ORDER
Mrs. Ruma Pal, J.
1. The Ananda Marga was founded by one P.R. Sarkar who was known to his followers and “Sri Ananda-murtiji”. The followers of Ananda Marga are known as Ananda Margis. For Ananda-margis Ananda Murtiji is their guru and his precepts are binding on them. It is contended by the Anandamargis that in 1966 the Tandava Dance was introduced by Ananda Murtiji to be performed publicity in processions on special occasions. This alleged introduction was not in writing. The performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession was prohibited by the State Authorities under orders passed from time to
time under S. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Representatives of the Anandamargis challenged the prohibitory orders issued under S. 144, Cr.P.C. by way of writ proceedings in 1982. The matter was ultimately disposed of by the Supreme Court in 1983. The judgment (hereinafter referred to as the earlier judgment) has since been reported in Jagadishvarananda v. Commr. of Police, Calcutta, . In disposing of the matter the Supreme Court held that the Ananda Marga was a religious denomination within Hinduism but was of the view that the Anandamargis had not been able to establish that the public performance of the Tandava Dance was an essential part of the their belief and as such they could not claim the protection of Art. 25 or 26 of the Constitution. In arriving at its finding the Supreme Court had observed that no literature had been produced by the Ananda Margis in support of their contention that it was essential to their belief that the Tandava Dance should be performed in public.
2. In 1986 a revised edition of the precepts of Ananda Murtiji was published. The precepts which are known as “CARYA-CARYA” contain directions that the Tandava Dance is to be performed during certain festivals in procession in public.
3. In May, 1987 an application was made by the Ananda Marga Pracaraka Sangha to the Police Authorities for permission to hold a “public procession with Tandava Dance”. This permission was refused by the Police “in terms of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court….. on the subject.” The present writ petitioner then filed an application under Art, 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court challenging such refusal.
4. The Supreme Court disposed of the application under Art. 32 directing that the case should be appropriately examined by the High Court keeping in view what has been said by the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment. The petitioners were given the liberty to go before the High Court. It is the writ petitioners’ case that pursuant to such leave the present writ petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court.
5. The writ application was heard and disposed of by B.P. Banerjee, J., who held that “the Tandava Dance as prescribed for the followers of Ananda Marga is an essential and integral part of the religion of the said religious denomination and they have a right to perform such a dance in public on the occasions prescribed in this behalf subject to the to the restrictions imposed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution and the Police Authorities have no jurisdiction to impose a ban on such dance”.
6. The State respondents have preferred this appeal from the judgment and order of B.P. Banerjee, J. The appellants represented by the Advocate-General have challenged the order basically on three grounds namely-
1) That the issues involved in the present writ proceedings had already been determined by the Supreme Court in the earlier writ proceeding. The earlier judgment of the Supreme Court it is contended, is final and there was no scope for the same issue to be re-agitated or determined by this Court.
2) In any event the Ananda Marga was not a separate religion and was not entitled to the protection of Art. 25 of the Constitution.
3) The Tandava Dance was at best a secular function and not a “matter of religion” within the meaning of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution and as such, was not entitled to any protection as claimed.
7. The respondent writ petitioners represented by Mr. D. Ghosh have argued that:
i) the issue raised in the present writ petition had been raised by way of an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court; The Supreme Court having directed the High Court to dispose of the matter keeping in view the judgment of the Supreme Court, the matter is at large;
ii) the action of the appellants in refusing the Ananda Marga the right to perform the Tandava Dance was violative of Arts. 15, 19, 21, 25 and 26 of the Constitution;
8. The first question which needs to be
decided goes to the very root of this Court’s jurisdiction. If the issues raised before us have been finally resolved by the Supreme Court by it’s earlier judgment, there is no question of this Court deciding the same matter.
9. It is clear from the language used by the Supreme Court in disposing of the application under Art. 32 that the Supreme Court itself was persuaded that the earlier judgment did not finally conclude the matter. That is why, it appear to us, the Supreme Court directed the petitioners to go before the High Court and directed the High Court to reconsider the matter. This would indicate that the Supreme Court thought that the matter needed reconsideration.
10. Furthermore, in the earlier judgment, the Supreme Court had observed Art. 25 did not apply to the Ananda Margis as Ananda Marga was not a separate religion. In the more recent decision of the of the Supreme Court i.e. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala () (hereinafter referred to as the National Anthem case), the Supreme Court has held (Para 23):–
“This sentence appears to have sought into the judgment by some slip. It is not a sequitur to the reasoning of the Court on any of the issues. In fact, in the subsequent paragraphs, the Court has expressly proceeded to consider the claim of the Ananda Marga to perform Tandava Dance in public streets pursuant to the right claimed by them under Art. 25(1).”
Therefore the question whether the Ananda Marga can claim the benefit of Art. 25(1) is still open.
11. Secondly, on an analysis of the earlier judgment, it appears that the Supreme Court had, in arriving at its finding that the Tandava Dance was not an essential part of Ananda-marga religion, taken into consideration the fact that there was no document to show that the Tandava Dance was to be performed in public. Whether it was a factor as contended by the Advocate-General appearing for the appellants or the factor as contended by Mr. Ghosh appering on behalf of the respondents, nevertheless, there has been a factual change in the situation since the earlier judgment.
The question as to whether such factual
chance would affect the issue before us at all, will have to be resolved.
12. Thirdly, although the phrase “keeping in view” does not apper to have been judicially defined, a synonymous phrase “having regard to” has been so defined.
13. In several cases courts have had occasion to consider the phrase “shall have regard to” or “having regard to” and other synonymous phrases. These have been noted and discussed by the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Ashit Mukherjee v. Susmita Mukherjee (). The Division Bench held that the phrase means “must take into consideration”.
14. We, therefore, hold that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this writ proceeding but in disposing of the matter the decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier judgment will have to be taken into consideration.
15. Before dealing with the second contention of the Advocate-General it is necessary to clarify certain expression used in Arts. 25 and 26. The first expression which needs such clarification is the word “religion”.
16. It is contended by the Advocate-General that the word religion in Art. 25(1) does not include a sect of a religion. It is contended that by the earlier judgment the Ananda Marga has been described as a religious denomination. According to the Advocate-General in order to obtain the protection of Art. 25, it must be shown that what is sought to be professed, practised or propagated, is a basic or integral part of a religion as opposed to a religious denomination. It is contended that the Anandamarga being within the Hindu religion, the Ananda Margis can only claim the protection of Art. 25 in respect of their right to profess or practise or propagate such tenet of Hindusim as is acceptable to the entire Hindu Community.
17. The argument of the Advocate-General is unacceptable. Semantically (sic)
there appears to be some confusion. The wording of Art. 25 does not refer to a religion but to “religion” without any qualification. The use of the word “a” before the word “religion” would have meant a reference to a particular religion. The absence of the word “a” means that the reference in the Article is to religion in general.
18. To hold that “religion” means “a particular religion” would lead to startling results. No practice of Hinduism or other like unorganised religion would be protected as it is doubtful whether any particular practice is followed by all Hindus. Yet there are many such practices of Hindu sects which, though not accepted by all, would undoubtedly fall within the concept of religion.
19. The word “religion” has been judicially defined by the Supreme Court in the case of the The Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (). The better known passage of the Supreme Court in the Shirur Mutt case has been quoted in the earlier judgment. However, an equally explicit definition of religion has been given in paragraphs 14 and 19 of the judgment which are-
“We now come to Art. 25 which, as its language indicates, secures to every person, subject to public order, health and morality, a freedom not only to entertain such religious belief, as may be approved of by his judgment and conscience, but also to exhibit his belief in such outward acts as he thinks proper and to propagate or disseminate his ideas for the edification of others.”
“If the tenets of any religious sect of the
Hindus prescribe that offerings of food
should be given to the idol at particular house
of the day, that periodical ceremonies should
be performed in a certain way at certain
periods of the year or that there should be
daily recital of sacred texts or oblations to the
p sacred fire all these would be regarded as parts
of religion.”
20. In fact, in the decision of Supreme Court in the National Anthem case (supra) the Supreme Court held
that the peculiar practice of a particular religious denomination could be protected under Art. 25(1) even though the practice was not recognised and in fact disapproved of by other religious denominations of the same religion. In that case children belonging to a sect of Christianity i.e., Jehovah’s witnesses had argued that according to the tenets of their religious denomination they could not show respect to any other concept or thing apart from Jehovah. As such it was argued that they were forbidden by the religious belief of their denomination from singing the National Anthem.
21. The Supreme Court held that Jehovah’s witnesses were entitled to the protection of Art. 25 of the Constitution and could not be compelled to sign the National Anthem contrary to the belief of their religious denomination. In paragraphs the Supreme Court observed as follows:–
“That the petitioners truly and conscientiously believe what they say is not in doubt. They do not hold their beliefs idly and their conduct is not the outcome of any perversity.”
22. The Supreme Court further held that although the belief may appear strange or even bizzare but the sincerity of their beliefs was beyond question.
23. The word “religion” has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition as including (i) a state of life bound by monastic vows; the condition of one who is a member of a religious order; the religious life and (ii) a particular monastic or religious order or rule.
24. In our view what is religion within the meaning of Art. 25 must be understood in contradistinction to what is secular. On the basis of the authorities referred to above, we hold that a practice to be ‘religion’ within the meaning of Art. 25(1) need not be adopted by all members of a religion and cannot be denied if it is shown to be performed as an Article of faith by a religious denomination.
25. The third contention of the appellants as noted above deals with Art. 26(b). Art. 26(b) deals with rights of religious
denominations. These may be termed as organisational rights as distinct from personal rights guaranteed under Art. 25. Unlike Art. 25 which is subject to the other provisions of Part II of the Constitution, Art. 26 is only subject to public order, morality and health. Art. 26 is a special provision giving an additional right to organisations or denominations. This means that members of an organisation can have personal rights under Art. 25.
26. The language used in Art. 26(b) is “matter of religion”. Again the word used as “religion” simpliciter and not a religion. A ‘matter of religion’ would mean ‘pertaining to religion’. The concept of “matters of religion” in Art. 26(b) overlaps with the concept of professing, practising and propagating religion under Art. 25 of the Constitution.
27. Examples of what would be a “matter of religion” have been stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore as follows :–
“Thus, under the ceremonial law pertaining to temples, who are entitled to enter into them for worship and where they are entitled to stand and worship and how the worship is to be conducted are all matters of religion”.
28. It cannot be, as is sought to be suggested by the Advocate-General, that a matter of religion would have to be matter accepted and practised by the entire religion of which the denomination may form a part. Apart from the language of Art. 26(b) this submission runs counter to the Supreme Court’s observation in the Devaru case (supra) as well as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Syedna Teher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay () in which the Supreme Court has categorically stated as follows (at p. 864):–
“Article 26 in no uncertain terms, has guaranteed the right to every religious denomination or a section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion. Now what are matters of religion and what are
not is not an easy question to decide. It must
vary in each individual case according to the
tenets of the religious denomination concerned”.
It may be mentioned that in that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the case of Dawoodi Bohras, a community of the Shia” sect of the Muslim religion.
29. Finally in the Shirur Mutt case (supra) the Supreme Court also held as follows (Para 22) :–
“Under Art. 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with their decision in such matters.”
30. Therefore, in order to succeed the Ananda Margis will have to show that the performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession is part of their “religion” or is a “matter of religion” thus warranting protection of their rights under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution.
31. Before considering the submissions of Mr. D. Ghosh appearing for the Ananda Margis in this respect, it is necessary to analyse the earlier judgment to find out the basis on which the Supreme Court negatived the Ananda Margis case that the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession was part of their religion. The relevant paragraph of the earlier judgment is paragraph 12. This is set out in extenso as the ultimate decision in this case will depend upon a proper construction of the paragraph :–
“12. The question for consideration now, therefore is whether performance of Tandava Dance is a religious rite or practice essential to the tenets of the religious faith of the Ananda Margis. We have already indicated that Tandava Dance was not accepted as an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis when in 1955, the Ananda Marga order was first established. It is the specific case of
the petitioner that Shri Ananda Murti introduced tandava as a part of religious rites of Ananda Margis later in 1966. Ananda Marga as a religious order is of recent origin and Tandava Dance as a part of religious rites of that order is still more recent. It is doubtful as to whether in such circumstances Tandava Dance can be taken as an essential religious rite of the Ananda Margis, Even conceding that it is so, it is difficult to accept Mr. Tarkunde’s argument that taking out religious processions with Tandava Dance is an essential religious rite of Ananda Margis. In paragraph 17 of the writ petition the petitioner pleaded that “Tandava Dance lasts for a few minutes where two or three persons dance by lifting one leg to the level of the chest bringing it down and lifting the other.” In paragraph 18 it has been pleaded that “when the Ananda Margis greet their spiritual preceptor at the airport, etc. they arrange for a brief welcome dance of tandava wherein one or two persons use the skull and symbolic knife and dance for two or three minutes.” In paragraph 26 it has been pleaded that “Tandava is a custom among the sect members and it is a customary performance and its origin is over four thousand years old, hence it is not a new invention of Ananda Margis.” On the basis of the literature of the Ananda Marga denomination it has been contended that there is prescription of the performance of Tandava Dance by every follower of the Ananda Marga. Even conceding that Tandava Dance has been prescribed as a religious rite for every follower of the Ananda Marga it does not follow as a necessary corollary that Tandava Dance to be performed in the public is a matter of religious rite. In fact, there is no justification in any of the writings of Sri Ananda Murti that Tandava Dance must be performed in public. At least none could be shown to us by Mr. Tarkunde despite an enquiry by us in that behalf. We are, therefore, not in a position to accept the contention of Mr. Tarkunde that performance of Tandava Dance in a procession at public places is an essential religious rite to be performed by every Ananda Margi.”
32. It appears to us that the Supreme Court took note of the fact that the practice
was a recent one. No finding however was arrived at by the Supreme Court that by reason of the recentness of the practice the same could not from part of religion or be a matter of religion. It appears to us that the Supreme Court finally rested its finding on the fact that the Ananda Margis had not been able to show from any of their religious literature that the Tandava Dance was to be performed in public. In fact that the Supreme Court has also recorded that the counsel for the Ananda Margis had been asked by the Court to produce any literature in this regard but that this could not be done.
33. As far as the recentness of the practice is concerned it has been submitted by Mr. Ghosh as follows:–
(1) The Tandava Dance has been closely associated with Hinduism from time immemorial. In support of this argument Mr. Ghosh relied upon several authorities, i.e. The Dance of India by Enact Banana, Natural in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Sri-varamarnurti, Nataraja by Rabindra Nath Tagore and Bharater Nritya Kala by Gayatri Chattopadhyay.
(2) The Hindus in general have always believed in dance as a form of worship: vide Nararaja in Art, Thought and Literature by C. Sivaramamurti (pg. 11).
(3) Ananda Murtiji was considered by the Ananda Margis as their religions preceptor or guru. Any direction given by him was a mandate which could not be disobeyed. Therefore the rites and rituals which would be prescribed by Ananda Murtiji would form an integral part of their religion. As Ananda Murtiji was alive till recently, necessarily such directives could continue to be given until his death.
34. We are of the view that there is substance in the contention of Mr. Ghosh. Although the specific introduction of Tandava Dance in public procession may have been recent, this does not detract from the fact that the Tandava Dance is part of the religion of the Ananda Margis. In any religion, practices may be introduced according to the decision of the spiritual head. If
these practices are accepted by the followers of such spiritual head as a method of achieving their spiritual upliftment, the fact that such practice was recently introduced cannot make it anytheless a matter of religion.
35. The Advocate-General, however, submitted that the concept of the Tandava Dance was not a part of religion but a secular activity. In support of this submission, the Advocate-General relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali . The particular passage relied upon by the Advocate-General is as follows (at p. 1415):–
“In order that the practices in question should be treated as a part of religion, they must be regarded by the said religion as its essential and integral part; otherwise even purely secular practices which are not an essential or an integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with a religious form and may make a claim for being treated as religious practices within the meaning of Art. 26. Similarly even practices though religious may have sprung from merely superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be extraneous and unessential accretions to religion itself. Unless such practices are found to constitute an essential and integral part of a religion their claim for the protection under Art. 26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other words, the protection must be confined to such religious practices as are an essential and integral part of it and no other.”
36. This observation of the Supreme Court in our view runs counter to the observations Mukherjea, J. in the Shirut Mutt case noted above. Furthermore in a subsequent decision, namely, Ramanuja Jeevar Swami v. State of Tamil Nadu () the Supreme Court has held that:–
“Worshippers lay great store by the rituals and whatever other people, not of the faith, may think about these rituals and ceremonies, they are a part of the Hindu Religious faith and cannot be dismissed as either irrational or superstitious.”
37. It was then pointed out by the Advocate-General that the directive regarding the performance of the Tandava Dance was contained in CARYA-CARYA under the heading “Social functions and festivals”. It is contended that therefore the performance of the Tandava Dance was a secular activity.
38. It is difficult for us to accept this contention. Firstly festivals referred to at which the Tandava Dance has to be performed are religious. Secondly it is stated in chapter 15 of the CARYA-CARYA. “Our social-cum-spiritual functions will be considered part of our spiritual life”. Admittedly the original Tandava Dance of Siva forms part of the Hindu religion. It is said to represent the threefold processes of creation, preservation and destruction. The rhythm, postures, ornaments (including the skull) and the weapons used in the dance are said to be symbols of religious significance (vide the chapter entitled “The significance of Sivas dance from Natraja in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Sivaramamurthi). A although the Tandava Dance may be performed for social or other temporal purposes, its performance with a view to propagating the concepts represented by the dance cannot be termed as secular.
39. Lastly, it has been contended by the Advocate-General that for the practice to form an essential part of the religion there must be a decision taken by the Ananda Murtiji in the matter. According to the Advocate-General there was no such decision.
40. Assuming that such a decision is necessary, we are of the view that it is not open to the Advocate-General to raise this point in view of the pleadings. In paragraph 10 of the writ petition the writ petitioner have referred to the CARYA-CARYA as containing mandatory directions. This has not been refuted by the appellants. On the other hand it is admitted in paragraph? of the affidavit-in-opposition of the State Authorities that “the directives of Ananda Murtiji as laid down in the CARYA-CARYA (4th Edn.), Part-I may be mandatory and binding upon the followers of Ananda Marga….”
41. The views of Latham, C.J. in Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witness Inc. v. The Commonwealth (reported in (1943) 67 CLR 116) are apposite here:–
“….. almost any matter may become an element in religions belief or religious conduct. The wearing of particular clothes, the eating or the non-eating of meat or other foods, the observance of ceremonies not only in religious worship, but in the everyday life of the individual — all these may become part of religion. Once upon a time all the operations of agriculture were controlled by religious precepts. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that each person chooses the content of his own religion. It is not for a Court, upon some a prior basis, to disquality certain beliefs as incapable of being religious in character.”
42. The second aspect is the fact that since 1986 Ananda Murtiji has specifically directed the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession on special occasions. This directive is contained in the revised version of the CARYA-CARYA. It cannot be gainsaid that if this writing had been produced before the Supreme Court during the hearing of the earlier writ proceedings, the Supreme Court might very well have accepted the case of the Ananda Margis.
43. In view of our finding as to the scope of the word “religion” as used in Art. 25 and the phrase “matter of religion” as used in Art. 26(b), we are of the view that the performance of Tandava Dance in public procession forms part of the Ananda Marga religion and is also a matter of religion within the meaning of those articles.
44. Thus the Anandamargis cannot be deprived of their right to practise their religion in the manner prescribed by their religious preceptor, except on the grounds of public order, morality and health. It is not the case of the appellants that the permission for the performance of the Tandava Dance in a public procession has been forbidden on the ground of health. According to the case made out in the affidavit of the State Authorities the permission has been refused on the ground of public order and morality.
45. However, in the orders by which permission has been refused, the Police authorities have refused permission for public performance the Tandava Dance “in terms of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the subject passed on October 20, 1983.”
46. The Police authorities appear to have misread the earlier judgment. The Supreme Court had never directed the State authorities not to acced to the performance of the Tandava Dance in public procession. Therefore, it was wrong for the State authorities to refuse permission purportedly “in terms of the Supreme Court Order.”
47. The orders refusing permission do not contain any reference to public order or morality. The case of the State Government cannot be improved by their affidavit. The reason justifying refusal of permission should have appeared in the order refusing permission itself. As stated above the only reason given was the Supreme Court order. The reasons cannot now be modified or supplemented by way of an affidavit in the proceeding (vide Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commr. ).
48. In any event, we accept the contention of Mr. Ghosh that there is a difference between Law and Order and Public Order. This distinction has been recognised in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (). The Supreme Court stated that (Para 51) :–
“The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large.”
It does not appear from the orders challenged in the writ petition that the authorities concerned had at all considered the question of public order.
49. In the affidavit in opposition however some grounds have been put forward by the State Authorities to show that the performance of the Tandava Dance was likely to affect Public order and morality.
50. Even if we consider the additional
grounds put forward by the State Authorities in their affidavit justifying the refusal of permission to the Anandamargis, we are of the view that the allegations without more cannot reasonably raise a question of public order and morality. The allegations which are repeated throughout the affidavit are as follows:–
“Carrying of human skulls and indulging in dance with weapons like tridents, daggers and/ or knife on public roads of Calcutta and its suburbs or anywhere are not only repulsive to public taste and morality but is bound to cause fear in the mind of people and will cause public annoyance as well.”
51. As far as public order is concerned, we do not think that the allegations even if true, would come within the concept of public order as laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Monohar Lohia’s case . It has been pointed out to us by the writ petitioners that other religious denominations hold processions carrying weapons. These processionists have not been stopped. Furthermore the right of Sikhs to carry kirpans has been constitutionally protected under Art. 25. Therefore, it cannot be said that the carrying of weapons per se would affect public order.
52. The human skull is not a new concept in the Hindu religion. We were shown diverse photographs of images of Siva in many temples in which Siva has been shown as carrying a skull (vide Chapter on Karanas presented in Siva’s Tandava from Nataraja in Art. Thought and Literature by C. Siva-ramamurti). It is also not clear to us how the performance of Tandava could affect morality.
53. In the affidavit of the State Authorities it has again been reiterated that the refusal to allow Tandava Dance on public roads was in accordance with the directive of the Supreme Court. As we have already stated there was no such directive.
54. In the case of Gulam Abbas v. State of U.P. () the Police Authorities had sought to prohibit the performance of religious rites by the Shia
community at the time of Muharrum on certain plots. The Supreme Court observed as follows (para 32):
“….instead of prohibiting or suspending the exercise of such rights on concerned occasions on the facile ground of the imminent danger to public peace and tranquillity of the locality the authorities (should) make a positive approach to the situation and if they are satisfied that the exercise of the rights is likely to create a riot or breach of peace it would be their duty to take from those from whom disturbance is apprehended security to keep the peace. It is only in an extremely extraordinary situation, when other measures are bound to fail, that a total prohibition or suspension of their rights may be resorted to as a last measure”.
55. It appears from the letters requesting permission that the representatives of the Anandamargis had undertaken to the Police Authorities on behalf of the Anandamargis to maintain peace and discipline on the occasions of the performance of the Tandava Dance, In the circumstances we uphold the decision of B.P. Banerjee, J. The police authorities should permit the Anandamargis to perform the Tandava Dance in public procession on the occasion of their principal religious functions listed in prayer (b) of the writ petition subject to their undertaking to maintain peace and discipline on such occasions.
56. We refrain from dealing with the allegations of mala fides and unequal treatment made by the writ petitioners in view of our findings on Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. In the result the appeal is dismissed and all interim orders are vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
57. The point as involved in this application virtually disposes of the Appeal and as such the learned Advocate appearing before us agreed that the appeal may also be disposed of after treating the same as on the day’s list. We order accordingly. There wilt be no order as to costs.
58. Let it be noted that paper Books have been filed.
M.N. Roy, J.
59. I agree.
60. Appeal dismissed.