Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 1
In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh.
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Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996
Date of Decision: 9.11.2009
Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association
…Petitioner
Versus
Union of India and Others
…Respondents
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S.THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE.
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA.
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
2. Whether to be referred to the reporters or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Present: Mrs. Anju Arora, Advocate and
Ms.Aditi Girdhar, Advocate,
for the petitioner.
Mr. Onkar Singh Batalvi, Advocate
Central Government Standing Counsel
for respondent No.1.
Mr. H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana
with Mr. Randhir Singh, Addl. AG Haryana,
for respondents No.2 and 3.
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Sunish Bindlish and Mr. Subhash Gupta,
Advocates, for respondents No.4 and 5.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 2
Mr. Girish Agnihotri, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Arvind Seth, Advocate
for respondent No.6.
Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, Advocate
for respondent No.7.
None for respondent No.8.
Mr. Gaurav Mohunta, Advocate
for respondent No.9.
T.S. Thakur, Chief Justice
Four hundred and forty six precious lives, mostly children and
women, were lost in what turned out to be the worst fire tragedy ever in
this part of the Country. Besides those who died, nearly 200 suffered
burn injuries, disfiguring some of them beyond recognition. Payment of
compensation to those, who survived or the next of kin of those, who did
not, may never heal their wounds completely nor make any material
difference in the ground realities unless all those concerned do some
introspection to identify the causes for such tragedies and take
corrective steps to prevent their recurrence in future. That is because
human tragedies of such magnitude are more often than not caused as
much by lack of care and caution as by the all round failure of public
authorities statutory or otherwise in the due and proper discharge of
their functions and duties especially those concerning enforcement of
safety measures.
D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali was known to
be a Premier Educational Institute in District Sirsa in the State of
Haryana. The school was amongst six hundred and fifty other colleges
and institutions under the management of DAV College Managing
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 3
Committee, Chitragupta Road, New Delhi. For an Annual Prize
Distribution Function, the school appears to have chosen what was
known as Rajiv Marriage Palace situated at Chautala Chowk, Mandi,
Dabwali, as the venue to which the children on the rolls of the school,
their parents and teachers were invited. An invitation card sent to the
invitees by the Principal of the School and the Regional Director of the
DAV Managing Committee announced that Shri M.P.Bidlan, IAS, Deputy
Commissioner, Sirsa would be the Chief Guest and Shri S.N.Kamboj,
SDM Dabwali as the Guest of Honour. The function was to start at 11.00
A.M. on the 23rd of December 1995. At about 1.40 P.M. or so, the pandal
under which a very large number of invitees were sitting, appears to
have caught fire. To the misfortune of those attending the function the
fire spread much too fast to let them escape. The blaze claimed 446
lives apart from causing burn injuries to 200 others. The cause of death
was fire and a resultant stampede inside the pandal for want of escape
routes the single exit point proving to be too small to let everyone under
the pandal run to safety.
Nearly nine months after the incident when the funeral pyres
and the ill fated venue had cooled, CWP No.13214 of 1996 was filed by
the petitioner-association in the interest of those affected by the tragedy
claiming a number of reliefs including adequate compensation to those
who had lost their near and dear ones. Several directions were issued in
the said writ petition from time to time which was finally disposed of by
an order dated 28/29.01.2003, whereby Justice T P Garg, a former
Judge of High Court of Allahabad was appointed as a one man
Commission for determining the negligence of those connected with the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 4
incident and the amount of compensation payable to the victims or their
next of kin.
The one man Commission, pursuant to the above directions,
published notices inviting claim petitions from the general public, in
response whereto the victims association filed a total of 493 petitions,
out of which 405 cases related to compensation in death cases while the
remaining 88 cases pertained to burn injuries suffered by the claimants.
Notices were also sent to nine respondents including Union of India,
State of Haryana, DAV Managing Committee, Haryana State Electricity
Board, Municipal Council, Mandi Dabwali and Rajiv Marriage Palace.
In their claim petitions, the claimants alleged that the DAV
Managing Committee and the school authorities had organized the ill
fated function at a Marriage Palace without taking reasonable care and
caution expected of a prudent person regarding the safety of all those
attending the function. The School Authorities had thereby committed an
act of negligence especially when the Marriage Palace and the Pandal
under which the function was held were constructed in defiance of the
building plan sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and had more than
double the sanctioned electric load with loose wires crisscrossing the
Pandal. Absence of fire fighting equipment and proper exits made the
peace vulnerable to any mishap which mishap did occur claiming
valuable human lives. The claim petitions prayed for several reliefs apart
from payment of compensation.
In the reply filed by the respondents to the claim petitions, the
allegation that there was any negligence on their part or that any legal
liability accrued against them were both denied. Reply filed by
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 5
respondents No.1 to 3 inter-alia pointed out that the State Government
was shocked over the tragic incident and that apart from remedial
measures and providing relief to the affected instituted a fact finding
enquiry into the incident. FIR No.397 of 1995 under Section 304-A of the
Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station, Dabwali was
subsequently transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
Respondents No.1 to 3 further pleaded that the Government had
announced an ex-gratia payment of Rs.1,00,000/- for every death and
Rs.50,000/- for every injury case which amount had been disbursed to
the persons concerned. Reimbursement of medical bills to the injured
was also one of the reliefs, which the State Government had conceded
to the victims before the High Court. Respondents 1 to 3 alleged that the
incident had taken place on account of the negligence of respondents
No.4, 5 and 9, who had organized the function and on account of their
short sighted, careless and greedy approach meant to cut corners and
save money in total disregard of the safety of the students, the parents
and guests invited to the function. It was also alleged that the incident
had taken place on account of highly inflammable material used to erect
the pandal and the inadequate number of exit points from the same. The
charge sheet filed by the CBI, had, according to the respondents,
culminated in the conviction of Kewal Krishan, Rajinder Kumar and Devi
Dayal by Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ambala.
Respondents No.4 & 5 had also similarly denied the
averments made in the claim petitions and asserted that the fault leading
to the tragedy lay with respondent No.9, who had failed to make proper
arrangements and take all such steps as were essential in the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 6
circumstances. It was also asserted that no claim was maintainable
against respondent No.4 as the said respondent was not a juristic
person. It was also alleged that the function was not organized by the
DAV Managing Committee, as such no negligence or blame for the
tragedy could be attributed to the said Committee. It was further alleged
that the DAV organization had treated the tragedy as a natural calamity
and taken several steps in the matter such as helping the victims in
getting free education, medicines and even financial assistance.
According to respondents No. 4 and 5, the responsibility for the safety of
the students, staff and parents was that of respondent No.9, engaged to
organize the function and not the School Authorities or DAV Managing
Committee. Respondent No.9 was, according to the school, expected to
make arrangements for the safety of the students, staff, parents and
guests invited to the function.
Respondents No. 6 and 7, HSEB and Municipal Committee,
Dabwali respectively also disputed their liabilities and denied that they
were guilty of any negligence whatsoever. Similarly respondent No.8,
Sh. M.P. Bidlan, the then D.C. Sirsa denied his liability and pleaded
complete innocence in the matter.
Respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace too filed a reply inter-
alia stating that the venue had not been formally inaugurated till the time
the incident occurred and it was only because the school was serving a
social cause that the venue was offered to them without charging a
single penny in consideration thereof. It was also alleged that the
responsibility for making the necessary arrangements for seating of the
guests and provisions for electricity and water etc. was that of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 7
respondents No. 4 & 5. The allegation that they had been using more
then the sanctioned load of electricity with loose wires hanging all
around was also denied by them. The Pandal was, according to
respondent No.9 made of pure cotton fabric purchased from M/s Sukh
Chain Singh Makhan Singh and Co. Gandhi Chowk, Abohar. All other
arrangements towards electricity, water, security, eatables according to
respondent No.9 and seating etc. were to be made by the school itself.
The Commission afforded the fullest opportunity to the parties
to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. Consequently, as
many as 1084 witnesses including 393 doctors were examined on behalf
of the claimants over a period of four years. In rebuttal, the respondents
examined 29 witnesses on their behalf, while the Commission examined
as many as 30 witnesses on its own. It is noteworthy that as many as
2800 documents were produced, marked and exhibited during the
course of inquiry proceedings. The hearing of the claim petitions filed
before the Commission commenced on 29.8.2006 and was completed
on 24.12.2007. The Commission submitted the first part of the report on
19.8.2008 in which it determined the amount of compensation payable
to the claimants in death cases. The second part of the report submitted
by the Commission on 10.12.2008 dealt with the amount of
compensation payable to the victims in injury cases. The third and final
part of the report submitted on 16.3.2009 determined the negligence of
the respondents and the apportionment of the liability to pay
compensation among them.
Dealing with the question of negligence of the respondents,
the Commission recorded a clear finding to the effect that while the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 8
accommodation in the School building was admittedly insufficient for
holding of a function like the one which the School was organizing, the
same did not absolve the School of the responsibility to look for a
suitable alternative. The Commission took the view that it was the
responsibility of respondents No.4 and 5 to see that the Marriage Palace
where they were holding their Annual Function was safe and had the
capacity to accommodate the large number of invitees attending the
same. It was also the responsibility of the said respondents to ensure
that adequate arrangements for fire fighting in the case of an
emergency existed and that there were sufficient number of exits for
escape in any such eventuality. The School was also expected to
ensure that the Marriage Palace owner had the necessary certificates
and permissions from the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, for holding of
a function like the one being organized by the School. The Commission
took the view that respondents No.4 and 5 had, in their anxiety and over
enthusiasm, failed to take care and look into all these aspects of
security even when the function was to be attended by a very large
number of persons comprising men, women and children. The
Commission observed:-
“Under the above circumstances, it is clear that
respondents No.4 & 5, who were expected to see
that the Marriage Palace where they were holding
their annual function was safe and sound and it had
the capacity to accommodate about 1500
persons/invitees; that there were sufficient
arrangements for fire fighting equipment and water
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 9in case of emergency and there were sufficient
number of exits and openings for escape and going
out in case of emergency and also that the owners
of the Marriage Palace had with them the
completion certificate from the Municipal Committee,
Dabwali, before holding any such function but in
their anxiety and over-enthusiasm they did not care
to look into any such thing”.
The Commission rejected the contention urged by
respondents No.4 and 5 that the responsibility for making arrangements
for the function lay entirely with respondent No.9, the owner of the
Marriage Palace, or that safety and security of the guests including the
children who were participating in the function was a matter that rested
with Marriage Palace or its owners. The Commission observed:
“Although respondents No.4 & 5 have throughout
alleged that the Banquet Hall owners had to make
all arrangements including sitting, electricity, lighting
and tent etc. but then they have not led any
evidence in support of their allegations. Their own
witnesses: Smt. Neelam Wadhwa, a teacher of the
school, and Shri V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School,
have categorically stated that there was only one
gate of entrance and exit in Rajiv Marriage Palace
and the width of that gate as per their estimate was
about 10 X 12 feet. Respondents No.4 & 5 have not
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 10led any iota of evidence in support of their plea that
their ‘agent’ respondent No.9 was negligent in so far
as the sitting, lighting, electricity and tent
arrangements were concerned. None of their
witnesses has stated as to what steps were taken
and what arrangements were made by the
organizers of the function i.e. Respondents No.4 & 5
to meet any emergency, or unforeseen event like
the present one. Admittedly, the size of the only
gate of entrance and exit to the Banquet Hall was
only 10 X 12 feet. Thus, when the fire engulfed the
entire Pandal, it was humanly impossible for the
children, ladies and gents to come out speedily from
out of the single gate of exit”.
Repelling the contentions urged on behalf of respondents
No.4 and 5 that they had paid a sum of Rs.6,000/- towards hire charges
of the Marriage Palace and, therefore, had no responsibility for the
safety and security of the children and other guests, the Commission
observed:-
“Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that
the respondent No.9 had to make all these
arrangements for a consideration of Rs.6,000/-,
although as per the statement of Kewal Krishan, one
of the owners of respondent No. 9 (RW19/1-DFT),
they offered the Marriage Palace to the School
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 11Authorities for their publicity free of charge; that the
entire arrangement with regard to the chairs,
curtains and other installations were all made by the
School Authorities with which they had no concern
whatsoever. He has also stated that as many as two
generators were provided by the School Authorities
and which were placed outside the Marriage Palace
in the street. It can thus safely be concluded that
even if the Rajiv Marriage Palace was hired for an
amount of Rs.6,000/-, but as per statement of Kewal
Krishan, they had only offered the Banquet Hall
while all other arrangements were to be made by
the School Authorities. It is also a matter of common
observation that in such functions, the sitting,
lighting and such type of other arrangements are
always made by the organizers themselves as per
their requirement. To say now that all these
arrangements like sitting, lighting, tent etc. were to
be made by respondent No.9, does not, therefore,
appeal to reason. The respondent No.9 was only an
‘agent’ of respondents No.4 & 5 and whatever he
did, was done during the course of his agency”.
While examining the liability of respondent No.9, the owner of
the Marriage Palace, the Commission recorded a finding that the owners
had not applied for a completion certificate after the construction of the
Marriage Palace was completed nor had they obtained any licence from
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 12
the Municipal Committee for running the Marriage Palace. The
Commission further recorded a finding that respondent No.9 had not
made any arrangement for a Fire-brigade and/or Ambulance in the
event of an emergency arising during the function. The Commission
accepted the assertion made by respondent No.9, the owner of
Marriage Palace, that the Marriage Palace was offered to respondents
No.4 and 5 free of any charge only with a view to promoting the
commercial interest of the establishment. Analysing the deposition of
Mr. V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School and Mr. Jagdish Deol, Upper
Division Clerk, produced by respondents No.4 and 5 as defence
witnesses, the Commission came to the conclusion that payment of
Rs.6,000/- to the Marriage Palace was not established as the receipt
showing the said payment had not been produced. The Commission
observed:-
“From the evidence of Shri V.K. Mittal, it is rather
made out that there did not exist any such receipt
showing the alleged payment of Rs.6000/- to
respondent No.9. In case there would have been
any such receipt, Shri V.K. Mittal or Shri Jagdish
Deol, Upper Division Clerk of the Head Office of the
D.A.V. College Managing Committee must have
produced it but the same has been withheld from
the Commission for the reasons best known to
them. Shri Jagdish Deol has nowhere stated about
his having received any such receipt of Rs.6-000/-
from the D.A.V. School, Dabwali alongwith other
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 13record as alleged by Shri V.K. Mittal. Moreover,
even if there was any such receipt as has been
categorically stated by Shri V.K. Mittal, there are no
reasons as to why respondents No.4 & 5 would
withhold the same from the Commission”.
Having, thus, found the owners of Marriage Palace guilty of
negligence leading to the fire incident, the Commission went on to hold
that the relationship between respondents No.4 and 5, on the one hand,
and respondent No.9, on the other, was that of Principal and Agent
thereby rendering the former vicariously liable for the acts of negligence,
omission and commission of the latter. Relying upon the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others v.
Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. And Another AIR 1977
Supreme Court 1735 and Minu B. Mehta and Another v. Balkrishana
Ramchandra Nayan and Another AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1248 and
a Full Bench of this Court in Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram and Others
AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 56, the Commission held that regardless
whether or not payment of Rs.6,000/- was proved to have been made
towards user charges by respondents No.4 and 5 to respondent No.9
the former were vicariously liable for any act of negligence, omission
and/or commission of the latter. The Commission took the view that
since the function in question had been arranged by respondents No.4
and 5 in the premises of respondent No.9 the inference was that
negligence of respondent No.9 was in the course of Agency thereby
making the Principal vicariously liable for such negligence. Reliance was
also placed by the Commission upon the decision in M.S. Grewal &
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 14
Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others 2001 Supreme Court Cases
(Criminal) 1426 and Kooragang Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Richardson
& Wrench Ltd. (1981) 3 AII ER 65 to hold that the liability of
respondents No.4 and 5 could not be different from that of respondent
No.9.
The Commission examined the question of negligence on the
part of the Haryana Electricity Board also and on the basis of the
evidence on the record, returned a specific finding to the effect that the
officers of the Board were totally negligent in the discharge of their
duties. The Commission held that there were two electric connections
for the Marriage Palace and that although the sanctioned load was
limited to 5.980 KW only, the owners of the Marriage Palace were found
to be consuming 11.15 KW load, a fact that was established even in the
investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The
Commission found that the terminal plate of the three-phase meter was
intentionally left unsealed by the Junior Engineer, who had released the
connection in favour of the owner of the Marriage Palace. This was
done to facilitate illegal abstraction of electricity by the owners without
making any payment to the Board. It also recorded a finding that
welding-set lying at the spot appeared to have been utilized by the
owners for the construction of steel structures of the main hall and that
no meter reading was recorded in regard to both the electric
connections. The bills issued by the Board Authorities were also for very
petty amounts. In the opinion of the commission, had the
officers/officials of the Board been vigilant and had they checked the
premises, things would have been entirely different and the incident in
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 15
question may not have occurred. The Commission observed:
“From the above, the negligence of the officials of
the Board respondent No.6 is proved. It is also
proved that there were two electric connections
installed in the Marriage Palace. One of the
connections was Single-Phase while the other was
a Three-Phase connection. Although the
sanctioned load of Three-Phase connection was
5.980 KW but the owners were found consuming
11.10 KW load which was almost double the
sanctioned load, which has clearly been established
from the investigation of the C.B.I. as per their report
Ex.P.1347/1-DFT. It has also come in the C.B.I.
Report that the meter terminal plate of the Three-
Phase meter was intentionally not sealed by the
J.E., who had released the connection in favour of
Kewal Krishan. This was done to facilitate undue
consumption of the electricity by the owners without
making any payment to the Board. It has also come
in the evidence that the owners had taken the
electric connection in the Pandal by unauthorisedly
extending it from Three-Phase connection. The
welding-set lying there appears to have been
utilized by the owners for the construction of steel
structures of the main Hall. As stated above, no
meter reading was taken and the bills for both the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 16
electric connections were issued for very petty
amount and even then no payment of the bills was
ever made by the consumers. This further shows
that the whole staff of the Board was in connivance
with the owners. It has also been proved that four
core of cable of the length of 66 meters was used by
the J.E. against the instructions of the Board for the
use of 30 meters cable only. The Meter Reader,
Lineman, J.E. and other supporting staff of the
Board were all highly negligent and not performing
their duties intentionally in connivance with the
owners of the premises, where connection was
released and even the higher officers also cannot
escape the liability, because they (higher officers)
also failed in the performance of their duties as they
never cared to inspect the site and get matters
straight particularly when the consumer was not
making payment of any bill for a considerable long
time. Had they been vigilant and checked the
premises and other record of the Board with regard
to the payment qua the bills, the things would have
been entirely different and the incident would not
have perhaps occurred. In this view of the matter,
the respondent No.6 and its officials were extremely
negligent in the performance of their duties and for
which they are certainly liable. Since the negligence
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 17
of the officials of the Board was in their public
capacity as also in the discharge of their public
duties during the course of employment and they
being employees of the Board, the respondent No.6
i.e. The Board is vicariously liable for their
negligence”. (emphasis supplied)
The Commission, on the above reasoning, found the officials
of the Board to be negligent in the discharge of their duties and the
Board to be vicariously liable for such negligence. Since the Board,
during the intervening period, was converted into Dakshin Haryana Bijli
Vitran Nigam, the Nigam was held liable for payment of compensation to
the claimants. But keeping in view the fact that the Nigam was entirely
controlled by the State Government, the Commission held the State of
Haryana to be liable to pay the amount in the first instance and recover
the same from the Nigam subsequently.
Dealing with the liability of the Municipal Committee, Dabwali,
the Commission came to the conclusion that Rajiv Marriage Palace was
constructed in complete violation of the sanctioned plans. No
Completion Certificate was obtained by the owners and the building
occupied without clearance from the Municipal Authorities. There were
no fire fighting equipments nor any exit gate except one that was
barely 10X12 feet wide. The owners of the Marriage Palace had never
obtained “No Objection Certificate” from the Fire Officer nor made any
arrangement for fire fighting equipment and other such essential
services before putting the Marriage Palace to use. The Commission
observed:-
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 18
“As stated by Shri Ramesh Chander, Assistant
Engineer of the Municipal committee, he did not
care to the inspect the site after the sanction of the
building plan. He did not care to see as to whether
the construction is being done according to the site
plan and all the constructions made by the owners
are according to the sanctioned site plan and that
after completion of the construction, a completion
certificate has been obtained or not and whether a
‘no objection certificate’ from the Fire Officer has
been procured or not. In this view of the matter, the
Municipal Committee (respondent No.7) was
certainly negligent and so also respondents No.4 &
5 alongwith them”.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
“This further shows that the Municipal Committee
was also negligent in so far as the maintenance and
upkeep of its fire station and the presence of the
officials at the Fire Station is concerned. It appears
that the Municipal Committee perhaps had no
control or supervision on the staff of its Fire Station,
so much so, that even the Fire Station Officer was
found to be on “furlough” at the time when his
presence was of utmost importance at the time of
such an emergency”.
The Commission then summed up its findings regarding the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 19
negligence of the Municipal Committee and its officials, in the following
words:
“It has also been held in this report that the officials
of the Municipal Committee, who were duty bound
to check the unauthorized construction in the town
and the construction of the Marriage Palace
according to the sanctioned plan, miserably failed in
the discharge of their duties. Had the officials of the
Municipal Committee taken due and timely care, the
tragedy might have been minimized. It has been
held above that the building of respondent No.9 was
constructed in violation of the sanctioned plan; that
no completion certificate was obtained by the
owners of the building before occupying the same
nor any fire fighting equipment was installed and
there was only one gate of entry and exit of the size
of 10′ x 12′. The Fire Officer of the Municipal
Committee took no pains to see that the owners of
the Marriage Palace had never obtained ‘No
Objection Certificate’ from him nor made any
arrangement for keeping fire-fighting equipment in
the case of emergency. Under the circumstances
and as held above the Municipal Committee
(respondent No.7) and its officials were certainly
negligent in the discharge of their duties”.
Having regard to the gravity of the culpable negligence as also
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 20
the involvement of the officials of the Municipal Committee in the non-
observance of statutory requirements, the Commission held the
Municipal Committee to be liable to pay compensation to the extent of
5% of the whole amount and directed the said amount to be paid by the
State Government on the ground that the latter was vicariously liable for
the negligence of the former.
The Commission then examined whether the State of Haryana
was liable to share the responsibility for the tragedy that occurred at
Dabwali. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Commission held
that Mr. M.P. Bidlan who happened to be the Head of the District
Administration and was the Chief Guest for the function organized by
the School did not take any care to see that proper arrangements for
security, fire fighting equipment, ambulance and other public utility
services were made for those who were invited to the function. The
Commission rejected the explanation offered by Mr. Bidlan that such
arrangements were not necessary to be made because the function was
a private function. Relying upon the deposition of Mr.Norang Dass,
Tehsildar, Dabwali, who was examined as a witness by respondents
No.1 to 3, the Commission held that District Administration was duty
bound to enforce and secure the enforcement of laws relevant to
various departments. It also held that the District Administration had to
look after the security, safety and welfare of its citizens and that the
Deputy Commissioner had agreed to be the Chief Guest at the function
in discharge of a public duty and not in his private capacity, which fact
was admitted even by Mr. Bidlan in his own deposition. The Commission
relied upon the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer against Mr.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 21
Bidlan, according to which the charge of dereliction of duty framed
against Mr. Bidlan was proved. On the basis of the material on record
comprising oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the
Commission further held that Mr. Bidlan had left the place of incident
hastily only to go to the security of a Police Station at Odhan some 28
Kms. from Dabwali and had in the process, failed to discharge his
duties as the Head of the District Administration in which capacity he
ought to have supervised the relief and rescue measures especially
when people were crying for the same. The Commission also held that
the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding the charge of
dereliction of duties by Mr. Bidlan and the imposition of penalty upon
him were perfectly justified. The Commission noted that the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, before whom the order of
punishment imposed upon Mr.Bidlan was assailed, had upheld the
order of punishment. After discussing the deposition of eight witnesses
examined by Mr. Bidlan in his defence, the Commission concluded as
under:-
“From the evidence of above witnesses examined
by Shri M.P. Bidlan, he has tried to prove that he
remained at the scene of occurrence for quite some
time after the incident, tried to break the wall with
the help of a tractor-trolley, sent for Haryana
Roadways buses and also tried to use the telephone
facility at Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and only
thereafter, he went to Police Post, Odhan. But then
it will be seen that no such plea has been taken by
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 22him anywhere in his written statement. Obviously,
therefore, the entire evidence led by him in support
of his contention is certainly beyond the pleadings
and cannot be looked into . Moreover, it appears
that all this evidence has been led by Shri M.P.
Bidlan in order perhaps to build up some sort of
defence in his departmental enquiry or for any other
reason best known to him. In any case, this
evidence does not help him in any manner in view
of the findings of the Enquiry Officer Shri Dharam
Vir and the punishment awarded to him by the
Government of India and his challenge against the
same before the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Chandigarh, also met with no success. A perusal of
written statement filed by Shri M.P. Bidlan shows
that he has throughout accused respondents No.4,
5 and 9 for the tragedy and has asserted that the
only liability for compensation falls upon
respondents No.1, 2, 3 i.e. the Union of India, the
State of Haryana and the Secretary Health and
respondent No.9 besides respondents No.4 & 5.
The only plea taken by him in the prayer clause of
his written statement is that he never fled away from
the place of incident and there is absolutely nothing
against him as alleged by the claimants. It is thus
evident that no such plea has been raised by him in
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 23his written statement that he stayed at the scene of
occurrence for quite some time, asked a driver of
tractor-trolley to demolish the wall, sent directions to
the Haryana Roadways Workshop for sending
buses, went to Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and
when all these efforts failed, he went to Police Post
Odhan to do the needful. The evidence led by Shri
M.P. Bidlan cannot, therefore, be looked into and is
of no assistance to him in the absence of any plea in
any of his written statements. As per his own
statement, Shri M.P. Bidlan had already put in 21
years of service at that time, firstly as a Haryana
Civil Service Officer for 13 years and thereafter, an
Officer of the I.A.S. For the last about 8 years. Being
an officer having 21 years administrative
experience, it is indeed extremely sad to see that
Shri Bidlan did not rise to the occasion and instead
of taking control of the entire situation created by the
unfortunate fire incident, chose to run away from the
site only to take breath at a distance of 28 Kms.
from Dabwali at Odhan. The conduct of Shri M.P.
Bidlan was indeed most reprehensible and certainly
deserves censure and for which he has been rightly
penalized by the Appropriate Authority. The
evidence led by him does not, in any manner,
absolve him of the responsibility that fell upon him
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 24
on account of the fire incident. An officer of such a
long administrative experience should have
remained at the spot and organized the rescue
operations, particularly when his Sub Divisional
Officer had died in the fire incident while the Deputy
Superintendent of Police had received extensive
burns and there was no Senior Officer except him
on the spot at that time”. (emphasis is ours)
The Commission further held that the version given by Mr.
Bidlan that a large mob had gathered in front of Police Station Sadar
Dabwali did not lend any support to the plea of innocence set up by him.
It was, according to the Commission, all the more necessary for the
Deputy Commissioner, who had long administrative experience, to stay
put at Dabwali having regard to the extremely grave situation that had
arisen out of the incident. The Commission held that when Mr. Bidlan
left the place of occurrence, there was no responsible civil or police
officer to take charge of the situation that had been created by the
incident. He did not contact the local officers nor left any instructions
before leaving the site although the Tehsildar, Dabwali was very much
there, whose services could have been utilized by him. The Commission
finally concluded as under:-
“From the entire material on the record, it is clearly
established that Shri M.P. Bidlan was certainly
negligent in the discharge of his duties as Head of
the District Administration and he is, therefore,
liable for the negligence on his part and for his act of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 25omission to perform his duties as Head of the
District Administration being the Deputy
Commissioner of the District. Since Shri Bidlan was
present as Chief Guest at the function in his public
capacity as also in the discharge of his public duties
during the course of employment and was an
employee of the State Government, only the
Haryana State Government respondent No.2 is
‘vicariously’ liable for his negligence”.
The vicarious liability of the State Government was, on
account of the neglect on the part of its officer Mr. Bidlan in the
discharge of his duties properly, fixed at 10% of the amount awarded to
the victims and their legal representatives. The Commission observed:-
“Having regard to the degree of negligence on the
part of Shri Bidlan in the discharge of his public
duties as public servant during the course of
employment and being an employee of the State
Government, it is held that the Haryana State
Government (respondent No.2) shall be vicariously
liable for his negligence and as such it is held that it
shall be liable to pay compensation to the extent of
Ten Percent of the whole”.
For the purpose of award of compensation, the Commission
categorized the claim petitions into following six distinct categories:-
1) Death cases involving children between the age
group of one month to ten years;
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 26
2) Death cases involving children between the age
group of ten to fifteen years;
3) Death cases involving children between the age
group of sixteen to twenty two years;
4) Death cases involving housewives including
working women;
5) Death cases involving working men; And
6) Claims based on injuries sustained by the victims
men, women and children.
Category 1 Cases
In so far as death cases involving children between the age
group of one month to ten years, the Commission relying upon the
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.K.Subramonia Iyer &
Others v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair & Others AIR 1970 Supreme Court
376, New India Assurance Company Limited v. Satender & Others
2007 (1) Civil Court Cases 255 (SC), Lata Wadhwa & Others v.
State of Bihar & Others (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 197, M.S.
Grewal & Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others 2001 Supreme
Court Cases (Criminal) 1426, awarded to the parents/next of kin of
each child killed in the incident, a lump sum amount of Rs.2,00,000/-
towards compensation. It is noteworthy that majority of the victims fell in
this category, as out of a total of four hundred and forty six dead, 172
happened to be children in the age group of one month to ten years.
Category 2 Cases
In the case of children in the age group of 10 to 15 years,
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 27
numbering in all 38, the Commission relying upon the decisions referred
to earlier, awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- per child killed in the incident
and apportioned the same between the parents/legal representatives of
the deceased.
Category 3 Cases
In the case of 20 children who lost their lives and fell in the
age group of 16 to 22 years, the Commission awarded a sum of
Rs.5,00,000/- for each child killed in the unfortunate incident and
apportioned the amount of compensation suitably among those
claiming the same.
Category 4 Cases
As regards 136 house wives that included 47 working women
killed in the fire incident, the Commission awarded compensation that
ranged between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.10,82,000/- depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case which facts have been discussed
by the Commission at considerable length. The amount of award has
also been apportioned by the Commission suitably among the
claimants. It is noteworthy that out of 47 working women nine victims
who were killed in the incident were unmarried and were working with
the DAV School on meager salaries offered to them. It is ironical that
while in the case of children in the age group of 16 to 22 years, the
Commission awarded Rs.5,00,000/- per child killed, in the case of nine
young unmarried girls, who were working in the School, the
compensation awarded ranges between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.2,30,000/-
only. The petitioners/claimants have made a grievance against this
anamolous situation and claimed enhancement of the compensation
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 28
awarded to the parents/next of kin of these nine victims by treating the
victims as children in age group of 16-22 years. We shall presently
examine that aspect when we come to the question of enhancement of
the amount of compensation.
Category 5 Cases
In so far as working men are concerned, the Commission
determined compensation payable to the legal representatives of the
victims ranging between Rs.61,200/- to Rs.16,11,000/- depending upon
the income which the deceased was earning and the multiplier that was
applicable to the case at hand.
Category 6 Cases
In 88 cases of injured men, women and children, the
Commission has adopted a method of awarding compensation based
on the extent of disability that was suffered by the victims. For a better
understanding of the method adopted by the Commission, we may
present the picture emerging from the recommendations of the
Commission in the following tabular form:-
S.No. No. of victims Extent of Disability Amount of
comprising men, compensation
women and children ranging from
who suffered disability
on account of burn
injuries.
1 29 1% to 10% Rs.2,00,000/-
except in case of
one person
namely Surinder
Pal Kaur alias
Chhinder Pal Kaur
who has been
awarded
Rs.1,00,000/-.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 29
S.No. No. of victims Extent of Disability Amount of
comprising men, compensation
women and children ranging from
who suffered disability
on account of burn
injuries.
2 8 11% to 20% Rs.2,50,000/- to
Rs.6,00,000/-
3 9 21% to 30% Rs.3,50,000/- to
Rs.6,00,000/-
4 12 31% to 40% Rs.3,00,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
5 7 41% to 50% Rs.3,25,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
6 4 51% to 60% Rs.5,00,000/- to
Rs.5,50,000/-
7 3 61% to 70% Rs.4,00,000/- to
Rs.6,50,000/-
8 3 71% to 80% Rs.7,00,000/- to
Rs.8,00,000/-
9 3 81% to 90% Rs.8,00,000/-
each
10 1 91% to 99% Rs.15,00,000/-
11 9 100.00% Rs.10,00,000/- to
Rs.16,00,000/-
Learned counsel for the parties have filed their objections to
the report and recommendations made by the Commission. We may
briefly refer to the said objections before proceeding further.
The Association and the victims have inter-alia raised the
following objections to the report:-
I) The Commission committed an error in determining the
amount of compensation payable in death cases involving
children by following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) stricto senso. The
Commission overlooked the fact that the amount of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 30
compensation awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) for
the children was determined on the basis of the price index
then prevailing. The incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)
having taken place on 3.3.1989 could not possibly provide a
sound basis for awarding compensation in a claim arising out
of an accident that took place seven years later on 23.12.1995
without adding to the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s
case (supra) the component of price escalation based on the
National Price Index. In support of its claim for higher amount
of compensation, the petitioner-Association has filed a
separate calculation chart indicating the amount which the
claimants would be entitled to after taking into consideration
the Price Index. According to this chart, the compensation
payable to the claimants for children of different age groups
would be as under:
S. No. Age Group Amount awarded by Amount claimed by the
of Children the Commission on Petitioner-Association
the basis of Lata
Wadhwa’s case
1 One month Rs.2,00,000/- Rs.3,57,000/-
to ten years
2 Ten to 15 Rs.4,10,000/- Rs.7,33,684/-
years
3 15 to 22 Rs.5,00,000/- Rs.8,94,736/-
years
II) The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the award
of compensation by the Commission in the case of
housewives. According to it, the Commission committed a
mistake in ignoring the very essence of the decision in Lata
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 31
Wadhwa’s case (supra), where the contribution of a
housewife was assessed by their Lordships at Rs.3,000/- per
month. The Commission has, while accepting that
contribution in the form of services rendered by the
housewives to their families wrongly deducted 1/3rd towards
expenses of the victim on herself. This was not, according to
the petitioner-Association, permissible having regard to the
fact that the Supreme Court had determined Rs.3,000/- per
month to be the value of the contribution of the housewives to
their families. No deduction towards personal expenses was
permissible out of the said contribution nor was any made by
their Lordships. The Commission, thus, fell in error in taking
the multiplicand at Rs.24,000/- per annum instead of
Rs.36,000/- per year. The petitioner-Association has further
asserted that the value of the contribution made by the
deceased housewives ought to be proportionately raised to a
higher figure having regard to the increase in the price index
for the period between 1989 and 1995. According to the
petitioner-Association, the multiplicand, after taking into
consideration the escalation in the Price Index, could be
determined at Rs.64,424/- for all housewives except the
elderly ones between the age group of 62 to 72 years, qua
whom the multiplicand would come to Rs.35,789/- as for that
category of cases the Supreme Court had determined the
contribution towards family to be Rs.20,000/- per annum only
which could, on the basis of price index, be taken as
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 32
Rs.35,789/-. It is noteworthy that in both these cases namely
housewives and the elderly women, the petitioner-Association
or the claimants have not found any fault with the multiplier
chosen by the Commission while determining the amount of
compensation.
III) The conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- awarded by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra),
ought to be enhanced. According to the claimants, after
taking into consideration the Price Index, the said amount
could be fixed at Rs.89,473/- per person killed in the incident.
IV) The petitioner-Association has also questioned the amount of
compensation determined by the Commission qua nine young
working girls in regard to whom the Commission has
recommended different amounts of compensation ranging
between Rs.44,000/- to Rs.2,88,000/- depending upon the
evidence that was adduced to prove their monthly income.
According to the petitioner-Association and the claimants, the
award of compensation for such young victims of the tragedy
could be more logically determined and awarded as in the
case of children in the age group of 15-22 years. The
approach adopted by the Commission in fixing a lower amount
of compensation for working young girls has brought about an
anomaly as those who were working at the time of tragedy
would leave behind lesser amount for payment to their legal
representatives than those who were not. The fact that young
girls were working on the date of the incident could not, it is
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 33
asserted, become a disadvantage in the matter of
determination of compensation. The amount in DFT Nos. 6,
55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63 and 342 would, thus, require to be
enhanced suitably so as to be equivalent to the amount paid
for non-working girls in the age group of 15 to 22 years.
V) The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the
amount of compensation determined in favour of legal
representatives of deceased working women, 38 of whom
had fallen victim to the tragedy. Most of them were, according
to the Association, working as Teachers in the DAV School.
Some of them were working even in Government Schools as
Teachers. The salaries received by these working women
ranged between Rs.1,800/- per annum to Rs.81,600/- per
annum. The petitioner-Association states that while
determining the compensation payable to the legal
representatives of these victims, the Commission has not
taken into consideration their future prospects and proceeded
to determine the amount of compensation entirely on the
basis of the amount they were receiving as salaries on the
date of the incident. Relying upon the decision of the
Supreme Court in Kerala State Transport Corporation v.
Susama Thomas 1994(2) PLR 1, the Association asserts that
the Commission ought to have taken into consideration future
prospects of the victims also while determining the
multiplicand. Notably learned counsel did not question the
correctness of the multiplier chosen by the Commission qua
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 34
these claims also. The Association asserts that the
conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- has not been awarded in
the above cases which ought to be awarded taking into
consideration the escalation in the price index.
It is also asserted by the petitioner-Association that
apart from the amount quantified on the basis of multiplier
method evolved in Susama Thomas’s case (supra) the
claimants were entitled to an additional amount of
compensation on account of the loss of contribution which
such working women made in terms of services rendered by
them to the family. The Association argues that while in the
case of housewives, the Supreme Court has quantified the
said amount at Rs.36,000/- per annum in the case of working
women the said amount could be awarded over and above
the amount quantified on the basis of the multiplier method as
it was not disputed that working women were apart from
supplementing the family income contributing in terms of
services rendered to their families which could also be
quantified.
VI) The same line of reasoning is urged by the petitioner-
Association in cases arising out of death of working men. The
Association finds fault with the failure of the Commission in not
taking the future prospects into consideration in the said
cases. No conventional amount has been awarded to the
claimants in cases involving death of working men.
VII) In injury cases also, the claimants have found fault with the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 35
amount awarded in their favour and prayed for enhancement
of the said amounts on several grounds.
The respondents have also filed their objections to the report
submitted by the One Man Commission and questioned the findings as
also the extent of liability fastened upon them. The objections filed by
respondents No.4 and 5 upon whom the liability to pay has been fixed to
the extent of 80% of the amount awarded by the Commission,
challenge the final report of the Commission not only regarding the
entitlement of some of the claimants to claim compensation but even the
determination of the negligence of the parties and the apportionment of
the liability arising out of the same among them. The objections assail
even the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants by the
Commission. The case of these respondents is that they were not
negligent in any manner and that no responsibility for the incident can
be fixed upon them. According to these respondents, there was no
statutory duty cast on them to take any preventive measures towards
safety etc. nor was there any duty cast on them to take any other
measures which, if taken, would have prevented the fire tragedy. The
respondents allege that the statutory duty to provide measures, enforce
compliance with the said measures regarding safety of the victims
including compliance with the building bye-laws by the owners of the
Marriage Palace, regulation of electric supply etc. was that of the
Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and/or Haryana State Electricity Board.
It was also the duty of the Marriage Palace Owners to ensure
compliance with safety measures required for safety of any visitor/guest
entering such a public place. Relying upon the provisions of the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 36
Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, Haryana Municipal Building Bye-laws,
1982, Haryana Municipal (Dangerous and Offensive Trades) Bye-laws,
1982, Haryana Municipal (Formation and Working of Fire Brigade)
Rules, 1985, Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and Indian Electricity
Rules, 1956, the respondents have tried to absolve themselves of their
responsibility for the tragedy while accusing the statutory and public
authorities of negligence in the performance of what, according to these
respondents, were statutory duties cast upon them.
In the reply to the claim for enhancement of compensation
payable to the victims, respondents No.4 and 5 have inter-alia alleged
that the award of compensation in the case of children was on the basis
of consensus arrived at between learned counsel for the parties
appearing before the Commission. Compensation in the case of children
was, on that basis, awarded at the rate of Rs.2,00,000/-, Rs.4,10,000/-
and Rs.5,00,000/- in the three age groups of children between one
month to ten years, ten to 15 years, and 16 to 22 years, respectively.
The respondents argued that since the award of compensation was
consensual qua the claims arising out of death of children, neither the
petitioner-Association nor the claimants could seek any enhancement of
the same.
The respondents further assert that the claim for
enhancement in death cases involving housewives was also not justified
and that deduction of 1/3rd of the amount in terms of the second
Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act by application of a suitable multiplier
was legally correct. It is also alleged that compensation awarded was
excessive. The decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) is even
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 37
otherwise not applicable as the same is, according to the respondents,
based on a concession made before the Apex Court. It is also
contended that the One Man Commission could award compensation
taking the income of housewives to be Rs.15,000/- per annum keeping
in view the second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and not
on the assumption that the income of the deceased housewives was
Rs.3,000/- per month.
The claim for enhancement made in the case of working men,
killed in the incident, has also been disputed by the respondents as the
amount already awarded is, according to them, just and reasonable
having regard to the evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants. The
claim regarding future prospects is disputed by the respondents on the
ground that there was no evidence to support any such claim. In the
claims arising out of injury cases, the respondents have questioned the
award of compensation by the Commission on the ground that the same
is highly excessive and unsustainable. It is alleged that the question of
taking future prospects into consideration in cases where the
compensation is awarded on the basis of multiplier method does not
arise.
Objections to the Commission’s report have been filed even by
the Haryana Electricity Board, now known as Dakshin Haryana Bijli
Vitran Nigam Limited. It is inter-alia alleged that the incident in question
had occurred during a period when there was a regular power cut from
11.20 A.M. To 12.20 P.M. and that the power supply by the Board was
in no way responsible for the unfortunate incident. The findings recorded
by the Commission suggesting negligence on the part of the officers of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 38
the Board have also been assailed by the Nigam.
The Municipal Committee, Dabwali, has also similarly filed
objections and assailed the findings recorded by the commission that
the Committee and its employees were also to an extent responsible for
the occurrence leading to a large scale human tragedy, hence liable to
pay compensation to the claimants.
State of Haryana has not filed any objections to the findings
recorded by the Commission. Objections, however, have been filed to
the prayer for enhancement of compensation made by the petitioner and
the claimants in which it is alleged that the prayer for enhancement is
not justified as the Commission has determined the amount of
compensation payable to the victims in a fair and reasonable manner.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable
length. We have also been taken through the material on record
including the depositions recorded before the Commission. The
following questions, in our opinion, fall for determination:
1) Whether the findings of fact recorded by the One
Man Commission of Inquiry regarding the genesis of
the fire incident and the concomitant negligence
leading to 446 deaths and injuries to 200 suffer from
any error of law or perversity to warrant interference
from this Court?
2) If answer to Question No.1 above is in the negative,
was the Commission of Inquiry legally correct in
holding that respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace
was an Agent of the D.A.V. School and
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 39Management Committee, respondents No.4 and 5,
so as to render the later vicariously liable for the
acts of negligence committed by the former?
3) Is the apportionment of the responsibility and
negligence for the fire tragedy in question and the
liability flowing from the same fair and reasonable
having regard to the acts of omission and
commission and the role played by each one of
those held responsible for the incident?
4) Are the claimants entitled to seek enhancement in
the payment of compensation in the light of the
consensus allegedly arrived at before the One Man
Commission?
5) In case, answer to question No.3 is in the
affirmative, what is the extent of enhancement to
which the petitioner and claimants are entitled in
each category and/or claim petition filed by them
before the Commission and on what basis?
6) To what other reliefs are the claimants entitled?
We shall deal with the above questions ad seriatim.
Re: Question No.1
Before we examine whether the findings of fact recorded by
the Commission suffer from any error or perversity, we may briefly
discuss the legal purport of what in law constitutes negligence in the
realm of actionable tort. The term negligence has not been given a
statutory definition. Black’s Law Dictionary, however, describes
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 40
negligence to mean:-
“The failure to exercise the standard of care that a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised in
a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the
legal standard established to protect others against
unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is
intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of
others’ rights”.
Judicial pronouncements have similarly described negligence
to mean the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something
which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of a person would do or not do. One of the earliest
pronouncements as to the meaning of negligence came from the House
of Lords in Donoghue Vs. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL) where Lord
MACMILLAN summed up the legal purport of negligence in the following
words:-
“The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in
the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness
only where there is a duty to take care and where
failure in that duty has caused damage. In such
circumstances carelessness assumes the legal
quality of negligence and entails the
consequences in law of negligence.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
The cardinal principle of liability is that the party
complained of should owe to the party
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 41complaining a duty to take care, and that the party
complaining should be able to prove that he has
suffered damage in consequence of a breach of
that duty”.
Lord ATKIN who delivered a separate opinion in the above
case summarized the legal approach to be adopted in the case of
negligence thus:-
“You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omission which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who,
then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems
to be , persons who are so closely and directly
affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have
them in contemplations as being so affected when
I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions
which are called in question.”
The above view was affirmed by the House of Lords in Home
Office Vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Limited (1970) 2 All England Reports
294 (HL). Later decisions that were delivered by English Courts and the
Courts in this Country limit the “proximity principle” to persons to whom
the defendant owes a duty referred to by Lord ATKIN as neighbours. At
the bottom of the principle of proximity, thus, lies a relationship the
nature whereof makes it reasonable to impose a liability in negligence.
The relationship ought to be such as would in justice and fairness make
it reasonable for the defendant to keep the plaintiff in contemplation
while doing the act giving rise to the claim. The Principle of Proximity
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 42
does not have anything to do with physical proximity, as for instance in
Donoghue’s case (supra) the manufacturer had no proximity with the
consumer of the product and yet it was held that the manufacturer owed
a duty to the consumer.
Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (The Common Law Library
No.3) (16th Edition) London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989 while dealing
with “Duty of Care Situation” states that no action lies in negligence
unless there is damage. In cases of personal injuries, damage used to
be understood to have been inflicted when injury was sustained by the
plaintiff. The duty in negligence, therefore, is not simply a duty not to act
carelessly, it is a duty not to inflict damage carelessly. Since damage is
the gist of the action, what is meant by “duty of care situation” is that it
has to be shown that the Courts recognize as actionable the careless
infliction of the kind of damage of which the plaintiff complains, on the
type of person to which he belongs and by the type of person to which
the defendant belongs.
Reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of
High Court of Karnataka in M.N. Rajan and Others v. Konnali Khalid
Haji and Another, III (2004) Accident & Compensation Cases 272, in
which the Court held that in a case based on tort by negligence, it was
imperative for the Court first to determine whether the defendant was
under a legal duty to take care and whether there was sufficient reason
of proximity between the defendant and plaintiff. In answering that
question, the Court has to apply the test of foresight of a reasonable
person to examine whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably
foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant’s acts of omission or
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 43
commission. In Southern Portland Cement Limited Vs. Cooper
(1974) 1 ALL ER 87, the court declared that in cases of tort by
negligence the test applicable is the foresight of a reasonable man and
not the hindsight of the Court for it is easy to become wiser after the
event.
There is sufficient authority for the proposition that a public
school educator’s relationship to his/her student is one of those
relationships in which one party (the educator) owes a duty to the other
party (the student). In the context of “principle of proximity”, the Courts
have had several occasions to pronounce whether the School owes any
duty towards its students in terms of the care that need be taken for their
safety. In Virna Mirand et al. v. City of New York and Board of
Education of the City of New York 92 Ed. Law Rep. 957, it was held:-
“A teacher owes it to his or her charges to exercise
such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence
would observe in comparable circumstances; duty
owed derives from simple fact that school, in
assuming physical custody and control over
students, effectively takes place of parents and
guardians”.
In M.S. Grewal’s case (supra), one of the questions that fell
for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the School
owed any duty of care towards its students on the principle of proximity
of relationship. Answering the question in the affirmative, their Lordships
observed:-
“Duty of care varies from situation to situation-
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 44whereas it would be the duty of the teacher to
supervise the children in the playground but the
supervision, as the children leave the school, may
not be required in the same degree as is in the play
field. While it is true that if the students are taken to
another school building for participation in certain
games, it is sufficient exercise of diligence to know
that the premises are otherwise safe and secure but
undoubtedly if the students are taken out to
playground near a river for fun and swim, the degree
of care required stands at a much higher degree and
no deviation therefrom can be had on any count
whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is
otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular
sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a
matter of fact the degree of care required to be
taken specially against the minor children stands at
a much higher level than adults: children need much
stricter care”.
In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman
Iyer and Another, III (2003) Accident & Compensation Cases 551
(SC): 2003 (4) Recent Civil Reports 764, the Supreme Court held:
“Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an
omission to do something which a reasonable man
guided upon those considerations who ordinarily by
reason of conduct of human affairs would do or
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 45obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent
or reasonable man would not do. Negligence does
not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of
such a degree of care as is required in particular
circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe, for
the protection of the interests of another person, the
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand whereby such other
person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and
duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either
subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively
careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute
term, but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative
term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no
matheatically exact formula can be laid down by
which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly
measured in a given case. What constitutes
negligence varies under different conditions and in
determining whether negligence exists in a particular
case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct
amounts to negligence, all the attending and
surrounding facts and circumstances have to be
taken into account. It is absence of care according to
circumstances. To determine whether an act would
be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to
determine if any reasonable man would foresee that
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 46the act would cause damage or not. The omission to
do what the law obligates or even the failure to do
anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by
law would equally and per se constitute negligence
on the part of such person. If the answer is in the
affirmative, it is a negligent act”.
Let us now examine in the light of the above principles
whether the Commission of Inquiry had correctly held that the School
had committed a breach of the duty qua the students, their parents and
other invitees to participate in the function. The foremost aspect that
would require examination is whether the Commission had properly
appreciated the evidence adduced before it and correctly applied the
legal tests to which we have referred in the foregoing paragraphs.
Appearing for respondents No.4 and 5, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram,
strenuously argued that the One Man Commission had not properly
appreciated the evidence before it while recording its findings on the
question of the nature and extent of negligence of each one of the
respondents, their employees and agents. He made a valiant attempt to
persuade us to hold that the findings were unsupported by any material
and at any rate a contrary view was equally plausible on a proper re-
appraisal of the material assembled before the Commission. He, in
particular, laid considerable emphasis on certain aspects which,
according to him, established that the School was in no way negligent in
the discharge of its duty towards the children, their parents and
members of the staff invited to attend the ill fated annual function; that
the School premises was not big enough to permit the holding of such a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 47
function which forced the School Authorities to take a reasonable and
prudent decision to shift the function to another place; that Rajiv
Marriage Palace was the only public place in Dabwali where the fateful
function could be organized by the School; that the Marriage Palace
comprised a steel structure used for making a permanent Pandal inside
the premises thereby ensuring safety of the premises for any public
function conducted in the same; that the wiring and fittings within the
Pandal were permanent and had been got done by the Marriage Palace
owner through a reputed Electrician; that several functions had already
been held in the Marriage Palace over a period of three-four months
before the incident; that nearly 1200 people were present at the venue
none out of whom could foresee the possibility of fire breaking out and
engulfing the entire area; that functionaries of the District Administration
like the Deputy Commissioner, Tehsildar and Police Officers were also
present at the spot which created a reasonable impression in the mind
of everybody that the place was safe and nothing untoward could
happen; that although the School had hired the Marriage Palace on
payment of a sum of Rs.6,000/-, yet even if the premises had been
offered by the Marriage Palace owner free to the School for the sake of
commercial publicity, there was an element of quid pro quo in the
arrangement which brought about a commercial relationship between
the parties distinctly different from the jural relationship of a Principal
and Agent. All these circumstances, argued the learned counsel,
proved that respondents No.4 and 5 were in no way negligent in the
discharge of the duty which they owed towards their invitiees, guests,
students and staff attending the function.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 48
Relying heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and
Others (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552, Mr. Atma Ram argued
that the fact situation of the instant case did not satisfy the dual test of
proximity of relationship between the School and the victims or the
foreseeability of the incident in question. The Commission had,
therefore, fallen in error in holding the School guilty of tort arising out of
negligence.
On behalf of the petitioner/claimants, it was per contra argued
that the findings recorded by the One Man Commission were based on a
thorough appraisal of the evidence adduced before it and that it had
given cogent reasons in support of its findings. There was, according to
Mrs. Arora, nothing perverse about the said findings to call for
interference of this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
This Court cannot, it was contended, assume the role of a Court of
appeal and sit in judgment over the correctness of the findings of fact
recorded by the Commission presided over by none other than a former
Judge of this Court.
On behalf of the State of Haryana, it was contended by Mr.
H.S. Hooda, learned Advocate General, Haryana, and Mr. Randhir
Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, that the findings
recorded by the One Man Commission regarding negligence on the part
of the respondents leading to the fire incident had been accepted by the
State of Haryana and that the State had challenged neither the said
findings nor the apportionment of the liability arising out of the
negligence established against them. Even otherwise, the findings
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 49
recorded by the Commission, argued the learned counsel, were justified
on the material placed before it and any attempt by the School to shift its
responsibility or accuse the statutory and other public authorities of
negligence while underplaying its own fault was unwarranted and indeed
unfortunate having regard to the magnitude of the tragedy that occurred
only because the School was cutting corners without caring for the
safety and security of a very large number of people whom it had invited
to a place wholly unsuitable for a function that was to be attended by
such a large number of people.
We have given our careful consideration to the submissions
made by learned counsel for the parties.
Claims arising out of Tort ordinarily go for trial and adjudication
before the competent Civil Courts except in cases where statutory fora
are created for such adjudication as is the position in claim cases arising
before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, or the Railway Claims Tribunal established under the Railway
Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Even so, the High Courts and indeed the
Apex Court exercising writ jurisdiction have, in exceptional
circumstances, intervened with a view to providing immediate succour to
those affected by tragedies involving heavy loss of human lives. That is
precisely what happened in M.S. Grewal’s case, in which 14 students
studying in fourth, fifth and sixth standards in Dalhousie Public School,
Badhani, Pathankot, were drowned in river Beas while out on a picnic. In
a writ petition filed before it, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held
the School Management liable to pay compensation at the rate of
Rs.5,00,000/- each to the parents of 14 students who died in the incident
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 50
with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In an appeal arising out
of that decision, the Apex Court noted the shift in the judicial attitude
from the old to new concept of providing expeditious relief in cases
where the citizens’ right to life and/or liberty has been affected. Making a
departure from the conservative approach that damages must be left to
the Civil Courts to determine, their Lordships observed:
“Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the
old draconian concept and the traditional
jurisprudential system – affectation of the people
has been taken note of rather seriously and the
judicial concern thus stands on a footing to provide
expeditious relief to an individual when needed
rather than taking recourse to the old conservative
doctrine of civil courts obligation to award damages.
As a matter of fact the decision in D.K. Basu, (1997)
1 SCC 416, has not only dealt with the issue in a
manner apposite to the social need of the country
but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of
expression firmly established the current trend of
‘justice oriented approach’. Law courts will lose its
efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of
the society – technicalities there might be many but
the justice oriented approach ought not to be
thwarted on the basis of such technicality since
technicality cannot and ought not to out-weigh the
course of justice”.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 51
That is also what happened in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)
in which as many as 60 persons including 26 children, 25 women and
nine men died in a fire incident in a function held to celebrate the 150th
birth anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata at Jamshedpur. Lata Wadhwa,
who had lost both her children in the said incident, filed a writ petition in
the Supreme Court alleging inaction on the part of State in initiating
proceedings against the officers because of whose negligence the
tragedy had taken place. It was in that petition that the Supreme Court
requested Mr. Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, to look
into the matter and determine the compensation payable to the legal
heirs of the deceased as well as compensation payable to the injured.
Upon receipt of the report from Justice Chandrachud the Court directed
payment of the amount of compensation to those affected by the
tragedy.
Even in Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and
Others v. Union of India and Others 104 (2003) Delhi Law Times 234
(DB), the High Court of Delhi was dealing with a case for payment of
compensation to victims of what was commonly known as Uphar Fire
Tragedy. The determination of the negligence and the apportionment of
liability was undertaken on the basis of broad principles applicable in
such situations and the reports and material that was placed before the
Court. The enquiry into the fire incident was in that case ordered by the
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and conducted by Mr.
Naresh Kumar, Deputy Commissioner (South). It was meant to identify
the causes and circumstances leading to the fire and examine whether
the Cinema had taken the necessary safety measures. The petitioner
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 52
had, upon conclusion of the said enquiry, filed a writ petition seeking
adequate compensation for the victims and punitive damages against
the respondents for showing callous disregard towards their obligations
to protect the fundamental and indefeasible rights of the citizens under
Article 21 of the Constitution by failing to provide a premises that was
safe and free from hazards, that could be reasonably foreseen. The
approach adopted by the Court in that case if we may say with respect
was in consonance with the law declared by the Supreme Court in D.K.
Basu v. State of W.B. (1997)1 Supreme Court Cases 416 where their
Lordships made a distinction between a claim in public law for an
unconstitutional deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty
which proceeds on the doctrine of strict liability and a claim for damages
for tortious act of public servants. The Court observed:
“The claim in public law for compensation for
unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to
life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed
under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict
liability and is in addition to the claim available in
private law for damages for tortious acts of the
public servants. Public law proceedings serve a
different purpose than the private law proceedings.
Award of compensation for established infringement
of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article
21 is a remedy available in public law since the
purpose of public law is not only to civilize public
power but also to assure the citizens that they live
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 53under a legal system wherein their rights and
interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of
compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or
Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the
established violation of the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the
courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising
the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public
wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of
its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of
the citizen.
The old doctrine of only relegating the
aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits
the role of the courts too much, as the protector and
custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens.
The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social
aspirations of the citizens because the courts and
the law are for the people and expected to respond
to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its
consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere
punishment of the offender cannot give much solace
to the family of the victim – civil action for damages
is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process.
Monetary compensation for redressal by the court
finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to
life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 54perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to
the wounds of the family members of the deceased
victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the
family”.
Having said that, we need to keep in mind is that the setting
up of the One Man Commission of Inquiry for determination of the nature
and the extent of negligence of the School or the public functionaries
and for award of compensation to the victims does not constitute the
Commission as a Civil Court nor does it constitute the High Court under
whose order the Commission was set up as an Appellate Forum for the
latter to sit in judgment over the findings of fact recorded by the
Commission. The choice of the person who was to preside over the
Commission was evidently guided by the solitary consideration that he is
a trained and vastly experienced judicial mind familiar with the principles
of law and procedure that need to be followed for any such
determination. The report submitted by a Commission of Inquiry so
chosen and appointed shall, therefore, have to be respected unless
there is apparent on the face of the record an error of law or perversity
of the kind that cannot be countenanced. Suffice it to say that this Court
cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the
Commission or undertake an exercise in re-appraisal of evidence and
substitute its own finding for that of the Commission simply because a
contrary or alternative view seems equally plausible. Keeping the above
broad parameters in view, let us briefly refer to the material that was
placed before the Commission for its appreciation and findings recorded
on the basis thereof, not because we propose to re-appraise the entire
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 55
material adduced before the Commission to record our own findings but
only to see whether the findings of fact recorded by the Commission are
perverse in that they are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.
The incident in question took place on 23.12.1995. On the
very following day i.e. 24.12.1995, the then Secretary to Government of
Haryana directed the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar to
hold a Magisterial enquiry into the facts relating to the fire incident. The
first of the enquiries into the incident was, thus, conducted by the
Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar, the report whereof was
marked before the One Man Commission. In the course of the enquiry,
the Divisional Commissioner had examined as many as 40 witnesses
including Magistrates, Police Officials, Advocates, Doctors and the
owners and employees of Rajiv Marriage Palace. Relations of the
deceased persons present on the occurrence, a large number of the
injured including Teachers of the D.A.V. Centenary Public School,
technical experts of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban,
Haryana State Electricity Board, Public Works Department, Municipal
Committee and Chief Electrical Officer, Haryana, were also examined.
On the basis of statements made by the experts and eye
witnesses including the police officials and public men, the Divisional
Commissioner recorded a clear finding to the effect that the fire incident
had not occurred on account of any sabotage or the use of any
explosive substance whatsoever, as the physical or chemical clues
available from the evidence and the opinion of the experts did not
support any such possibility. The Commissioner then examined whether
the fire could have been caused by leakage of gas cylinder or bursting of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 56
gas stove or burning of cigarettes etc. and ruled out the same also as a
possible cause of the incident. He then turned to the possibility of fire
having been caused because of electric wirings on account of the heat
generated by the use of focus lights, mingling of supply of two generator
sets at a common point and electrocution of the entire area through
which PVC tubes covered wires passed in the Pandal and concluded
that the available material, both documentary and oral, lent support to
the possibility that the fire started from a height of 12 feet on the right
side of the main entrance to the Pandal on account of use of crude
material in the focus light fixed at that place. The wires passing through
the welding machine was found as a second possibility from which the
fire could have started. The Divisional Commissioner was also of the
view that the fire had started while the two generating sets placed near
the Pandal were in operation. The following passage from the report
submitted by the Divisional Commissioner is, in this regard, relevant:-
In addition to the fire breaking out from the heating
of the focus light which had crude material in it,
according to Dr. M.B. Rao, the other possibility of
quick burning of whole of the pandal along with
factors like false roofing PVC material, the synthetic
curtains and the like, could arise from the fact that
even while the power of one generating set might
have stopped on the breaking out of fire in the focus
light, the other generating set was still in operation
(as admitted in the statement of Rajinder Kumar)
and thus heating caused by the live wires multiplied
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 57with the burning of PVC covering with the outbreak
of fire from one side which spread through the
synthetic material available in the roof, and all this
could have accelerated the speed of fire as
witnessed by all”.
The Divisional Commissioner also recorded the finding that
the owners of the Marriage Palace had illegally taken a three-phase
connection from the Electricity Board and the officers of the Board had
made no effort to issue and recover any bill from the owners in regard
to the three phase connection granted to them. The Commissioner also
found fault with the construction of an unauthorized building in violation
of the building plans sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and the
casual manner in which the plans were sanctioned. He also found fault
with the loose terminals of the wires drawn from the three phase meter
which, according to him, showed the real motive behind the criminal
intention of the owners of the Marriage Palace. Strictest criminal action
against the owners and disciplinary proceedings against the employees
was, therefore, recommended.
The enquiry by the Divisional Commissioner was followed by a
charge sheet presented against the owners of the Marriage Palace by
the Central Bureau of Investigation. The investigation conducted by the
Central Bureau of Investigation established that Rajiv Marriage Palace
at Mandi, Dabwali was a partnership firm comprising three real brothers,
named Kewal Krishan Dhameeja, Om Parkash Dhameeja and Chander
Bhan Dhameeja. The place was named after Rajiv Dhameeja, eldest
son of Kewal Krishan Dhameeja. A rectangular Pandal was constructed
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 58
in the Rajiv Marriage Palace covering an area measuring 100′ X 90′.
The Pandal comprising steel super structure of GI Sheets on the top and
partially covered on the three sides with a false ceiling supported with
bamboo sticks. The lowest false ceiling wall inside the Pandal was at a
height of 12 feet from the ground. The entire ceiling was made of cotton
clothes in colourful designs and in chunri style. All the three sides of
the Pandal were covered with thick cotton curtains tightly fitted with the
bamboo support from the ground level to the height of first ceiling. The
upper portions of the three sides of the Pandal were covered with PV
Sheets. The front portion of the Pandal was covered with PV Sheets
from inside upto the height of 12 feet. Thick cotton curtains on both
sides of the gate were also fixed right from the ground level upto the
height of 12 feet leaving a vacant space of 12′ X 12′ as entrance/exit
gate. Both inner and upper curtains in the front portion were tightly tied
with bamboos placed in between the angle frames and steel poles. The
curtains of D-China cloth were fixed in hanging order on both sides of
the entrance/exit gate of the Pandal. The lighting arrangements in the
Pandal were described in the charge sheet submitted by the Central
Bureau of Investigation in the following words:
“The pandal was provided with 12 electrical circuits
through the switch board installed in the switch room
towards eastern side of the pandal. There were 25
jhumar lights with electric bulbs of 100 watts each
hanging from the false ceiling of the pandal. Beside,
two halogen lights over the stage and other two
halogen lights near the entry/exit gate of the pandal
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 59were also fixed. Due to frequent power tripping in
Dabwali, the owners of the Rajiv Marriage Palace
(Pandal) had arranged two generator sets to ensure
uninterrupted power supply at the function on
23.12.1995 in the Pandal. The switch board fitted in
the switch room of the premises had been provided
with the arrangements of power supply from HSEB
as well as from the generators.
In addition, the lighting arrangements
inside the pandal also include an arc light in crude
form fitted with two carbon electrodes and a reflector
fitted above the first ceiling near the central portion
of entrance gate facing the dias. Accused Rajender
Kumar and Devi Lal of M/s Chacha Bhatija Light
Service were deployed for manning the electrical
arrangements, operating generators etc. on the day
of function i.e. on 23.12.1995. Besides, a number of
temporary/loose connections were also provided in
the pandal on the date of function by Rajendra
Kumar and Devi Lal by tampering with the electrical
fittings inside the pandal”.
The Charge sheet also referred to the seating arrangements
inside the Pandal and suggested that as many as 725 chairs made of
plastic were laid out on both sides of the central passage. The first three
rows from the stage had blocked the central passage. In the front row
there were sofa sets with extra chairs on both sides for VIPS and
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 60
special guests. There was a narrow passage in the southern, eastern
and western side of the Pandal. The placement of chairs was at the end
of the Pandal from the entrance, in diagonal shape because of provision
of counter for serving tea and cold drinks to the invitees.
The Charge sheet further indicated that the organizers of the
D.A.V. Public School, Dabwali, had hired Rajiv Marriage Palace for
holding its annual function for a sum of Rs.6,000/- only. A huge crowd
of around 1000 invitees including children and parents had gathered at
the venue. The function started around 1200 hours on 23.12.1995 in
which Mr. M.P.Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, was the Chief
Guest. While the function was going on, around 1.45 to 1.50 P.M., a fire
was noticed at the entrance/exit gate. The fire spread so fast that it
engulfed the whole Pandal within no time. Consequently, more than 441
persons majority of which were innocent children died due to burn
injuries. Besides more than 145 persons sustained burn injuries. Among
the dead were, Mr.Som Nath Kamboj, Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Dabwali, daughter of Mr. Anil Yadav, Deputy Superintendent of Police,
Dabwali, and Mrs.Priti Kamra, Principal of D.A.V. School. The charge
sheet placed reliance upon the report submitted by the Forensic
Experts from Forensic Science Laboratory Madhuban, Haryana, the
relevant portion dealing with the cause of incident may be extracted at
this stage:-
“In the middle portion leading to stage a focus light
connected by copper wire was connected temporarily
by the two terminals of a welding machine. The
welding machine in turn was connected to the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 61mains through switch change over box. In one of the
terminals of the welding machine, the copper wires
were found melted leading to bead formation. This
clearly indicates that there was high voltage due to
which there could have been heavy sparking at the
loose terminals. Because of this even the two fuse
grips through which the focus light has been connected
also had blackening resulting in the burning of copper
wire. In the focus light two carbon electrodes are
placed at a distance to produce spark which is
transmitted on to reflector to give bright light. This
process produces tremendous amount of heat which
has burnt the bamboo poles as well as decorative cloth
which was synthetic. The synthetic cloth caught fire
instantaneously and fell down as fused mass with
flames. The remaining plastic sheets and synthetic
cloth caught fire and engulfed the entire area leading to
death of several people”.
The Charge sheet also relied upon the report submitted by Mr.
V.B. Gupta, Superintending Engineer, North Regional Electricity Board,
New Delhi, in which the cause of fire was summed up as under:-
“Based on the results of experiments conducted at
site and discussions the most probable cause of fire
appears to be the flash/spark created at the T-Joint
above the main entrance to the pandal where a
large number of loose electrical connections were
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 62made by the electrical operators for fitting the
lighting equipments. The T-Joint was very close
almost touching the curtains spread horizontally at
12′ height above the main entrance. The spark from
this T-Joint could have caused the fire in the curtain
clothes. Once the cloth caught fire, the fire spread
all around within few minutes bringing the whole of
pandal into burning simultaneously”.
Relying upon the opinions given by the Central Forensic
Science Laboratory Experts in the field of Ballistics, Physics and
Chemistry the Central Bureau of Investigation concluded that the
incident was not caused by any sabotage as no explosive substance
had been detected in the residue. The fire, according to the Central
Bureau of Investigation, was caused due to short circuiting. The charge
sheet also concluded that Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and Chander Bhan
Dhameeja, partners of M/s Rajiv Marriage Palace, were personally
supervising the arrangements at the venue including the electrical
fittings etc. and that the accused/owners had hurriedly provided several
temporary electric connections in the Pandal employing untrained and
unqualified Electricians in total disregard of the safety of human lives.
The charge sheet stated:-
“During the course of investigation, it has been
established that accused Kewal Krishan Dhameeja
and Chander Bhan Dhameeja, Partners of M/s Rajiv
Marriage Palace, were personally supervising the
arrangements at the site of the function which
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 63included electrical fittings etc. The electrical fittings
etc. were made by accused Rajendra Kumar and
Devi Lal who had no training. Accused Rajendra
Kumar and Devi Lal also provided several
temporary electrical connections at the Pandal.
Temporary electrical connections were also
provided by them for the arc light and also for the
Halwai’s Oven. These connections were made by
these untrained and unqualified accused persons in
a haste and hurry in total disregard to the safety of
the human lives. Investigation has established that
accused ‘Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and
Chanderbhan Dhameeja, apart from personally
supervising these operations had taken the
electrical connection in the Pandal in an illegal and
unauthorised manner and, therefore, they are also
liable to be prosecuted for their acts of omission and
commission which resulted in loss of 441 lives and
injuries to 145 others”.
The Commission of Inquiry has referred to and partly relied
upon the enquiry report submitted by the Divisional Commissioner and
the conclusions drawn by the Central Bureau of investigation in its
charge sheet. But apart from what was gathered by the Divisional
Commissioner and the Central Bureau of Investigation in their respective
enquiries/investigations, the One Man Commission had before it, the
depositions of a very large number of witnesses examined in the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 64
course of enquiry proceedings. The Commission, among others, relied
upon the statement of Vinod Bansal, one of the claimants, according to
whom, the banquet hall had around 500 to 600 chairs for guests and
visitors but about 1500 persons including men, women and children had
gathered at the venue on the fateful day. The witness further stated that
since the number of visitors was more than the capacity of the Marriage
Palace and the Pandal, the main gate was closed from inside. The
witness further stated that Pandal was made of curtains, synthetic cloth,
polythene sheets and coconut ropes used for tying the curtains with
bamboo sticks. The electrical fittings were all temporary and the joints of
electrical wires were loose and naked. There were inside the Pandal
nearly 15/16 Chandeliers fixed to the ceiling besides a large number of
other lights. The witness goes on to state that the fire broke out at
about 1.45 PM but an announcement was made from the stage that the
fire had been brought under control and the visitors should remain calm,
quiet and sitting. The fire all the same spread all around and could not
be controlled and engulfed the entire Pandal within no time. According
to the witness, the fire had broken out on account of short circuit of the
electricity. Neither the District Administration nor the D.A.V.
Management nor the Municipal Committee, the Electricity Board or the
Management of Rajiv Marriage Palace had made any arrangement for
fire fighting in the event of an emergency.
The witness further stated that as many as 442 persons had
died and 200 persons suffered injuries on account of fire including the
witness himself. That his wife and two children died in the incident. He
also referred to the small exit gate in the dark room behind the stage out
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 65
of which Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, had made good his
escape immediately on seeing the fire. The S.D.O. (Civil) and his wife
had, however, died in the incident.
In the cross-examination, the witness inter-alia stated that the
size of the Pandal was about 50′ X 70′, whereas the height of Pandal
was nearly 15/16 feet. All the chairs in the Pandal were occupied by the
visitors and the persons who could not get chairs were standing on all
the three sides of the Pandal. The size of the banquet hall was 100′ X
70′ and there were walls all around the banquet hall with one gate
about 10/11 feet wide for entrance to the banquet hall. There was
another small gate with the size of 2 feet behind the stage. The witness
further stated that there was only one gate to the Pandal whereas all the
sides had been covered by curtains tied with bamboo and coir ropes.
The bamboos were fixed at a distance of half a foot of each other. The
fire started from the exit gate of the Pandal from where he was standing
at a distance of 15/20 feet. He further stated that if there was no Pandal,
the total capacity of banquet hall would have been around 1000
persons.
The Commission has similarly relied upon the statements of
Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, examined to
prove the site plan and the documents pertaining to the Municipal
Committee. So also the statement of M.R. Sachdeva, Assistant
Engineer of the Haryana State Electricity Board has been relied upon
to prove grant of electric connection to the Marriage Palace. The witness
has stated that a three phase commercial supply connection had also
been granted to the Marriage Palace owners with a sanctioned load of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 66
5.980 KW. Details of the consumption with regard to single phase
electric connection were also given by the witness. The witness also
tried to suggest that the incident took place at 13.45 P.M. during which
time there was a power cut for about five minutes i.e. from 13.40 P.M.
to 13.45 P.M. on account of some technical fault.
The Commission has similarly taken note of the depositions of
Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of the Financial Commissioner
and Principle Secretary to Government Haryana, Ram Parkash,
Superintendent in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, Bahadur
Singh, Deputy Superintendent in the office of the Sub Divisional Officer
(Civil), Dabwali, examined by the claimants in support of their cases
apart from proving a very large number of documents relevant for the
issues that fell for consideration. Also noticed by the Commission are
the documents that were proved in the course of the enquiry and relied
upon by the Commission for recording its findings.
The Commission has also taken note of the depositions of the
witnesses examined by the respondents. These include Norang Dass,
Tehsildar, Dabwali, Om Parkash, Superintendent in the office of Civil
Surgeon, Sirsa, and Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of
Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of
Haryana, examined on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3. Out of these
witnesses, Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of Financial
Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of Haryana,
produced before the Commission statements of 39 witnesses who were
examined by Mr. K.C. Sharma, Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division,
Hisar, the then Commission of Inquiry.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 67
The statements of Chander Parkash Jain, Assistant, New
India Assurance Company Limited, Lachhman Dass, Private Architect,
Mrs. Neelam Wadhwa, Teacher of D.A.V. School, Mandi Dabwali,
Jagdish Deol, Upper Division Clerk, D.A.V. Managing Committee,
Chitragupta Road, New Delhi and V.K.Mittal, Principal of D.A.V. School,
Mandi Dabwali, examined by respondents No.4 and 5, have also been
noticed and discussed at great length by the Commission.
While discussing the statement of V.K. Mittal, Principal of
D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, the Commission has
noticed that no receipt regarding payment of Rs.6,000/- to the Marriage
Palace owners had been produced by the witness or any other official of
the School nor was there any recital anywhere in the written statement
about the alleged payment of Rs.6,000/- as hire charges to the owners
of the Marriage Palace. The Commission has observed:-
“From the evidence of this witness, it is made out
that although there is no recital in the written
statement about the alleged settlement or payment
of Rs.6000/- as hire charges to the owners of the
Rajiv Marriage Palace but he has introduced the
payment of Rs.6000/- to them by the School
Authorities although he could not produce any such
receipt and has stated that there is no such receipt
in the School record as it was sent to the Head
Office. Shri Jagdish Deol RW6/1-DFT is an Upper
Division Clerk in the Head Office of the D.A.V.
College Managing Committee. He has nowhere
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 68stated about any such alleged receipt of Rs.6000/-
having been sent by the D.A.V. School, Mandi
Dabwali, to the Head Office nor has he produced
any such receipt. It appears that this witness has
introduced the factum of the alleged receipt on his
own and the same does not find support from any
documentary evidence. This witness has also
introduced that the hiring charges of Rs.6000/- also
included charges for making sitting arrangements,
electricity, water, security, eatables and tent etc. but
then he has added that there was an oral agreement
in this respect and there was no written agreement”.
The Commission has also noted and discussed the deposition
or R.K. Sodha, Executive Engineer of the Electricity Board examined as
RW9/1-DFT by respondent No. 6 and the documents marked in his
deposition. The Commission has, upon a careful analysis of the
deposition, observed that the witness was not able to satisfactorily
explain the over-writing made in the log sheet in support of the case
sought to be set up that the electric supply had tripped during the period
the incident took place. The Commission observed:-
“The over-writing over the digits 42 into digits 50 to
give the time as 13.50 PM has not only been
admitted by this witness but it is also clear on the
Log sheet even to the naked eye. This assumes
significance in view of the fact that the fire broke out
at 13.45 PM., and the plea of the Board is that there
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 69was no electric supply at that time. But then in case
the electric supply was restored at 13.42 PM., the
plea of the Board pales into insignificance. However,
in case the supply was not restored at 13.42 PM.,
what necessitated the Board officials to manipulate
the entry of the time 13.42 PM by over-writing the
digits 42 and making it into 50. This was done in
order perhaps to give the impression to the Enquiry
Officers concerned and the public at large that there
was no electric supply at 13.45 PM. when the fire
broke out. But in their over enthusiasm and anxiety
to do so, they forgot that the digits 50 which they
were manipulating by over-writing on the digits 42
may be detected at sometime and the factum of the
electric supply having been restored at 13.42 PM.
may be established”.
The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Municipal
Committee, Dabwali, has been similarly examined by the Commission
and the depositions of Ramesh Chander Kamboj, Assistant Engineer of
the Improvement Trust, Mandi Dabwali, Balwant Singh, Assistant Fire
Officer, Mandi Dabwali and Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal
Committee, Mandi Dabwali, discussed. The Commission has, on a
careful analysis of their depositions, recorded a specific finding that
Kartar Singh Chawla, Fire Station Officer, Mandi Dabwali, was absent
from duty on 23.12.1995 when the occurrence took place. Although,
attendance register produced showed him to be present the entry was
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 70
belied by the statement of his own Assistant Fire Officer Balwant Singh.
The evidence adduced by Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa,
comprising eight witnesses besides himself has also been discussed
and evaluated by the Commission apart from four witnesses examined
by Rajiv Marriage Palace in support of its defence.
On a careful and thorough appraisal of the evidence referred
to above the Commission held that D.A.V. School Authorities held its
Annual Prize Distribution Function at Rajiv Marriage Palace on
23.12.1995; that invitation Card marked P74/248-DFT was jointly issued
by the Management, Staff and Students of D.A.V. Centenary Public
School which is under the direct control of D.A.V. Managing Committee,
New Delhi; that the invitation card so far as the same pertains to D.A.V.
Centenary Public School was issued through its Principal Mrs. Naresh
Kamra. In so far as D.A.V. Managing Committee, New Delhi was
concerned, the same was issued by its Regional Director Mr. S.P.
Rajput. The card was, thus, a joint invitation card issued by both the
respondents; that D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, was
under the overall control of the Managing Committee, respondent No.4,
and its affairs are run as per the directions of the said respondent
including recruitment of the staff as well as the grant of funds etc.; that
the venue of ill-fated function was Rajiv Marriage Palace, Mandi
Dabwali, with Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, as the Chief
Guest; that the function was an open public function and persons other
than invitees could also attend the same; that the School had collected
annual insurance premium from the students along with the annual fee;
that respondents No.4 and 5 had nowhere claimed in the written
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 71
statement that the Marriage Palace was hired for the day for a sum of
Rs.6,000/-; that even payment of Rs.6,000/- towards the hiring charges
of the venue was not proved to have been made; that there was only
one gate for entrance and exit to Rajiv Marriage Palace and the width of
the gate was no more than 10′ X 12′; that there was only one gate for
entry and exit to the Pandal; that there were nearly 700 to 800 chairs
placed inside the Pandal and the central passage inside the Pandal was
blocked by the front rows of chairs and sofas; that no safety measures
were taken by the School to prevent any untoward incident like fire or
stampede in the course of the function; that when the entire Pandal was
engulfed in fire, it was impossible for the children and the ladies to move
out of a single exit gate provided for that purpose; that the respondents
had not made any alternative arrangement for exit of visitors trapped
inside the Pandal in case of emergency; and that no Fire Brigade or
Ambulance or any other arrangement with regard to safety and security
of the visitors especially ladies and children were made.
The Commission has on the above findings of fact held that
the School had failed to exercise due care expected of a reasonable and
prudent person in disregard of the safety of those who were invited to
attend the function including students, parents and the staff. Relying
upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.S. Grewal’s case
(supra), the Commission declared that the School was duty bound to
take proper care for the safety of the children under its charge, which
care the School had failed to take in the instant case. The School was,
thus, negligent in the discharge of its legal obligations. The legal injury
caused thereby was an actionable tort, observed the Commission.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 72
There is, in our opinion, no infirmity leave alone, any perversity
in the findings of fact recorded by the Commission. The material on
record was more than sufficient for the Commission to support the
findings recorded by it and the legal inferences that inexorably flow from
such findings. The very fact that the School did not have enough space
in its own premises to organize the Annual Function, did not absolve it
of the legal obligation to act prudently and to ensure that the children,
staff and the parents invited to such a function are safe wherever the
same may be held. That there was no other suitable place in Dabwali
where the function could be held also did not mean that the School
could hold the function in a Marriage Palace which admittedly had no
safety measures whatsoever to take care of any emergency.
The argument that the place chosen by the School was
functional and the School had no reason to believe that it would not
have sufficient safety measures as required under law has not
impressed us. The standard of care that may be required would vary
from case to case and situation to situation. In the case of children of
tender age, the care that the School Authorities were expected to take
regarding their safety was much higher in comparison to the care which
may be required qua adults. Children are under a disability. They need
care and protection more than the grown ups. Parents who leave their
children to the care of the School are entitled to rest assured that the
School would act prudently while dealing with their wards and would do
nothing that may in the slightest expose them to danger or compromise
their safety and security. The choice of the venue for the function was,
therefore, an onerous decision which the School ought to have taken
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 73
having regard to all the attendant risks, hazards and imponderables that
could be reasonably foreseen in a public function attended not only by
the children, parents and teachers but even the general public. The
School ought to have realized that holding of a function in a Marriage
Palace may not be the best option especially when the Marriage Palace,
did not have the statutory completion certificate and was promoting its
commercial interests by offering the place gratis to the School. The
School ought to have known that in a function which is open to general
public, a Pandal with a capacity of 500 to 600 persons spread over no
more than an area measuring 100′ X 70′, a gathering of 1200 to 1500
persons could result in a stampede and expose to harm everyone
participating in the function especially the children who were otherwise
incapable of taking care of their safety. The school ought to have known
that the availability of only one exit gate from the Marriage Palace and
one from the Pandal would prove insufficient in the event of any
untoward incident taking place in the course of function. The School
ought to have taken care to restrict the number of invitees to what could
be reasonably accommodated instead of allowing all and sundry to
attend and in the process increase the chances of a stampede. The
School ought to have seen that sufficient circulation space in and around
the seating area was provided so that the people could quickly move out
of the place in case the need so arose. Suffice it to say that a
reasonably prudent School Management organizing an annual function
could and indeed was duty bound to take care and ensure that no harm
came to anyone who attended the function whether as an invitee or
otherwise, by taking appropriate steps to provide for safety measures
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 74
like fire fighting arrangements, exit points , space for circulation, crowd
control and the like. And that obligation remained unmitigated
regardless whether the function was held within the School premises or
at another place chosen by the Management of the School, because the
children continued to be under the care of the School and so did the
obligation of the School to prevent any harm coming to them. The
principle of proximity creating an obligation for the School qua its
students and invitees to the function would make the School liable for
any negligence in either the choice of the venue of the function or the
degree of care that ought to have been taken to prevent any harm
coming to those who had come to watch and/or participate in the event.
Even the test of foreseeability of the harm must be held to have been
satisfied from the point of view of an ordinary and reasonably prudent
person. That is because a reasonably prudent person could foresee
danger to those attending a function in a place big enough to
accommodate only 500 to 600 people but stretched beyond its capacity
to accommodate double that number. It could also be foreseen that
there was hardly any space for circulation within the Pandal. In the event
of any mishap, a stampede was inevitable in which women and children
who were attending in large number would be worst sufferers as indeed
they turned out to be. Loose electric connections, crude lighting
arrangements and an electric load heavier than what the entire system
was geared to take was a recipe for a human tragedy to occur.
Absence of any fire extinguishing arrangements within the Pandal and a
single exit from the Pandal hardly enough for the people to run out in the
event of fire could have put any prudent person handling such an event
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 75
to serious thought about the safety of those attending the function
especially the small children who had been brought to the venue in
large numbers. Applying the foresight of a reasonable person to the fact
situation which the evidence established before the Commission, we
have no hesitation in holding that the Commission was justified in
declaring that the School was negligent in the matter of arranging the
function and providing security qua those whom it owed the duty to take
care.
The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajkot
Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and Others
(1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552 heavy reliance upon which was
placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel for the School,
does not, in our opinion, lend any assistance to the School or its
Management. On a comprehensive review of the case law on the
subject, the Court in that case observed:-
“The degree of carelessness in breach of duty
would, therefore, vary from case to case and it
should not unduly be extended or confined or limited
or circumscribed to all situations. The attending
circumstances require evaluation and application to
a given set of facts in the case on hand”.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
“The negligence lies in failure to take such steps as
a reasonable, prudent man would have taken in the
given circumstances. What constitutes carelessness
is the conduct and not the result of inadvertence.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 76Thus, negligence in this sense is a ground for
liability in tort”.
What is noteworthy is that the Court was, in that case, dealing
with a claim arising out of the sudden fall of a tree causing death of a
road user. The question was whether there was proximity of relationship
between the parties, and foreseeability of danger and duty of care to be
performed by the defendant to avoid the accident or to prevent danger
to the person of the deceased. The Court answered all the three in
negative and held that there was no proximity of relationship between
the Corporation and a road user nor any foreseeability of danger where
a healthy tree suddenly falls and injures a road user. Consequently,
there was no failure to take care. The Court observed:
“If the duty of maintaining constant vigil or verifying
or testing the healthy condition of trees at public
places with so many other functions to be
performed, is cast on it, the effect would be that the
authority would omit to perform statutory duty. Duty
of care, therefore, must be carefully examined and
the foreseeability of damage or danger to the person
or property must be corelated to the public duty of
care to infer that the omission/non-feasance gives
rise to actionable claim for damages against the
defendant”.
In the light of what we have stated above, we have no
hesitation in answering question No.1 in the negative.
Re: Question No.2
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 77
The Commission of Inquiry has recorded a clear finding that
the School had failed to adduce any evidence to establish that Rajiv
Marriage Palace was hired for use on payment of a sum of Rs.6,000/-
as alleged by the School. It noted the denial of that allegation by one of
the owners of the Marriage Palace, according to whom use of Marriage
Palace was given gratis to gain commercial publicity for the place. The
Commission has held that regardless whether the place had been hired
for consideration or had been taken for use gratis, the Marriage Palace
was, for purposes of the function organized by the School, its agent. The
Commission has, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in
Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi’s case (supra), Minu B. Mehta’s case
(supra), and M.S. Grewal’s case (supra) and a few English decisions,
taken the view that the Principal is vicariously liable for the acts of his
Agent performed during the course of the agency. The Commission
observed that the vicarious liability of the Master does not depend upon
whether the act is lawful or unlawful and that the Principal would be
liable for the acts of his Agent committed in the course of the contract
even though the Agent may have acted in contravention of some of the
provisions of the statute or the rules thereunder.
Finding fault with the conclusion arrived at by the Commission,
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents
No.4 and 5, strenuously argued that the School had only a commercial
relation with the Marriage Palace and that the commission was in error
in holding that the relationship of Master and Servant or Principal and
Agent came about between the two. It was argued by Mr. Atma Ram
that the School was like any other person in that position to be taken as
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 78
a client/customer of the Marriage Palace who was for all intents and
purposes an independent Contractor engaged to render services in
connection with the function in question. In the event of any mishap
taking place in the course of function resulting in any damage or loss of
lives, the School was in no way responsible for any such negligence. It
was contended that the School had no reason to believe that the
Marriage Palace was unauthorizedly built, did not have a completion
certificate or that the arrangements made by it whether for lighting or
other purposes were unsafe or unsatisfactory thereby jeopardizing the
safety and security of the invitees. The School was, according to Mr.
Rajive Atma Ram, supremely confident that once the Management of
the event was placed in professional hands, the safety and security of
the guests/participants would be taken care of by them.
On behalf of petitioner, it was per contra argued that the
School had shifted the function from out of its premises for want of
sufficient space and that according to the evidence on record all
arrangements including the arrangements for fixing of chairs, lighting,
standby generators, safety and security were that of the organizers of
the function. The school was the sole organizer of the function who had
cut corners to save expense and arranged an unsatisfactory and wholly
insecure place for holding the function in total disregard of its legal
obligations of taking care especially when children and women formed a
major part of the audience qua whom special care had to be taken by
the organizers. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the School had
entered into any arrangement for holding the function with any other
agency like the Marriage Palace on whatever terms that may have been
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 79
settled between the two, it would be liable for the consequences flowing
from any act of negligence on its own part as much as it would be liable
for the negligence of its Contractor for that function who would, in the
eyes of law, be an Agent of the School. The Commission was, therefore,
justified in holding the School liable for its own negligence and also the
negligence of the Marriage Palace owners.
M/s H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana and Randhir
Singh, Additional Advocate General, Haryana, also supported the same
line of reasoning and contended that not only was the School itself
negligent but even if it had engaged the services of any agent for
holding that function and providing support needed for the same,
negligence of any such person brought into the scheme of things had
also to be treated as negligence of the School itself in the event of
something going wrong. Learned counsel appearing for the Municipal
Committee, Dabwali and Electricity Board pursued a similar line of
reasoning.
On behalf of the Marriage Palace owners, respondent No.9, it
was contended by Mr. Mohunta that the School was the occupier of the
premises at the time of the unfortunate incident and since the control
over everything relevant to the holding of the function lay in the hands of
the School, it could not shift its responsibility to the Marriage Palace.
Relying upon certain English decisions, Mr. Mohunta argued that
although there was no comparable legislation in this Country to what in
United Kingdom is called the Occupiers’ Liability Act, 1957, the
principles underlying the said legislation were well recognized in
common law and could be attracted to analogous situations.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 80
The fateful function was organized by the School and the
Management at the helm of its affairs. Any such School function, would
in the ordinary course, have been conducted within the School premises
because it is the School that organizes and controls the function not only
as to the content of the programme but also the manner in which the
same may be performed and completed. So also the School had the
complete freedom not only to decide about the venue for the function but
also the manner and the conditions subject to which the same shall be
conducted. That the School did not have sufficient space for holding of
such a big function was admitted before us. This only meant that the
function had to be organized outside the School premises, but the fact
remained that the function continued to be a School function regardless
of the venue at which it was held. It cannot be disputed that for holding
of any such function, the School would have to make necessary
arrangements not only for a tent/shamiana and the like but also arrange
electricity, refreshment, tea, water etc. The School could make these
arrangements of its own or employ an agency for doing so. In the
present case, according to the School, it had engaged Rajiv Marriage
Palace for providing the necessary support in terms of accommodation
etc. required for holding of the function. The School alleges that the
Marriage Palace had agreed to do the needful for a consideration of
Rs.6,000/- only which fact has been disputed by the Marriage Palace
Owners. But even assuming that the arrangements were for a payment,
the legal relationship that arose between the School on the one hand
and the Marriage Palace Owners on the other hand, was that of a
Principal and Agent, the purpose underlying the agency being a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 81
satisfactory conduct and conclusion of the entire programme. The
function was for all intents and purposes a school function, controlled
entirely by the School. The kind of sitting arrangement that was required
to be made for the guests invited to the function, the kind of lighting
arrangement that was required to be made in and around the Pandal,
the size of the stage that was required to be prepared for the function
and the kind of decoration that was required to be made were all matters
that lay entirely in the discretion of the School Authorities. It is common
knowledge that not only for marriage ceremonies but also other similar
functions where venues are hired, the hiring clients of the premises have
a free hand in deciding as to how the available space within the
premises can be utilized and what facilities, safeguards, precautions
and comforts need to be provided to those attending or invited to the
function. The fateful function held on 23.12.1995 was not for that matter
different from any other function in which the School remained in
complete control of what it wanted to be arranged and the manner in
which the same had to be arranged. The participation or presence of
the owners of the Marriage Palace only suggests that they were carrying
out the instructions given to them by the School Authorities. At any rate
even if the School had given a free hand to the Marriage Palace to
organize the function, the relationship between the School and the
Marriage Palace did not undergo any change and continued to be that of
a Principal and Agent.
The legal relationship between the School and the Marriage
Palace as Principal and Agent apart, both were on the principles of
common law liable to third parties as occupier of the premises which
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 82
went up in flames because of their negligence to take care. In Salmond
on the Law of Torts (Tenth Edition), the Law on the point is
stated/summarised as below:-
“In dealing with dangerous premises it is necessary
to distinguish between the responsibilities of the
owner and those of the occupier or possessor.
Generally speaking, liability in such cases is based
on occupancy or control, not on ownership. The
person responsible for the condition of the premises
is he who is in actual possession of them for the
time being, whether he is the owner or not, for it is
he who has the immediate supervision and control
and the power of permitting or prohibiting the entry
of other persons”.
In Wheat v. E. Lacon & Co. (1966)1 All England Reports
582 (HL), Lord Denning declared that anyone exercising sufficient
degree of control over the premises would as an occupier be under a
duty of care towards those who came lawfully on the premises. The
following passage is, in this connection, apposite:
“It was simply a convenient word to denote a person
who had a sufficient degree of control over premises
to put him under a duty of care towards those who
came lawfully on to the premises. In order to be an
‘occupier’ it is not necessary for a person to have
entire control over the premises. He need not have
exclusive occupation. Suffice it that he has some
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 83degree of control. He may share the control with
others. Two or more may be occupiers. And
whenever this happens, each is under a duty to use
care towards persons coming lawfully on to the
premises, dependent on his degree of control. If
each fails in his duty, each is liable to a visitor who is
injured in consequence of his failure but each may
have a claim to contribution from the other”.
In the instant case while the School had the absolute right to
restrict the entry to the venue of the function being organized by it and
everything that would make the function go as per its requirements, the
owners had not completely given up their control over the premises, and
were indeed present at the time the incident occurred. The facts and
circumstances brought on record in the course of the enquiry establish
that the School and the Marriage Palace owners were both occupying
the premises and were, therefore, under an obligation to take care for
the safety of not only the students, but everyone who entered the
premises on their invitation or with their permission specific or implied.
As to the obligation of an occupier to take care qua his invitees a long
line of English decisions have settled the legal position. We may, at this
stage, briefly refer to some of those decisions:
In Thomson v. Cremin and Others (1953)2 All England
Reports 1185, it was observed:
“The duty of the invitor towards the invitee is,in my
opinion, a duty personal to the former, in the sense
that he does not get rid of the obligation by
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 84entrusting its performance to independent
contractors. It is true that the invitor is not an insurer:
he warrants however, that due care and skill to
make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee
have been exercised, whether by himself, his
servants, or agents or by independent contractors
whom he employs to perform his duty. He does not
fulfill the warranty merely by leaving the work to
contractors, however, reputable or generally
competent. His warranty is broken if they fail to
exercise the proper care and skill. This is only an
instance of the general rule which was stated by
LORD BLACKBURN in another connection in Dalton v.
Angus (6) (6 App. Cas. 829), where he distinguished
the case of what has been called the collateral
negligence of sub-contractor from their negligence in
failing to perform a duty resting on the principal
himself”.
In Hartwell v. Grayson Rollo and Clover Docks Limited
and Others (1947) 1 King’s Bench Division 901, similarly it was
observed:
“In my opinion the true view is that when a person
invites another to a place where they both have
business, the invitation creates a duty on the part of
the invitor to take reasonable care that the place
does not contain or to give warning of hidden
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 85dangers, no matter whether the place belongs to the
invitor or is in his exclusive occupation. Although the
rule has generally been stated with reference to
owners or occupiers of premises, it is indicated by
Lord Wright in the case of Glasgow Corporation v.
Muir and others (I) that the occupation need not be
exclusive. He said there: “Before dealing with the
facts, I may observe that in cases of ‘invitation’ the
duty has most commonly reference to the structural
condition of the premises, but it may clearly apply to
the use which the occupier (or whoever has control
so far as material) of the premises permits a third
party to make of the premises”. Invitors, of course,
do not as a rule invite others on business to
premises in which the invitors have no business
interest or control, but they may have an interest and
control which falls short of exclusive occupation, and
where they have such an interest and control and
invite others to come to the spot on business they
are bound, in my opinion, to warn the invitee against
concealed dangers of which they know, or ought to
know, even if such dangers are not created by their
own positive acts”.
In H & N Emanuel Ltd. v. Greater London Council and
Another (1971) 2 All England Reports 835, the Court of appeal was
dealing with a case where an independent contractor was negligent
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 86
resulting in the escape of fire and damage to the neighbouring building.
The Court held the occupier liable and observed:
“An occupier was liable for the escape of fire caused
by the negligence not only of his servant, but also of
his independent contractor and anyone else who
was on his land with his leave and licence; the only
occasion when the occupier would not be liable for
negligence was when the negligence was the
negligence of a stranger, although (per Lord
Denning MR) for this purpose a ‘stranger’ would
include a person on the land with the occupier’s
permission who, in lighting a fire or allowing it to
escape, acted contrary to anything which the
occupier could anticipate that he would do; in the
present case the council were ‘occupiers’ of the
premises because they had a sufficient degree of
control over the activities of persons thereon and K’s
men were not ‘strangers’ because, although they
were forbidden to burn rubbish, it was their regular
practice to do so; the council could reasonably have
anticipated that the men would light a fire and ought
to have taken more effective steps to prevent them”.
In the light of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that
the One Man Commission of Inquiry was perfectly justified in holding the
School and the Marriage Palace liable for the act of tort arising out of
their negligence and duty to take care about the safety of all those
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 87
invited to the function at Dabwali. Question No.2 is answered
accordingly.
Re: Question No.3
On behalf of School, it was argued by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram,
learned senior counsel, that the Commission of Inquiry had not fairly
apportioned the liability among the School and other tort-feasors. It was
urged that the Commission was influenced only by the income of the
School while fixing its liability at 80% of the total. The economic
capacity of the School or the Managing Committee under whose control
the School functions was not, according to learned senior counsel,
determinative of the extent of the liability that could and ought to be
fastened on the School. The liability fixed upon the Municipal Committee
and the Electricity Board was unreasonably low even when the
Commission has recorded a clear finding that the incident could have
been avoided only if the employees of the Municipal Committee and the
Electricity Board had performed their duties properly. So also the
liability of the State had not been properly fixed having regard to the
magnitude of the default on the part of its officers and employees. The
present was, according to learned senior counsel, a fit case where the
liability could be apportioned afresh having regard to the extent of
negligence attributable to each one of the tort-feasors.
On behalf of the State, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and the
Electricity Board, it was argued that the major part of the liability arising
out of the tragedy must fall on the School and its Agent, the Marriage
Palace, and had been rightly placed by the Commission on them jointly
and severally. There was, according to the learned counsel, no
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 88
comparison between an actual tort-feasor and tort-feasor who was being
held responsible only because of its omission to take steps which could
have prevented the tragedy.
The Commission of Inquiry has, no doubt, fixed the liability of
the School at 80% of the total amount payable to the claimants but it is
wrong to say that the higher percentage of liability fixed upon the
School was only because it was in a position to pay the amount
recoverable from it. Apportionment of liability arising out of act of tort
would vary from case to case and situation to situation. There is no cut
and dried formula that can be applied while fixing liability among several
tort-feasors. Broadly speaking, the liability ought to be apportioned
depending upon the nature and extent of the role played by the tort-
feasor in the commission of the tort and the resultant loss to the
claimants. In the opinion of the Commission, the School being the major
player in the tort arising out of its negligence ought to shoulder the
responsibility to the extent of 80%, while the State, the Municipal
Committee and the Electricity Board would take only 10%, 5% and 5%,
respectively. That ratio, in our opinion, is open to a slight correction in
order to balance the equities and also to make the apportionment as
nearly as possible proportionate to the extent of negligence and its
effect. In the case of Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy’s
case (supra), the fire incident had claimed as many as 59 lives and
caused injuries to 203 men, women and children who had gone to
Uphar Cinema to watch a Hindi Movie. In a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution filed by the Association of Victims of the Tragedy, the
Court had not only held the owners of the Cinema, Delhi Vidyut Board,
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 89
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Licensing Authority guilty of
negligence but awarded compensation against them to the claimants.
The Court had, while fixing the liability to the extent of 55% of the total
upon the owners of the Cinema, held Delhi Vidyut Board, the Licensing
Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, liable to the extent of
15% each. It is evident from a reading of the decision rendered by the
Court that a distinction was made between the tort-feasors inter-se. A
heavier liability was fastened on the person whose primary duty it was to
take care about the safety of the Cinema goers. In the absence of any
reason to the contrary we are inclined to adopt the same approach for
apportionment of liability in the present case also. Consequently, while
the School and its Agent namely respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace
would be jointly and severally liable to pay 55% of the total amount of
compensation payable to the claimants, the remaining tort-feasors,
namely the State of Haryana, Haryana State Electricity Board (now
named as “Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam) and the Municipal
Committee, Dabwali, shall be liable to pay 15% each of the total amount.
We make it clear that the State Government shall, as recommended by
the Commission of Inquiry, pay the amount on its own behalf and on
behalf of respondents Electricity Board and Municipal Committee,
Dabwali, in the first instance but shall be free to recover the same from
them to the extent of the liability that we have fixed for the said two
respondents.
Question No.3 is answered accordingly.
Re: Question No.4
It was contended by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 90
counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents No.4 and 5, that the
claimants were not entitled to make any claim for enhancement of
amounts of compensation awarded in their favour. He argued that the
amounts awarded by the Commission in favour of the claimants were
based on a consensus arrived at before the Commission by not only the
claimants but by the respondents also, which could not at this stage be
displaced by the claimants. He drew our attention in this regard to the
following passages appearing in the report submitted by the
Commission while dealing with the claims arising out of death of minor
children:-
“In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all
unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that
there is a consensus between them that in view of
the overwhelming case law on the subject and the
principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case, an
amount of Rupees two lacs may be held to be ‘just’
compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of
these 76 cases. Accordingly, accepting their
submissions and also finding the same to be just
and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle
laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), an
amount of Rupees two lacs is hereby fixed to be
payable by way of compensation to the
claimant/claimants in each of these 76 cases”.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
“In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 91unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that
there is a consensus between them that in view of
the overwhelming case law on the subject and the
principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case, an
amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs may be held to be ‘just’
compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of
these 38 cases. Accordingly, accepting their
submissions and also finding the same to be just
and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle
laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), an
amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs is hereby fixed to be
payable by way of compensation to the
claimant/claimants in each of these 38 cases”.
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
“In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all
unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar
stating that there is a consensus between them that
in view of the overwhelming case law on the subject
and the principle laid down both in M.S. Grewal’s
case and Lata Wadhwa’s case, an amount of
Rupees 5 lacs may be held to be the ‘just’
compensation to be paid to the heirs of all the 20
deceased children in the age group of 16 to 22
years. Accordingly, accepting their submissions and
also finding the same to be just and reasonable, the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 92amount of Rupees 5 lacs is hereby fixed to be
payable by way of compensation to the
claimant/claimants in each of these 20 cases”.
Per contra, Mrs. Anju Arora, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner-Association argued that the claimants gave no consent like the
one referred to in the report. All that was agreed before the Commission
was that the principles of payment of compensation as set out in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra) could be adopted while determining the
amounts payable to the claimants where children of different age groups
had been killed in the tragedy. The question as to what would be the
amount of compensation on the said principles was a matter which had
to be determined by the Commission and on which the claimants had
made no concession. In support of that submission she placed on record
affidavits sworn by her and by M/s Harpal Singh, President of Dabwali
Fire Tragedy Victim Association, Sukhcharan Singh Sran, Dewan Chand
Garg, Ravinder Kumar Tayal, Radhey Shyam Challana, Advocates, who
appeared for the claimants before the Commission of Inquiry. All these
affidavits emphatically deny making of any statement or concession on
behalf of the claimants that a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards
compensation in each one of the 172 cases arising out of death of
children would suffice or was just and fair compensation. It was
submitted that the alleged consensus was not evidenced by any
statement recorded at any stage of the proceedings nor was the making
of any such concession mentioned in the interim orders passed by the
Commission. The concession attributed to the petitioners in the final
report has, according to learned counsel, come as a surprise to the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 93
petitioner-Association and deserved to be eschewed from consideration.
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel, argued that in
case the parties were to be relieved of the concessions made by them
even the respondents ought to have the freedom of arguing that no such
concession was made on their behalf either. No affidavit on behalf of
the School has, however, been filed either by any School functionary or
by the Advocates appearing on its behalf before the Commission
repudiating or denying the concession attributed to the School. In the
totality of these circumstances, therefore, and in the absence of any
material to suggest that a concession was indeed made before the
Commission, we are of the opinion that no such concession was made
or can stand in their way in praying for a reasonable enhancement in the
amount of compensation payable to them. What holds true about the
concession attributed to the petitioner-Association must, however, be
equally true about the concession attributed to the School also although
there is no specific denial on its part. Consequently, all that, the parties
shall be deemed to have agreed to, was that the amount of
compensation payable to the petitioners shall be determined on the
principles stated in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra). As to what amount
would become payable on the application of those principles was not,
however, covered by any concession and would, therefore, remain open
to be determined on a proper appreciation of the matter by this Court.
Question No.4 is accordingly answered in the affirmative.
Re:Question No.5
The One Man Commission of Inquiry has dealt with the claims
in different categories and awarded compensation accordingly. We also
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 94
propose to similarly deal with the claims by reference to each category
of cases.
Category 1 Cases
In Category 1 fall cases involving children in the age group of
one month to ten years. The Commission has, as noticed earlier,
awarded to the parents/next of kin of each child killed in the incident a
sum of Rs.2,00,000/- by way of compensation. The Commission has,
while doing so, taken support from the decisions of the Supreme Court
including those delivered in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and M.S.
Grewal’s case (supra). Before us, while the claimants prayed for
enhancement of the amounts awarded by the Commission, respondent-
School has sought reduction of the amount already awarded. The plea
for enhancement was made by the claimants primarily on the basis that
the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- awarded on the analogy of Lata Wadhwa’s
case (supra) ignored the escalation in the price index between 1989
when the incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) occurred and 1995
when the incident relevant to these cases took place. In the intervening
period, the consumer price index having risen considerably, any amount
of compensation based on the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)
can be accurate, fair and reasonable only if the amount is
proportionately enhanced to take care of the escalation in the price
index during the intervening period. Relying upon a Single Bench
decision of High Court of Delhi in Ashok Sharma and Others v. Union
of India and Others II(2008) Accident and Compensation Cases 644,
it was contended that the amount of compensation awarded to claimants
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 95
in Category 1 ought to be raised to Rs.3,57,000/-.
On behalf of respondent-School, it was, on the other hand,
contended that the amount of compensation awarded by the
Commission for children falling in the age group of one month to ten
years was on the higher side and ought to be suitably reduced. In
support of that submission, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram placed reliance upon
the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Satender and Others AIR 2007 Supreme Court 324, where the Court
had awarded a sum of Rs.1,80,000/- towards compensation for the
death of a nine year child killed in a motor accident on 7.5.2002.
Reliance was also placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram upon the decision of
Supreme Court in Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and Others AIR
2007 Supreme Court 1912 where a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was awarded
towards compensation for a 14 years old boy killed in a road accident.
In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and Others AIR 2008
Supreme Court 103 relied upon by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, the amount
of compensation awarded was limited to a sum of Rs.51,500/- only for
the death of a seven year old child in a road accident that occurred in
the year 1994. It was submitted by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram that the
amount of Rs.2,00,000/- awarded by the Commission of Inquiry on the
analogy of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case
(supra) was already on the higher side and did not call for any further
enhancement.
In State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others
(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 484, their Lordships of Supreme Court
were dealing with a case involving determination of compensation for
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 96
loss of life. The Court observed that compensation for loss of limbs or
life can hardly be weighed in golden scales and that while
compensation need not be a windfall for the victim or the dependents
left behind the same cannot be a pittance also. The Courts and
Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors in quantifying the amount
of compensation which appears to be just. No mathematical precision
can, however, be expected in such calculations. Compensation would
depend upon the facts and circumstances and special features of each
individual case. What is to be remembered is that compensation is just
implying thereby that it can neither be whimsical nor arbitrary. It must be
equitable, fair and reasonable.
In New India Assurance Co. Ltd.’s case (supra), Arijit
Pasayat, J., while dealing with the question of determination of
compensation in cases where children are killed, observed:
“There are some aspects of human life which are
capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of
human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the
splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of
monetary tape-measure. The determination of
damages for loss of human life is an extremely
difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling
when the deceased is a child and/or a non-earning
person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the
deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but
had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment
of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 97figure of compensation in such cases involves a
good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents
are claimants, relevant factor would be age of
parents”.
The Court further held that in the case of children of tender
age, uncertainties abound making it difficult to quantify the prospects of
the future increase in their income or the chances of advancement of
their career. Uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits,
achievements in career and advancement in life are so many that
nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty.
Reference may also be made to the decision in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra) in which the Supreme Court was dealing with
claims arising out of a similar fire incident in which a large number of
children had lost their lives. The Commission of Inquiry comprising
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, had, in that
case, awarded a sum of Rs.50,000/- towards compensation for the
death of children in the age group of five to ten years. This amount was
enhanced by the Supreme Court to Rs.1,50,000/- to which was added a
conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- taking the total compensation to
Rs.2,00,000/-. While doing so, the Court observed:
“Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own
submitted that the compensation determined for
the children of all age groups could be doubled, as
in his view also, the determination made is grossly
inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is
irrecoupable and no amount of money could
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 98compensate the parents. Having regard to the
environment from which these children were
brought, their parents being reasonably well placed
officials of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and on
considering the submission of Mr. Nariman, we
would direct that the compensation amount for the
children between the age group of 5 and 10 years
should be three times. In other words, it should be
Rs.1,50,000 to which the conventional figure of
Rs.50,000 should be added and thus the total
amount in each case would be Rs.2,00,000/-“.
It was argued on behalf of School by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram
that the enhancement of compensation in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)
was based on a concession made before the Apex Court and could not,
therefore, be taken as a benchmark for adoption in other cases of similar
nature. This may not be wholly correct, inasmuch as a reading of the
passage extracted above would show that the concession made before
the Court was to the extent of awarding double the amount
recommended by the One Man Commission. The Court had, however,
awarded three times the said amount taking the compensation from
Rs.50,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/-. The conventional amount was also
enhanced by the Apex Court from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. In that
view, therefore, the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) cannot be
said to be based on consent alone.
Even so what would be the reasonable amount of
compensation for claimants in Category 1 needs to be examined.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 99
According to the claimants, the amount cannot be less than
Rs.3,57,000/- per child killed in the incident. In our opinion, even if the
amount of compensation is not calculated with mathematical precision
based on the consumer price index as was done in case decided by the
Delhi High Court, the fact that there was a considerable time gap
between the incident referred to in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and
that with which we are concerned in these cases cannot be overlooked.
We are also of the opinion that the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s
case (supra) could only be a guiding factor and not a benchmark for all
times to come especially with an ever increasing price index and falling
value of the rupee. That apart determination of compensation in cases
involving loss of life always involves some amount of guess work and
speculation. What is important is that any such guess work is moderate,
and tempered by realism, prudence and experience in life. Taking into
consideration the totality of these factors we are of the opinion that while
the amount of compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- awarded in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra) for an incident that took place six years before
the incident in question could be enhanced to Rs.2,75,000/-, the
conventional figure of Rs.50,000/- awarded in the said case could also
be revised to Rs.75,000/- in each one of the cases that fall in Category 1
to serve the ends of justice. The amount awarded by the One Man
Commission of Inquiry would accordingly stand enhanced to
Rs.3,50,000/- in 172 claim petitions of children in the age group of one
month to ten years. The apportionment of the enhanced amount
among the claimants shall be in the ratio recommended by the
Commission.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 100
Category 2 Cases
The cases falling in this category comprised claims arising out
of death of children in the age group of ten to 15 years. The One Man
Commission had, relying upon the decisions referred to above, awarded
a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- in each one of these cases. The claimants,
however, seek enhancement of the same based on consumer price
index to Rs.7,33,684/-.
The Commission has, while awarding the amount mentioned
above, taken support from the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)
where the Court had awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000/- for each claimant
in said category. The basis of said calculation has been set out in the
following passage appearing in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra):
“So far as the children between the age group of 10
and 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to
Class X and are children of employees of TISCO.
The TISCO itself has a tradition that every
employee can get one of his child employed in the
company. Having regard to these facts, in their
case, the contribution of Rs.12,000/- per annum
appears to us to be on the lower side and in our
considered opinion, the annual contribution should
be Rs.24,000/- and instead of multiplier of 11, the
appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the
compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis
should be worked out to Rs.3,60,000 to which an
additional sum of Rs.50,000 has to be added, thus,
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 101making the total compensation payable at
Rs.4,10,000 for each of the claimants of the
aforesaid deceased children”.
It is evident from a careful reading of above that their
Lordships of Supreme Court had adopted the multiplier method for
calculating the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. The
Court had taken the contribution of the deceased children as
Rs.24,000/- per annum and adopted a multiplier of 15 to work out a sum
of Rs.3,60,000/- towards compensation. To that amount is added
Rs.50,000/- towards conventional figure, taking the total to
Rs.4,10,000/-. What is significant is that one of the factors that the
Court considered while awarding the compensation in this category was
the fact that the TISCO had a tradition of providing employment to
atleast one child of each one of its employees. There is, in the case in
hand, no such assured employment to the children of the employees of
respondent-School. The process of determination of compensation,
therefore, remains a difficult task with all the uncertainties and other
imponderables a galore. Even so while the multiplier chosen by the
Supreme Court can be adopted for application in the present case also
the question is whether the amount of contribution which the Supreme
Court had adopted for purposes of calculation can be enhanced and, if
so, to what extent.
In Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), the contribution of the victims
was on a notional basis taken at Rs.24,000/-. That figure cannot remain
static forever. Some escalation is inevitable having regard to all the
relevant considerations, especially the time gap between the two
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 102
incidents. In our opinion, an annual increase of Rs.1,000/- in the
contribution ought to be reasonable. This would mean that the annual
contribution of the victims in this category could be taken at Rs.30,000/-.
The amount of compensation would, accordingly, go to Rs.4,50,000/- by
applying a multiplier of 15. To that figure should be added Rs.75,000/-
towards conventional amount to take the total to Rs.5,25,000/- in each
case falling in this category which amount we hereby award.
Category 3 Cases
The Commission had, taking support from the decision in M.S.
Grewal’s case (supra), awarded Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation to
elderly children in the age group of 16 to 22 years. The claimants have,
before us, claimed a sum of Rs.8,94,736/- in each one of the cases
falling in this category. The enhancement of claim rests entirely on the
consumer price index escalation during the period of six years that
separates the two incidents. On the analogy of what we have said in
Category 2 cases, we are inclined to take the contribution of the children
falling in this category at Rs.35,000/- and adopt a higher multiplier of 16
for determining the compensation payable in these cases. The total
amount payable by that method comes to Rs.5,60,000/- to which we add
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure taking the total to Rs.6,35,000/-.
The award made by the Commission shall, to the above extent, stand
modified. The enhanced amount shall also be apportioned among the
claimants in the ratio indicated by the Commission.
Category 4 cases:-
In this category fall cases of 136 women, who lost their lives in
the fire incident. While 93 out of the victims in this category were simple
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 103
housewives, 4 were elderly ladies and 9 others were unmarried working
girls. Another 9 were employed in Government service, while 12 were
employed in Non-Government service. Remaining 9 were working
women doing miscellaneous work. Since each one of these groups
would stand on a different footing for purposes of payment of
compensation due in their cases, it would be appropriate to deal with
them separately, under the following sub-categories:-
i) Housewives;
ii) Elderly ladies;
iii) Unmarried working girls;
iv) Working women in Government service;
v) Working women in Non-Government service; and
vi) Working women (miscellaneous).
i) Housewives
A total of 93 victims fall in this sub-category. The one man
Commission has dealt with 85 of these cases by treating their
contribution to the family to be Rs.36,000/-, deducted 1/3 out of the
same towards personal expenses, applied a multiplier appropriate in
each one of the cases and awarded compensation accordingly. What is
noteworthy is that the one man Commission has in 8 out of a total of 93
cases awarded a higher amount of compensation in comparison to other
similar cases on the premise that the women in these 8 cases held high
family status. Their contribution, in terms of services to the family, was
on that basis assessed at a higher figure. We have not been able to
persuade ourselves to accept that line of reasoning. So long as the
deceased victims were housewives, the services rendered by them to
the family ought to be assessed on an equal footing common to all. The
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 104
social status of the victim notwithstanding, the value of the services
rendered by her may not make any difference vis-a-vis any other
housewife, who was less qualified or held a relatively modest position in
the social milieu. The proper course, therefore, would be to deal with
the claims relating to all 93 housewives on a common basis and to
award compensation payable to them depending on the multiplier
applicable in each one of these cases.
As noticed in the earlier part of this order the claimants have
found fault with not only the deduction made by the Commission but also
claimed that a higher multiplicand ought to be chosen having regard to
the rise in the consumer price index between the year 1989 and 1995.
Both these submissions have considerable merit in them. In
Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), relied upon by the claimants, the
contribution which a housewife makes to the family in the nature of
services rendered by her was assessed at Rs.36000/- and
compensation awarded on that bases by applying a suitable multiplier.
No deduction towards the personal expenses was made nor was there
any occasion to do so. That is because deduction towards personal
expenses would be called for only when the deceased was earning and
the Court is examining as to what would eventually accrue to the benefit
of the family, out of the said earning. It has no application to a case
where the value of the services rendered by the housewife was itself
assessed at Rs.36000/- per annum. The Commission was, therefore, in
error in deducting 1/3rd of the said amount while determining the amount
of compensation payable to the claimants. A Single Bench decision of
the High Court of Gujarat has in United India Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 105
Virambhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and others, 2007 (4) RCR (Civil)
436, taken a similar view and observed:-
“6. In Lata Wadhwa V. State of Bihar, 2001(4)
RCR (Civil) 673: 2001 ACJ 1735: (AIR 2001 SC
3218), the Apex Court awarded compensation to the
family members of the deceased-housewives by
assessing the value of their services at Rs.3,000/-
per month, albeit on a concession from the TISCO.
The Tribunal has valued the services rendered by
the deceased to the family at only Rs.1500/- per
month and with fall in the value of money, such
income could certainly be valued at Rs.2250/- per
month. In fact, when such services are being valued
in terms of money, the question of deducting one-
third amount therefrom may not arise. Hence, even
if only Rs.1500/- per month is taken as the value of
such services, which were being rendered by the
deceased, the same can certainly be adopted as the
datum figure for determining the amount of
compensation payable under the head”.
The second aspect relates to the choice of the multiplicand in
as much as according to the claimants the amount of Rs.36000/- was in
Lata Wadhawa’s case (supra) assessed as the contribution of a
housewife in connection with an incident of the year 1989. The incident
in the present case had occurred six years later. This time gap ought to
be suitably provided for in terms of a suitable increase argued Mrs.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 106
Arora, appearing for the claimants.
That assessment of the contribution made by a housewife in
Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) must be taken with reference to the
incident in that case was not and cannot be disputed. It is not as
though regard less of the rise in the consumer price index, inflation and
the ever decreasing purchasing power of the rupee, the value of the
contribution made by a housewife would forever remain static at
Rs.36000/- per annum. The value must of necessity go up with passage
of time on the common sense principle that what could be purchased for
Rs.36000/- in the year 1989, was no longer purchasable at the same
price in the year 1995. As to what ought to be the escalation over the
base figure of Rs.36000/- per annum is the real question.
According to the claimants, the inflation corrected value of
Rs.36000/- in the year 1989 would rise to Rs.64,424/- in the year 1995.
In the case of elderly ladies in the age group of 62 to 72 years the
amount of contribution assessed by the apex Court of Rs.20,000/- would
rise to Rs.35,789/-. This means a rise of over 75% of the base amount.
which in our view may be on the higher side. The rise can in our opinion
be on a uniform basis applicable to all the claimants taken at 25% of the
base figure which would add to the amount of Rs.36000/- an amount of
Rs.9000/- taking the total to 45000/- per annum. In the case of elderly
ladies in the age group of 62 years to 72 years the amount of
contribution would stand enhanced from Rs.20,000/- to Rs.25000/- per
annum. We have already noticed in the beginning of this order that the
parties have not assailed before us the choice of the multiplier applied
by the Commission in each one of these cases. In the result in the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 107
cases of 93 housewives who died in the fire incident the amount of
compensation awarded shall stand enhanced to the extent indicated
below. The conventional amount of Rs.50,000/- shall also stand
enhanced to Rs.75,000/- as determined by us in category 2 cases
above. The final picture that would thus emerge shall be as under:-
Sr. Case Name & Age of Amount Multiplier Value ofRevised Conventional Total
No. No. the Deceased awarded by Applied services amount of Figure (InAmount
the rendered compensation Rs.) {7+8}
Commission to theheld payable (In Rs.)
(In Rs.) family (In{Rs.45000/-X
Rs.) multiplier
applicable}
(In Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 65-DFT Mrs. Meera 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
Kumari 28 years
2 67-DFT Mrs. Rameshwari 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
30years
3 77-DFT Mrs. Amarjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur 37 years
4 79-DFT Mrs. Kanta 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Bathla 43 years
5 82-DFT Mrs. Kaushalya 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Devi 20 years
6 83-DFT Mrs. Narinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Kaur 21 years
7 84-DFT Mrs. Rekha 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Rani 22 years
8 85-DFT Mrs. Vandna 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000
Rani 22 years
9 86-DFT Mrs. Jasbir Kaur 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
22 years
10 87-DFT Mrs. Saroj Devi 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
25 years
11 89-DFT Mrs. Dimple 24 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000
years
12 90-DFT Mrs. Mishu Bala 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
24 years
13 91-DFT Mrs. Lata Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
30 years
14 92-DFT Mrs. Neelam 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Rani 25 years
15 93-DFT Mrs. Kailash 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Rani 26 years
16 94-DFT Mrs. Champa 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Rani 33 years
17 95-DFT Mrs. Madhu 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Rani 26 years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 108
18 96-DFT Mrs. Vanita alias 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Pooja Rani 27
years
19 97-DFT Mrs. Harinder 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Kaur 27 years
20 98-DFT Mrs. Madhu 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Bala alias
Neena 27 years
21 99-DFT Mrs. Paramjit 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Kaur 27 years
22 100-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
27 years
23 101-DFT Mrs. Seema 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Rani 27 years
24 102-DFT Mrs. Surinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Kaur 28 years
25 103-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
28 years
26 104-DFT Mrs. Anjna 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kumari 28 years
27 105-DFT Mrs. Sushma 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Chugh 28 years
28 106-DFT Mrs. Sunita 25 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
years
29 107-DFT Mrs. Shalu 19 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
years
30 108-DFT Mrs. Harinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Kaur 27 years
31 110-DFT Mrs. Saroj Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
29 years
32 111-DFT Mrs. Suman 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Jain 30 years
33 112-DFT Mrs. Santosh 38400 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kumari 30 years
34 113-DFT Mrs. Usha Rani 36000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
30 years
35 114-DFT Mrs. Shashi 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Bala 30 years
36 115-DFT Mrs. Rajinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Kaur 30 years
37 116-DFT Mrs. Anita Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
30 years
38 117-DFT Mrs. Kiran 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Gupta 30 years
39 118-DFT Mrs. Kulvinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Kaur 30 years
40 119-DFT Mrs. Neelam 31 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
years
41 120-DFT Mrs. Neelam 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Rani 30 years
42 121-DFT Mrs. Nirmla 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Devi 31 years
43 122-DFT Mrs. Suman 31 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 109
44 123-DFT Mrs. Nina 31 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
years
45 125-DFT Mrs. Satbir Kaur 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
31 years
46 128-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
32 years
47 129-DFT Mrs. Sarita Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
alias Prem lata
32 years
48 130-DFT Mrs. Jaswinder 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Kaur 32 years
49 132-DFT Mrs. Bhupinder 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Kaur 33 years
50 133-DFT Mrs. Sangeeta 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Bhateja 33
years
51 134-DFT Mrs. Veena 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
Kumari 32 years
52 136-DFT Mrs. Arun Bala 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
34 years
53 137-DFT Mrs. Shardha 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Rani, 33 years
54 139-DFT Mrs. Ranjit Kaur 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
35 years
55 140-DFT Mrs. Basant 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur alias Sant
Kaur 35 years
56 141-DFT Mrs. Krishna 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Devi 35 years
57 142-DFT Mrs. Anita alias 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
Krishna 35
years
58 144-DFT Mrs. Amarjeet 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur 38 years
59 145-DFT Mrs. Sudarshan 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
alias
Sukhdarshan 36
years
60 146-DFT Mrs. Charanjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur 37 years
61 148-DFT Mrs. Harbans 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur 38 years
62 149-DFT Mrs. Manju 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Grover 37 years
63 150-DFT Mrs. Neeta 40 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
years
64 151-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000
41 years
65 153-DFT Mrs. Nirmal 43 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
years
66 154-DFT Mrs. 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
Rameshwari 49
years
67 155-DFT Mrs. Roopan 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000
Devi 50 years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 110
68 156-DFT Mrs. Veena 192000 8 45000 360000 75000 435000
alias Veera 57
years
69 157-DFT Mrs. Satya Devi 264000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000
50 years
70 161-DFT Mrs. Kuldeep 192000 8 45000 360000 75000 435000
Kaur 25 years
71 347-DFT Mrs. Parmjit 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Kaur 28 years
72 349-DFT Mrs. Sunita 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Sachdeva 32
years
73 350-DFT Mrs. Shikha 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Midha 20 years
74 352-DFT Mrs. Jasvinder 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
Kaur 28 years
75 354-DFT Mrs. Anju Sethi 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000
28 years
76 357-DFT Mrs. Asha Rani 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
32 years
77 359-DFT Mrs. Sanjana 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
alias Suman
Lata 24 years
78 360-DFT Mrs. Gitika Rani 408000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
25 years
79 367-DFT Mrs. Parveen 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Rani widow of
Ravi Kumar, 32
years
80 370-DFT Mrs. Suraksha 384000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
40 years
81 468-DFT Mrs. Preetpal 120000 5 45000 225000 75000 300000
Kaur (widow) 42
years
82 469-DFT Mrs. Neena 312000 13 45000 585000 75000 660000
Rani 36 years
83 470-DFT Mrs. Santosh 40 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
years
84 473-DFT Mrs. Chanchal 360000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
44 years
85 481-DFT Mrs. Sunita 28 432000 18 45000 810000 75000 885000
years
86 88-DFT Mrs. Rama 652800 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
Chaudhary 23
years
87 126-DFT Mrs. Meena 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Kumari 32 years
88 127-DFT Mrs. Priti Midha 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
32 years
89 131-DFT Mrs. Sanjivan 693600 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Lata 33 years
90 143-DFT Mrs. Sonia Rani 612000 15 45000 675000 75000 750000
26 years
91 147-DFT Mrs. Som Lata 450000 11 45000 495000 75000 570000
37 years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 111
92 348-DFT Mrs. Anupam 38 653000 16 45000 720000 75000 795000
years
93 493-DFT Mrs. Kamlesh 816000 17 45000 765000 75000 840000
Rani 33 years
TOTAL 71280000
ii) Elderly Ladies
Case No.21-DFT
In Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) the value of services
rendered to the family by elderly ladies was assessed at Rs.20,000/- per
annum. That amount can and ought to be revised to Rs.25,000/- in
respect of an incident that took place six years later. Applying a
multiplier of 5, which the one-man Commission has chosen in the
present case the amount payable to the claimants would come to
Rs.1,25,000/-. To that amount we need to add Rs.82,000/-, which the
Commission has determined as the loss of dependency on account of
pension drawn by the deceased at the time of death. Adding to these
two figures the conventional amount Rs.75,000/-, the total amount of
compensation payable to the claimant in this case would come to
Rs.2,82,000/-.
Cases No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and 353-DFT
The deceased in Claim Petitions No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and
353-DFT, namely Mrs. Lakshmi Devi aged 70 years, Mrs. Reshma Devi,
aged 67 years and Mrs. Sumitra Devi aged 62 years, were simple
housewives, whose contribution has been taken by the Commission to
be Rs.36,000/- per annum as against Rs.20,000/- awarded in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra). Deducting 1/3rd towards their personal
expenses and applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 112
sum of Rs.1,20,000/- to the claimants in each one of these cases. That
figure would stand enhanced even after a correct application of the
norms fixed in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra). Taking the contribution of
the deceased elderly ladies, mentioned above, to be Rs.25,000/- per
annum and applying a multiplier of 5, the claimants in each one of these
cases would be entitled to Rs.1,25,000/-. To that shall be added a sum
of Rs.75,000/- each towards conventional amount, taking the total
amount of compensation payable to the claimants in each one of these
cases to Rs.2,00,000/-.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this
category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Multiplier Value of Loss of Revised Conventional Total
No. No. of theawarded by applied Services Depen- amount ofFigure Amount
Deceased the rendered dency compensation (In Rs.) {8+9}
Commission to the (In Rs.) held payable (In Rs.)
(In Rs.) family (In {5x6+7} (In
Rs.) Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 21-DFT Mrs. Shanta 82000 5 25000 82000 207000 75000 282000
Relan 73
years
2 158-DFT Mrs. Lakshmi 120000 5 25000 0 125000 75000 200000
Devi 70 years
3 159-DFT Mrs. Reshma 120000 5 0 125000 75000 200000
Devi 67 years 25000
4 353-DFT Mrs. Sumitra 120000 5 25000 0 125000 75000 200000
Devi 62 years
TOTAL 882000
iii) Unmarried Working Girls
Apart from the housewives and elderly ladies dealt with in the
foregoing paragraphs, the deceased included 9 unmarried working girls,
most of whom were at that point of time, employed in the DAV School at
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 113
meager salaries. The Commission of Inquiry has, based on the salaries
received by the girls, assessed and awarded compensation that varies
between Rs.44,000 to Rs.2,88,000/-.
It was contended on behalf of the claimants that the approach
adopted by the Commission has brought about an anomalous situation
in as much as in cases involving children in the same age group the
Commission has awarded a higher amount of compensation than what
is awarded in cases where the victims were in some employment or the
other. Mrs. Arora, Learned Counsel for the Association argued that the
anomaly could be removed by awarding to the working girls the same
amount of compensation as is awarded to children in the comparable
age group. There is in our opinion merit in that contention. That young
and un-married girls had taken up jobs at meager salaries need not put
the victims or the claimants at a disadvantage which would be obvious if
the mere fact that the young girl was working results in the assessment
of a lower amount of compensation than that payable for a non-working
one. The fact that the girls had taken up small time and temporary jobs
in the school or elsewhere was even otherwise not a sound reason why
the compensation should be determined on the basis of the income they
derived from such engagements. The nature of the employment and
remuneration paid for the same sufficiently indicates that the same were
more in the nature of pastime for spending the time available with them
usefully than an estimate or indication of their true potential in life. In the
circumstances, we deem it fit to award in each one of the following
cases the same amount as is determined for payment in category 3
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 114
cases.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this
category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. No. Case No. Name & Age of theAmount awarded by Revised amount of
Deceased the Commission (In compensation held
Rs.) payable (In Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5
1 6-DFT Ms. Maninder Kaur 19 230400 635000
years
2 56-DFT Ms. Manju Bala 19 years 88000 635000
3 57-DFT Ms. Meera 21 years 288000 635000
4 58-DFT Ms. Anju Rani 22 years 72000 635000
5 59-DFT Ms. Sunita Mehta 27 years 44000 635000
6 60-DFT Ms. Rita 22 years 60000 635000
61-DFT Ms. Babita Wadhera 23 150000 635000
7 years
8 63-DFT Ms. Sandeep kaur 25 years 105600 635000
9 342-DFT Ms. Rekha Rani 21 years 60000 635000
TOTAL 5715000
iv) Working Women in Government Service
As already noticed above, nine out of the female victims were
working women employed in Government service. The one man
Commission has based on the salary drawn by these victims,
determined the contribution towards their families and, awarded
compensation by adopting the multiplier method. The claimants have
found fault with the end result for two precise reasons. Firstly it is
contended that even when the women were working on a full time basis,
they also rendered services to their respective families as is normally
done by a housewife. Determination of any compensation must,
therefore, take note of the said contribution also, argued the learned
counsel for the claimants.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 115
The second reason advanced by the claimants for an upward
revision is that the Commission had not taken into consideration the
future prospects while determining the amount of compensation in these
cases and other cases where women are not working in Government
Departments. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in
Susamma Thomas’s case (supra) and Smt. Sarla Dixit v. Balwant
Yadav 1996(2) The Punjab Law Reporter 656, it was argued that
future prospects must be one of the inputs for determining the
multiplicand. Any award which ignores that input would not be fair and
reasonable contended the learned counsel for the claimants.
On behalf of the respondent-school it was per contra argued
by Mr. Atma Ram, that future prospects could not be taken into
consideration except in cases and situations which the Apex Court has
identified in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others v. Delhi Transport
Corporation and Another (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121. The
cases at hand do not, according to the learned counsel, fall in anyone of
the situations in which future prospects could be taken into
consideration. It was also argued that once compensation was awarded
by applying the multiplier method there was no room for adoption of any
other method nor could two methods be applied to produce results
favourable to the claimants.
In Sarla Verma’s case (Supra), relied upon by Mr. Rajive
Atma Ram, the Supreme Court has on a review of its pronouncements
dealing with the relevance and the necessity of adding the future
prospects for determination of compensation payable in Motor Accident
Claim cases declared that as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 116
actual salary income of the deceased could be added towards future
prospects, in cases where the deceased had a permanent job and was
below 40 years of age. The addition should however be only 30% of the
actual salary income in cases where the age of the deceased was
between 40 to 50 years. In cases where the age of the deceased was
more than 50 years no addition towards future prospects could be made.
It was further held that where the deceased was self-employed or was
on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments etc. the Courts
will usually take only the actual income at the time of death, a departure
being permissible only in rare and exceptional cases involving special
circumstances. The following passage from the decision is apposite in
this connection: –
“24: In Susamma Thomas this Court increased
the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income
was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah
the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of
the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in
favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of
50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of
the deceased towards future prospects, where the
deceased had a permanent job and was below 40
years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable
range, the words “actual salary” should be read as
“actual salary less tax”). The addition should be only
30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years.
There should be no addition, where the age of the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 117
deceased is more than 50 years. Though the
evidence may indicate a different percentage of
increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition
to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different
methods of calculation being adopted. Where the
deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed
salary (without provision for annual increments etc.)
the courts will usually take only the actual income at
the time of death. A departure therefrom should be
made only in rare and exceptional cases involving
special circumstances.”
It is in the light of the above pronouncements clear that the
addition to the salary income of the deceased victims would depend on
whether the victims held a permanent job. The extent of addition would
also depend upon the age of the victims. In the case of working women
in Government Service, an addition towards future prospects would be
perfectly justified, on the principles laid down in Sarla Verma’s case
(Supra).
That brings us to the question whether working women were
also rendering services to the family that could be evaluated in terms of
money and, if so, what is the monetary value of such services. Our
answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Working
women not only support the income of the family but are at times the
main bread winners of the family. That does not, however, mean that
they neglect duties towards the family that are otherwise enjoined upon
them as ladies of the house. In the social and cultural milieu that we
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 118
have in this Country, the very fact that a woman is employed does not
necessarily mean that she does not perform any other duty towards her
family. The only difference between a housewife simpliciter and a
working woman is that while a housewife may be working and rendering
services to the family for a greater part of the time available to her, a
working woman by reason of her commitment to the job is not able to
spare that much time. On an average, if we take the contribution of a
housewife, in terms of services rendered to the family stretched over a
period of 15 hours a day, the services rendered by a working woman
may be limited to only five hours, for she would be at her work place for
atleast 8 hours and travelling to and fro for atleast two hours everyday.
On a rough basis one can safely assume that the value of services
rendered for 5 hours would be proportionately less than the value of the
services rendered by a whole time housewife. Proportionate to the time
spent by the working woman the value of her services may be only 1/3rd
of the value at which the services of a housewife have been assessed
i.e. 45,000X1/3= Rs.15,000/- per annum. Consequently, with the death
of a working female, the family not only looses in terms of the monetary
supplement which she was providing but also in terms of loss of services
that the family was enjoying on account of her presence. The One Man
Commission has not taken this into consideration except in 64-DFT
arising out of the death of Mrs. Neelam Kumari, where the Commission
has taken into account not only the income being earned by her at the
time of death but also added the value of services to the family at
Rs.36,000/- less 1/3rd deducted by the Commission towards personal
expenses. Suffice it to say that the correct approach appears to us to
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 119
determine the net loss of dependency on the basis of the income of the
deceased from her employment after taking into consideration the future
prospects in terms of Sarla Verma’s case (supra) and add to the same
a sum of Rs.15,000/- per annum towards the value of services which
she was rendering to the family. This could provide the true multiplicand
applicable in each one of these cases and provide a uniform and non-
discriminatory basis for determination of compensation payable to the
claimants. The position that would, on that basis, emerge in each one
of the nine cases of the working women in Government service, would
be as under:-
Sr. Case Name & Age ofSalary at Future Annual loss Value of Revised Conventional Total
No. No. the Deceased the time prospects of services amount offigure @ amount
of death (In Rs.) dependency rendered compensation Rs.75,000/- {8+9}
(In Rs.) {4+5-1/3rd to the held payablep.a. (In Rs.)
towards family @ {6+7x multiplier
personal Rs.15,000 applied} (In
expenses} p.a. Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 64-DFT Mrs. Neelam 3661 1831 43936 15000 766168 75000 841168
Kumari 34
years
2 71-DFT Mrs. Krishna 3159 1580 37912 15000 264560 75000 339560
Kamboj 34
years
3 72-DFT Mrs. Karamjit 5500 2750 66000 15000 1296000 75000 1371000
Kaur 35 years
4 74-DFT Mrs. Lakhvinder 4811 2406 57736 15000 945568 75000 1020568
34 years
5 75-DFT Mrs. Sneh Lata 3845 1923 46144 15000 794872 75000 869872
32 years
6 78-DFT Mrs. Neelam 6800 3400 81600 15000 1545600 75000 1620600
Kumari 39
years
7 80-DFT Mrs. Sushil 3337 1001 34704 15000 646152 75000 721152
Jattana 45
years
8 81-DFT Mrs. Geeta 5100 1530 53040 15000 1020600 75000 1095600
Devi 44 years
9 471-DFT Mrs. Sunita 2843 0 22744 15000 301952 75000 376952
Devi 57 years
TOTAL 8256472
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 120
v) Working Women in Non-Government Service
Out of 12 working women in Non-Government service, all the
victims except four viz. Mrs. Naresh alias Preeti Kamra, deceased, in
case No. 17-DFT, Mrs. Santosh, deceased, in case No. 76-DFT, Mrs.
Sarita Bansal, deceased, in case No. 135-DFT and Mrs. Nirmal Sharma,
deceased, in case No. 374-DFT were employed as Teachers in DAV
School on payment of salary ranging from Rs.900/- to Rs.1,500/- per
month. The Commission has while awarding compensation in these
cases taken the contribution of the deceased as a housewife for
services rendered to her family to be Rs.3,000/- per month and added to
the same the salary, which the deceased was drawing from the school.
From the figure thus available the Commission has deducted 1/3rd
towards personal expenses, applied an appropriate multiplier and made
its award accordingly. In principle we do not see any error in the method
adopted by the Commission except that there should have been no
deduction towards personal expenses, from out of the value of services
rendered by the deceased to her family. Even though the deceased
employee victims were working with the DAV School there is nothing on
record to suggest that they had any security of tenure or any other
benefits like Assured Career Progression or increments so as to call for
award of compensation on the basis of their salary income alone. In
reality, they were not only rendering services to their family but were
working in the school to supplement the family income, the former being
the dominant of the two engagements. In the process of determination of
compensation payable for their death the proper course would be to
treat them primarily as housewives and add to the value of the services
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 121
rendered by them the additional amount which they were earning from
the school out of their employment. We have in the foregoing part of
this judgment valued the services rendered by the housewives to the
family at Rs.45,000/-. To that amount we need to add the annual
income of the victims from the salary drawn from the school less 1/3rd
deducted towards personal expenses, which would then be the
multiplicand for purposes of applying a suitable multiplier to arrive at a
correct figure, to which we need to add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional figure. The position that would emerge by adoption of this
process would be as under: –
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal
No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount
Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In
Commission cy afterto the held payable Rs.)
(In Rs.) deducting family @ {5+6x7} (In
1/3rd Rs.45000/- Rs.)
thereof (Inp.a.
Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 62-DFT Mrs. Manju 544000 8000 45000 17 901000 75000 976000
Bala 24
years
2 66-DFT Mrs. Mamta 609000 9840 45000 18 987120 75000 1062120
Midha 26
years
3 68-DFT Mrs. Upma 544000 8000 45000 17 901000 75000 976000
30 years
4 69-DFT Mrs. Renu 468000 7200 45000 15 783000 75000 858000
Bala 32
years
5 70-DFT Mrs. Bimla 512000 8000 45000 16 848000 75000 923000
Devi 37
years
6 324-DFT Mrs. Anita 524800 8800 45000 16 860800 75000 935800
Sharma 33
years
7 478-DFT Mrs. Sunita 590000 8800 45000 18 968400 75000 1043400
Rani 28
years
8 482-DFT Mrs. Maya 576000 12000 45000 16 912000 75000 987000
Devi 35
years
Total 7761320
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 122
In 76-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Santosh aged about 38 years,
was working as a teacher in Arya School, Dabwali at a salary of
Rs.5716/- per month. So also in 17-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Naresh
alias Preeti Kamra, was working as Principal in DAV School, Dabwali at
a salary of Rs.4,400/- per month. Mrs Nirmal Sharma, deceased in 374-
DFT, was working as Principal in Satluj School, Dabwali at a salary of
Rs.3,000/- per month. Mrs. Sarita Bansal, aged about 34 years,
deceased in 135-DFT, was also working as Lecturer in M.P. College,
Dabwali at a salary of Rs.5,000/- per month. These four cases appear
to be distinguishable from other employees referred to above inasmuch
as they were holding regular and permanent jobs and drawing the salary
attached to the same and were, therefore, more comparable to those
holding permanent jobs in the Government. They were at the same time
rendering services to their respective families, the value whereof cannot
be less than Rs.15,000/- per annum as held by us while dealing with the
cases of Government employees. Award of compensation would,
therefore, be more rational, if these regular employees holding
permanent jobs in their respective establishments are placed at par with
the Government employees in the matter of award of compensation. In
the case of Mrs. Nirmal alias Preeti Kamra, the Commission has also
found that she was drawing an income of Rs.6,393/- per annum from the
LIC agency work that she was doing. The said amount can, therefore,
be added to her income from salary while determining the amount of
compensation payable to claimants in her case. The final picture, that
would emerge, can be summarised in a tabular form as under: –
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 123
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal
No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount
Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In
Commission cy (In Rs.) to the held payable Rs.)
(In Rs.) family @ {5+6x7} (In
Rs.15000/- Rs.)
p.a.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 17-DFT Mrs. Naresh 632416 57158 15000 16 1154528 75000 1229528
@ Preeti
Kamra, 39
years
2 76-DFT Mrs. 731650 68592 15000 16 1337472 75000 1412472
Santosh, 38
years
3 135-DFT Mrs. Sarita 1088000 60000 15000 17 1275000 75000 1350000
Bansal, 34
years
4 374-DFT Mrs. Nirmal 816000 36000 15000 17 867000 75000 942000
Sharma
Total 4934000
vi) Working women (Miscellaneous)
In this category fall nine cases in which the deceased were
said to be working women doing miscellaneous work. Having regard to
the nature of employment and the amount earned from the same, the
Commission has treated them as housewives but added the income
derived by them from their respective vocations to the multiplicand for
determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. We
shall briefly deal with each one of these cases and re-assess the
amount of compensation by reference to the findings recorded by the
Commission.
Case No. 14-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Asha Rani, an
Anganwari Worker who was drawing a salary of Rs.450/- per month.
Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards personal expenses, the
net contribution to the family can be taken to be Rs.3,600/- per annum.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 124
To that amount shall be added Rs.45,000/- towards value of the
services rendered to the family taking the total loss of dependency to
Rs.48,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the claimants would
be entitled to a compensation of Rs.8,26,200/-. Adding to that figure the
conventional amount of Rs.75,000/-, the total amount of compensation
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.9,01,200/-.
Case No. 109-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Rekha Rani, who
was, according to the findings recorded by the Commission, doing
tuition work and earning Rs.36,260/- per annum from the same.
Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards her personal expenses,
her net contribution to the family would come to Rs.24,174/- per annum.
Adding to that amount the value of the services to the family amounting
to Rs.45,000/-, the multiplicand would rise to Rs.69,174/-. It is
noteworthy that before the Commission, the claimants had produced
the Income-tax return filed by the deceased for the financial year 1994-
95 which supported the claim made by them that the deceased was
doing tuition work during her life time. Applying a multiplier of 18 to that
amount, the claimants would be entitled to Rs.12,45,132/-. To that figure
we add the conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- taking the total amount
of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.13,20,132/-.
Case No. 124-DFT
Mrs. Renu Bala, deceased, in this case was said to be a
Social Worker. The Commission has taken her income from social work
at Rs.2,100/- per month. We, however, see no reason to assume that a
Social Worker does such work for any monetary gain. Addition of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 125
Rs.2,100/- per month to the monthly income of the deceased was,
therefore, not justified. All the same, if the value of the services rendered
by the deceased, who was a young lady of 31 years, is taken at
Rs.45,000/- per annum and a multiplier of 17 applied to the same, the
amount payable to the claimant would work out to Rs.7,65,000/-. To that
figure is added Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount taking the total
amount payable to the claimants to be Rs.8,40,000/-, which amount we
hereby award to the claimants in this case.
Case No. 138-DFT
Mrs.Sushma Gupta, deceased, in this case, was aged 34
years. The Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.6,12,000/- by taking
her income to be Rs.1,500/- per month from tuition/coaching work in
addition to Rs.3,000/- per month towards services rendered to the
family. Taking the value of services rendered to the family at Rs.45,000/-
and adding the net income of Rs.12000/- per annum after deducting
1/3rd towards her personal expenses earned by her from tuition/coaching
work, the multiplicand would come to Rs.57,000/- per annum. Applying
a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation payable to the claimants
in this case would come to Rs.9,69,000/-. Addition of a sum of
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the total amount of
compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.10,44,000/-, which is
hereby awarded.
Case No. 152-DFT
Mrs. Kiran Pal Grover, deceased in this case was, according
to the evidence adduced before the Commission, engaged in tailoring
work and earned Rs.100/- to Rs.200/- per month. The Commission has
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 126
taken her earning to Rs.150/- per month or Rs.1,800/- per annum and
added a sum of Rs.36,000/- per annum towards the value of the
services rendered by her to the family, deducted 1/3rd towards her
personal expenses and determined the multiplicand at Rs.25,200/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum
of Rs.3,78,000/- to the claimants who happen to be the husband and
minor daughter of the deceased. We see no reason to interfere with the
determination made by the Commission towards the income of the
deceased from tailoring work. The value of the services rendered to the
family shall, however, stand enhanced to Rs.45,000/- without any
deduction as has been the position in all such cases. The total loss of
dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.46,200/- per annum. Applying
a multiplier of 15 to that figure, the claimants would be entitled to a sum
of Rs.6,93,000/-. Adding conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- to the
same the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants would
come to Rs.7,68,000/-.
Case No. 160-DFT
Mrs. Manju Bala, deceased, in this case was also a 31 years
old housewife who was engaged in Life Insurance Corporation Agency
work. The Commission has, on the basis of the material placed before
it, taken her income from the Agency’s work to be Rs.2,000/- per month
or Rs.24,000/- per annum and added to the same the value of services
rendered to the family. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards
personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency
to be Rs.40,000/- per annum. The Commission has, accordingly,
awarded Rs.6,40,000/- to the claimants. While we see no reason to
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 127
interfere with the amount determined by the Commission towards the
earning from the Agency work undertaken by the deceased, the
deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses must be confined only to
said amount. This would mean that the net loss of dependency, on
account of the income from the Agency’s work, would come to
Rs.16,000/- per annum. Adding to the said amount, the value of services
rendered to the family assessed at Rs.45,000/-, the loss of dependency
would come to Rs.61,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 16 to the
said amount, the compensation works out to Rs.9,76,000/-. Adding
Rs.75,000/- to the said figure towards conventional amount, the total
compensation payable to the claimants comes to Rs.10,51,000/-.
Case No. 346-DFT
In this case the deceased Mrs. Sakshi alias Rakesh Rani was
a 25 years old housewife who used to take cooking classes at the time
of her death in the fire tragedy. Her husband and son Bobby had
claimed a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation before the
Commission. The evidence before the Commission comprised
documents showing her academic qualification and other achievements.
The Commission has, on the basis of the said evidence, taken the
income of the deceased at Rs.2,100/- per month and deducted 1/3rd
towards her personal expenses taking the loss of dependency to be
Rs.40,800/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 18
and awarded a sum of Rs.7,34,400/-. The value of the services
rendered by the deceased to the family should in our opinion be taken at
Rs.45,000/- per annum to which amount could be added Rs.16,800/- per
annum towards income earned from cooking classes. The total loss of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 128
dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.61,800/- per annum. Applying
a multiplier of 18 the amount of compensation payable to the claimants
would come to Rs.11,12,400/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional amount would take the figure to be Rs.11,87,400/-.
Case NO. 351-DFT
In this claim petition, the deceased Mrs. Nirmla alias Rani was
a 34 years old housewife who was imparting training for tailoring and
stitching work at the time of her death in the fire tragedy. A claim of
Rs.60,00,000/- was made by her husband and son Mohinder Kumar.
The evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the
deceased was a diploma holder from Industrial Training Institute in
Cutting and Tailoring as per National Trade Certificate issued by the
Ministry of Labour, Government of India. The Commission had, on the
basis of the material placed before it, taken the income of the deceased
to be Rs.2,100/- per month from her vocation and determined the total
loss of dependency at Rs.40,800/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of
17, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.6,94,000/- towards
compensation and directed its apportionment between the two
claimants. In our opinion, while the income earned by the deceased
from her tailoring work could be taken at Rs.1,400/- per month or
Rs.16,800/- per annum after deduction of 1/3rd towards her personal
expenses, the value of the services rendered to the family could be
assessed at Rs.45,000/-. This would take the multiplicand to
Rs.61,800/-. Applying a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.10,50,600/-. Addition of
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount would take the total to
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 129
Rs.11,25,600/- which shall be apportioned between the claimants
equally.
Case No.486-DFT
Deceased Mrs. Tulsi Devi, in this case was, a housewife, aged
about 19 years working as a Domestic Servant at the time of her death
in the fire tragedy. The Commission has taken the income of the
deceased at Rs.18,000/- per annum, deducted 1/3rd from the same
towards personal expenses, added the amount so determined to the
value of services rendered to the family to award a sum of
Rs.6,122,000/- to the claimants. Taking the value of services of the
deceased at Rs.45,000/- and the net income after deduction of 1/3rd
towards her personal expenses to be Rs.12,000/-, the multiplicand
comes to Rs.57,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 17 to the said amount, the
amount of compensation comes to Rs.9,69,000/- to which is added
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges to take the total amount of
compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.10,44,000/-.
The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this
category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-
Sr. Case Name & AgeAmount Annual Value of Multiplier Revised ConventionalTotal
No. No. of theawarded byloss ofServices Applied amount of figure (InAmount
Deceased the dependen rendered compensation Rs.) {8+9} (In
Commission cy afterto the held payable Rs.)
(In Rs.) deducting family @ {5+6x7} (In
1/3rd Rs.45000/- Rs.)
thereof p.a.
(In Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 14-DFT Mrs. Asha 469200 3600 45000 17 826200 75000 901200
Rani 32
years
2 109-DFT Mrs. Rekha 867000 24174 45000 18 1245132 75000 1320132
Rani 29
years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 130
3 124-DFT Mrs. Renu 693600 -- 45000 17 765000 75000 840000
Bala 31
years
4 138-DFT Mrs. 612000 12000 45000 17 969000 75000 1044000
Sushma
Gupta 34
years
5 152-DFT Mrs. Kiran 378000 1200 45000 15 693000 75000 768000
Pal Grover
41 years
6 160-DFT Mrs. Manju 640000 16000 45000 16 976000 75000 1051000
Bala 31
Years
7 346-DFT Mrs. Sakshi 734400 16800 45000 18 1112400 75000 1187400
alias
Rakesh
Rani 25
years
8 351-DFT Mrs. Nirmla 694000 16800 45000 17 1050600 75000 1125600
alias Rani
34 years
9 486-DFT Mrs. Tulsi 612000 12000 45000 17 969000 75000 1044000
Devi 19
years
TOTAL 9281332
Category 5 cases:-
This category comprises claims in connection with 39 adult
males of different age groups who lost their lives in the fire incident. The
Commission of Inquiry has relied upon the decision of the Supreme
Court in Susamma ‘s case (supra), Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and
the English decisions in Mallett Vs. Mc.Monagle, 1970 A.C. 166,
Davies Vs. Taylor, 1974 A.C. 207, Davies Vs. Powell Duffryn
Associated Collieries Ltd. (1942) A.C. (Privy Council) 601 as also the
decisions of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Chairman, A.P.SRTC
Vs. Shafiya Khatoon’s case (supra), Bhagwan Dass Vs. Mohd.
Aref’s case (supra) and A.P.STRC Vs. G.Ramanaiah’s case (supra),
observed that the multiplier method for determining compensation in
cases of death is legally well established and ensures not only `just’
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 131
compensation but certainty of the awards also. A departure from the
method could be justified only in rare and extraordinary circumstances
and very exceptional cases. The legal position as set out in the
recommendations made by the Commission is, in our opinion,
unexceptionable and does not call for any addition or any further
discussion by us in this judgment. We may only add that the Supreme
Court has in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others Vs. Delhi Transport
Corporation and another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, on a
review of the case law on the subject, restated the legal principles
governing determination of compensation in cases under the Motor
Vehicles Act. The decision lucidly reiterates the approach to be adopted
for determination of compensation, addition of income towards future
prospects, deduction of living expenses, selection of multiplier and
computation of compensation etc. We have, while dealing with the
cases falling in other categories, already made a reference to the said
decision in so far as the same lays down the principles governing
addition of income towards future prospects. We need only add that
the legal position as stated by the Supreme Court in the cases of
Susamma Thommas (supra) and other cases referred to above,
remains firmly established and has indeed been reiterated by their
Lordships in Sarla Verma’s case (Supra).
The Commission, in category 5 cases, has awarded
compensation ranging between Rs.61,200/- to Rs.16,11,000/-.
We propose to take up each one of these cases for a close
scrutiny ad seriatim.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 132
Case No. 8-DFT
In this case arising out of the death of Gurdeep Singh, the
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- and
applied a multiplier of 13. The Commission found no evidence to support
the claim for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- made by the mother of the
deceased. What is significant, however, is that the deceased was just
about 19 years old at the time of his death. He was employed as a
School Van Driver with Satluj Public School. The amount being earned
by him could not, therefore, be said to be the optimum of what he was
capable of earning with better experience in the years to come. It is
common knowledge that a driver during the relevant period could earn
upto Rs.6,000/- per month depending upon his experience and good
conduct. Deceased Gurdeep Singh had just started his career. A salary
of Rs.3,000/- could not, therefore, be said to be a real Index of what he
would have earned in times to come. Super added to this is the fact that
a housewife who simply renders services to the family is taken to be
contributing upto Rs.45,000/- per annum. An adult male who is bodily fit
and gainfully employed as a driver could earn more than that amount.
Having regard to all these circumstances and even when the income of
the deceased was on the date of the fire incident said to be Rs.3,000/-
per month, we are inclined to accept his income to be Rs.4,500/- per
month. Deducting 1/3rd of said amount towards personal expenses of the
deceased the contribution to the family would work out to Rs.3,000/- per
month or Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 13 to that
figure, the amount of compensation works out to Rs.4,68,000/-. We see
no reason to deny conventional figure of Rs.75,000/-, awarded by us in
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 133
cases falling in other categories. We accordingly award the
conventional amount of Rs.75,000/- to the claimants in this case, which
would take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,43,000/-.
Cases No. 9-DFT and 12-DFT
Ravinder Kumar and Ashwani Kumar, deceased were
brothers. The Commission has awarded to the claimants in both these
cases a sum of Rs.3,90,000/- in each case to be apportioned equally
between the parents of the deceased. While doing so, the Commission
has taken the income of the two brothers at Rs.10,500/- each, deducted
1/3rd towards personal expenses and applied a multiplier of 5.
In his testimony Roshan Lal, father of the deceased victims,
stated that his sons were earning Rs.30,000/- each every month which
figure the Commission had disbelieved as according to it, business in a
small town like Dabwali could not, in its opinion, yield that kind of return.
It is true that apart from the statement of the father of the deceased,
there is no other evidence to establish the true income of his sons from
the business being carried on by them, even so, keeping in view the fact
that both the boys were engaged in photography business, we see no
reason why their income should not be taken at Rs.12,000/- per month
per person, instead of Rs.10,500/- determined by the Commission.
Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, the net
contribution to the family would come to Rs.8,000/- per month or
Rs.96,000/- per annum per person. Taking into consideration the age of
the parents, the multiplier of 5 chosen by the Commission is, in our
opinion, appropriate which would take the amount payable to the
parents to be Rs.4,80,000/- in each case. Over and above the said
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 134
figure we award Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges taking the
total amount of compensation to Rs.5,55,000/- in each one of these two
cases to be apportioned equally between the parents.
Case No.10-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Balbir Singh, who was
working as a Cameraman. The Commission has taken the income of the
deceased at Rs.3,000/- per month against Rs.4,000/- or Rs.5,000/- per
month stated to be his income according to the mother of the victim. In
our opinion, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be
Rs.4,000/- per month in which case the net loss of dependency to the
family would come to Rs.2,667/- per month or Rs.32,000/- per annum.
Applying a multiplier of 17, chosen by the Commission to the said figure,
the amount payable as compensation would work out to Rs.5,44,000/-.
Adding Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure, the total amount
payable to the claimants in this case would come to Rs.6,19,000/-.
Since the deceased has left behind his mother and a minor
daughter, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to
the mother, while the remaining amount shall be deposited in a Fixed
Deposit Receipt till the daughter attains majority. The interest income
accruing from the Fixed Deposit can, however, be withdrawn by the
minor through her grand mother, the guardian periodically, to be spent
on her upbringing and education etc.
Case No. 11-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Ashok Gill aged 26 years
who was working as a Music Teacher at the time of his death in the fire
tragedy. The claimants are his widow and a minor daughter. The
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 135
Commission has accepted the version given by the claimants that the
deceased was earning Rs.150/- per day by teaching music to school
children. The income of the deceased has been determined at
Rs.4,500/- per month or Rs.54,000/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd out of
the said amount, towards his personal expenses, the Commission has
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.36,000/- per annum. Keeping
in view the age of the claimants, the Commission has correctly applied a
multiplier of 18 and awarded Rs.6,48,000/- to the claimants. There is in
our opinion no reason to interfere with the said amount except that the
claimants would be entitled in addition to the amount awarded by the
Commission to an amount of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure.
The total amount thus payable to the claimants in this case would come
to Rs.7,23,000/-.
Case No. 13-DFT
This claim arises out of the death of Bhagirath aged about 31
years on the date of incident who was working as a Constable in the
Police Department. His widow Smt.Uma Devi and minor son Baldev
claimed Rs.70,00,000 as compensation before the Commission. The
Commission has, however, determined the gross salary of deceased as
Rs.3,134/- per month on the basis of his certificate issued by the office
of the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa. Deducting 1/3rd of the said
amount, the loss of dependency to the family has been determined as
Rs.25,027/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 17
to award Rs.4,26,224/- which amount in our opinion deserves to be
enhanced having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a
permanent job in the Police Department and had prospects of rising
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 136
higher in the police department. Applying the principles stated by the
Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra), the income of the
deceased can be taken to be Rs.4,701/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of
the said amount towards personal expenses of the deceased, the net
loss of dependency can be taken as Rs.3,134/- per month or Rs.
37,608/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17 chosen by the
Commission, the compensation payable to the claimants comes to
Rs.6,39,336/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to
that figure would take the total amount payable to the claimants to
Rs.7,14,336/-.
Case No. 15-DFT
This claim arises out of the death of Shri Ashok Wadhera, who
was a Press Reporter running a News Agency at the time of his death in
the fire tragedy. His wife and minor son and daughter made a claim for
Rs.70,00,000/- before the Commission. The Commission has
determined the income of the deceased to be Rs.6,000/-per month and
the loss of dependency to be Rs.4,000/- per month or Rs.48,000/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the Commission has awarded
Rs.8,16,000/- towards compensation in this case and directed that out of
the said amount, a sum of Rs. 3,16,000/- be paid to Mrs. Usha Wadhera
while a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- each be paid to their son and daughter left
behind by the deceased. It appears that the income of the deceased
was stated to be between Rs.5,000/- to Rs.7,000/- per month. The
Commission has therefore rightly taken the mean figure while
determining the loss of dependency. We see no reason to interfere with
the said determination or the multiplier chosen by the Commission. All
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 137
that we need add is a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount
to take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.8,91,000/-. A
sum of Rs.3,50,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow
of the deceased while the remaining amount can be deposited in the
Fixed Deposits in the name of the minor son and daughter of the
deceased till the time they attain majority. The interest accruing from the
said income can be withdrawn by the mother/guardian of the children for
upbringing and education of the children.
Case No. 16-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam Shastri
who was 36 years old at the time of incident and had been engaged in
performing religious and pooja ceremonies to earn his livelihood. The
evidence adduced by the Commission suggests that the deceased was
earning Rs.15,000/- per month from such Pooja and other ceremonies.
The Commission, has, however, taken the income of the deceased to be
Rs.7,500/- per month, deducted 1/3rd amount towards his personal
expenses and taken the loss of dependency for the family to be
Rs.5,000/- per month or Rs.60,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of
15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- to the claimant
in this case, to which we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure,
taking the total amount of compensation to Rs.9,75,000/-. There is, in
our opinion, no room for making any other alteration in this case.
Case No. 18-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Ravinder Kumar, aged 40
years, who was a registered Medical Practitioner at the time of his
death. The claimants happen to be his wife and two sons and a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 138
daughter. A claim of Rs.70,00,000/- was made before the Commission.
The Commission has eventually awarded a sum of Rs.1,16,000/- only.
The Commission has noted that the deceased had passed Ayurveda
Rattan Examination and was a registered Medical Practitioner since
1976 as per the certificate marked as Ex.P232/18-DFT. The
Commission also noted that the deceased was working as a Press
Correspondent with a local newspaper. The Commission, has, however,
come to the conclusion that the claim for payment of compensation was
unsupported by any evidence and has accordingly taken the monthly
wages fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa for the years 1995-96
and determined the monthly earning of deceased as Rs.1,322/- or
Rs.15,864/- per year. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount towards
personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency
to be Rs.10,576/- per annum. The Commission has in our opinion failed
to take into consideration the fact that the deceased was a Registered
Medical Practitioner for a number of years and was qualified to practice
medicine in that capacity. The absence of any specific figure mentioned
in the statement of the widow left behind by the deceased could not be
taken as conclusive of the deceased not being gainfully employed in the
profession for which he was trained. Having regard to the totality of the
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the income of the deceased
could be taken to be Rs.4,500/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd towards
personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to
Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15 to the said figure, the
claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.5,40,000/-. Addition of
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 139
total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.6,15,000/-.
Case No. 19-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Om Parkash Mehta aged
43 years on the date of fire tragedy. His wife and two sons claimed
Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation and adduced evidence to show
that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- per annum from
agricultural land and running the business of a Commission Agent in the
name of M/s Mehta Brothers, from which he was earning Rs. 2,00,000/-
per annum. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of
Haryana and another V. Jasbir Kaur and others, III(2003) Accident
and Compensation Cases 90, the Commission held that there was no
loss of income to the family by reference to the agricultural land owned
and cultivated by the deceased. The Commission has also held that
there was no evidence to show that after the death of the deceased Om
Parkash Mehta, the family had engaged anyone to look after the land
mutated in their favour. As regards the income from the Commission
Agency, the Commission has determined Rs.36,490/- per annum as
income of the deceased. Deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses,
the net loss of dependency has been determined at Rs.24,327/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 13, the Commission has awarded a sum
of Rs.3,16,251/- to the claimants to be distributed equally among all the
three claimants.
There are only two aspects which we propose to highlight in
this case, one relating to the money value of the contribution which the
deceased was making towards cultivation of the agricultural land and
managing the affairs concerning the same and the other regarding the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 140
payment of conventional amount of Rs.75,000/-. It may be true that the
claimants have not established that any one has been engaged by them
after the death of Om Parkash Mehta to manage the agricultural land,
but the mere absence of any such alternative arrangement may not
suggest that the deceased was not contributing anything towards the
cultivation of land and the resultant income from the same. In our
opinion, the monetary equivalent of the contribution made by the
deceased in the matter of cultivation of the land held by him could not be
less than Rs.1,000/- per month or Rs.12,000/- per year which amount
could be added to the annual loss of dependency by reference to the
Commission Agency business that the deceased was doing during his
lifetime. Viewed thus, the annual loss of the dependency would work out
to be Rs.36,327/-. Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the
claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,72,251. Addition of
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the
total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,47,251.
Case No. 20-DFT
The claim, in this case, arose out of the death of Des Raj who
was, at the time of the incident, a 68 years old Pensioner. His widow
Raj Rani and son Palwinder made a claim of Rs.50,00,000/- towards
compensation before the Commission who arrived at the conclusion
that the Pensioner was drawing a pension of Rs.4,000/- per month only
and that the net loss of dependency after deduction of 1/3rd towards his
personal expenses would come to Rs.32,000/- per annum. Applying a
multiplier of 5, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.1,60,000/- to be
paid to both the claimants in equal share. In the absence of any material
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 141
to show that the deceased was having any additional income from any
other source, we are inclined to accept the view taken by the
Commission that the deceased was, as Pensioner, earning only
Rs.4,000/- and that the net loss of dependency was Rs.32,000/- per
annum. The Commission has not, however, awarded to the claimants
the conventional figure of Rs.75,000/- which we see no reason to deny
them. We, accordingly, enhance the amount of Rs.1,60,000/- awarded
by the Commission to Rs.2,35,000/- to be paid to both the claimants in
equal shares.
Claim No. 22-DFT
In this case, deceased Surinder Kumar was 37 years old and
working as a Bank Collection Agent. The claimants before the
Commission happened to be the widow, daughter, son and father of the
deceased. The evidence adduced before the Commission attempted to
prove that the Commission Agent was earning between Rs.30,000/- to
Rs.40,000/- per annum apart from a sum of Rs. 5,000/- per month from
tuition work. The One Man Commission has, however, found no
evidence to support the claim of income from the tuition work. The
Commission has, all the same, accepted the version given by the
claimants that the deceased was earning, from the Commission Agency,
a sum of Rs.32,314.90 ps. in the year 1995. Making that income as the
basis, the Commission deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses and
determined the net loss of dependency to the family at Rs.21,550/- per
annum. The Commission has, it appears, gone entirely by the amount
earned by the deceased from the Commission Agency in the year 1995
ignoring the assertion made by the claimants that the income was
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 142
between Rs.30,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per annum. On an average,
therefore, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be
Rs.35,000/- per annum instead of Rs.32,314.90 ps., as was done by the
Commission. To that amount, we are inclined to add a sum of
Rs.15,000/- towards income from tuition work, keeping in view the fact
that the deceased was an academically qualified young man, for whom
Commission Agency work could leave enough spare time to be spent on
providing tuition for supplementing his income. The gross annual income
of the deceased could, therefore, be taken to be Rs.50,000/-. Deducting
1/3rd of the said amount towards his personal expenses the net loss of
dependency would come to Rs.33,300/-. Applying a multiplier of 16
chosen by the Commission, the amount payable to the claimants comes
to Rs.5,32,800. To that amount, we need to add Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional amount taking the compensation to Rs.6,07,800/- which we
hereby award to the claimants.
Case No. 23-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Ramesh Chugh, aged 46
years, who was an Agriculturist by profession and who was also one of
the unfortunate victims of the fire incident. The claimants before the
Commission comprised widow of the deceased and his two children.
The claim for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation was
sought to be supported on the basis that the death of deceased had
deprived the family of the entire income earned by him from 29 acres of
cultivable land owned by him in village Lohgarh, Tehsil Dabwali. The
Commission has, however, discussed the evidence and relying upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Another v.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 143
Jasbir Kaur and Others III (2003) Accident and Compensation
Cases 90 (SC) came to the conclusion that the source of income
remains available to the family since the landed property held by the
deceased continues to remain available and stands mutated in favour of
the claimants. The contribution made by the deceased towards
management and cultivation of the said land could, however, be
evaluated and an appropriate amount awarded as the family was forced
to engage someone else to do what the deceased was doing during his
life time. The Commission has, accordingly, taken the contribution of the
deceased to be Rs.7,000/- per month, deducted 1/3rd amount out of the
same towards his personal expenses to award a compensation of
Rs.7,28,000/- by applying a multiplier of 13. The Commission has, in
our view, committed a mistake on both counts, viz. taking the
contribution of the deceased at Rs.7,000/- per month as also deducting
1/3rd out of the said amount. In the first place, there was no cogent
evidence to establish that the family was indeed spending Rs.7,000/-
per month except engagement of one Bihari Lal,a graduate who had
passed away in August 2003. Be that as it may, the engagement of a
person to look after the lands could not be said to be improbable and
unnatural having regard to the fact that ownership of the land and its
cultivation was firmly established. In our opinion, the contribution of the
deceased which now would necessitate the engagement of someone
else to do what the deceased was doing could be assessed at
Rs.5,000/- per month. The net loss on account of the death of the
deceased could, therefore, be Rs.60,000/- per annum and no more.
Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the amount of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 144
compensation would come to Rs.7,80,000/-. To that amount should be
added the conventional figure of Rs.75,000/- to take the total amount of
compensation to Rs.8,55,000/- to be paid to the claimants in equal
proportions.
Case No. 24-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Sanjay Kwatra, a 26 years
old businessman who was also one of the victims of the fire incident.
The claim was made by his minor daughter Simmy Kwatra for a sum of
Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The claimant had lost both her parents
in the incident. The claim proceeded on the assertion that the deceased
was earning Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from his readymade garments
business. The Commission has, however, taken the monthly income of
the deceased to be Rs.8,000/-, deducted 1/3rd out of the same towards
personal expenses of the deceased and determined the annual loss of
dependency at Rs.64,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 18, the Commission
has awarded a sum of Rs.11,52,000/- with which we can find no fault
except that, we need to add Rs.75,000/- to the said amount as
conventional figure taking the total amount payable to the claimant to
Rs.12,27,000/.
Case No. 25-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Niranjan Dass Bansal,
Advocate, aged 60 years and a Member of the Executive Committee of
D.A.V. School. The claimants happen to be his widow and two sons.
The deceased was also invited to the function and was, according to the
statements made before the Commission, earning upto Rs.12,000/- to
Rs.15,000/- per month from his law practice. The Commission has
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 145
taken the income of the deceased at Rs.12,500/- per month and after
deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses assessed the loss of
dependency at Rs.1,00,000/- per annum. To that amount, the
Commission has applied a multiplier of 5 having regard to the age of the
deceased and awarded a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- to the claimants. The
award is, in our opinion, justified and does not call for any alteration
except addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount.
The total amount would, thus, stand enhanced to Rs.5,75,000/- out of
which a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- shall be paid to the widow of the deceased
while the remaining shall be distributed equally among the two sons.
Case No. 26-DFT
This claim arose out of the death of Sanjay Grover, aged 30
years, working as a Chemist, who too had lost his life in the fire
incident. The claim made by his widow and two sons was to the extent
of Rs.70,00,000/- on the basis that the deceased was earning about
Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- per month from his Medical Store business.
The deceased was a graduate and was also said to be taking part in
social and extra curricular activities. The Commission has, however,
taken the income of the deceased at Rs.9,000/-, deducted 1/3rd out of
the said amount towards his personal expenses and determined the loss
of dependency at Rs.72,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17,
the Commission has awarded Rs.12,24,000/- out of which Rs.3,24,000/-
was to be paid to the widow, while remaining amount is to be distributed
equally among the sons. There is nothing wrong with the amount
awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to add a sum of
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure which takes the total amount of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 146
compensation to Rs.12,99,000/-, rounded off to Rs.13,00,000/-. A sum
of Rs.5,00,000/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow and
the balance distributed equally among the other two claimants.
Case No. 27-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Gurdas Singh, aged 25
years, who was working as a Constable. The One Man Commission of
Inquiry has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000/- and the net
accretion to the family at Rs.2,000/- per month or Rs.24,000/- per
annum. That amount, in our opinion, appears to be on the lower side
having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent job
and had future prospects of rise in the police force. Adding 50% towards
future prospects in the light of the decision in Sarla Verma’s case
(supra) the income determined by the Commission would go to
Rs.4,500/-. Deducting 1/3rd towards his personal expenses, the loss of
dependency to the family would work out to Rs.3,000/- per month or
Rs.36,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 18, chosen by the
commission, the total amount payable to the claimants comes to
Rs.6,48,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional charges
would take the figure to Rs.7,23,000/-.
Case No. 28-DFT
This claim was made by Master Venus Sethi and parents of
Surinder Kumar, deceased, aged 30 years, who also lost his life in the
fire incident. The deceased was, according to the claimants, running a
Karyana Shop at Dabwali and earning Rs.20,000/- to Rs.30,000/- per
month. The Commission has, however, declined to accept that version
and determined the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.10,000/-,
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 147
deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and determined the loss of
dependency at Rs.80,000/- per annum. The Commission has then
applied a multiplier of 17 to award a sum of Rs.13,60,000/- towards
compensation. There is, in our opinion, no room for any enhancement
in the amount awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to
add a sum of Rs.75,000/- as conventional figure to that amount, which
would take the total to Rs.14,35,000/-, out of which a sum of
Rs.2,50,000/- each shall be paid to the parents of the deceased while
the remaining shall be invested in a Fixed Deposit in the name of his
minor son Venus Sethi till the time he attains majority. The interest
accruing on the investment can, however, be withdrawn by the
guardians for upbringing and education of the minor.
Case No. 29-DFT
The claim, in this case, was made by the daughter of the
deceased being the only surviving member of the family who perished in
the incident. Ashok Kumar Sikka, the deceased father of the claimant,
was a Rural Development Officer-cum-Branch Manager, State Bank of
India, Dabwali. He, accompanied by his wife and the sister of the
claimant, was attending the ill fated function only to meet a fiery end.
The claim proceeded on the basis that the deceased was, at the time of
his death, earning Rs. 13,424/- per month as salary from the bank. The
Commission deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and determined the
loss of dependency at Rs.8,950/- per month or Rs.1,07,400/- per
annum. The Commission has then applied a multiplier of 15 to award a
sum of Rs.16,11,000/-. Addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional figure meets the ends of justice as there is nothing wrong
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 148
either with the multiplicand or the multiplier chosen by the Commission.
The addition of a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount shall
take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to
Rs.16,86,000/-.
Case No. 30-DFT
In this case arising out of the death of Jagwinder Singh, the
deceased was engaged in tent house business at the time of incident.
The Commission had taken the income of the deceased to be
Rs.3,000/- per month only and loss of dependency at Rs.24,000/- per
annum. This amount, in our opinion, is on the lower side having regard
to the fact that the deceased was, as per the evidence on record,
engaged in tent house business and was, on the fateful day, at the
venue to arrange the public address system for the ill fated function.
The income of the deceased can, in our view, be taken to be Rs.4,500/-
per month. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount towards personal
expenses, the loss of dependency to the family would work out to
Rs.3,000/- per month or Rs.36,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of
13, chosen by the Commission, the total amount payable to the
claimants would work out to Rs.4,68,000/-. Adding a sum of Rs.75,000/-
towards conventional amount to that figure, the total compensation
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.5,43,000/-.
Case No. 31-DFT
The claim in this case was made by Saloni Bhateja, daughter
of Ravi Bhateja, who was a qualified doctor holding a MBBS degree,
and posted as Medical Officer in Primary Health Center, Village Lambi,
District Muktsar (Punjab). The deceased was aged 42 years drawing at
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 149
the time of his death Rs.6,742/- per month and was an income-tax
assessee. He had, during the financial year preceding the year of his
death, earned an annual income of Rs.62,250/-. It was also alleged that
the deceased was earning Rs.7,000/- to Rs.8,000/- from private
practice. The Commission has, however, refused to accept that the
deceased had any income from private practice and taken the income of
the deceased at Rs.6,742/- per month, deducted 1/3rd out the same
towards his personal expenses rounded off the net loss of dependency
to Rs.4,500/- per month or Rs.54,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier
of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.8,10,000/-. The
Commission does not appear to have taken into consideration the future
prospects of the deceased having regard to the fact that the deceased
was holding a permanent Government job and had prospects of further
rise in service. Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma’s case
(supra) addition of 30% of the salary income to the gross income at the
time of incident would be perfectly justified. The gross monthly income of
the deceased would, therefore, come to Rs.8,756/- per month.
Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the net loss of dependency to
family would come to Rs.5,843/- per month or Rs.70,120/- per annum.
Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation payable to
the claimant would work out to Rs.10,51,800/-. To that amount, we add
a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to take the total
amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.11,26,800/-.
Case No. 32-DFT
In this case, the deceased Sukhbir Singh was a 31 years old
Contractor who left behind his parents to make a claim before the
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 150
Commission for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The
deceased was, according to the evidence led before the Commission, a
graduate and had gone to the function along with his daughter and his
wife where all of them got burnt to death. The deceased was, as per the
evidence on record, a liquor contractor as well as a Property Dealer,
earning between Rs.20,000/- to Rs.25,000/- per month. The
Commission has, however, declined to accept that version and taken the
income of the deceased to be Rs.10,000/- to Rs.12,000/- jointly with his
father. The share of deceased in that income has been taken as
Rs.6,000/- per month or Rs.72,000/- per annum. Deduction of 1/3rd of
the said amount has reduced the loss of dependency to Rs.48,000/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a sum
of Rs.2,40,000/- to the claimants. The Commission has, in our opinion,
assessed the income of the deceased at a lower figure. In the absence
of any evidence in rebuttal, the income of the deceased could be taken
to be Rs.12,000/- per month, if not more. The net loss of dependency
could, therefore, be taken at Rs.8,000/- per month or Rs.96,000/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount payable to the parents
would come to Rs.4,80,000/-. To that we add a sum of Rs.75,000/-
towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the
claimants to Rs.5,55,000/- in equal proportion.
Case No. 33-DFT
This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam, aged
27 years. The Commission has taken the income of the deceased at
Rs.8,100/- per month on the date of incident and after deducting 1/3rd of
the said amount towards personal expenses, determined the loss of
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 151
dependency for the family at Rs.64,800/- per annum. Applying a
multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a sum of Rs.3,24,000/-. In
our opinion, the income of the deceased could be taken at Rs.9,000/-
per month keeping in view the fact that the deceased was a Trained
Graduate Teacher. We accordingly take the income of deceased at
Rs.9,000/- deduct 1/3rd of the same towards personal expenses and
determine the loss of dependency for the family at Rs.72,000/- per
annum. Applying the multiplier of 5, the total amount payable to the
claimants would come to Rs.3,60,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional amount would take the amount of compensation to
Rs.4,35,000/-.
Case No. 34-DFT
This claim arose out of the death of Gurdev Singh Shant, 63
years old Freedom Fighter and Chairman of Improvement Trust,
Dabwali. The claim was made by his wife Surjit Kaur for payment of
Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The claimants had stated that the
deceased was earning Rs.10,000/- per month from the jewellery shop of
his brother. The Commission has, however, taken the income to be
Rs.5,100/- per month, deducted 1/3rd to determine the loss of
dependency to Rs.3,400/- per month or Rs.48,000/- per annum.
Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded Rs. 2,04,000/-
to be paid to the widow of the deceased and son Iqbal Singh in equal
shares. The assessment of the income of the deceased has not been, in
our opinion, fair and reasonable in this case. The Commission could
and indeed ought to have assessed the income of the deceased at
Rs.9,000/- per month and awarded compensation on that basis. We,
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 152
accordingly, determine the loss of dependency in this case at Rs.6,000/-
per month after deduction of 1/3rd towards his personal expenses. The
annual loss of dependency would, thus, come to Rs.72,000/-. Applying a
multiplier of 5, we award a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- to the claimants.
Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure would take the
amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.4,35,000/-, out
of which a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- shall be paid to the widow of the
deceased, while the balance shall be paid to his son Iqbal Singh.
Case No.35-DFT
In this claim petition, deceased Pawan Kumar was a 40 years
old bank employee. The claim was made by his wife and daughter for a
sum of Rs.70,00,000/-. The Commission has taken the income of
deceased as Rs. 7685.39 ps., deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount and
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.5,124/- per month or
Rs.61,488/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has
awarded Rs.9,22,320/-, rounding it off Rs.9,22,500/-, with which we find
no fault, except that, we add a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional
figure to that amount taking the total amount of compensation payable to
the claimants to Rs.9,97,500/-. The amount shall be paid in equal
shares to both the claimants.
Case No.36-DFT
In case No. 36-DFT arising out of the death of Rajbir Singh,
the Commission had taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,530/-
and determined the loss of dependency to the family at Rs.12,240/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a
meager amount of Rs.61,200/- to the claimants. The Commission has in
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 153
the process disbelieved the version given by the mother of the deceased
that he was working as a Contractor and was earning Rs.15,000/- to
Rs.20,000/- per month. The Commission has instead chosen to rely
upon the minimum wages payable under the Minimum Wages Act as on
the date of incident while determining the compensation payable to the
claimants. The Commission, in our opinion, was not justified in doing so.
The evidence on record may not have been conclusive, but in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the same could give an
indication of the amount which he was earning. The deceased had
passed the Senior Secondary Examination and was an invitee at the
function. In the totality of these circumstances, therefore, we are of the
view that the income of the deceased could be taken to be Rs.15,000/-
per month which happens to be the lower of the figure mentioned by his
mother who appeared as witness. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said
amount, the net loss of dependency to the family would come to
Rs.10,000/- or Rs.1,20,000/- per year. Applying a multiplier of 5, the
amount of compensation payable to the claimants would work out to
Rs.6,00,000/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount
would take the amount of total to Rs.6,75,000/-.
Case No. 37-DFT
In this case arising out of the death of Naresh Kumar, the
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.6,000/- and
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.4,000/- per month. The
Commission had then applied a multiplier of 11 and awarded a sum of
Rs.5,28,000/- to the claimants. The income of the deceased was,
according to the evidence adduced before the Commission between
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 154
Rs.5,000/- to Rs.7,000/- per month. The Commission has, therefore,
taken a mean figure while determining the amount of compensation.
There is no error in that approach to warrant any interference from this
Court. All that we need say is that Rs.75,000/- shall stand added to that
figure as conventional amount taking the amount of compensation to
Rs.6,03,000/-.
Case No. 73-DFT
In this claim, deceased Manphool Chand was a Science
Teacher in Government service at the time of his death. The claim was
filed by his mother Jamuna Bai for payment of Rs.70,00,000/- towards
compensation. The deceased was, according to the claimant, getting a
salary of Rs.5,000/- per month as per the salary certificate issued by the
Principal of the School. He was a trained Teacher and had gone to the
function his son and daughter were also attending. The Commission
has, taking the income of the deceased to be Rs.4,800/- per month,
awarded compensation of Rs.1,92,000/- to the mother. In the process,
the Commission has overlooked the fact that the deceased had future
prospects of higher income on the principles stated in Sarla Verma’s
case (supra). We, therefore, add 50% of the salary income to his gross
monthly income which takes the total monthly income of the deceased to
Rs.7,200/- per month. Deducting 1/3rd of the amount towards his
personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to
Rs.4,800/- per month or Rs.57,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of
5, the amount of compensation would work out to Rs.2,88,000/-. To that
amount, we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount, to take the
total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.3,63,000/-.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 155
Case No. 343-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Shalbh Juneja. The
Commission has taken the monthly income of the deceased at
Rs.2,352/-, deducted 1/3d of the said amount, and determined the loss
of dependency at Rs.18,816/-. Applying a multiplier of 13, the
Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.2,44,608/-. The deceased, in this
case, was working as a Teacher in St. Joseph School at Dabwali at the
time of his death and earning a salary of Rs.2,300/- per month. He was
B.Sc., B.Ed. He was at the ill fated venue with his nephew Vivek who
was a student of D.A.V. School. The claimant in the case who happens
to be the elder brother of the deceased was the only legal heir left
behind. Taking into consideration all these circumstances, the loss of
dependency to the family would indeed come to Rs.18,816/- per month.
Applying a multiplier of 13 the amount of compensation comes to
Rs.2,44,608/-. We need only to add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional
amount to take the total amount payable to the claimant to be
Rs.3,19,608/-.
Case No. 344-DFT
Suresh Kumar Sethi aged 33 years was in private employment
on the date of his death in the fire incident. The parents made a claim
for the payment of Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation. The
deceased, according to them, was a graduate and was working at a
shop at a monthly salary of Rs.2,000/-. The Commission has accepted
that version, deducted 1/3rd of the income towards his personal
expenses, determined the loss of dependency at Rs.16,000/- per annum
and awarded a sum of Rs.80,000/- as compensation by applying a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 156
multiplier of 5. The amount so determined does not appear to be just
and reasonable and is more in the nature of pittance than reasonable
compensation to which the parents of the deceased were entitled. The
deceased, it is proved on the record, was a graduate. His employment in
a shop at a paltry sum of Rs.2,000/- per month was, therefore, only a
temporary feature in life which was not an index of his real potential to
earn a higher amount. We have, as seen earlier, taken even the value of
the services rendered by a housewife to be Rs.45,000/- per annum. We
see no reason why we should not adopt that amount for a person who
happened to be the only life support for the old parents. He was not only
serving his parents but also earning Rs.2,000/- per month to supplement
the income which take the loss of dependency to Rs.45,000/- +
Rs.1,6000/- = Rs.61,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of
compensation would come to Rs.3,05,000/-. To that figure, we add
Rs.75,000/- towards conventional amount taking the total to
Rs.3,80,000/-.
Case No. 345-DFT
The deceased, in this case, was 35 years old Rakesh Kumar.
His parents made a claim for Rs.70,00,000/- towards compensation for
his death in the fire incident. According to the claimant, deceased was
earning Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.1,50,000/- per annum from his mobile oil
business in the name and style of M/s Gupta Auto Store, Dabwali. He
was also an income-tax assessee and used to file his annual returns. A
tax challan for payment of tax was also produced during the hearing
before the Commission. The Commission has accepted that version
and taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,00,000/- per annum.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 157
Deducting 1/3rd of the same determined the loss of dependency to
Rs.67,000/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of
compensation came to Rs.3,35,000/- to be apportioned equally between
the parents. This amount, in our opinion, needs to be suitably enhanced
especially when the deceased was not only proved to be gainfully
employed in business but was earning a substantial amount from the
same. Instead of Rs.1,00,000/-, the income of deceased could be taken
at Rs.1,25,000/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the net
loss of dependency would come to Rs.83,334/- per annum. Applying
the multiplier chosen by the Commission, the amount of compensation
would work out to Rs.4,16,670/-. To that, we add Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional figure to take the total amount of compensation payable to
the claimants to 4,91,670/-, rounded off to Rs.4,92,000/-.
Case No. 362-DFT
In this case, deceased Bhim Sain aged 33 years was engaged
in oil mill business. His father and widow filed the claim petition before
the Commission in which it was alleged that the deceased was a partner
in the Jyoti Oil Mills, Dabwali earning between Rs.40,000/- to
Rs.50,000/- per annum. The Commission has accepted the income of
the deceased to be Rs.45,000/- per annum and after deducting 1/3rd,
taken the loss of dependency to be Rs.30,000/- per annum. Applying a
multiplier of 17, an amount of Rs.5,10,000/- has been awarded to the
claimants with which we cannot find any fault, except that the
Commission ought to have awarded a sum of Rs.75,000/- towards
conventional figure also which we hereby award taking the amount of
compensation payable to Rs.5,85,000/-. The widow shall receive a sum
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 158
of Rs.4,00,000/- out of the said amount, while the balance shall go to the
father of the deceased.
Case No. 366-DFT
In this case, deceased Ravi Kumar aged 34 years was
engaged in business. The claim for payment of compensation was made
by his brother, his wife and his niece. Evidence adduced before the
Commission suggested that the deceased was working as a
Commission Agent at Dabwali in the name and style of M/s Ravi Trading
Company, Mandi Dabwali and earning an annual income of Rs.40,000/-
to Rs.50,000/-. The Commission has also noted that the income of M/s
Ravi Trading Company was assessed at Rs.41,170/- for the financial
year 1995-96. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the loss of
dependency has been worked out at Rs. 27,447/-, rounded off to
Rs.27,450/-. Applying a multiplier of 16, the Commission has awarded
Rs. 4,39,200/- and directed the apportionment of the same among the
claimants with which we can find no fault. We only add Rs.75,000/- to
that figure towards conventional amount to take the total amount
payable to the claimants to Rs.5,14,200/- to be proportionately
distributed among the claimants.
Case No. 368-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Ashok Kumar, a 44 years
old Brick-Kiln Owner. The claim was made by his widow, daughter and
his son for a sum of Rs.70,00,000/- as compensation. The evidence
adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was an
income-tax assessee and his income for the year 1994-95 was
assessed at Rs.1,59,600/-. The Commission deducted 1/3rd of the same
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 159
towards personal expenses of the deceased determining the loss of
dependency for the family at Rs.1,06,400/- per annum. Applying a
multiplier of 13, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.13,84,000/- as
compensation. There is, in our opinion, no room for enhancement in
this case except that we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure
which would take the total amount of compensation payable to the
claimants to Rs.14,58,200/-.
Case No. 373-DFT
In this case, deceased Kishori Lal was 67 years old. He was
an Income-tax Practitioner who left behind three sons, the claimants in
the case. The evidence adduced before the Commission established
that the deceased was earning an income of Rs.50,000/- per annum.
Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the Commission has taken the
loss of dependency at Rs.33,334/- per annum and applied a multiplier of
5 to the same to award a sum of Rs.1,70,000/-. Keeping in view the fact
that income of the deceased as disclosed by the claimants has been
accepted by the Commission and an appropriate multiplier applied to
the same, we find no room for any enhancement in this case except that
we add Rs.75,000/- towards conventional figure to the amount awarded
by the Commission which takes the total amount payable to the
claimants to Rs.2,45,000/- to be shared equally among the three
claimants.
Case No. 377-DFT
This case pertains to the death of 60 years old pensioner
named Sutanter Singh Bhatti who died in the fire incident. The claim was
made by his wife and two sons for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000/-.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 160
The evidence on record established that the deceased was getting a
pension of Rs.38,400/- per annum, out of which the Commission has
deducted 1/3rd of the said amount and determined the loss of
dependency to Rs.25,600/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the
Commission has awarded Rs.1,28,000/-. We see no reason to enhance
the said amount except adding a sum of Rs.75,000/- as conventional
amount. The total compensation payable to the claimants would, thus,
come to Rs.2,03,000/-, out of which 75% shall be paid to the widow of
deceased, while the remaining 25% shall be apportioned equally among
the sons.
Case No. 472-DFT
In this case arising out of the death of Satkartar Singh, the
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.2,712/-,
deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses and determined the loss of
dependency at Rs.21,768/-. Keeping in view the age of the claimant, the
Commission has chosen a multiplier of 8 and awarded a sum of
Rs.1,75,000/-. The claimants happen to be the parents of the deceased
who was serving as a Teacher in the private School at the salary
mentioned above. The Commission has while doing so disbelieved the
version given by the father that the deceased was also earning
Rs.12,000/- per month from tuition work. The deceased was a Trained
Teacher which fact has not been disputed and stands firmly established
by the certificates marked in the course of the inquiry. It would not,
therefore, be incorrect to assume that the deceased may have been
offering tuition to the students and supplementing his income. In the
absence of any documentary evidence, we are inclined to hold that over
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 161
and above Rs.2,712/- per month towards salary, the deceased was also
earning atleast Rs.3,300/- per month from tuition taking his gross
income to be Rs.6,000/-. Deducting 1/3rd of the said amount, the loss of
dependency would come to Rs.4,000/- or Rs.48,000/- per annum.
Applying a multiplier of 8 to that figure the amount payable to the
claimants would come to Rs.3,84,000/-. Addition of the conventional
figure of Rs.75,000/- would take the amount of compensation to
Rs.3,84,000/- + Rs.75,000/- = Rs.4,59,000/-.
Case No. 490-DFT
This case arose out of the death of Shri Dharam Singh. The
Commission has assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.2,100/-
per month and determined the loss of dependency to the family at
Rs.16,800/-. Applying a multiplier of 8, the Commission has awarded a
sum of Rs.1,35,000/- to the mother of the deceased who was 60 years
old at the time of her statement before the Commission.
The deceased, in this case, was a young boy of 23 years and
was not engaged in any vocation. The evidence on record shows that
the deceased was a Matriculate and had completed two years Diploma
Course in Agriculture D-Pharma from Sirsa. He was an able bodied
person and could have well started a career in due course. The
commission has applied to him the minimum wage payable to a skilled
worker and attributed to him an income of Rs.2,200/- only. That amount
appears to us to be on the lower side. Keeping in view the professional
qualification which the deceased had acquired his gainful employment
was only a matter of time. In our opinion, the notional income of the
deceased could be taken for purposes of award of compensation at
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 162
Rs.4,200/-. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said amount, the loss of
dependency would come to Rs.2,800/- per month or Rs.33,600/- per
annum. Applying a multiplier of 8 to the said figure, the amount payable
to the claimant would come to Rs.2,68,800/-. Addition of Rs.75,000/-
towards conventional amount to that figure would take the total amount
payable to the claimant to Rs.3,43,800/-.
Case No. 492-DFT
In this case, the claim was made by the sons of deceased
Som Nath Kamboj who was 40 years old serving in Haryana Civil
Services and posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dabwali. The
evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased
was a highly qualified officer and was selected for appointment in the
Haryana Civil Services on the basis of a competitive examination. He
was drawing a salary of Rs.9,668/- per month on the date of his death.
The Commission has deducted 1/3rd out of the said amount towards
personal expenses of the deceased and taken the loss of dependency to
the family to be Rs.77,344/- per annum. It has then applied a multiplier
of 15 to award a sum of Rs.11,60,000/-. This amount, in our opinion,
needs to be suitably enhanced keeping in view the fact that the
deceased was holding a permanent job in the State Government and
had prospects of further rise. On the principles stated in Sarla Verma’s
case (supra), an amount equivalent to 30% of the salary income of the
deceased could be added to the gross income of the deceased which
would take the gross monthly income of the deceased to Rs.12,568/- per
month or Rs.1,50,816/- per annum. Deducting 1/3rd out of the said
amount, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.1,00,544/- per
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 163
annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation
would work out to Rs.15,08,160/-. To that figure, we add Rs.75,000/-
taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to
Rs.15,83,160/-.
The amounts of compensation payable to the claimants in the
cases discussed above may now be summarised as under:-
Sr. Case Name &Amount Annual Future Annual lossRevised ConventionalTotal
No. No. Age of theawarded byIncome prospects of amount offigure (InAmount
Deceased the at the(In Rs.) dependencycompensationRs.) {8+9} (In
Commissiontime of {5+6-1/3rd payable Rs.)
(In Rs.) death towards {7xmultiplier
Iin Rs.) personal applied} (In
expenses} Rs.)
(In Rs.)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 8-DFT Gurdeep 312000 54000 0 36000 468000 75000 543000
Singh, 19
years
2 9-DFT Ravinder 390000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000
Kumar 20
years
3 12-DFT Ashwani 390000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000
Kumar, 29
years
4 10-DFT Balbir Singh, 408000 48000 0 32000 544000 75000 619000
24 years
5 11-DFT Ashok Gill, 648000 54000 0 36000 648000 75000 723000
26 years
6 13-DFT Bhagirath, 426300 37608 18804 37608 639336 75000 714336
32 years
7 15-DFT Ashok 816000 72000 0 48000 816000 75000 891000
Wadhera 32
years
8 16-DFT Radhey 900000 90000 0 60000 900000 75000 975000
Shyam
Shastri, 36
years
9 18-DFT Ravinder 160000 54000 0 36000 540000 75000 615000
Kumar 40
years
10 19-DFT Om Parkash 316251 36490 0 36327 472251 75000 547251
Mehta, (24327+
43years 12000)
11 20-DFT Des Raj, 68 160000 48000 0 32000 160000 75000 235000
years
12 22-DFT Surinder 345000 50000 0 33300 532800 75000 607800
Kumar 39
years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 164
13 23-DFT Ramesh 728000 60000 0 60000 780000 75000 855000
Chugh, 46 (Contribut (Contribution
years ion
14 24-DFT Sanjay 1152000 96000 0 64000 1152000 75000 1227000
Kwatra, 26
years
15 25-DFT Niranjan 500000 150000 0 100000 500000 75000 575000
Dass
Bansal, 60
years
16 26-DFT Sanjay 1224000 108000 0 72000 1224000 75000 1300,000
Grover 30 (rounded
years off)
17 27-DFT Gurdas 432000 36000 18000 36000 648000 75000 723000
Singh, 25
years
18 28-DFT Surinder 1360000 120000 0 80000 1360000 75000 1435000
Kumar, 30
years
19 29-DFT Ashok 1611000 161088 0 107400 1611000 75000 1686000
Kumar (Rounded
Sikka, 43 off)
years
20 30-DFT Jagwinder 362000 54000 0 36000 468000 75000 543000
Singh
21years
21 31-DFT Ravi 810000 80904 24276 70120 1051800 75000 1126800
Bhateja, 40
years
22 32-DFT Sukhbir 240000 144000 0 96000 480000 75000 555000
Singh, 31
years
23 33-DFT Radhey 324000 108000 0 72000 360000 75000 435000
Sham, 27
years
24 34-DFT Gurdev 204000 108000 0 72000 360000 75000 435000
Singh
Shant, 63
years
25 35-DFT Pawan 922500 92232 0 61488 922500 75000 997500
Kumar (Rounded (Rounded Off)
Sharma, 40 off)
years
26 36-DFT Rajbir 61200 180000 0 120000 600000 75000 675000
Singh, 25
years
27 37-DFT Naresh 528000 72000 0 48000 528000 75000 603000
Kumar, 25
years
28 73-DFT Manphool 192000 57600 28800 57600 288000 75000 363000
Chand, 35
years
29 343-DFT Shalbh 245000 28224 0 18816 244608 75000 319608
Juneja, 26
years
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 165
30 344-DFT Suresh 80000 24000 0 61000 305000 75000 380000
Kumar (45000 +
Sethi, 33 16000)
years
31 345-DFT Rakesh 335000 125000 0 83334 416670 75000 492000
Kumar, 33 (Rounded
years off)
32 362-DFT Bhim Sain, 510000 45000 0 30000 510000 75000 585000
33 years
33 366-DFT Ravi Kumar, 439200 41170 0 27450 439200 75000 514200
34 years (Rounded
off)
34 368-DFT Ashok 1384000 159600 0 106400 1384000 75000 1458200
Kumar, 44 (Rounded off)
years
35 373-DFT Kishori Lal, 170000 50000 0 33334 170000 75000 245000
67 years (Rounded off)
36 377-DFT Sutanter 128000 38400 0 25600 128000 75000 203000
Singh
Bhatti, 60
years
37 472-DFT Satkartar 175000 72000 0 48000 384000 75000 459000
Singh, 26 (Rounded
years off)
38 490-DFT Dharam 135000 50400 0 33600 268800 75000 343800
Singh 23
years
39 492-DFT Som Nath 1160000 116016 34800 100544 1508160 75000 1583160
Kamboj, 40
years
TOTAL 27697655
Category 6
In this category of cases fall 88 claim petitions filed by those
injured in the fire incident. The Commission has categorized these
cases into different groups depending upon the extent of disability
suffered by them and awarded compensation accordingly. The first of
these groups comprises cases in which the victims suffered disability on
account of burn injuries ranging between 1% to 10%. In Table “A” to the
report submitted by the Commission are enumerated 29 such cases.
The second group comprises cases where the disability reported ranges
between 11% to 20% enumerated in Table “B” to the report. Similarly,
Table “C” to the report enumerates cases where the disability suffered is
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 166
between 21% to 30%, while Table “D” enumerates cases in which the
disability reported is between 31% to 40%. Tables “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, “I”
and “J” similarly enumerate cases with disabilities ranging between 41%
to 50%, 51% to 60%, so on and so forth. Table “K” is the last of the
tables enumerating 9 cases in which the percentage of disability is
reported to be 100%.
The Commission of Inquiry has, while dealing with the claims
in question, referred to certain text books and articles dealing with “Burn
Injuries”, “Burn Trauma” and their treatment. It has also referred to
several judicial pronouncements that lay down the approach to be
adopted by the Courts while awarding compensation in injury cases.
While we see no error or misdirection on the part of the Commission in
identifying and applying the principles governing assessment and award
of compensation in injury cases, we may briefly refer to some of the
decisions on the subject only to emphasise that the task and process of
assessment of compensation in injury cases is by no means an easy
task and that some amount of speculation and guess work is inherent in
the process of adjudication of such claims.
In Wards v. James (1965) I All England Reports 563, Lord
Denning while dealing with the principles governing award of
compensation for personal injury identified three distinct matters that
need to be kept in mind while undertaking any such exercise. He said:-
“Firstly, Accessibility: In case of grave injury,
where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed. It
is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in
money, so difficult that the award must basically be
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 167a conventional figure, derived from experience or
from awards in comparable cases.
Secondly, Uniformity: There should be some
measure of uniformity in awards so that similar
decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there
will be great dissatisfaction in the community and
much criticism of the administration of justice.
Thirdly, Predictability: Parties should be able to
predict with some measure of accuracy the sum
which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for
by this means cases can be settled peaceably and
not brought to court, a thing very much to be public
good”.
It was further said:
“Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured
much for his ‘lost year’, you can, however,
compensate him for his loss during his shortened
span, that is, during his expected ‘years of survival’.
You can compensate him for his loss of earnings
during that time, and for the cost of treatment,
nursing and attendance. But how can you
compensate him for being rendered a helpless
invalid? He may, owing to the brain injury, be
rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or,
owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his
bed. He has lost everything that makes life
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 168worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges
and Juries have to do the best they can and give
him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it
wellnigh insoluble. They are being asked to
calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be
for the most part a conventional sum. The Judges
have worked out pattern and they keep it in line with
the changes in the value of money”.
Reference may also be made to Thomas v. British Railway
Board, 1977 ACJ 222 (CA. England), where Scarman, L.J. Observed:-
“…the greatest element of damage in a case such as
this is the pain, the suffering and the loss of the
ordinary pleasures and convenience associated with
healthy and mobile limbs. All that the court can do is
to award such a sum as will enable the plaintiff to
acquire some material possessions or to develop a
lifestyle which will offset to some extent her terrible
disability”.
In H.West & Son Limited v. Shephard 1958-65 ACJ 504
(HL, England) the House of Lords emphasised the need for uniformity
in the method and the approach to ensure that awards are reasonable,
assessed with moderation and also to ensure that comparable injuries
are compensated by comparable awards.
In Fowler v. Grace (1970) 114 Sol Jo 1993, the difficulty in
the assessment of monetary compensation notwithstanding the need for
valuation in terms of money was emphasized to avoid a situation where
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 169
the law became sterile and incapable of giving any remedy at all. The
Court observed:
“If a person in an accident loses his sight, hearing or
smelling faculty or a limb, value of such deprivation
cannot be assessed in terms of market value
because there is no market value for the personal
asset which has been lost in the accident, and there
is no easy way of expressing its equivalent in terms
of money. Nevertheless a valuation in terms of
money must be made, because, otherwise the law
would be sterile and not able to give any remedy at
all. Although accuracy and certainty were frequently
unobtainable, a fair assessment must be made.
Although undoubtedly there are difficulties and
uncertainties in assessing damages in personal
injury cases, that fact should not preclude an
assessment at best as can, in the circumstances be
made”. (emphasis supplied)
To the same effect are the observations made by Lord Morris
in Perry v. Cleaver 1969 ACJ 363 (H.L. England) where the Court
stated:
“To compensate in money for pain and for physical
consequences is invariably difficult but it is
recognized that no other process can be devised
than that of making a monetary assessment”.
Back home, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court have
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 170
laid down the norms to be adopted in assessing compensation in injury
cases and broadly classified damages payable under two distinct
heads, namely pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages. The
distinction between the two was pointed out by the Supreme Court in
R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others 1995
ACJ (Supreme Court) 366 in the following words:-
“Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of
compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the
damages have to be assessed separately as,
pecuniary damages and special damages.
Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has
actually incurred and which are capable of being
calculated in terms of money; whereas non-
pecuniary damages are those which are incapable
of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In
order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary
damages may includes expenses incurred by the
claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning
of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material
loss. So far as non pecuniary damages are
concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental
and physical shock, pain and suffering already
suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii)
damages of compensate for the loss of amenities of
life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on
account of injury the claimant may not be able to
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 171walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of
expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the
normal longevity of the person concerned is
shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort,
disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life”.
The difficulties besetting the process of calculating damages
were recognized by the Supreme Court even in Susamma Thomas’s
case (supra) where the Court observed that calculation of damages
necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis in which reason,
arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. The overall picture is
what matters. The amount of award, observed their Lordships, must not
be niggardly since the law values life and limb in the free society in
generous scales. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme
Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Limited v. Nirmala Devi
1980 ACJ 55 (SC).
Let us, in the light of the above pronouncements, now take up
for consideration the first group of 29 cases appearing in Table “A” of
the report in which percentage of disability suffered by the victims
ranges between 1% to 10%. Table “A” contained in the report gives the
particulars of the victim and the percentage of burns sustained by
him/her as also the percentage of disability reported by the doctors
examined in each one of the cases. A closer look at the percentage of
burns and the percentage of disability suffered by each victim would
show that except in Claim Petition No. 426-DFT filed by Mrs. Surinderpal
Kaur alias Shinder Pal Kaur where no burns or disability is reported, in
all other cases set out in Table “A”, the disability reported is not
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 172
necessarily equivalent to the extent of burns suffered by the victim. For
instance, in Claim Petition No. 379-DFT against 2% burns, the disability
suffered is 3%. A converse situation is found in Claim Petition No. 389-
DFT where the percentage of burns is 10% but the disability is only 2%.
In the case of Mehak claimant in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT the
percentage of burns was reported to be 35% but the disability is only
6%. Having said that, we must mention that in as many as 9 cases out
of 29, enumerated in Table “A”, the extent of burn injuries and the
percentage of disability are exactly the same. In the remaining, it is
either more or less than the percentage of burns. The position is similar
in cases enumerated in Table “B” also where the disability suffered is
between 11% to 20%. The extent of burns and the disability are more or
less comparable though not in all cases. That is true even in Table “C”
with a few exceptions in which cases of disability ranging between 21%
to 30% have been enumerated. In Table “D”, the disparity between the
percentage of burns and the percentage of disability becomes more
prominent. For instance, in Claim Petition No. 355-DFT filed by Vinod
Bansal 25% burns give rise to 36% disability. So also in Claim Petition
No. 432-DFT filed by Mrs. Shashi Bala 11% burns give rise to 40%
disability. A converse situation is noticed in Claim Petition No. 435-DFT
filed by Sanjay Midha where 65% burns have given rise to only 35%
disability.
The inference that one can draw from the above state of
affairs is that while burns and disability go hand in hand, one need not
necessarily be proportionate to the other. No definite co-relation is
discernible between the extent of burns and the extent of disabilities
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 173
suffered by the victims. Lesser burns have at times resulted in higher
disability. The converse is also noticed in many cases where higher
percentage of burns have resulted in relatively lower disability. It will
not, therefore, be possible to adopt a norm or formula for calculation of
compensation by reference to both i.e. Burns and disability. Any such
attempt may lead to anomalous and at times absurd results. The proper
course, therefore, appears to be to make the extent of disability as the
solitary basis for award of compensation regardless of the extent of
burns suffered by the victim except may be in exceptional cases where
the disability may be less but non pecuniary damages become
awardable on account of loss of amenities such as marriage prospects
for young girls and boys. Subject to that exception, we shall proceed to
determine the amount of compensation payable on the basis of the
extent of disability suffered by the victims on account of the burn injuries
sustained by them.
The One Man Commission has, in cases appearing in Table
“A” where the disability is between 1% to 10% awarded on a uniform
basis a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- towards compensation. It has, while doing
so, drawn support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra) where the Court noted that Justice
Chandrachud had not awarded any compensation in cases where the
burns were less than 10% but considered payment of Rs.2,00,000/- in
favour of each such victim to be just and reasonable. What is significant
is that the report submitted by Justice Chandrachud and the judgment
delivered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have both taken the
extent of burns as the basis for award of compensation. There was, it
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 174
appears, no material before the Supreme Court or before Justice
Chandrachud for that matter to indicate the extent of disability suffered
by the victims on account of the burn injuries sustained by them. Two
questions, in the above backdrop, arise at the threshold, namely:-
i) Whether award of Rs.2,00,000/- in 28 cases
appearing in Table “A” to the report is just and
reasonable compensation in cases where the
victims have suffered 1% to 10% disability (not
burns); And
ii) If a higher amount than what has been awarded in
Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) is to be awarded what
should that amount be, having regard to the time
period that separates the two incidents.
As noticed earlier, in cases enumerated in Table “A” of the
report, the extent of disability in comparison to the percentage of burns
is lower except in one case where 2% burns have resulted in 3%
disability. It is also noteworthy that in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT while
the disability is only 6%, the burns sustained were 35%. We, therefore,
consider it reasonable to hold that if the extent of disability is the basis
for award of compensation, the amount should be higher than what was
awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) for a comparable percentage
of burns. This means that for disability between 1% to 10% a higher
amount of compensation ought to be payable than what was paid for
burns sustained between 1% to 10%.
We are also of the view that payment of compensation to a
victim who has suffered 10% disability at the same rate at which a
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 175
victim who has suffered only 1% disability would also not be fair and
reasonable. While the Supreme Court has accepted the classification of
victims by reference to the extent of burns between 1% to 10% in Lata
Wadhwa’s case (supra) we see no reason why victims cannot be
classified more closely to reduce the disparity in the award of the
amount as far as possible. The proper course, in our opinion, would be
to classify the victims in Table “A” into two groups, one who have
suffered injuries between 1% to 5% and the other comprising victims
who have suffered injuries between 6% to 10%.
Coming to the second question, viz. what is the reasonable
amount of compensation payable to the victims in the two categories
mentioned above, we are of the view that having regard to the totality of
the circumstances, the nature of the evidence led and taking support
from what the Supreme Court has awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case
(supra) award of a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- to victims who suffered 1% to
5% disability should meet the ends of justice. The higher amount
awarded by us would not only take care of the qualitative difference
between the extent of burns and the resultant disability but also the time
gap between the incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and the one
we are concerned with.
In so far as victims falling in second category namely those
who suffered disability between 6% to 10% are concerned award of a
sum of Rs.4,00,000/- to each one of them would be just and fair in our
opinion. This amount would include payment for shock, pain and
suffering which the victims have gone through or may have to go
through for the rest of their lives.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 176
The second head under which amounts have been awarded to
the victims is on account of loss of marriage prospects. The Commission
has even for that purpose taken support from the decision of the
Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) where compensation
for loss of marriage prospects was related to the extent of burn injuries
The compensation awarded, accordingly, ranged between Rs.3,00,000/-
to Rs.10,00,000/- in the case of unmarried young girls and Rs.3,00,000/-
to Rs.5,00,000/- in the case of unmarried young boys. It is noteworthy
that in the case of victims who had 1% to 10% burns Justice
Chandrachud had not awarded any amount by way of compensation.
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had, however, awarded a
consolidated sum of Rs.2,00,000/- to such victims ex-gratia. We have
raised that amount to Rs.3,00,000/- in cases where the disability is
between 1% to 5% and to Rs.4,00,000/- in cases where the disability is
between 6% to 10%. We are of the opinion that every disability must in
the case of unmarried girls and boys affect their marriage prospects
also. The difficulty arises only in quantifying the amount of
compensation payable on that account. Taking a cue from the amount
awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) on account of loss of
marriage prospects, we are of the opinion that the amount of
compensation could start at the base figure of Rs.2,00,000/- in cases
where the percentage of disability among girls was between 1% to 5%
and rise by Rs.50,000/- in every slab of 5% higher disability. This would
mean that for the first category of cases involving young girls who
suffered disability between 1% to 5% the total amount of compensation
would be Rs.3,00,000/- for disability in addition to Rs.2,00,000/- for loss
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 177
of marriage prospects taking the total to Rs.5,00,000/-. For boys in that
category the loss of prospects of marriage could be compensated by
award of Rs.1,00,000/- with Rs.50,000/- additional amount for every slab
of 5% next above the first slab of 1% to 5%.
Adoption of the above method would, in our opinion, make the
entire process uniform, transparent and predictable at the same time
reduce the possibilities of any discrimination or unfair treatment in the
matter of award of compensation. It goes without saying that in cases
where the claimants are married men and women, the amount of
compensation towards marriage prospects would not be due and
payable. Applying the above norms, the final picture as regards
compensation payable to the victims would be as under:-
Sr. Case Name of Extent of Amount of non Amount of Total Amount
No. No. Injured disability pecuniary/ compensation (In Rs.)
(in %age) disability for loss of
compensation marriage
(In Rs.) prospects
(In Rs.)
UNMARRIED GIRLS
1 379-DFT Ramandeep 3 300000 200000 500000
2 450-DFT Pooja alias 4 300000 200000 500000
Shweta
3 444-DFT Anju Rani 4 300000 200000 500000
4 415-DFT Prabhleen Kaur 4 300000 200000 500000
alias Heena
5 384-DFT Pooja Parihar 5 300000 200000 500000
6 420-DFT Mehak 6 400000 250000 650000
7 425-DFT Manju 6 400000 250000 650000
8 405-DFT Ritu Bala 7 400000 250000 650000
9 407-DFT Priya 8 400000 250000 650000
386-DFT Neha alias 8 400000 250000 650000
10 Nikita
11 453-DFT Simmi Monga 9 400000 250000 650000
12 434-DFT Saniya 11 500000 300000 800000
13 429-DFT Gunjan Kamra 12 500000 300000 800000
14 381-DFT Rekha Rani 17 600000 350000 950000
15 421-DFT Bhavik 24 700000 400000 1100000
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 178
16 393-DFT Pooja 26 800000 450000 1250000
17 411-DFT Gagan Monga 37 1000000 550000 1550000
18 439-DFT Sakshi 38.5 1000000 550000 1550000
394-DFT Varsha alias 38.5 1000000 550000 1550000
19 Anjli
20 441-DFT Saloni Bhateja 40 1000000 550000 1550000
21 454-DFT Chanda Rani 45 1100000 600000 1700000
22 383-DFT Anmol Parihar 45 1100000 600000 1700000
23 437-DFT Rinku Sethi 60 1400000 750000 2150000
24 458-DFT Partima 68.5 1600000 850000 2450000
25 436-DFT Neha Midha 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
431-DFT Gagandeep 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
26 Butter
27 410-DFT Seema Rani 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
28 402-DFT Sarabjit Kaur 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
29 396-DFT Suman Kaushal 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
30 392-DFT Geeta Rani 100 2200000 1150000 3350000
UNMARRIED BOYS
1 451-DFT Abhishek 1 300000 100000 400000
2 457-DFT Harsimranjit 2 300000 100000 400000
Singh
3 418-DFT Rajinder Kumar 2 300000 100000 400000
4 389-DFT Dikshant 2 300000 100000 400000
5 475-DFT Rakesh Kumar 2.5 300000 100000 400000
6 438-DFT Sumit 3 300000 100000 400000
7 422-DFT Lalit Kumar 3 300000 100000 400000
8 390-DFT Deepak 3 300000 100000 400000
9 452-DFT Gaurav 4 300000 100000 400000
10 445-DFT Akash 6 400000 150000 550000
11 380-DFT Pankaj Mehta 10 400000 150000 550000
12 446-DFT David 13.5 500000 200000 700000
13 417-DFT Rahul Grover 15 500000 200000 700000
14 459-DFT Pawan Kumar 17 600000 250000 850000
15 378-DFT Navdeep Singh 21.5 700000 300000 1000000
16 403-DFT Subhash 26 800000 350000 1150000
Munna
17 428-DFT Rohit Joshi 27.5 800000 350000 1150000
18 385-DFT Sanjay Kumar 30 800000 350000 1150000
19 395-DFT Vikku 40 1000000 450000 1450000
20 404-DFT Ashish Kumar 50 1200000 550000 1750000
Bansal
21 433-DFT Sahil 54 1300000 600000 1900000
22 419-DFT Rajan 80 1800000 850000 2650000
23 412-DFT Prabhjot 80 1800000 850000 2650000
Vishwas
24 398-DFT Ankit Chugh 80 1800000 850000 2650000
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 179
25 442-DFT Iqbal Singh 85 1900000 900000 2800000
26 424-DFT Navjeet Sethi 85 1900000 900000 2800000
27 387-DFT Venus Sethi 88 2000000 950000 2950000
28 456-DFT Boby Girdhar 95 2100000 1000000 3100000
29 399-DFT Umesh Kumar 100 2200000 1050000 3250000
MARRIED WOMEN
1 426-DFT Surinderpal 0 150000 0 150000
Kaur alias
Shinder Pal
Kaur
2 423-DFT Sudha Rani 3 300000 0 300000
3 474-DFT Poonam Rani 7 400000 0 400000
4 449-DFT Kiran 7 400000 0 400000
5 460-DFT Veena Rani 8 400000 0 400000
6 406-DFT Savita Angi 15 500000 0 500000
7 448-DFT Alka 17.5 600000 0 600000
8 408-DFT Seema 28 800000 0 800000
9 447-DFT Sushma Rani 32.5 900000 0 900000
10 432-DFT Shashi Bala 40 1000000 0 1000000
11 416-DFT Kamlesh Rani 40 1000000 0 1000000
12 443-DFT Rajni 50 1200000 0 1200000
13 391-DFT Mitu Bala 50 1200000 0 1200000
14 382-DFT Anju Rani 50 1200000 0 1200000
15 427-DFT Savita Sharma 52 1300000 0 1300000
16 455-DFT Madhu Bala 55 1300000 0 1300000
17 413-DFT Veena Rani 70 1600000 0 1600000
18 440-DFT Neera Jagga 100 2200000 0 2200000
19 400-DFT Saroj Rani 100 2200000 0 2200000
MARRIED MEN
1 430-DFT Mukesh Kamra 8 400000 0 400000
2 388-DFT Bir Singh 8 400000 0 400000
3 477-DFT Anil Kumar 22 700000 0 700000
4 356-DFT Ramesh 800000 0 800000
Sachdeva 30
5 435-DFT Sanjay Midha 30.5 900000 0 900000
6 414-DFT Jai Muni Goel 35 900000 0 900000
7 401-DFT Keshav 35 900000 0 900000
Sharma
8 355-DFT Vinod Bansal 36 1000000 0 1000000
9 397-DFT Nazir Singh 50 1200000 0 1200000
10 409-DFT Girdhari Lal 70 1600000 0 1600000
TOTAL 112400000
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 180
Re: Question No.6
There are three distinct aspects which need to be addressed
while dealing with this question. The first relates to payment of interest
on the amount awarded in favour of the claimants. Whether any interest
is at all awardable, and, if so, from what date and at what rate would fall
for determination while dealing with this aspect. The second aspect
relates to the mode of recovery to be adopted in the event of a default in
the payment of the amount by those held liable. The third aspect that
needs to be addressed is whether the injured victims are entitled to a
direction for treatment at the expense of the State in future.
Coming to the question of award of interest, it was argued on
behalf of the School by Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram that the One Man
Commission had not awarded any interest in favour of the claimants,
which aspect has been left to be determined by this Court. He urged
that no interest had been awarded even in Lata Wadhwa’s case
(Supra) either by Justice Chandrachud, who conducted an Inquiry into
the claims or by the Apex Court. This, according to the learned counsel,
implied that award of interest was not an essential part of the award of
compensation for the Torts suffered by the claimants.
On behalf of the claimants, it was per-contra argued that since
the amount of compensation was being awarded on the principles
governing claims made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was
no reason why it should be denied to the claimants especially when
Section 171 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to award interest at such
rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 181
may be specified by the Tribunal. It was contended that interest was
awarded in M.S. Garewal’s case (Supra) and is invariably awarded in
all Motor Vehicle Accident Claim cases.
Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes a specific
provision for award of interest where any claim is allowed by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal. The rate of interest and the date from which
the same is payable is, however, in the discretion of the Tribunal,
subject to the condition that the date of award of interest cannot be
earlier to the date of making of the claim. As seen by us in the earlier
part of this judgment award of compensation to the claimants in death
and injury cases has been guided by the broad principles applicable to
cases arising under the Motor Vehicles Act. The multiplier method of
determination of compensation in death cases and the broad principles
on which amounts have been determined by us in injury cases are not
different from those applied and determined under the said Act. Such
being the position, there is no reason why award of interest should be
denied to the claimants especially when the right to claim and receive
the amount relates back to the date on which the incident had taken
place and the award of interest to the date on which a claim for payment
of compensation filed. That apart award of interest simply ensures that
the claimants are not prejudiced on account of the delay in
determination of their claims by suitably compensating them, for such
delay. No juristic principle has been cited by the respondents on which
award of interest may be said to be impermissible in a case like the one
at hand. Indeed even in M.S. Garewal’s case (Supra) the Court had
awarded interest at the rate of 6% in favour of the claimants. The fact
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 182
that no interest was awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (Supra) also
cannot in our opinion, be construed as a declaration of law especially
when the question whether interest was payable and if so, from what
date and at what rate had not been urged before their Lordships for
determination. If the judgment in Lata Wadhwa’s Case (Supra) is silent
on the question of interest, the same cannot be cited as an authority for
denial of interest to the claimants in the present case.
That brings us to the question as to what should be the rate of
interest and from what date. Insofar as the date from which the interest
is to be awarded is concerned, we see no reason to go against the
provisions of the Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no matter
that provision may have no direct application to the case at hand. It
would be just and proper in our opinion to award interest only from the
date of the filing of the claim petitions before the One Man Commission.
The rate at which the said interest ought to be paid to the claimants also
should not present any serious difficulty. Although there are decisions in
which rate of interest has been as high as 12% per annum, as in the
case of Kaushlya Devi Vs. Karan Arora & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1912
and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman
Iyer and Anr., 2003(4) RCR (Civil) 764, we are of the view that simple
interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the claim petition
would serve the ends of justice.
The next question relates to the mode of recovery of the
amount awarded against the respondents in the event of their default in
making the payment. It may be recalled that out of the total amount
awarded by us, 45% has been made payable by the State Government
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 183
out of which 15% is its own liability while the remaining 30% is the
liability of the Dakshin Haryana Bijli Virtran Nigam and Municipal
Committee, Dabwali with liberty to the State to recover the same from
the Board and Municipal Committee, Dabwali. A direction issued to the
State Government to pay the said amount within the time stipulated by
us, would in our opinion, suffice as a violation of the said direction may
itself be the subject matter of contempt proceedings before this Court.
What is significant is that 55% of the amount awarded by us is payable
by respondents No. 4, 5 and 9. While proceedings for disobedience of
the direction to pay may be permissible even for enforcement of the said
direction against the said respondents also we need to clarify that apart
from recourse to those proceedings, the amount held recoverable from
respondents No. No. 4, 5 and 9 shall be recoverable both as fine and/or
as arrears of land revenue. In the event of default in payment of the
amount within the time that we are granting for such payment or in the
event of a dispute as to the exact sum payable in terms of our order, the
Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall be competent
to determine the question and direct payment which direction/order shall
tantamount to a certificate for recovery of the amount so determined
from the said respondents, as fine and/or as arrears of land revenue by
the concerned revenue authority.
That leaves us with the only other aspect viz. whether
directions for treatment at the expense of the State need to be issued for
the benefit of the injured victims. All that we need say in that regard is
that this Court had, vide its orders dated 10.12.1996, 24.09.2001 &
18.02.2002 directed such treatment. Treatment has been accordingly
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 184
provided to the injured as and when required. All that we need say is
that in case the State-run hospitals in Haryana are not equipped to
provide the requisite treatment to the victims, such treatment may be
provided either at the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and
Research, Chandigarh, or at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
New Delhi, at the Cost of the State Government upon satisfaction of the
Director, Health Services, Government of Haryana that such treatment
cannot be provided in the State run Hospitals.
Before concluding, we need to point out that while the hearing
of these cases was, at an advanced stage, Civil Miscellaneous No.
1011 of 2009 was filed by applicant Vinod Kumar claiming compensation
on account of death of his wife and daughter namely Smt. Asha, aged
28 years and Ganga alias Kunjan Rani aged about 3½ years and Civil
Miscellaneous No.16045 of 2009 was filed by applicant Smt. Anil Arora
wife of Vijay Arora claiming compensation on account of death of her
husband Vijay Kumar and sons namely Ankit aged six years and Archit
aged seven years. It was submitted by Ms. Anju Arora, Advocate, that
these claims could be entertained by this Court at this stage also and
suitable directions be issued for claiming compensation. We regret our
inability to do so. The proceedings before the Commission had
remained pending for nearly six years. No claim petition was, however,
filed by the applicants before the One Man Commission. The applicants
have attempted to offer an explanation for their failure. We do not,
however, consider it necessary to examine either the explanation or the
claim for the present proceedings, at this stage, which remained
confined only to cases that were filed before the One Man Commission
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 185
and in which evidence was adduced by the claimants in proof of their
respective claims. Whether or not the applicants can maintain the claims
at this distinct point of time and, if so, whether the allegations forming
the basis of claim are supported by any material and, if so, what is the
amount which can be awarded by way of compensation, are mixed
questions of law and facts which we cannot, in these proceedings,
entertain at this stage. To that we can say that the applicants shall be
free to file appropriate proceedings permissible in law for such relief as
may be due to them but subject to all just exceptions including
maintainability and limitations.
In the result we pass the following order:
1) The amounts determined in each one of the cases
referred to in the body of this judgment are hereby
awarded in favour of the claimants with interest at
the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f. date of the filing of
the claim petition before the One Man Commission.
2) Out of the total amount payable to each one of the
claimant, the State of Haryana shall pay 45% of the
total amount of compensation awarded in each one
of the cases dealt with by us with liberty to recover
15% each of the amount so paid from Dakshin
Haryana Bijli Virtran Nigam and Municipal
Committee, Dabwali. The balance 55% of the
amount awarded shall be payable by respondents
No.4, 5 and 9 jointly and severally.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 186
3) The apportionment for the enhanced amount of
compensation among the claimants shall be in the
same ratio as recommended by the One Man
Commission subject only to modifications and/or
further directions indicated by us in the body of this
judgment. We make it clear that in cases where we
have directed deposit of the amount of
compensation in the name of minor claimants, the
same shall be disbursed to the claimants in case
they have already attained majority.
4) The amount awarded by us together with interest
shall be deposited by the respondents in the ratio
indicated in para 2 above with the Additional Civil
Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for disbursement among
the claimants within a period of 4 months from
today, failing which the rate of interest awarded by
us on the principal amount held payable, shall stand
enhanced from 6% to 10% per annum from the date
the period of 4 months expires till actual payment is
made.
5) In the event of any default by the respondents in the
making of the payment, the claimants shall be free
to not only institute proceedings for the breach of the
direction of this Court but also approach the
Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for
effecting recovery of the amount remaining unpaid.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 187
6) The Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall,
in any such event, initiate proceedings for recovery
of the amount that remains unpaid as if the same
was recoverable as fine and/or as arrears of land
revenue for which purpose he shall be competent to
issue certificates and instructions to the Collector(s)
concerned for recovering the amount outstanding.
7) Treatment for the burn injury sustained by the
injured victims shall be provided free of cost. In case
the same is not available in the State-run hospitals
in Haryana, the same shall be arranged in Post
Graduate Institute of Medical Education and
Research, Chandigarh or at the All India Institute of
Medical Sciences, New Delhi upon satisfaction by
the Director, Health Services, Government of
Haryana that such treatment is essential but cannot
be provided in the State-run hospitals.
8) Liberty is given to the petitioners to seek further
clarification of this order at any stage, should the
need so arise.
9) Civil Miscellaneous Nos.1011 and 16045 of 2009
are dismissed with liberty to the applicants to file
appropriate proceedings for payment of amount of
compensation and/or other reliefs due to them
subject to just exceptions including maintainability of
claims and limitations etc.
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 188
10) The costs involved in the setting up of the
Commission from beginning till end shall be borne
by the State of Haryana.
11) The parties shall bear their own costs in this Court,
and in the proceedings before the One Man
Commission.
(T.S.Thakur)
Chief Justice
(Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia)
Judge
November 9th, 2009
"Deepak"