ORDER
Arijit Pasayat, C.J.
1. An interesting question is raised regarding the power of this Court to condone delay in presentation of application for reference in terms of Section 130-A of the Customs Act, 1962 (in Short ‘the Act’). Sub-section (1) of the said Section provides that the application has to be filed within a period of 180 days of the date upon which the concerned party is served with the notice of order passed under Section 129-B of the Act. The provision reads as follows:
“130A. Application to High Court.- (1) The Commissioner of Customs or the other party may, within one hundred and eighty days of the date upon which he is served with the notice of an order under section 129B passed on or after the 1st day of July, 1999 ( not being the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment), by application in the prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees, apply to the High Court to direct the Appellate Tribunal to refer to the High Court any question of law arising from such order of the Tribunal.”
2. Undisputedly, there was delay in presentation of the application to this Court. According to learned counsel for Revenue in the absence of any specific period for which the delay beyond the prescribed period can be condoned, this Court, by resort to the provision contained in Limitation Act, 1963 (in Short ‘Limitation Act‘), can condone the delay. Per contra, learned counsel for the assessed submitted that without any specific power having been conferred for condensation of delay beyond the prescribed period for filling. It is apparent that the Court has no power to condone the delay.
3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to take note of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. The said provision reads as follows:
“29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law.”
The scope and ambit of the provision has been examined by the Apex Court in many cases, one of them being Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker .
4. As noted by the Apex Court in Mukri Gopalan’s case (supra), a mere look at the provision quoted above shows that for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision. They are: (i) there must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application; and (ii) the said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act. Once the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied, consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follows. They are: (1) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule; and (2) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extend to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. It is to be noted that once the aforesaid two conditions are satisfied, Section 29(2) on its own force will get attracted to the application filed before the High Court under Section 130A of the Act and the provisions of Section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply. Section 5 being one of them would, therefore, get attracted.
5. It is also necessary to note the change in the statutory settings of Section 29(2) as earlier obtained in the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and the present Limitation Act. Section 29(2) as found in Indian Limitation Act, 1908, read as follows:
“29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the First Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law-
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Section 9 to 18 and Section 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law: and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
As per this sub-section, the provisions contained in certain sections of the Limitation Act were applied automatically to determine the periods under the special laws, and the provisions contained in other sections were stated to apply only if they were not expressly excluded by the special law. The provisions (Section 5) relating to the power of the Court to condone delay in preferring appeals and making application s came under the latter category. So if the power to condone delay contained in Section 5 had to be exercised by the appellate body it had to be conferred by the special law. That is why we find in a number of special laws a provision to the effect that the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the proceeding under the special law. The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings under the special laws is sometimes given to the ordinary courts and sometimes given to separate tribunals constituted under the special law. When the special law provides that the provision contained in Section 5 shall apply to the proceedings under it, it is really a conferment of the power of the Court under Section 5 to the tribunals under the special law – whether these tribunals are courts or not. If these tribunals under the special law should be courts in the ordinary sense an express extension of the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act will become otiose in cases where the special law has created separate tribunals to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special law. That is not the intention of the legislature.
6. Above being the position, Section 5 of the Limitation Act has application to the proceedings under Section 130A of the Act.
7. Residual question that needs adjudication is whether the petitioner has shown sufficient cause justifying condensation of delay in presentation of the application. We have heard learned counsel for the parties on this aspect. Considering the reasons indicated in the application for condensation and the submissions made, we consider this to be a fit case where the delay deserves to be condoned, which we direct.
8. The application stands disposed of accordingly.