JUDGMENT
A.P. Ravani, J.
1. Even if one covers a marble stone with beautiful linen cloth or with flowers, the marble stone does not change its real character and worth. Similarly, by throwing the veil of suitable phraseology on the relief Clause in the plaint the subject-matter of the suit cannot be changed. In the back-drop of the facts that follow, these observations are called for.
2. It was the case of the petitioner-plaintiff that it is a registered partnership firm doing the business of purchase and sale of cotton seeds and cotton; that it had entered into two separate contracts with the defendant Cotton Corporation of India for purchase of Manavadar Cotton Seeds. As per the contract dated November 28, 1986 the defendant was required to deliver 4500 quintals of cotton seeds at the rate of Rs. 61.25 ps. per 20 kgs. As per the contract dated December 8, 1986 the defendant was required to deliver 450 quintals of cotton seeds at the rate of Rs. 64.50 ps. per 20 kg. The defendant had supplied 1260 quintals of cotton seeds in respect of first contract. Thereafter the defendant had failed to give delivery of the balance quantity of the cotton seeds. Therefore the plaintiff prayed for a declaration and injunction to the effect that the defendant had no right to give delivery of cotton seeds to other dealers unless the balance quantity of cotton seeds was delivered to the plaintiff and accordingly prayed for permanent injunction. The plaintiff valued the relief deemed in the suit at Rs. 300 and paid court-fees of Rs. 30 only. The Inspecting Officer (Court-fees), on examination of the plaint, came to the conclusion that the relief prayed for was capable of being valued in terms of money. The reliefs were in respect of two different contracts. According to the relevant provisions of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 the plaintiff was liable to pay an amount of Rs. 18,800/- as court-fees.
3. Hence the Inspecting Officer (Court fees) made reference to Court Detailed calcula-tion has been given by the Inspecting Officer (Court-fees) as under:
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Particulars. Amount of Court-fees
consideration. payable.
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1. Contract dated 28-11-1986
for 4500 quintals at the rate
of Rs. 61.25 ps. per 20 kg. 13,78,125/- 15,000/-
2. Contract dated 8-12-1986
for 450 quintals at the rate
of Rs. 64.50 ps. per 20 kg. 1,45,125/- 3,800/-
Total court-fees payable 18,800/-
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4. The aforesaid reference was made by the Inspecting Officer (Court-fees) on March 24, 1987. The learned IInd Joint Civil Judge (JD) Rajkot, after hearing the parties passed an order on October 15, 1987 accepting the reference. By this order he directed that the suit was required to be valued as per the provisions of Section 6(xi)(a) of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959 and accordingly an amount of Rs. 18,800/- was required to be paid for the amount involved in the suit was Rs. 15,23.250/-. The plaintiff had already paid Rs. 30/- as court-fees. Therefore the plaintiff is directed to pay the deficit court-fees of Rs. 18,770/- within thirty days from the date of the order. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order passed by the trial Court.
5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has prayed for declaration and injunction simpliciter and therefore the petitioner is not liable to pay court-fees as directed by the trial Court. In his submission the provisions of Section 6(iv)(j) of the Bombay Court-fees Act would apply. The submission cannot be accepted. The relevant part of the provisions of Section 6(iv)(j) of the Act read as follows:
6. The amount of fees payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:
(i) ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... (iv) (a) to (i) (i) In suits where declaration is sought, with or without injunction or other consequential relief and the subject matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and which are not otherwise provided for by this Act-thirty rupees.
For applicability of the aforesaid provisions, over and above other conditions, the following two conditions are required to be satisfied, namely, (1) the subject matter in dispute should not be susceptible of monetary evaluation; and (2) the subject matter in dispute should not have been otherwise provided for in the Act. In the instant case, both the aforesaid conditions are not satisfied. The subject matter in dispute is ‘non-supply of goods contracted to be delivered by the defendant-corporation’. In substance the dispute is with regard to performance of contract of sale by the defendant-corporation to the plaintiff. According to the plantiff it is entitled to receive the goods as per the agreement to sell. The plaintiff prayed for declaration that it is entitled to receive the balance quantity of cotton seeds and the defendant-corporation be restrained from delivering cotton seeds to others unless the plaintiff is supplied the balance quantity of cotton seeds. The relief is worded in negative form for declaration and injunction. It is a clever and astute way of drafting the pleadings. Court should be little more careful before accepting the statement that subject matter of the suit is not susceptible to monetary evaluation. The phrase ‘susceptible of monetary evaluation’ means ‘capable of or admitting of monetary evaluation’ (See: (1) Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary; (2) Anil Starch Products Ltd. v. The Gujarat Labour Welfare Board 1983 (2) 24(2) GLR 1082 para 12; and (3) Premchand Gordhandas Valia v. The Rajpipla Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. [1979] 20 GLR 389.) In present day commercialised and sufficiently monetised economy very few right may be incapable of being evaluated in terms of money. Therefore little more exercise would be necessary to find out the truth or otherwise of such loose statements in the pleadings.
6. In each case, what in substance the plaintiff demands should be understood. It is not mere declaration of a particular right or it is not mere restriction to be placed on the defendant-corporation from doing certain things that the plaintiff prays for. In substance what the plaintiff prays for is that the defendant-corporation should be prevented from supplying goods to others before it supplies the goods contracted to be delivered to the petitioner-plaintiff. Therefore it is nothing but a prayer for specific performance of the contract couched in different phraseology so as to appear that it is a suit for declaration and injunction and not for specific performance of the contract. But the verbal gloss or the veil with which the plaintiff has covered the actual relief prayed for cannot change the nature and substance of the relief. The clothes put on by an individual cannot change the real character and worth of the individual concerned. Simply because a person is made to put on a black coat he does not become a lawyer. Similarly, the verbal gloss or the veil of suitable phrases with which the ‘relief is adorned cannot change the real substance and nature of the relief. In substance what the plaintiff has prayed for is nothing but specific performance of the contracts dated 28th November, 1986 and 8th December, 1986.
7. If the pleadings are not read in this manner, and they are understood literally, the suit will not be maintainable at all. It is obvious that the plaintiff has no right to claim that defendant-corporation be restrained from delivering cotton seeds to others. If in that literal fashion the plaint is understood, the suit would be bad also for non-joinder of necessary parties. All other persons with whom the defendant-Corporation may have entered into contract of sale of cotton seeds will be required to be joined in the suit because in their absence effective and final adjudication of the disputes will not be possible. Moreover, even if all such persons are joined, the suit would be bad tor mis-joinder of causes of action and for mis-joinder of parties too. Thus the suit would be bad for multi-fariousness. Therefore, that would not be the correct way of reading the pleadings. The pleadings are to be read reasonably so as to render justice and not for showing ‘exit’ door to the parties on the footing of technical reading of the pleadings. In the case of Anil Starch Products Ltd. v. The Gujarat Labour Welfare Board and Anr. 1983 (2) 24 (2) GLR 1082, a notice of demand made by the Labour Welfare Commission was challenged as being illegal and void. It was contended that the suit was merely for a declaration and injunction and therefore it fell within the scope of Section 6(iv)(i) of the Act. Negativing the contention raised by the plaintiff it was held that in such cases all that the Court is required to do is to look into the allegations in the plaint and find out what is the subject matter of the suit. Then the question whether the subject matter of the suit is susceptible of monetary evaluation be decided. Thereafter it is to be found out which particular provisions of the Court-fees Act is applicable. While deciding the aforesaid case relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad and Ors. , it is inter alia observed that in deciding the question of court-fees, the Court should look into the allegations in the plaint and should see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for.
8. Applying the aforesaid principle and reading the plaint as indicated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision it is evident that in substance what the plaintiff has prayed for is the specific performance of the contracts dated 28th November, 1986 and 8th December, 1986. As far as the provisions of the Bombay Court-fees Act are concerned, suits for specific performance of the contract are governad by the provisions of Section 6(xi)(a) in which case the amount of court-fees payable is determined on the basis of the amount of consideration mentioned in the contract of sale (See: Section 6(xi)(a)).
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under the provisions of the Court-fees Act even if it is held that the petitioner plaintiff is required to pay court-fees on ad valoram basis he cannot be directed to pay court-fees in addition to Rs. 15,000/-. In his submission the table of rates of ad valorem fees leviable on the institution of suits given in the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, it is clearly provided that maximum of Rs. 15,000/- of court fees can be levied. In the instant case, undisputedly the amount of court-fees which is sought to be levied is Rs. 18,800/-. Therefore, the amount which exceeds Rs. 15,000/- i.e. Rs. 3.800/- which is in excess of Rs. 15,000/- is illegal and void. The aforesaid argument cannot be accepted, in view of the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. Section 18 provides for charging court-fees in respect of multi-farious suits. When the suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the court-fees to be levied would be on the basis of calculation on each separate subject and each separate subject is to be clubbed together. In fact such a suit would be bad multi-fariousness, and the Court may order separate trials or make such other order as may be expedient in the interest of justice (See: Order II Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code). However whether the suit is bad for multi-fariousness or not, or the Court is required to order separate trials as provided in Order II Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code, is not the question posed before me.-The question is whether separate causes of action have been clubbed together in this suit or not. It is obvious that the subject matter of the suit are two different document of sale of cotton seeds, one dated 28th November, 1986 and another dated 8th December, 1986. Causes of action arising out of both the aforesaid contracts have been clubbed together. Hence, as provided under Section 18 of the Act the court-fee has to be levied after evaluating both the subject matters separately. This is what has been done by the Inspecting Officer (Court-fees), Rajkot and by the trial Court. This is in accordance with the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. In such cases the celling limit of Rs. 15,000/- would not be applicable.
10. Before I part with the judgment, certain observations are called for. During the course of this sitting I have come across a large number or matters wherein ostensibly the prayer is for declaration and injunction but in substance the prayer is either for specific performance of the contract or for obtaining some monetary gain or prevention of some monetary loss. It is unfortunate that this happens at all levels, at the level of the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) upto the level of Civil Courts. I do not propose to lay blame on any one. That is not the purpose of making these observations. All that is necessary is that this calls for little more vigilance at all level. Some times it may happen that on proper examination of the plaint the Court of Civil Judge (J.D.) would not have pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit and decide the questions raised therein (such a situation has arisen in this very case). In such suits many a times prayer for injunction is granted or refused. The matter is taken to superior forum in appeal and then it is further dragged to the revisional Court. Ordinarily the other side does not raise question of proper valuation of the suit, probably considerations of self-interest dictate that no such objection be raised. Sometimes, when such objection is raised it is too late. In all such cases three things certainly happen, (1) Loss to the public revenue; (2) unfair advantage to the litigants who resort to astute and clever drafting of pleadings; and (3) utter confusion. The Court gets itself lost into wilderness. Consequently the real controversy between the parties is understood too late, or sometimes it fails to understand the same. If the plaint is not examined properly the attention of the Court will not be revetted on the real controversy between the parties. The Court’s attention will be diverted on altogether different issues which in fact would be the side issues or no issues on which the fate of the suit should be determined. Therefore apart from the questions of loss of public revenue or unfair advantage to certain litigants self interest demands that the lower Courts be little more vigilant and may examine the pleadings properly both from the point of view of real nature of the dispute involved in the suit and for the purpose of proper court-fees to be levied in each case. If this is done at the appropriate stage, their own task will become easier and public interest also would not suffer.
11. In above view of the matter, there is no substance in the revision application and hence the same is required to be rejected. Rule discharged.