JUDGMENT
Vijender Jain, J.
1. This application for condensation of delay has been filed by DDA for condoning the delay of 421 days in filing the application under Order 9 rule 9 for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeal dated 5th December, 2001. Mr. Anil Sapra, learned counsel for the applicant has contended that appeal was filed on 10th August, 2001 when it was adjourned to await decision of learned Single Judge on claim no. 11. The matter was adjourned to 26th August, 2001 and thereafter the matter was further adjourned to 24th September, 2001. In the meanwhile, Counsel appearing for the DDA resigned and it was informed to Hon’ble Court on 24th September, 2001, therefore, the matter was adjourned to 5th December, 2001. Though the matter was entrusted to Shri Sushil Salwan Advocate on 13th November, 2001, but nobody appeared and the appeal was dismissed on 5th December, 2001. That the counsel did not take any note of the fact that the appeal was dismissed and on 26th August, 2002 that counsel who did not appear on 5th December, 2001, also resigned. However, it is the stand of the DDA that the file from the said counsel was received by the DDA on 9th September, 2002 after he resigned on 26th August, 2001. File was inspected on 14th November, 2002 and an application for condensation of delay was filed on 3rd March, 2003. Mr. Sapra has also cited to legitimate the delay on the part of appellant and its condensation relying on , State of Haryana Vs. Chandra Mani and others. It was observed in this matter as under:-
” When the State is an applicant, praying for condensation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay – intentional or otherwise – is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and require adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause.”
2. On the basis of aforesaid authority of the Supreme Court, it was contended before us that on account of delay in the Department, the matter may be heard on merits.
3. We have perused the application filed by the appellant. Even if we condone the delay from 5th December, 2001 till 9th September, 2002, which is the date on which file was received from counsel who had resigned and who had not appeared on 5th December, 1991 and when appellant-Department directed for ascertaining the status of the case and finding out the lapses thereof as stipulated in para 6 of the application. No explanation, whatsoever has been given as to why this inspection was made on 14th November, 2002 and not before that nor any details have been given as to what was done in order to get the file inspected. To apply the ratio of the authority cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, we may not shut our eyes to the ground realities that when the Government is a litigant, there is an impersonalised interest but we cannot keep the law of limitation off the shelve, if the Government is the party. In paragraph 6 of the application for condensation of delay, it has been specifically admitted that the appellant had issued instructions on 9th September, 2002 for inspection of the case. Not even an iota of explanation as to why the file was not inspected before 14th November, 2002 and if the file was inspected on 14th November, 2002 why the application for restoration was filed on 3rd March, 2003, has been given. It is very easy to cite a judgment by an authority like the DDA but what steps DDA has taken in relation to the said authority where it has been observed by their Lordship of the Supreme Court. Relevant para of that reads as under:-
” The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and she should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.”
4. We have asked Mr. Sapra, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that when the reliance is placed at para 10 of the said judgment, the judgment of the Supreme Court has to be applied with all its observations. Appellant was not in a position to explain to us as to why steps to comply with the said judgment has not been taken. The appellant was unable to disclose, whether in terms of the orders passed by the Supreme Court which was passed in the year 1996, whether any cell to examine the cases wherein legal principles are involved for decision by the Court or whether cases require adjustments and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement, have been constituted or not. If the application and appeals were not filed promptly by the officers of the DDA, whether any action has been initiated against such officers?
5. Until and unless we implement the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, about penalizing and making them personally liable, the officers who are the head of the Government or who have responsibility to file and take appropriate steps, who have powers to file proceedings, who knowingly in an irresponsible and casual manner do not discharge their duties and do not take appropriate steps and get the appeals and applications filed within the parameters of law oblivious of that delay will go against the interest of their departments and organization, will continue to cause immense harm to their own departments and organizations. Considering all the facts and circumstances, it cannot be inferred that there is any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing application for setting aside the order of dismissal dated 5th December, 2001.
6. Therefore, we find no merit in the applications. Application for condensation of delay is dismissed and the application for restoration of appeal also stands dismissed.
7. However, we impose the cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the officers of the DDA who have been responsible for not filing application for restoration within the time and promptitude. The Vice-Chairman will identify the officers responsible for lapses and will recover the costs from their salaries. Appeal has already been dismissed and is not restored.
8. Compliance of this order be sent to this Court within 8 weeks. Report be filed within one week thereafter.