JUDGMENT
S.N. Phukan, J.
1. On an application by the Revenue, the following question has been referred by the Tribunal to this court under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for short “the Act”.
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the ease, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the lower authorities were wrong in cancelling the registration of the assessee-firm under Section 186 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ?”
2. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows : Three persons formed a partnership which was duly registered under Section 184 of the Act. Subsequently, the audit by the Accountant-General objected to the grant of registration on the ground that an artificial juridical person, Ganeshji Maharaj, had been made a partner. Thereupon, the Income-tax Officer with the approval of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner cancelled the registration. This order was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. However, on appeal by the assessee, the order was set aside by the learned Tribunal. It may be stated that the reference relates to the assessment year 1970-71. Hence, the present reference.
3. We have heard Mr. D. K. Talukdar, learned counsel for the Revenue.
None appears for the assessee.
4. It may be convenient at this stage to reproduce Section 186(1) of the Act, which runs as follows :
“(1) If, where a firm has been registered, or its registration has effect under Sub-section (7) of Section 184 for an assessment year, the Income-tax Officer is of opinion that there was during the previous year no genuine firm in existence as registered, he may, after giving the firm a reasonable opportunity of being heard (and with the previous approval of the Assistant Commissioner), cancel the registration of the firm for that assessment year :”
5. The language of this sub-section is clear and unambiguous. Before cancellation of the registration of the firm, the Income-tax Officer has to give reasonable opportunity of being heard to the firm in question. Further, the Income-tax Officer must form the opinion that no genuine firm was in existence as registered and, after forming such an opinion, the Income-tax Officer has to get the previous approval of the Assistant Commissioner before passing the final order of cancellation under the said Section 186 of the Act.
6. According to Chambers’ Twentieth Century Dictionary (new edition reprinted in 1984, 1985) the word “genuine” means natural, native, not spurious, real, pure, sincere. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Edition), the term “genuine” means that it is not false, forged, fictitious, simulated, spurious or counterfeit.
7. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the expression “no genuine firm in existence as registered” in Section 186 of the Act means that a firm registered under Section 184 of the Act is actually not in existence, non est or a fictitious one. Therefore, for the purpose of cancelling the registration of the firm, the Income-tax Officer must form an opinion accordingly.
8. From the facts of the present reference, we find that the registration of the firm was cancelled by the Income-tax Officer which was also upheld by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on the ground that, according to the deed of partnership an artificial juridical person, Ganeshji Maharaj, was made a full partner in the sense that the said person was not only to get profit but also to share the loss of the firm at the rate of 4%. Mr. D. K. Talukdar, learned counsel for the Revenue, has urged, drawing our attention to Section 184 of the Act read with Rule 22 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, that the application for registration, though required to be signed by all the partners (not being minors), was signed only by three partners and that the partnership is bad in law inasmuch as the artificial juridical person cannot be made liable to share the loss of the firm. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance in Dulichand Laxminarayan v. CIT [1956] 29 ITR 535 (SC).
9. In Dulichand Laxminarayan [1956] 29 ITR 535 (SC) the question that arose for consideration before the apex court was whether, on the facts of the case, the assessee is entitled to registration under Section 26A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. On a perusal of the judgment, we are of the opinion that the ratio laid down in the above decision is not relevant for our present purpose, as the main question about the genuineness of the firm under Section 186 of the Act was not considered.
10. Regarding the other contention of learned counsel for the Revenue, we find that all these were considered by the learned Tribunal which is the final authority on facts.
11. On going through the order of the Income-tax Officer as well as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, we find that there is absolutely no finding that there was no genuine firm registered under the Act. The learned Tribunal considered the entire matter and came to a clear finding that there was a genuine firm in existence during the previous year relevant to the assessment year under appeal and this finding cannot be faulted.
12. For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In other words, we hold that the Tribunal was justified in holding that the lower authorities were wrong in cancelling the registration of the firm under Section 186 of the Act The reference is answered accordingly.