JUDGMENT
Sunanda Bhaodare, J.
(1) Surinder Kumar respondent herein filed a suit in the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class, Delhi against the petitioners herein for permanent injunction restraining them from dispossessing the respondent- plaintiff from the premises bearing no. E-25 N.D.S.E. Part-1, New Delhi. Along with this suit, the respondent plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an interim order against dispossession from the said premises.
(2) The trial court by its order dated 2nd February 1987 granted a temporary injunction restraining the petitioners herein from dispossessing the respondent plaintiff from the said premises except by due process of law. Against this order, the petitioners herein filed an appeal in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Delhi which appeal was also dismissed and the interim order granted by the trial court was confirmed. This revision petition is directed against the order of the lower appellate court dated 16th February 1987.
(3) A preliminary objection was taken by the respondent regarding the maintainability of the revision on the ground that since the petitioners had not filed the certified copy of the trial court order nor an application for condensation of delay or exemption from filing the certified copy and, therefore, the petition was beyond time.
(4) I do not propose to decide the present case on the preliminary objection because the same is of a very technical nature and the defect can be over-come by making an oral prayer for condensation of delay and exemption from filing the certified copy.
(5) On merits, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent had failed to make out a prima-facie case and, therefore, the two courts below had erred in granting a temporary injunction against the petitioners’ Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the case of the respondent-plaintiff in the suit is that he was inducted as a tenant by one Shri Sher Singh and he had not placed on record any document to show that he was a lawful tenant of Shri Sher Singh. Learned counsel submitted that for granting an interim injunction the trial court has not only to see the balance of convenience and the irreparable loss and injury but has also to see whether a prima-facie case is made out. In support of this proposition he referred to Jaswant Rai v. Smt. Dhanwanti Devi & Another, , Bhag Surana v. Bal Krishan, 1983 R.L.R. 207 and Kanshi Ram v. Bansi Lal. and submitted that from the documents filed by the respondent-plaintiff before the trial court he had not made out any friable case. Learned counsel submitted that the premises were let out to M/s Khanijau Industries (Engg) Pvt. Ltd. and the respondent was permitted to use the premises in question in his capacity as a Technical Director of M/s Khanijau Industries (Engg) Pvt. Ltd. He referred to a resolution passed by the company to that effect which was also counter-signed by the respondent himself. Learned counsel stated that the respondent had now ceased to be the director of the said company and, therefore, it was imperative that the vacated the Premises. Learned counsel stated that since the respondent- plaintiff was only a licensee of the company he could be thrown out from he said premises without going to a court of law. In support of this contention, he referred to a full Bench judgment of this Court in Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, .
(6) On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent was inducted by Shri Sher Singh one month before the agreement for lease was signed with the present petitioners. He submitted that the company had in its income-tax return claimed deductions for payment of rent made in respect of these premises as rent paid to the director. Learned counsel submitted that the respondent had been in possession since 1981 and even assuming he is a licensee he cannot be thrown out except by due process of law. Learned counsel further submitted that there was nothing on record to show that the license was terminated at any time. Furthermore, M/s Khanijau Industries (Engg) Pvt. Ltd. had instituted separate proceedings against the respondent in that regard which are still pending in an appropriate court. Learned counsel stated that the respondent has been in settled possession since 1981 and is not a stray tress-passer; the position of the respondent in the company is a subject matter of dispute in a company court and the petitioner was wanting to throw away the respondent by force. Learned counsel referred to Lain Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh & Others, Air 1968 Sc 620, Smt. Shakuntla v.Hira Nand Sharma & Others, and Munshi Ram & Others v. Delhi Administration, Air 1968 Sc 702 in support of his contention that a person in settled and long possession cannot be thrown out except by due process of law,
(7) There is no doubt that apart from balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury the court has also to see whether a prima-facie case has been made out. However, in the present case on perusal of the two orders of the courts below as also the documents filed Along with the plaint I find that the respondent had prima-facie proved that he had been in possession of the premises since 1981 and had made out a friable case. Whether be was a tenant or a licensee or a tress-passer are questions which will have to be gone into in the main suit. Since the respondent was in possession for a long time, the trial court was right in protecting the possession of the respondent till the disposal of the suit. The judgment of the full Bench of this Court in ChanduLal (supra) does not help the petitioners in this case because in that case the court was dealing with a case where the Municipal Corporation of Delhi had granted permission to carry on business in kiosks by way of a license for a limited period. In that case it was held that the license of the persons occupying the kiosks were validly revoked and since they had no right to retain possession they were not entitled to temporary injunction. The resolution referred to by the petitioners through has been disputed by the respondent in fact strengthens the case of the respondent that he was put in lawful possession of the premises as early as in the year 1981. Our legal jurisprudence does not permit lawful possession of any person to be disturbed except by the process of law. Furthermore, since the question of revocation of license by the company is itself in dispute before an appropriate court and the respondent is still claiming his position as a director before the company court, the courts below were right in maintaining status quo regarding possession till the disposal of the suit. Considering that the respondent has been in possession for so long, balance of convenience is certainly in favor of the respondent and no doubt grave and irreparable loss and injury would be caused to him if he is thrown out of the said premises at this stage. I, therefore, see no ground to interfere with the orders of the courts below. Dismissed.