High Court Jharkhand High Court

Court On Its Own Motion vs K.K. Jha ‘Kamal’ on 17 August, 2007

Jharkhand High Court
Court On Its Own Motion vs K.K. Jha ‘Kamal’ on 17 August, 2007
Equivalent citations: 2008 (56) BLJR 477, 2008 CriLJ 1140, 2008 (1) JCR 1 Jhr
Author: N N Tiwari
Bench: M K Vinayagam, M Eqbal, A Sahay, R Merathia, N N Tiwari


JUDGMENT

Narendra Nath Tiwari, J.

Page 0479

1 In this criminal miscellaneous petition, the judgment dated 3rd July, 2007 passed in Cont. (Cr.) Case No. 8 of 2006 by the Full Bench consisting of five Judges, has been sought to be reviewed/set aside by the contemner lawyer under the power enshrined under Article 215 of the Constitution of India.

2. The grounds for seeking review are as follows:

(i) The contemner had not been heard at all either on merit of the contempt application or on the merit of his application filed on 12th March, 2007.

(ii) No charge was framed in the contempt proceeding which should have been served on the contemner lawyer and, thereafter, the charge should have been tried/heard before delivering the judgment.

(iii) The contemner lawyer had ‘anticipated mala fide attitude of the Judges’ of the Larger Bench, which stood affirmed. Apprehending mala fide attitude of the Judges, he had sent a complaint dated 10th April, 2007 to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Agarwal, Judge, Supreme Court, and other constitutional authorities before delivery of the impugned judgment dated 3rd July, 2007.

(iv) The part of the impugned judgment which prohibits the appearance of the contemner lawyer before this Court as well as in the Courts under its jurisdiction, is not only illegal but unconstitutional and is violative of Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India.

3. Mr. K.K. Jha ‘Kamal’, appearing in person, submitted that the said grounds constitute errors apparent on the face of the record.

4. Mr. K.K. Jha ‘Kamal’, in support of his said contention, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court (i) in re. Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. , (ii) the order passed in M.J.C. No. 220 of 1993 (R) (re. Yugal Kishore Saran v. State of Bihar and Ors.) by the Division Bench of the Patna High Court and that of (iii) his Complaint dated 10th April, 2007 addressed to the Hon’ble President of India, Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India, Page 0480 Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.N. Agarwal, Judge, Supreme Court, Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Chairman, All India Bar Council, New Delhi, alleging misuse, abuse and mala fide use of the contempt law by the Judges of this Larger Bench.

5. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to notice the nature and scope of remedy of review in exercise of inherent power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India under which the judgment, in question, has been sought to be reviewed by the contemner lawyer.

6. In re. M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala and Anr. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the power of review under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in Paras 14 to 17 of the said judgment. From the said decision of the Apex Court, it is evident that the High Court has power to review its own judgment/order if there are errors apparent on the face of the record.

7. In dealing with the power of review in criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court, in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Ors. , held in Para-6 as follows:

…notwithstanding the wider set of grounds for review in civil proceedings, it is limited to “errors apparent on the face of the record” in criminal proceedings. Such applications are not to be filed for the pleasure of the parties or even as a device for ventilating remorselessness, but ought to be resorted to with a great sense of responsibility as well.

8. In re. K.C. Thapar and Brothers v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. , the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 10 defined ‘apparent error’ as follows:

There is no dispute that an apparent error means a patent mistake; an error which one could point out without any elaborate argument.

9. Elaborating error apparent on face of record further the Apex Court in re. Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, held:

An error apparent on the face of the record must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions.

10. A Division Bench of Gujrat High Court held in re. State of Gujarat v. Consumer Education & Research Centre as follows:

An error apparent on the face of the record must be such as can be seen by one who runs and reads, that is, an obvious and patent mistake which does not need long drawn process of reasoning to discover.

11. In Marin v. Sheely, D.C. Alaska, 67 F. Supp. 689, (quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum: Vol. 77 P.411) the remedy of review has been defined thus:

Review is a strict legal remedy and not an equitable proceeding.

12. In New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (Goleta Water Dist), 2 Dist. 268 Cal. Rptr. 21 (as reproduced in 77 CJS 412), it has been held that where a Court conscientiously follows the law but reaches an arguably incorrect conclusion within the exercise of its jurisdiction, there is no basis for annulling its decision by writ of review.

13. The same being the nature and scope of the Courts’ power of review, we have to examine the grounds taken by the contemner lawyer in this case to consider as to Page 0481 whether the grounds taken indicate and point out apparent errors- meaning thereby ‘patent mistake’ to be pinpointed without any elaborate argument or process of reasoning.

14. The first ground taken and argued by the contemner lawyer is that he was not heard on merit of the contempt application. His second ground is that the impugned judgment is violative of principle of natural justice.

15. The events and number of days of stress spent by this larger Bench in hearing the contempt case to the satisfaction of the contemner before reaching to the painful conclusion of punishing a lawyer of this Court is writ large on the record. We carefully re-examined the record.

16. On bare reading of Paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 20, 33, 40, 42, 47, 48, 51 and so on of the impugned judgment it would be evident that this Court, after giving elaborate hearing, had held in Paragraph No. 51 as follows:

…there is no dispute that the counsel-contemner committed contempt of the learned Single Judge of this Court as the counsel contemner himself admitted the same and tendered his apology. However, we cannot accept his apology for the contempt committed before the learned Single Judge’s Court in view of the subsequent incidents narrated above and also for the reason that we feel the act of tendering unqualified apology by the counsel contemner before the learned Single Judge and before us is merely an eye wash as the feeling of tendering apology did not come from his heart….

17. Article 215 of the Constitution vests the High Court with all the powers of court of record including the power to punish for its contempt. This special jurisdiction is inherent in a court of record from the very nature of the court itself. The said special power is not subject to the procedural law either of the Criminal Procedure Code or the Contempt of Court Act. The High Court can deal with the matter summarily and can adopt its own procedure. However, if the High Court initiates the proceeding as a court of record, principle of natural justice must be applied and the contemner should be given sufficient opportunity to know the accusation and to defend himself. In the instant case, the contemner was served with the notice to show cause. He was well aware of the accusation. He also admitted his guilty. In view thereof, we find no foundation and substance in the first and second grounds aforesaid.

18. So far as the third ground is concerned, the same is in the form of wild allegation of anticipated mala fide against the Judges and the Chief Justice constituting the Special Bench. The said ground appears to have been taken with motive to offend this Bench consisting of the four senior most judges, led by the Chief Justice of this Court. We feel disturbed by such repeated defiant conduct of the contemner lawyer, tending to destroy the majesty and dignity of this Court. We can only say that it is a deliberate attempt to insult this Court and denigrate the authority and solemnity and we strongly deprecate such attempt made with biased attitude. Such attempts would cause damage to the prestige of this Court and weaken the strong pillars of temple of justice.

19. It is the solemn duty of the Bench and Bar to maintain and uphold the majesty, authority and dignity of the Courts for the sustenance and progress of democracy in our country particularly at the juncture when there are number of instances of outside attempt to disintegrate and destroy the democratic set up of our country. Page 0482 Such conduct of a member of the Bar brings the authority of the Court and the administration of justice into disrespect, erodes and undermine the foundation of the judiciary by shaking faith and confidence of the people in the ability of the courts to deliver free and fair justice.

20. We, however, want to maintain judicial restraint and not to proceed further in the matter. More so as because the contemner lawyer has been suffering the conviction and sentence for a proved criminal contempt of this Court. We just wish to quote from Oswald on Contempt of Court P.P. 49-50 (3rd Edition) with approval:

To charge a Judge with injustice is a grievous contempt. To accuse him of corruption might be a worse insult, but a charge of injustice is as gross an insult as can be imagined short of that. The arraignment of the justice of the Judges is arraigning the King’s justice: it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice of his Judges and excites in the minds of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations and indisposes their minds to obey them.

21. After the independence and adopting the Constitution by its people, the Judges of the High Court are appointed under the provisions of the Constitution. What was earlier done in the name of the king is now being done under the provisions of the Constitution by the President of the Republic of India. The Judges of this Court are now appointed by the President of India on the recommendations of the high constitutional authorities like Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the High Court assisted by a collegium of senior most Judges of the said Courts after following a long drawn process of selection prescribed by law. In that view, Oswald’s following dictum is still of importance when he advocated:

To keep a blaze of glory around them (Judges) and to deter people from attempting to render them contemptible in eyes of the public…. A libel upon a court is a reflection upon the King and telling the people that the administration of justice is in weak or corrupt hands, that the fountain of justice is itself tainted and consequently that the judgments which stream out of that fountain must be impure and contaminated.

22. In any view, such indiscriminate allegations against Judges, who are the members of the Bench, cannot be a ground for review of the impugned judgment.

23. The fourth ground challenging the legality of the impugned judgment can not as well be a ground for review in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The part of the impugned judgment, prohibiting appearance of contemner lawyer before this Court as well as in the courts under its jurisdiction, is based on his repeated convictions for contempt in the past and the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Harish Uppal v. Union of India .

24. The decision of the Supreme Court in Re. Bhavnaga University (Supra) and the order of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Re. Yugal Kishore Saran (Supra) relied upon by the contemner lawyer have no relevance to the facts of the instant case.

25. For the reasons aforesaid, we find no merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J.

26. I agree.

M.Y. Eqbal, J.

27. I agree.

Amareshwar Sahay, J.

28. I agree.

R.K. Merathia, J.

29. I agree.