JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner, a constable in the Punjab Police is aggrieved by the order dated May 14, 1996. By this Order, it was held that the petitioner had remained absent from duty. He was awarded a penalty of forfeiture of five years’ service permanently. The petitioner’s appeal having been rejected on the ground that it was barred by limitation, he has filed the present writ petition.
2. The solitary contention raised by Mr. H. S. Man, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that after his acquittal by the Court, the department could not have started disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner and awarded the impugned penalty. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on the provision of Rule 16.3 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. He has also referred to the decisions in Mohinder Pal v. State of Punjab and others, 1987 (1) SLR 226. Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand v. Commissioner of Police & others, JT 1995 (1) SC 23 and Sri Kundan Lal v. The Delhi Administration Delhi and others. 1976 (1) SLR 133.
3. It is correct that the petitioner had been prosecuted under Section 7 of the Essential Services Maintenance Act 1981. The learned Court had found that besides examining three witnesses viz., H.C. Naresh Kumar, Sub-Inspector Jangir Singh, H.C. Makhan Singh, the other witnesses were not produced in spite of the grant of 21 adjournments. On examination of the evidence produced by the prosecution, it was held that “the prosecution has not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt”. Thus, he was acquitted of the charge framed against him. However, on examination of the impugned order, we find that during the enquiry, statements of persons other than those who had appeared during the trial were also recorded. By way of instance, it may be noticed that Head Constable-Balkaran Singh was examined during the departmental proceedings. It has not been suggested that he was cited or examined as a witness during the trial before the Court. After examination of the evidence produced during the enquiry, the competent authority found that the charge of having remained absent from duty without permission was proved and that the petitioner was liable to be punished for this misconduct.
4. Mr. Mann submits that the action was contrary to the provisions of Rule 16.3.
5. Even though such an objection does not appear to have been raised before the authority, we find that in the circumstances of the case, there is no infirmity in the impugned action. Firstly, it is well known that in a criminal trial, the charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, in departmental enquiry, such a strict standard of proof is not applicable. Secondly, it is clear that Rule 16.3 permits a departmental enquiry if additional evidence is available. In the present case, Balkaran Singh has been examined. It has not even been suggested that he had been cited as a witness during the trial. Thirdly, we also feel that a constable is a member of a disciplined force. Even if he is acquitted by the Court, the charge of absence from duty is serious and the delinquent cannot be allowed to escape punishment on the hypertechnical plea. In the present case, nothing has been pointed out to show that the petitioner had not remained absent from duty. Even if he was exonerated of the charge of abscnce under the Essential Scrvices Maintenance Act, 1981 the charge of misconduct could have been levelled and proved against the petitioner. This is precisely what has been done in the instant case.
6. As for the decisions cited by Mr. Mann, it may be noticed that in Mohinder Pal’s case (supra), it was held that the departmental enquiry was ordered against him “on the same charges and on the same evidence which had already been examined in detail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge ….” Such is not the position in the present case.
7. In the case of Sulekh Chand (supra), the factual position was materially different. The validity of the proceedings of the Departmental Promotion. Committee was questioned on the ground that the employee had been arbitrarily denied promotion. It was found that the promotion was denied on the sole ground of prosecution under Section 5(2) inspite of the fact that he had been acquitted. Still fu rther, it was also observed that the departmental enquiry had been dropped by the respondents. In this situation, it was held that the facts on which the Departmental Promotion Committee had proceeded, were non-existent. Nothing of the sort has happened in the present case.
8. As for the decision in Kundan Lal’s case, it may be mentioned that the delinquent was prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. He was acquitted. An appeal against the order of acquittal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court. Thereafter, the employee was reinstated. More than two years later, he was served with a summary of allegations. Immediately on receipt of the summary of allegations, he had filed the writ petition. The departmental proceedings were stayed. After examination of the matter, the Court had found that there was divergence of judicial opinion. On facts, it was held that “the memo of evidence appended to Annexure ‘E’, as already indicated does not disclose anything which would enable the respondents to take departmental action against the petitioner under Punjab Police Rule 16.3”. Thus, the proceedings were quashed. We find that the position in the present case is different. The petitioner did not challenge the proceedings at the threshold. He took his chance. The charge was proved. Then he has challenged the order through the present writ petition. The charge having been proved during the enquiry, no advantage can be derived from the decision.
9. No other point has been raised.
10. In view of the above, we find no ground to interfere. The writ petition is, accordingly dismissed in limine.
11. Petition dismissed