JUDGMENT
G.G. Loney, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order passed in appeal under section 9(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the “Public Premises Act” rejecting the claim of the Controller of Aerodrome, Nagpur Airport to recover the rent which was ordered to be paid by the Estate Officer.
2. Briefly stated facts are that non-applicant No. 1 Homi D. Jahangir was licensee at the Nagpur Airport occupying the premises for running a canteen. He was in possession and occupation of the premises under the management of applicant-Controller of Aerodrome, Nagpur Airport upto August 1976. After the non-applicant No. 1 vacated the canteen premises, he was found in arrears of rent. Applicant-Controller of Aerodrome, Nagpur Airport therefore, filed an application under section 7, sub-section (2) of the Public Premises Act on 21-5-1981 claiming the recovery of rent amounting to Rs. 25,345.57 fora period from 1-2-1974 to 7-2-1977 and also some amount towards Electric and water charges plus interest. Thus, a total amount of Rs. 28,345.57 was claimed by the applicant as per the statement made by him before the Estate Officer at Nagpur. The non-applicant No. 1 had submitted a written say before the non-applicant No. 2 Estate Officer. He submitted that the claim of the applicant was without any legal basis and there was no contract between them. Besides the objection regarding the claim of the applicant, the non-applicant No. 1 took the plea that the claim was barred by Article 52 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. Evidence was led by the parties and the non-applicant No. 2 after hearing both the sides, passed an order dated 17-4-82 ordering the non-applicant No. 1 to pay to the applicant a total amount of Rs. 30,006.27. The non-applicant No. 1 filed an appeal before the District Judge, Nagpur under section 9 sub section (1) of the Pubic Premises Act being Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 68 of 1982. The District Judge took the view that the premises in question were governed under the International Airports Authority Act, 1971. He was of the view that an Airport Authority is a Corporate Body and therefore. It cannot be termed as Central Government. He further was of the view that the applicant should have fled the claim for recovery of rent within a period of three years under the provisions of Article 52 of the Limitation Act. The Appellate Court also took the view that the provisions under Article 112 of the Limitation Act were not applicable in this case and therefore, allowed the appeal, dismissing the claim of the applicant as barred by limitation. The appeal was allowed on the sole ground that the applicant is governed by the International Airports Authority Act, 1971.
3. Shri Bhangde, the learned Counsel appearing for the applicant, submitted that the provisions of International Airports Authority Act, 1971 will not be applicable to the Nagpur Airport. Shri Bhangde is right in his submission in view of the provisions of section 1, sub-section (3) in which the application of the Act is defined. Under sub-section (3) of section 1 of then aforesaid Act, the provisions are applicable to Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras Airport only. The provisions of the aforesaid Act can also be made applicable to other airports by the Central Government by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette. Shri Bhangde submitted at the bar that there is no such notification published extending the provisions of the aforesaid Act to Nagpur Airport.
4. Shri Kothari the learned Counsel Appearing for the non-applicant No. 1 was unable to point out that the provisions of the aforesaid Act also extended to Nagpur Airport. The finding of the learned Appellate Court, therefore, is obviously incorrect inasmuch as the provisions of the International Airports Authority Act, 1971 would not apply to the premises in question. Shri Kothari for the non-applicant No. 1, made two submissions. Firstly, according to him the revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable. His second submission is that Article 52 of the Limitation Act would apply to the claim in question and not the Article 112 of the Limitation Act. So far as the first point is concerned, Shri Kothari submitted that in section 9 of the Public Premises Act, the Appellate Court is designated as an ‘Appellate Officer’ and not as an ‘Appellate Court’. According to Shri Kothari, the order passed by the Appellate Officer is not revisable under section 115 of the C.P.C. He is not the person designated and therefore, the revision will not be tenable. HE relied on the decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court appearing in Sharma v. Divisional Engineer Railway Administration South Eastern Railway, Bilaspur and another, and Yeshwant Rao v. Sampat. The contentions of Shri Kothari on the basis of the aforesaid authorities does not survive as a good law inasmuch as the same High Court in a latest decision in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Barelal Yadav v. Union of India, through General Manager, Central Railway, Jabalpur and another, 1983 M.P.L.J. 18 has held that a revision under section 115 C.P.C. lies to High Court from the order passed in appeal under section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 by the District Judge arising out of the order of Estate Officer inspite of ‘finality’ referred in section 10. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision reads as under :
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Section 9 provides that an appeal lies from every order of the Estate Officer under Section 5 of the Act to an appellate officer who shall be the District Judge of the district in which the public premises are situate or such other Judicial Officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as District Judge may designate in this behalf. Section 10 gives finality to the orders of the Estate Officer or appellate officer, which shall not be called into question in original suit, application or execution proceeding. A Single Bench of this Court in Hargovind v. South Eastern Railway, has held that District Judge acts as persona designata, the word ‘application’ in section 10 is wide enough to cover an applicant for revision is excluded. But since then much water has flown on this question and the correctness of this decision is quite doubtful. There is a similar provision about appeal in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Section 60 provides for appeal to a judicial authority appointed by the M.P. State Government, i.e. Sections Judge, against the order of confiscation passed by the Collector under section 64. Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court in Thakur Das v. State of M.P., has held :—
“When the Sessions Judge was appointed an appellate authority by the State Government under section 60 of the Essential Commodities Act, what the State Government did was to constitute an appellate authority in the Sessions Court over which the Sessions Judge presides. The Sessions Court is constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure and indisputably it is an inferior criminal Court in relation to High Court. Therefore, against the order made in exercise of powers conferred by section 60 a revision application would lie to the High Court and the High Court would be entitled to entertain a revision application under section 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which was in force at the relevant time and such revision application would be competent. In such case the Sessions Court is not persona designate”.
The finality to the order of the District Judge means no further appeal lies and the order cannot be challenged in collateral proceedings i.e. by way of original suit or application, that is in separate proceeding. The section does not exclude the further remedy or revision provided under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order of a Court subordinate to High Court. Court of District Judge being a Court subordinate to High Court, revision would lie against the order of the District Judge in appeal under section 9 of the Act. A Full Bench of this Court in Municipal Council, Khandwa v. Santoshkumar, 1975 M.P.L.J. 3 has held :—
“In exercising the revisional power under section 139, M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, the District Judge functions as Court and not as persona designata inasmuch as the jurisdiction is conferred under the Act on the Court itself. Since the District Judge exercising powers of revision acts as a Court and not as a persona designata the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court including any right of appeal or revision will attach to the decision rendered in revision by the District Judge so long as there is no statutory provision excluding such right of appeal or revision. The use of the word final in section 139(5) only means that thee is no further appeal. It does not exclude the power of revision. The order of the District Judge, though in 7revision, being an order of a Court subordinate to the High Court and the order belng ‘a case decided’ a revision against such order under section 139(5), M.P. Municipalities Act is tenable under section 115, Civil Procedure Code”
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Shri Kothari further relied on the decision of the Mysore High Court reported in A.I.R. 1968 Mysore 38 K. Nanjundiab Setty and others v. Corporation of the City of Bandglore, and stated that the District Court is a persona designata as held in the above case, under the Municipalities Act. The proposition under the aforesaid case will not apply to the instant matter since the matter arises out of a central enactment and not under the Municipalities Act. In the aforesaid case, the designation of the District Judge was clearly a persona designata under the relevant Act. Therefore, the proposition of law enunciated in this case may not apply to the proposition involved in the present revision.
5. Shri Kothari also relied on the decision of this Court reported in I.L.R. 1967 Bombay 671 Union of India and others v. V.D. Tulzapurkar and others. The authority quoted by Shri Kothari is quite out of context inasmuch as it is based on the bias of an Enquiry Officer and not on the proposition whether he acts as a District Court or a Tribunal. There is one more decision on the same point of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court reported in A.I.R. 1977 Jammu and Kashmir 38 Badrinath Gupta v. Estate Officer Controller of Aerodromes, under the Public Premises Act. Under the Public Premises Act, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court on the relevant point held that the District Judge while hearing the appeal under section 9 of the Act does not act as a persona designata but acts as a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court. The nature of his duties enjoin upon him to act judicially and he possesses all the trappings of a Court and his orders are revisable under section 115 of the Civil P.C. In my view, the view taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Ayodhya Prasad Barelal Yadav v. Union of India , through General Manager Central Railway Jabalpur and another, 1983 M.P.L.J. 18 and the view taken by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court appears to be correct. Looking to the language of section 115 C.P.C. also, it is clear that the words “any Court subordinate to such High Court” implies a Court of District Judge acting as an appellate Officer under section 9 of the Public Premises Act, 1971. Therefore, I am of the view that the present revision is maintainable against the impugned order passed by the District Judge under section 9 of the aforesaid Act.
6. The next contention of Shri Kothari is that a claim which is not recoverable cannot be entertained by the Estate Officer. According to him, the claim was time barred and therefore, if was not a claim which could be entertained by the Estate Officer for the purpose of recover of arrears of rent in this case, Shri Kothari relied on the decision of the Supreme Court appearing in in the case of N.D. Municipal Committee v. Kallu Ram and another. There is no dispute with the authority of the Supreme Court in this decision, but a mere look at the case would show that the public premises in question were owned by New Delhi Municipal Committee which was the appellant in the case. The Municipal Committee is obviously a Corporation and will be governed under Article 52 of the India Limitation Act and therefore, this authority will not be of any help to the non-applicant No. 1.
7. Shri Kothari further argued that Article 52 refers to a claim for arrears of rent and Article 112 does not refer to any such claim. It would be useful to see that Article 112 is in part IX of the Limitation Act under the head “Suits relating to Miscellaneous Matters”. The Controller Aerodromes, Nagpur Airport clearly represents the Union of India and therefore, he presented the claim before the Estate Officer on behalf of the Union of Indian i.e. the Central Government and the claim in question would fall under Article 112 of the Indian Limitation Act, where the limitation is 30 years and not 3 years. The learned District Judge, therefore, was clearly in error in taking the view that the claim is on behalf of the Corporation and is governed by Article 52 the Limitation Act.
8. Under the circumstances, I find that the order passed by the learned District Judge dismissing the claim of the applicant in appeal, is not sustainable and requires to be set aside. I, therefore, allow the revision, set aside the order of the District Judge in appeal and restore the order of the Estate Officer. There would be no order as to costs.