JUDGMENT
Sujata V. Manohar, J.
1. This reference under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 relates to the estate of one Hirachand Gulabchand, who died on or about 23rd January, 1967. The deceased had a life interest in a property know as “Munim Villa” at Narayan Dabholkar Road, Malbar Hill, Bombay in respect of which there was a Trust. The life interest of the deceased at the time of his death was to the extent of 3½/56. The accountable person claimed an exemption in respect of this life interest of the deceased under section 33(1)(n) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. This claimed has been allowed by the Tribunal. From the order of the Tribunal the following question of law has been referred to us :
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, exemption under section 3(1)(n) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 in respect of the share of house property named “Munim Villa” at Narayan Dabholkar Road, Malbar Hill, Bombay was allowable even though the said house property belonged to a trust in which the deceased had life interest only?”
2. Section 33(1)(n) of the Estate Duty Act, 1956 is as follows:
33(1). To the extent specified against each of the clauses in this sub-section, no estate duty shall be payable in respect of property of any of the following kinds belonging to the deceased which passes on his death—
* * * * * * *
(n) one house or part thereof exclusively used by the deceased for his residence, to the extent the principal value thereof does not exceed rupees one lakh if such house is situate in a place with a population exceeding ten thousand, and the full principal value thereof, in any other case.”
3. The question is whether the life interest of the deceased in the house property can be said to property “belonging to the deceased” within the meaning of this section. The Supreme Court in the case of Raja Mohammed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur, , was called upon to construe the words “belonging to”, although in a somewhat different context. The Supreme Court held that these words, though no doubt capable of denoting an absolute title, were not confined to connoting that sense. The words could signify even an interest less than that of full ownership.
4. The word “property” under the Estate Duty Act is defined in section 2(15) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 to include “any interest in property, moveable or immovable”. A life interest is also an interest in property. The property belonging to the deceased, therefore, includes life interest’ which the deceased may have in any property. The exemption, therefore, under section 33(1)(n) will be available even in a case where the deceased had a life interest in a house provided he fulfils the other conditions of section 33(1)(n).
5. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Controller of Estate Duty v. Estate of Late Sanka Simhachalam, has taken a similar view and has held that the house property in which the deceased had a life interest and in which he resided at the time of his death is entitled to exemption as provided in section 33(1)(n) of the Estate Duty Act. A similar view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in the case of Controller of Estate Duty, West Bengal-I, Calcutta v. Jyotirmoy Raha, .
6. Mr. Jetly, however, relied upon a decision of this High Court in the case of Miss A.N. Khan v. First Asst. Controller of Estate Duty, reported in (1983)140 I.T.R. 293. In that case the deceased and her 3 daughters were entitled to reside and occupy the house free of rent during the deceased’s life time. In the assessment proceedings under the Estate Duty Act the Tribunal held that section 33(1)(n) was not applicable. The High Court held that there was no finding that the deceased alone was in occupation of the entire house. Under the terms of the trust deed the daughters of the deceased were also entitled to occupy the house. Therefore, the essential ingredient of section 33(1)(n) was not satisfied and the exemption under section 33(1)(n) could not be claimed. This ratio has no application to the present case. This decision, therefore, does not help Mr. Jetly. We respectfully agree with the view taken by the Andhra Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts.
7. Accordingly the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
8. There will be no order as to costs.