality in Arts. 14 and 16 of the
Constitution. Equal pay for equal work and providing security for service by regularising casual employment within a reasonable period has been accepted by this Court as a constitutional goal to our socialistic pattern. It has ceased to be a judge made law as it is the part of the constitutional philosophy which ensures a welfare socialistic pattern of a State providing equal opportunity to all and equal pay for equal work for similarly placed employees of the State. This Court has zealously enforced the fundamental right of equal pay for equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in a number of decisions. See : Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, ; Daily Rated Casual Labour employed under P & T Department Vs. Union of India, ; Dhirendra Champli Vs. State of U.P., ;
Surinder Singh Vs. Engineer-in-Chief, CPWD, ; R.D. Gupta Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi Administration, ; Bhagwan Dass Vs. State of Haryana, ; Jaipal Vs. State of Haryana, ; Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees Association Vs. State of Karna-
taka, . Therefore, the principle of equal pay for
equal work even in an establishment which is an instrumentality
of a State is applicable in its full vigour.”
Dealing with the claim of the petitioner in that case in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, it was observed :
“The question then arises whether the respondents have practiced discrimination in denying the employees of the Kendra pay which the Union of India has been paying to other similarly placed employees doing the same or similar work. This question is of primary importance which requires investigation of facts. Unless, it is demonstrated that the employees of the Grih Kalyan Kendra are discriminated in matters relating to pay and other
emoluments with the other similarly placed employees, the princile of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied. While consid erng this question, it is not necessary to find out similarity by mathematics formula but there must be a reasonable similarity in the nature of work, performance of duties, the qualification and the equality of work performed by them. It is permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts, pay scales, value of work and responsibility and experience. The classification must, however, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers Vs. Union of India, , Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) observed at page 1297 of AIR :
“There may be qualitative differences as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference, one cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions, of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonable on an intelligible criteria which was a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is important to emphasis that equal pay for equal work is a concomitant of Article 14 of the Constitution. But it follows naturally that equal pay for unequal work will be a negation of that right.”
Elaborating the aforesaid observation the learned Judge further observed thus at page 1300 of AIR :
“The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less _ it varies from nature and culture of employment. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. If it has a rational nexus with the object to be sought or, as reiterated before a certain amount of value judgment of the administrative authorities who are charged with fixing the pay scales has to be left with them and it cannot be interfered with by the Court unless it is demonstrated that either it is irrational or based on no basis or arrived mala fide either in law or in fact.”
Here again, I am unable to see how this case could be of any assistnce to the petitioners.
42. In “Chief Conservator of Forests and another, etc. etc., Vs. Jagannath aruti Kondhare, etc. etc.”, , the Supreme Court referred
to which it had decide:
“Two questions in the main need our determination in this batch of appeals which are by the Chief Conservator of Forests. State of Maharashtra. The first and foremost question is whether Forest, Department of the State Government is an “Industry” within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter `the Central Act’), which definition has been adopted by the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short `the State Act’). We shall have then to address ourselves to the question whether in the cases at hand the employer, namely, the State Government, had indulged in unfair labour practice visualised by item 6 of
Schedule IV of the State Act, as alleged by the respondents before the Industrial Court, Pune/Ahmednagar. If these questions would be answered in affirmative, we would be required to consider whether the directions given by the aforesaid industrial Courts need our interference.”
The facts of that case are entirely different. It is not necessary to iscuss them and this has absolutely no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the instant case with reference to the claim of the petitioners for pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 for the period from 1.1.73 to 18.2.1983.
43. This would take me to the authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee.
44. In “Union of India & Another Vs. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal”, , the fixing of 1st of August of the year concerned as the date with reference to which the eligibility of persons desirous of sitting in competitive examination for recruitment to the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Foreign Service etc., qua their age for which both minimum and maximum is normally fixed, was challenged before the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court had held :
“Having known the legal parameters within which we have to function, let it be seen whether fixation of 1st August as cut-off date for determining the eligibility of applicants qua their age can be held to be arbitrary despite preliminary examination being conducted before that date. As to why the examination, has been explained in paragraph 3 of the special leave petition. The sum and substance of the explanation is that preliminary examination is only a screening test and marks obtained in this examination do not count for determining the order of merit, for which pur-
pose of marks obtained in the main examination, which is still being held after 1st August, lone are material. In view of this, it cannot be held that continuation of treating 1st August, as the cut-off date, despite the Union c Service Commission having introduced the method of preliminary examination which is held before 1st August, can be said to be “very wide off any reasonable mark” or so capricious or whimsical as to permit judicial interference.”
In the instant case, the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 is given w.e.f. .2.1983 which was the date of resolution of the University Grants Commission. It cannot be said that giving effect to the decision from that is pricious and whimsical.
45. In “Sher Singh & Others Vs. Union of India & Others”, , the librarians employed in the University of Delhi claimed parity in pay with the corresponding categories of teaching staff. The Supreme Court held :
“After a serious and anxious consideration on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, according to us there appears to be no rationale or any justification in the claim of parity between the teaching staff and the library staff in Delhi University and its colleges for the simple reason that the two sets of employees belonged to different categories of employees who stand on a different footing. The nature of duties, workload, experience and responsibilities of the two sets of employees in question are totally different from each other. The teaching staff has to do some research work, deep study in their respective subjects and to make preparations for the daily lectures in the classrooms and other academic work while this is not so in the case of library staff. The experience of library staff is totally different from the one which is required for the teaching staff. Working pattern of the two sets of employees cannot be said to be identical so as to claim parity between the library staff. the experiance of library staff and the teaching staff. If the Government as a matter of policy had equated the library staff for the purposes of pay scales earlier for a cer tain period as contended by the appellants, they should be thank-
ful to the Government as they could not have claied the parity as of right. In any case that was the decision of the Government which had allowed the equation of pay scales during the period rom 1961 to 1.1.1973. Later, if the Government had taken a policy decision to grant parity again with effect from 1.4.1980 and not with retrospective effect from 1.7.1973 when it was disturbed there could be no litimate grievance for the same because the Government has the right to change its policy from time to time, according to the administrative exigencies and demands of the relevant time. As a matter of fact the courts would be slow in interfering with matters of Government policy
except where it is shown that the decision is unfair, mala fide or contrary to any statutory directions. There will be no justification for the Court to interfere with the policy of the Govrnment merely on the ground of change in the policy. If earlier the Government took a policy decision to grant parity to the library staff with the teaching staff it was the policy of the then Government and if for certain reasons the Government took a different policy decision to withdraw the parity and to enforce it again with effect from a certain date it will again be a matter of policy of the Government and it is not for the courts to interfere with such policy decisions of the Government. Normally the courts will not dictate the decision of the statutory authority in exercise of its discretion and formulation of its
policy. The Court will not direct the statutory authority to exercise the discretion in a particular manner not expressly required by law. The Court can only command the statutory authority by a Writ of mandamus to perform its duty by exercising the discretion according to law. This was also the view expressed by the Court in U.P. SRTC Vs. Md. Ismail, . In the present case, we find that there is no judicial or quasi judicial duty or any obligation imposed on the Government to equate the library staff with the teaching staff, on the basis of which the enforcement thereof could be claimed by the appellants. In such a situation it cannot be said that the Government did not act airly or acted mala fide so as to call for any interference by this Court invoking the power of judicial review.”
46. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, the principle laid down herein would apply to the facts of the instant case. The University Grants Commission took the decision and that was given effect to and the University Grants Commission had taken the decision after considering the whole history of the service.
47. In “Dr. P.N. Puri & Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others”, , similar question was posed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dealing with the point held :
“The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court for direction to pay equal pay on a par with Medical Officers at Rs. 2200-4000. There was a long controversy regarding the entitlement of the petitioners and their companions for the said scale of pay. Ultimately, it was referred to the Anomaly Committee which had decided in its proceedings dated 1.1.1995 accepting the new pay scales of different posts in the urban local bodies, namely, persons like the petitioners would be paid the scale of pay at s. 2200-4000 and recommended to upgrade the said scale from 7.11.1994 and to pay the scales of pay from that date. The Government has accepted the above recommendation and issued orders
on 16.2.995. Calling that order in question, the petitioners have filed the writ petition seeking payment of arrears from 1986.
Initially, directions were given by the Court to consider why the petitioners were not being paid w.e.f 1.1.1986. After consideration again, the respondent filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances. Undoubtedly, one of the circumstances stated was that previously the petitioners were unequals and were not being paid the same pay and, therefore, they were not entitled to the same scale of pay. The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition by order dated 21.9.1995.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the reason given by the respondents is not relevant since the Anomaly Committee recommended that they are performing the same duties on a par with the Medical Officers. Therefore, the High Court ought to have granted them the scale of pay from 1986. As stated earlier, reasons given in the counter-affidavit may not be the correct reasons but the Anomaly Committee had recommended for payment of the same scale of pay to the persons like the peti tioners w.e.f. 7.11.1994. It is well-settled law that fixing a
date is not arbitrary violating Article 14. It is settled law that the authorities cannot pick up from their hat and fix a date. The question, therefore, which arises for decision is : whether the date fixed is arbitrary? The question was referred to the Anomaly Committee to advise the Government as to the fixation of the scale of pay to which persons like petitioners would be entitled to. The Committee had gone into the question and recommended the scale of pay of Rs. 2200-4000 to persons like the petitioners and also recommended to give effect from the date on which they had decided, namely, 7.11.1994. The Government having accepted the same had given effect from that date. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said that fixation of date is arbi-trary violating Article 14.
The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.”
48. In “University Grants Commission Vs. Sadhana Chaudhary & Others”, A href=”javascript:fnOpenGlobalPopUp(‘/citation/crosscitations.asp’,”,’1′);”>, the point relating to the choice of a date was considered. The Supreme Court held :
“We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubgbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can
be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See : Union of India Vs. Parameswaran Match Works, and Sushma Sharma (Dr.) Vs. State of Rajasthan, In the present case, the date, 31.12.1993, as fixed by notification dated 21.6.1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken
in submitting the Ph.d. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M.Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31.12.1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. The exemption from eligibility test that has been granted under para 5 of the advertisement dated
23.1.1995 is relatable to the introduction of the requirement of eligibility test in the 1991 Regulations. The object underlying the grant of exemption is to mitigate the resultant hardship to candidates who had registered for Ph.D. degree or had joined the course for M.Phil. degree on the basis of the minimum qualifications prescribed under the 1982 Regulations. The validity of the fixation of cut-off date for the purpose of grant of exemption
from the eligibility test has to be considered with reference to the date of issuance of the 1991 Regulations and not with reference to the date of advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the direction of the High Court that it would not be necessary to appear in the eligibility test for candidates who have applied or/are applying for the Lecturers, posts pursuant to the advertisement dated 23.1.1995 if they have obtained M. Phil. degrees or submitted Ph.D. thesis before 31.12.1994, i.e., prior to the date of the publication of advertisement dated 23.1.1995 and the further direction to the Haryana Public Service Commission and State of Haryana to ensure that as and when any such advertisement is issued, they would bear in mind that the eligi-
bility dates be not far off from the date of advertisement. The exemption from the requirement regarding clearing the eligibility test has to be confined within the limits indicated in the amendment introduced in the 1991 Regulations by notification dated 21.6.1995. Respondents 1 and 2 who had moved the High Court by filing the writ petition obtained their M.Phil. degrees prior to 31.12.1993. They would be entitled to exemption from clearing the eligibility test under the of the notification dated 15.6.1995. The decision of the High Court, insofar as it relates to the said respondents, is not required to be disturbed and is, herefore, maintained.” LOCKQUOTE>
49. In “Rao Somashekara & Others Vs. State of Karnataka & Another”, , the petitioners before the Supreme Court were Secondary School Teachers in the State of Karnataka working in Government and Government aided Secondary Schools. The Supreme Court had referred to the circumstances to which the question was mooted. The same is as under :
“Certain Secondary Grade Teachers in the former State of Hyderabad were allotted to the State of Karnataka as on 1.11.1956. After reorganisation, the corresponding posts in former State of Mysore were equated with the posts of the allotted personnel. There was revision of pay scales on 1.1.1957 and again on 1.1.1961 but the disparity in pay scales was allowed to continue. This anomally was continued till 1.1.1970 _ for nearly fourteen years, when for the first time under the Karnataka Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1970 concerned which came into force on 1.1.1970, based on the report of the Pay Commission headed by Justice Tukol, the scales were brought on a par with scales of
allotted Hyderabad officers prospectively by enhancing the scales of all the Karnataka teachers w.e.f. 1.1.1970. But the grievance of the Secondary School Teachers of Government of Karnataka for the period from 1.1.1957 to 31.12.1969 inued and has not been removed. That is the subject of these writ petitions.”
50. In paragraphs 11 & 12 of the judgment, the Supreme Court dealt with the case of the respondents in the following terms :-
“It is to be noticed that in these writ petitions, after 1.11.1956, the disparities in the scales of pay continued till 1.1.1970 and it was only from the date that, on the basis of Justice Tukol Commission Report, the scales of the Mysore/Karna-taka Secondary School Teachers were brought on a par with those
of the Secondary School Teachers of the erstwhile Hyderabad State allotted to the State of Karnataka. In other words, the State took about fourteen years to set right the disparities. As to whether any inquiry is necessary for deciding about hostile discrimination, the petitioners contend that there is no dispute because the posts in the allotted areas of Hyderabad State and of Karnataka were equated soon after 1956. Question therefore is whether, in the writ petitions filed in this Court in 1991, we are compelled to interfere?
We are of the view that the State Government had before it the report of the Commission and on that basis it took a decision that the disparities should stand eliminated prospectively from 1.1.1970 and not retrospectively from 1.1.1957. The question as to whether the date from which the scales ought to have been equated should be 1.1.1970 or an interior or a later date was a matter which had to be arrived at by taking all factors into
account. It will be difficult for this Court to decide as to from what date the continuance of the existing scales should be treated as discriminatory or the continuance would lose its temporary character arising out of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. It may be that the State of Karnataka felt that the grievnce of the non-allotted Primary School Teachers whose salaries were lesser than the salaries of non-allotted Secondary School Teachers was a matter of grave concern requiring redressal even as late as 1979 or 1986. Merely because the grievances of non allotted primary teachers were reminded even after considerable lapse of time, we cannot say that grievances of Secondary School
Teachers _ even if it was late _ should have also been redressed for the period 1.1.1957 to 31.12.1969. Above all, the financial burden involved was also a matter of relevant consideration. We are not therefore inclined to hold that the cut-off date of 1.1.1970 fixed after the report of Justice Tukol Commission, in regard to Secondary School Teachers, is arbitrary or violative of Article 14. In any event, principle of laches applies equally to applications under Article 32 of the Constitution of India (Rabindranath Bose Vs. Union of India, .”
51. This was relied on by the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee in support of the case of the second respondent. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, Mr. Gourab K.
Banerjee, the University Grants Commission, after taking into account all facts, had taken the decision to give the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 to the petitioners and that was given effect to w.e.f. 19.2.1983. According to the learned counsel for the second respondent, the petitioners cannot claim pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 from 1.1.1973.
52. In “Vice Chancellor, G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technolo-
gy & Another Vs. Dr. Kewala Nand & Others , the Supreme Court had referred to the circumstances under which the appeal had arisen before the Supreme Court. The same reads as under :-
“Civil Appeal No. 3751 of 1996 has been filed by the G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology, Pant Nagar in the State of UP against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court under which Research Assistants working in the appellant-univer-sity have been declared as entitled to payment of salary in the pay scale of Rs. 700-1600 and the subsequently revised pay-scale of Rs. 2200-4000 from the date from which the said pay-scales have been given to the Research Assistants of two other agricul tural universities in the State, namely, Narendra Deva University
of Agriculture and Technology, Faizabad and Chandrashekhar Azad University of Agriculture and Technology, Kanpur. Civil appeal No. 6724 of 1996 is an appeal filed by the State of U.P. against the same judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court while Civil Appeal No. 3752 of 1996 is filed by the Association of Teachers in the G.B. Pant University of Agriculture and Technology against the same judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court.
In the appellant-university there are two cadres in the research wing. There is a cadre of Research Assistants and there is cadre of Senior Research Assistants. Prior to 1.4.1978 the minimum ualification prescribed for a Research Assistant was a B.Sc degree while the minimum qualification prescribed for a Senior Research Assistant was an M.Sc. degree. The scale of pay of Research Assistants was Rs. 350-700. With effect from 1.4.1978 the pay-scale of Research Assistants was revised to Rs. 500-900. The pay-scale of Rs. 700-1600 which was given to Senior Research Assistants has been revised with effect from 1.1.1986 to Rs. 2200-4000.”
53. Dealing with the point, the Supreme Court observed :
“Therefore, the High Court has proceeded on a wrong assumption that all Research Assistants in the other universities were given from inception the pay-scale of Rs. 700-1600. In the other two universities, there was no separate cadre of Senior Research Assistants. Therefore, those possessing an M.Sc. degree were given a higher pay-scale of Rs. 500-900 which was also the payscale of Research Assistants in the appellant-university at the relevant time. When there are two separate cadres of Research Assistants and Senior Research Assistants, the pay of the two
cannot be directed to be identical when separate minimum qualifiations are prescribed and there is a separate selection for the two cadres. Nevertheless, the Research Assistants in the appelant-university have, in fact, been given, with the approval of the Government, the same pay-scale as Senior Research Assistant with effect from 12.12.1989 it they possess an M.Sc. degree -after they were declared as teachers. There is no legal basis for the claim of the Research Assistants for the same pay-scale for he period 1.4.1978 to 12.12.1989.”
54. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited by Mr. Gourab K. Banerjee, the learned counsel for the second respondent, would apply to the facts of the instant case, the having regard to those principles, I am of the view that the petitioners cannot claim the pay scale of Rs. 650-1200 w.e.f. 1.1.1973 and what has been granted to the petitioners is absolutely in accordance with law. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
55. There shall be no order as to costs.
