ORDER
S. Parvatha Rao, J.
1. This is case of a Head Clerk working in the II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class Court at Madanapalle, the petitioner herein. After exercising his right of relinquishing promotion while working at Munsif Magistrate’s Court, Pakala and after it was accepted, he is trying to wriggle out from the predicament in which he is placed by the relinquishment. The letter of relinquishing dated 21-5-1993 addressed by him to the learned District Judge, Chittoor, the second respondent herein, is as follows:
“I, Sri D.N. Chandrasekhar Reddy, Head Clerk of Munsif Magistrate Court, Pakala, beg to submit the following for your Honour’s kind consideration.
I humbly submit that due to my personal inconvenience I am unable to proceed on promotion.
I therefore, humbly submit and request that I may kindly be permitted to forego my promotion, on personal grounds.”
This was promptly accepted by the second respondent by his Proceedings L.Dis.No. 256/A/93 dated 27-5-1993 stating as follows:
“In view of the request of Sri D.N. Chandrasekhar Reddy, Head Clerk, District Munsif’s Court, Pakala in Mis application cited above to forego his future promotion, the undersigned is pleased to accept the relinquishment of his rights for future promotion with immediate effect.”
2. It is not in. dispute that the petitioner received this letter. He did not protest against this. Thereafter on 7-3-1994 he represented to the second respondent that he should be considered for promotion to any other post in Category III Division IV of the Andhra Pradesh Judicial Ministerial Service Rules 1964 (Rules) as he was the next person to be promoted to the post adding as follows:
“Ignoring my previous application relinquishing my promotion to the post of Translator in June 1993.”
To that the second respondent replied that in view of the option already exercised by the petitioner relinquishing his right for promotion it would amount to relinquishment for ever all future promotions as per rules which was already intimated to him by letter dated 27-5-1993 and that therefore he was not entitled for reconsideration and that his plea was accordingly rejected. The petitioner appealed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad the first respondent herein, and the High Court rejected the same which was communicated in the order ROC 3613/94, C.Spl. (Con.) dated 13-4-1995 treating the said appeal as revision and holding that once an employee relinquished his right of future promotion he was not eligible to be considered for future promotions. The petitioner questions the orders of the respondents rejecting his plea for consideration for promotion ignoring his earlier letter of relinquishment treating it as relinquishment of promotion then offered to \him and as relinquishment of one time promotion only and not of all subsequent promotions that may open to him.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner’s letter dated 21-5-1993 was in response to promotion offered to him as Translator and under mistaken notion that the Translator post was higher than the post of Head Clerk in the Munsif Magistrate Court. The petitioner was also under the impression that it was a promotion offered to him and on that basis he sought to forego that promotion on personal grounds. The learned counsel points out that even by then it was clarified by G.O.Ms. No. 681 Home (Courts-A) Department dated 5-11-1986 that the post of ‘Head Clerk’ in District Munsif’s Court and that of ‘Translator’ in District Court were classified as falling under Category III of Division IV of the Rules and that they were transferable posts. In view of that clear position, the promotion that was offered to him, which was relinquished by him by his letter dated 21-5-1993, was not really promotion post. The learned counsel further points out that a reading of that letter of the petitioner would clearly show that he relinquished only the promotion that was offered to him and not all future promotions for all time to come. We find it difficult to accept this interpretation of the letter dated 21-5-1993. The learned District Judge, Chittoor did not understand the letter in that manner as is evident from his immediate communication dated 27-5-1993 accepting the relinquishment made by the petitioner and stating in categorical terms that the petitioner’s relinquishment of his rights for future promotion was accepted with immediate effect. It is also stated in that communication that the petitioner’s application was to forego his future promotion. There cannot be any confusion in the mind of the petitioner about the communication of the learned District Judge, Chittoor dated 27-5-1993. The petitioner received this communication and did not protest against this, if he never intended by the letter dated 21-5-1993 to forego future promotion.
4. Mr. P. Ravi Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has brought to our notice Rule 47 of the Rules which reads as follows:
“47. Relinquishment of rights by members: Any person may, in writing relinquish any right or privilege to which he may be entitled under these rules, if, in the opinion of the appointing authority, such relinquishment is not opposed in public interest and nothing In these rules shall be deemed to require the recognition of any right or privilege to the extent to which it has been so relinquished.”
This rule is in categorical terms and states that once his relinquishment is accepted the petitioner cannot seek recognition of the right or privilege to the extent he voluntarily relinquished. The learned counsel also relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. V. Parthasarathy and persuades us to interpret Rule 47 in the same manner the Supreme Court interpreted Clause l(d) of the Circular of State Bank of India in that case. Mr. P. Ravi Prasad, the learned counsel for the respondents also relies on the order of K. Ramaswamy, J. (as the learned Judge was then) in Writ Petition No.16212 of 1986 dated 7-6-1989 which was also referred to in the order of the first respondent rejecting the revision of the petitioner. In that case the learned Judge held that relinquishment to any one of the posts by necessary implication amounted to relinquishment to other posts in the same category. However, in interpreting Rule 47 of the Rules the learned Judge held:
“It is no doubt true, as relied on by Rule 47, it is open to the claimant to relinquish to any post and it is open to the authority to accept or refuse to accept it. But it is only a privilege given to the employee and officer. Once he opts his right under Rule 47, the parameters are to be considered only under Category 5 of Division IV. In the light of the reasons given above, the option once exercised relinquishing his right to one of the posts in Category 5 of Division IV, by necessary implication, it amounts to relinquishment to other posts as well. Therefore he is not eligible to be considered to the other posts of Category 5.”
In that view of the matter the learned Judge held that the promotion of the petitioner before him as Junior Assistant (Post in Category 5 other than the one in respect of which he exercised his right of relinquishment) was obviously illegal one.
5. In the view we have taken as regards the letter of the petitioner dated 21-5-1993 and the intimation dated 27-5-1993 of the learned District Judge, Chittoor accepting the relinquishment made by the petitioner, we do not find any reason for interfering with the impugned order of the High Court 1. . communicated by the 1st respondent in his letter dated 13-4-1995 confirming the decision of the 2nd respondent intimated by letter dated 27-5-1993 to the petitioner, in exercise of our jurisdiction of judicial review under the Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner did not question the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated 27-5-1993 accepting the relinquishment by the petitioner of his rights for future promotion, which formed the basis for the decision of the 2nd respondent and the confirmation by the High Court. In our view, the said decisions are not perverse or arbitrary. Under Article 226, we cannot exercise appellate powers and substitute our decision for the decision of the authorities concerned.
6. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
