JUDGMENT
P.R Gokulakrishnan, C.J.
1. All these appeals are filed by different parties, who are aggrieved by the orders passed in Company Petition No. 137 of 1985 on 18th February, 1988 and 2nd March, 1988. With the consent of the parties, they are fully board and disposed of finally. All appeals are admitted and respective Counsel waives service for his respective client in all the appeals.
2. The facts of the case, to appreciate the contentions of the respective parties, are as follows:
One Swashraya Benefit Private Limited, came into liquidation. In the winding up proceeding, its property, namely, northern wing of the building, known as ‘Virat Apartment’, situated in Diwali Baug, Athwa Lines, Surat, was sought to be sold. The Official Liquidator, as per the direction of the Court, inserted advertisements in various newspapers, calling for offers to purchase this Virat Apartment. Pursuant to the said advertisements, the appellants made their offers in writing to purchase the said property. Even though the matter was placed before the learned Company Judge on different dates, most of the appellants herein were not informed of the said dates of hearing. Ultimately, the matter was placed before D.C. Gheewala, J., on 23-7-1987 and the learned Judge, by his order dated 23-7-1987 held that the offers, other than That of the Virat Apartment Co-operaine Housing Society Limited, were conditional offers and were, therefore, lot acceptable and that the raised offer as suggested by the Court, raising the offer from Rs. 91.00.001/- to Rs. 1,03,25,001/-. made by the Society should be accepted. Two of the appellants herein, by name. Ambition and Ravi Enterprises, Surat. filed O.J. Appeal’ Nos. 17 and 18 of 1987 before the Bench of this High Court. The Bench of this High Court, by its order dated 18th September, 1987, without observing anything on the merits and acceptability of the offers made by the parties concerned, placed the matter again before the learned single Judge, as the order was passed in absence of and without any notice to the appellants, to consider the offers of the appellants and also of the Society and pass appropriate order, after taking into consideration various objections put forth by the appellants and also the respondents herein.
3. On 18-2-1988, the learned single Judge directed ‘the Official Liquidator to file a short summary, along with an affidavit, and the copy of the plaint of the suit, which has been filed by the Official Liquidator against the Society. A copy of the agreement also shall be filed by Mr. G.N. Shah (Advocate of the Official Liquidator) in order to enable the bidders to know as to what they are purchasing and the property which they are purchasing is subject to what cloud.’ For that purpose, the matter was allowed to stand over till 2nd March, 1988. By the same order, the learned Company Judge directed (1) Virat Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Surat, (2) Ambition, Surat. (3) Ravi Enterprises, Surat, (4) J. Jamnadas and Company. Surat, (5) D.R. Sanghvi and Co., Ahmedabad and (6) AARCEE Textiles, Ahmedabad, to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/- each on or before 2nd March, 1988 by way of demand draft. Again, the matter came up before the learned Company Judge on 2nd March, 1988. On that day, the learned Advocate for the Official Liquidator asked for time to enable him to file documents as directed by the order of the Court. The Company “Ambition”, which is the appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988 and others, according to the appellants herein, asked some time to tender a demand draft for Rs. 10,00,000/-. The Society tendered demand draft as ordered earlier by the learned Company Judge. The appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988, since it had only account payee cheque for the said amount on that day, requested some time to tender the demand draft for Rs. 10,00,000/-. Some of the tenderers tendered bank cheques, instead of demand drafts. The learned Company Judge, after accepting the request of the Advocate for the Official Liquidator to file documents on 9th March, 1988 rejected the prayer of the appellants to grant them some time to tender demand draft. It is against these orders of the learned single Judge, Whereby the learned single Judge directed the deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- each on or before March 2, 1988 by way of demand draft and refining to grant time for depositing and sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- beyond 2nd March, 1938, the above said Appears have been filed.
4. Mr. M.J. Thakore the learned Counsel appearing for M/s. D.R. Sanghvi and Co., appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos. 2 and 3 of 1988. states that the appellants are very eager to finalise the sale of Virat Apartment as early as possible, that the learned Company Judge has erred in refusing permission to deposit Rs. 10.00.000- as directed by him by extending the time, that the appellant is ready with Rs. 10.00.000/-and has in its possession the bank draft for the same, and that the Court, without being oppressed by the technicalities, should finalise the sale among the six bidders, who are in the field.
5. Mr. N.N. Gandhi, the learned Counsel appearing for ‘Ambition’ which is a partnership firm, and which is the appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988, contends that the respondent No. 2-Society in the said appeal is trying to knock away the property for a price, which will be Rs. 10,00,000/- below the price offered by the appellant herein, that the appellant herein is prepared to offer without any condition, that the condition mentioned in its offer is not a condition but a request for getting permission from the Official Liquidator and that the learned Company Judge should have, on the facts and circumstances of the case, given some time for depositing the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-.
6. Mr. R.N. Shah, the learned Counsel appearing for “AARCEE TEXTILES”, the appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos. 6 and 7 of 1988, contended that the learned Company Judge should have extended the time to deposit the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-. The learned Counsel further contended that the learned Company Judge having permitted respondent No. 1 in the said appeal to increase its bid ought to have given the very same opportunity to other bidders also to increase their bids.
7. From the abovesaid arguments of the learned Counsels appearing for the respective appellants in O.J. Appeals referred above, it is clear that they are very eager to purchase the property sought to be sold by the Official Liquidator and want their deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- to be accepted by extending the time so that the property can fetch advantageous price in order to satisfy the creditors of the Company in liquidation. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court, both by the appellants and also by the Official Liquidator, that a suit has been filed by the Official Liquidator against respondent No. 1, Virat Apartment Co-operative. Housing Society Limited for more than Rs. 40,00,000/-.
8. The learned Advocate General, appearing for Virat Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited, strenuously contended that the appellants are trying to delay the realisation of the amount by the sale of the property in question, that the creditors are put to great difficulty, that the price offered by his client is reasonably advantageous and will avoid various litigation inasmuch as his client claims to be the owner of the land on which the disputed property stands and also the southern wing of the property. It is further contended by the learned Advocate General that sufficient time has been given to the appellants here in and since they ha\e not complied with the direction given by the learned Company Judge, the appellants cannot be permitted to compete in the sale of the northern wing of the Virat Apartment.
9. The property in question was advertised tor sale by the Official Liquidator as early as 24-7-1988. By the end of the last date fixed in the advertisement, 14 offers were received, among which the present six offerers were there.
10. On 15-10-1985, the appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos. 2 and 3 of 1988 increased their offer to Rs. 1 crore-odd From these facts, the learned Advocate General states that the matter is pending for a long time and it is being delayed unnecessarily by the appellants herein and that offers by many of the appellants are conditional offers. The learned Advocate General further states that the appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos 2 of 1988 and 3 of 1988 had withdrawn his advance of Rs. 50.000- as early as 10-3-1987 and to this effect, there is a report of the Official Liquidator dated 23-3-1987 and as such, he could not be considered at all as a competitor to purchase the property in question. Reading the offer of ‘Ambition’, which is the appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988 the learned Advocate General states that his offer is conditional offer and as such, the case has to be rejected. As far as AARCEE Textiles, which is the appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 6 of 1988, is concerned, the learned Advocate General, pointing out that he has withdrawn the advance of Rs. 50,000/- as early as 11-3-1986, submits that the appellant herein cannot have a right to compete in the sale of the suit property. The learned Advocate General, after reading the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos. 2 of 1988 and 3 of 1988 contends that the said appellant never had the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- deposit as directed by the learned Company Judge. Hence, this appellant cannot at all be considered as a competitor in the proposed sale. After advancing such an argument, the learned Advocate General pointed out Rules 6, 9, 135 and 232 of the Companies (Court) Rules and also Section 457(1)(c) of the Companies Act, and contended that the learned Company Judge having passed the order in question, his discretion cannot be questioned by way of an appeal. It is the case of the learned Advocate General that some of the appellants, who have withdrawn the sum of Rs. 50,000/- which was paid as an advance as per the notice given by the Official Liquidator, have no locus standi to come before this Court for the purpose of competing the sale to be held. Finally, the learned Advocate General submitted that if the appellants are permitted to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/- by extending the time, it will open the Pandora’s Box and will make many others to come into compete in the sale and thereby the sale of the property will be delayed, resulting in irreparable loss and hardship, both to the Company and to the creditors, who are eager to get the money.
11. Mr. S.N. Shelat, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-Ravi Enterprises, Surat, and Jamnadas and Co., further submitted that there is no principle involved in this case for the Division Bench to interfere with the discretionary order of the learned Company Judge. For this proposition, he cited the decision in the case of Navalakha and Sons v. Ramanya Das, reported in AIR 1970 SC 2037. In this case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the interference by the Division Bench over the order passed by the learned Company Judge In the said case, the Company Judge decided to put the property in auction, confining the auction to only two persons. There was also lack of publicity. It was contended in that case that there was lack of publicity and that there was lack of opportunity for public to take part in the auction and that as such, the acceptance of the highest bid by the learned Judge was not a sound exercise of discretion. On the other hand, the appellant before the Supreme Court, who was aggrieved by the interference by the Division Bench of the High Court, contended that confirmation of sale is a discretionary order passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the discretion exercised by the Company Judge. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court held:
It is true that the discretion exercised by the Judge ought not to be interfered with unless the Judge hus gone wrong on principle. As already pointed out the learned Company Judge having decided to put the property to auction went wrong in not holding the auction as a public auction after due publicity and this has resulted in prejudice to the Company and the creditors is that the auction did not fetch adequate price. The prejudice was inherent in the method adopted. The petition of Padam Chand Agarwal also suggests that want of publicity had resulted in prejudice. In these circumstances the Company Judge ought not to have confirmed the bid of the appellant in the auction held on December 24, 1964. We are accordingly of opinion that the Division Bench was right in holding that the order of the Company Judge dated February 19, 1965 should be set aside and there should be fresh sale of the property either by calling sealed tenders or by auction in accordance with law. The tender will be called or the auction will take place with the minimum offer or with the starting bid of ten lakh rupees.
Mr. Shelat said that there is no principle involved for the Division Bench to interfere on the facts and circumstances of the present case.
12. The background in which the present appeals have been filed can be stated in a nutshell by narrating the events from the time the learned Company Judge (Coram; B.K. Mehta, J.) passed the order on 13th September, 1985. It is clear from the said order that the Virat Apartment Housing Society Limited laid claim to have this property, both on the ground that they own the land on which the superstructure stands and also on the ground that they are the owners of the southern wing and in management of the middle wing of this property. Considering all these averments, the learned Company Judge, by his order dated 13th September, 1985, directed the Official Liquidator to address a letter within a week from 13th September, 1985 to all the parties specified at serial Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13, setting out the precise objections lodged by the Virat Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited and also directed the said Housing Society to formulate and file a short affidavit in support of the contention. Thus, there is a direction to the Official Liquidator to send letters to all these persons in the said order with the objections raised by vanous individuals, including That of the Virat Co-operative Housing Society Limned The learned Company Judge has also observed that the revised offer that will be given, will be subject to the objections raised by other offerers after giving such direction and also the direction as to how the price amount has to be paid, the matter was adjourned for hearing on 10th October. 1985 Subsequently this matter came up before the Company Judge Mr Justice (Gheewala on 23rd July, 1987. The offers submitted before the Official Liquidator, alongwith the report of the Official Liquidator, were placed before the learned Company Judge. In this order of the learned Company Judge, there was on observation to the effect that when the matter came up for hearing before him, the other offerers, except the Virat Co-operative Housing Society Limited, did not come before the Court and the learned Company Judge had also observed that their offers were conditional offers and as such, they cannot be taken into consideration. It was also observed in that order of the learned Company Judge that the offer of the Virat Co-operative Housing Society Limited was unconditional and hence, fit for consideration. Even though the other offers were conditional, the learned Company Judge felt that the offer given by the Housing Society may be improved and accordingly, on the suggestion of the learned Judge, the Virat Co-operative Housing Society Limited increased its bid to Rs. 1,03,25,001/- from Rs. 91,00,000/-. Finally, the learned Company Judge directed the Official Liquidator to accept the offer of this Virat Cooperative Housing Society Limited, imposing certain conditions as to the payment of the offer concerned. Against this order of the learned Company Judge, M/s. Ravi Enterprises, Surat and ‘Ambition’, Surat, preferred O.J. Appeal Nos. 17 and 19 of 1987. The said appeals came up before the Bench of this High Court. The Division Bench found that the appellants before them and some of the offerers were not informed about the date of hearing and as such, they were not able to represent their case before the Company Judge. With this finding, the Bench, of which one of us was a party, passed the following order:
We do not propose to observe anything about the merits of the offers made by either party. It will be open to the learned Company Judge to accept the offer made by the respondent if he ultimately comes to the conclusion that it is just and proper to do so in view of the facts of this case. It will also be open to the learned Judge to consider the offers made by the appellants herein in the light of the objection raised by the respondent society that their offers are conditional, and pass an appropriate order in that behalf. As the creditors are not paid their dues since a long time, it will be better if the matter is re-heard by the learned Company Judge within a period of two weeks from today.
In view of what we have observed above, these appeals are allowed. The order passed by the learned Company Judge in Company Application No. 137 of 1985 is set aside; and the matter is remanded to him for re-hearing and passing a fresh order after hearing all the offerers including the present appellants. There will be no orders as to costs. We direct the office to place the aforesaid applications before the learned Company Judge on 25-9-1987 so as to enable the learned Advocates for both the sides to get a date of hearing fixed. The Official Liquidator is directed to inform all the offerers about the fact that the applications will be placed on 25-9-1987 before the learned Company Judge for fixing a date of hearing of the said applications.
Thus, the Bench, while passing the order, took care that the matter has to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and either party must have a fair chance of representing their case The Bench also observed in its order to consider the offers in the light of the objections raised by the respective offerers. Since this order has become final, we have now to consider as to the events that have happened subsequent to this order.
13. The learned Company Judge on 18th February, 1988 directed Mr. G.N. Shah, who represented the Official Liquidator to file on or before 2nd March, 1988, a short summary along with an affidavit and the copy of the plaint of the suit, which has been filed by the Official Liquidator against the Virat Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., and also the copy of the agreement “in order to enable the bidders to know as to what they are purchasing and the cloud on the property which they are purchasing. The learned Company Judge, after referring the bidders, who have to be provided with the particulars referred above, by the same order directed those bidders to deposit Rs. 10,00,000/- each on or before 2nd March, 1988 by way of demand draft. The bidders referred by the learned Company Judge are as follows:
1. Virat Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Surat;
2. Ambition, Surat;
3. Ravi Enterprises, Surat;
4. J. Jamnadas and Company, Surat;
5. D.R. Sanghvi and Company, Ahmedabad; and
6. AARCEE Textiles, Ahmedabad.
14. Even though M/s. D.R. Sanghvi and Company has withdrawn the deposit of Rs. 50,000/- they have already made, the learned Company Judge included it also as one of the bidders with an observation that its bid will be subject to the objections of the other bidders regarding the withdrawal of the deposit of Rs. 50,000/-. Again, the matter came up before the learned Company Judge Mr. Justice D.C. Gheewala on 2nd March, 1988. The learned Company Judge, after refusing to accept the deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- by way of cheque tendered by ‘Ambition’ and AARCEE Textiles, rejected the prayer for extension of time to deposit the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- on 2nd March, 1988. In the said order, the learned Company Judge gave time to the Counsel appearing for the Official Liquidator to supply the summary which he was called upon to do by the previous order, latest by 9th March, 1988. Thus, the learned Company Judge has permitted only Virat Co-operative Housing Society Ltd, Ravi Enterprises, Surat, and J. Jamnadas and Company, to be in the fray for purchasing the suit property since they alone had deposited the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- as directed. The learned Company Judge has also directed these parties to be present on 11th March, 1988. It is as against these orders, the present Appeals have been filed.
15. It is the say of the appellants in O.J. Appeals Nos. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 of 1988 that the learned Company Judge has wrongly refused to grant extension of time to deposit Rs 10.00.000- Respondents have contended that this Court should not interfere with the discretionary order of the learned Company Judge and that there is a clear default on the part of the appellants herein to tender the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- as directed by the learned Company Judge The learned Counsel further submitted that the question of extending or not extending the time is purely a discretionary one and since the learned Company Judge has exercised that discretion in a proper manner and there is no error in principle, this Court should not interfere and set aside the impugned orders.
16. We have already seen that the learned Company Judge has, before directing the deposit of the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- by 2-3-1988, also directed the Official Liquidator to supply by the same date the summary along with an affidavit and the copy of the plaint of the suit which has been filed by the Official Liquidator against the Virat Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Limited and also the copy of the agreement “in order to enable the bidders to know as to what they are purchasing and the cloud on the property which they are purchasing”. It is clear from the facts of the case that, when the appellants herein were not able to deposit the amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- either by demand draft or by cash, the Company Judge refused to extend time and to accept the cheque given by two of the appellants herein.
17. Even though the Company Judge has refused to extend the time beyond 2nd March, 1988 for the deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- the learned Company Judge extended the time for submitting the summary by the Official Liquidator up till 9th March, 1988. The submission of the summary and other particulars by the Official Liquidator, as correctly observed by the learned Company Judge on 18th February, 1988, is for the purpose of enabling the bidders to know as to what they are purchasing and the cloud on the property which they are purchasing. When the time for furnishing such particulars was extended, it is but fair that the learned Judge could have extended the time for payment of deposit, at least some time beyond 9th March, 1988. As a matter of fact, the Company Judge adjourned the main matter to 11th March, 1988. This action of the Company Judge has not only prejudiced the intending purchasers, but also denied the opportunity for tbe Company to get higher price offered by the appellants herein than that offered by the Virat Apartment Co-operative Society. Hence, the above said decision in the case of Navalakha and Sons v. Ramanya Das reported in AIR 1970 SC 2037, instead of helping the respondents, support the case of the appellants to have the time extended for depositing the 10 lakh of rupees.
18. Mr. Shelat also cited the decision in the case of Leon v. York-C-Matic Ltd. and Ors. reported in 1966 (3) AER 277. This case deals with the discretion vested with the Official Liquidator to sell the property. The plaintiff in that case alleged that the property has been very much undervalued by the Liquidator and as such, he must be restrained from selling the property. In that case, the Chancery Division observed that the Court would not interfere with the sale by the Liquidator unless he were acting in a manner in which no reasonable Liquidator could act. As a matter of fact, the Court in That case found that the plaintiff had not established that the Liquidator was acting in a manner in which no reasonable Liquidator could act. That was a case in which the action of the Liquidator in the administration of the estate was discussed. In that decision, the Chancery Division, after referring to the decision rendered by Harman, J. extracted the passage in that judgment, which is as follows:
I need not, I think, anempt to define what these circumstances are. They cannot, I think (In the absence of fraud) justify interference in the day-to-day administration of the estate, nor entitle the bankrupt to the question the exercise by the trustee in good faith of his discretion, nor to hold him accountable for an error of judgment. Administration in bankruptcy would be impossible if the trustee must answer at every step to the bankrupt for the exercise of his powers and discretions in the management and realisation of the property.
Thus, the facts of the Chancery Division case do not have any bearing to the facts of the present case.
19. The powers of the Division Bench on an appeal against the order of the learned Company Judge is wide enough and the said appeal is just like an appeal, which will lie from any order or decision of the Court of ordinary jurisdiction. Section 483 of the Companies Act reads as follows:
483. Appeals from any order made, or decision given, in the matter of the winding up of a Company by the Court shall lie to the same Court to which, in the same manner in which, and subject to the same conditions under which, appeals lie from any order or decision of the Court in cases within its ordinary jurisdiction.
Rule 6 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, speaks about practice and procedure of the Court and the provisions of the Code to apply and reads as follows:
Save as provided by the Act or by these Rules, the practice and procedure of the Court and the provisions of the Code so far as applicable, shall apply to all proceedings under the Act and these Rules. The Registrar may decline to accept any document which is presented otherwise man in accordance with these Rules or the practice and procedure of the Court.
Rule 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, reads as follows:
9. Inherent powers of Court: Nothing in the Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the Court to give such directions or pass such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
From these foregoing provisions, it can be seen that there cannot be any difficulty for the Division Beach to interfere with the order of the learned Company Judge, provided certain principle is involved in doing so.
20. As we have discussed in paragraph supra, the property in question is sought to be sold in order to Section that the creditors of the Company in liquidation get utmost advantage and at the same time, to see that the estate also is benefited in pursuance of the decision rendered by this Court on 18th September, 1988, the learned Company Judge decided to have the bidders referred by him in his order dated 18th February, 1988 to be in the fray and directed them to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- each on or before 2nd March, 1988 by way of demand draft. Thus, it is clear that as far as the competitors in the bid for the property are concerned, they have been made definite and final by the order dated 18th February, 1988. which order has not been upset by any body. Among these six bidders, Virat Cooperative Housing Society Limited, who is one of the respondents in these appeals, has offered Rs. 1,03,25,001/-. The appellant in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988 has offered Rs. 1,11,00,011/-. The appellant in O.J. Appeal Nos. 2 and 3 of 1988 has offered Rs. 1,05,00,000/-. Thus, we find that the two of the appellants herein have offered more than what has been offered by Viral Co-operative Housing Society Limited. The question as to whether their offer is conditional or not, is a matter which has to be decided by the learned Company Judge when the matter is taken up for hearing. The offerers, even at the time of final decision, may give up any condition they have stipulated. These are all matters which have to be discussed and decided finally by the learned Company Judge when the offers of the six contestants are taken into account. When especially the full particulars of the property and as to whether any cloud is there in respect of the property sought to be sold, has not been putforth before the intending purchasers, even though the learned Company Judge directed the Official Liquidator to do so, it would have been in the fitness of things that the time for depositing Rs. 10,00,000/- is extended until such particulars are furnished by the Official Liquidator. The facts we have discussed in paragraphs supra amply make out that the highest offerers are excluded on a technical ground of not depositing the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, either by bank draft or in cash, even though two of these offerers have come forward with cheques for the said sum. When especially the matter has been crystallised as regards the persons who will be eligible to be in the competition for purchase of the suit property and when especially the Official Liquidator has to file the affidavit as stated above, for which time has been extended up till 9th March, 1988, it would have been better and reasonable, if only the time to deposit is extended at least up till 9th March, 1988. The refusal to extend the time in this case will definitely prejudice not only the intending purchasers, who are the appellants herein, but also adversely affect the benefit that will accrue to the creditors and to the estate in question. When such a principle is involved, it is but fair that the time to deposit should have been extended.
21. For all these reasons, the O.J. Appeals are allowed, with a direction that the appellants herein have to deposii a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- by cash, demand draft or pay order of bank, within 10 days from today, i.e. on or before 18-4-1988. The matter may be posted before the learned Company Judge immediately thereafter for further steps There will be no order as to costs.
After the judgment has been pronounced, the learned Advocate General appearing for Virat Apartmeni Co-operative Housing Society Limited, respondent No. 1 in O.J. Appeal Nos. 2, 3, 6 and 7 of 1988, and respondent No. 2 in O.J. Appeal No. 4 of 1988, wants that proceedings before the learned Company Judge may be deferred for a period of three weeks, in order to enable his party to take up this matter to the Supreme Court. We have directed to post these matters before the learned Company Judge, immediately after the deposit of the sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, which has to be done on or before 18-4-1988. Instead, the matter may not be posted before the learned Company Judge, after the deposit of the said sum of Rs. 10,00,000/-, which is directed to be deposited on or before 18-4-1988, for a period of three weeks from this date.