High Court Rajasthan High Court

Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Shri Prithvi Raj Daga on 25 April, 1984

Rajasthan High Court
Commissioner Of Income-Tax vs Shri Prithvi Raj Daga on 25 April, 1984
Equivalent citations: 1986 159 ITR 193 Raj
Author: N Kasliwal
Bench: N Kasliwal, S Bhargava

JUDGMENT

N.M. Kasliwal, J.

1. On an application moved by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi (Cent.), New Delhi, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, has referred the following question for the opinion of this court :

” Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in rejecting the finding of the Department that the sale of immovable property to M/s. Sujangarh Investment Corporation and Trading Co., Sujangarh, was sham, collusive and colourable transaction and thereby excluding the income from properties amounting to Rs. 4,204 ?”

2. We have heard Mr. Surolia on behalf of the Department.

3.Nobody has appeared on behalf of the assessee in spite of service.

4. In our view, the question whether the sale of immovable properties to Sujangarh Investment Corporation Trading Co., Sujangarh, was a sham, collusive or colourable transaction, is a question of fact. No question of law arises on such a point. The Tribunal is competent to decide the question whether a particular transaction of immovable property made by the assessee is sham, collusive or colourable or is a genuine transaction. That apart, a perusal of the record shows that a civil litigation is also going on between the Union of India and the present assessee, Shri Prithvi Raj Daga, with regard to the transaction in question. The Union of India had filed a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Churu, being Civil Suit
No. 71 of 1962, seeking a declaration that the transaction in question was fictitious and was made in order to defeat and delay the creditors including the Union of India.

5. In view of these circumstances, we are clearly of the opinion that the question as mentioned above, sent for our opinion, is not a question of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal and, in these circumstances, there is no necessity to answer the above question.

6. This reference is accordingly disposed of in the manner indicated above.