JUDGMENT
M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J.
Page 0170
1. Deepak Prakash, the petitioner, who was initially appointed as Chairman of the Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) by the order of the Governor dated 26.10.2003 invoking powers under Article 35(a) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation, was removed from the post of Chairman on 4.5.2007 by the Governor invoking Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner has filed this writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
2. The petitioner has made two-fold prayer in the present writ petition – (i) for declaring the powers of the Governor under Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation for removal of the Chairman as void and ultra vires to Article 14 of the Constitution and (ii) for holding that the order of removal of the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the Corporation through notification dated 4.5.2007 is illegal.
3. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, appearing for the petitioner, would elaborately argue with reference to these prayers. The gist of the submissions made with regard to each prayer could be summarized as follows:
(i) Under Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation, the Governor may at any time remove the Chairman at his absolute discretion. This Article does not provide for giving opportunity to the person concerned Page 0171 before removal; there is no need to comply with the principles of natural justice; there is also no need for the Governor to assign any reason for removal. There is no guideline prescribed under the provisions of law as to how the said absolute discretion is to be exercised by the Governor. The absolute power of exercising discretion cannot be vested upon any authority. Therefore, this Article giving absolute discretion is to be declared void and ultra vires to the Article 14 of the Constitution.
(ii) The submission with regard to the second prayer is as follows:
(A) Under Article 163 of the Constitution, the Governor has to act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution. The decision for removal of the Chairman of the Corporation has to be taken by the Cabinet consisting of Council of Ministers and only on its recommendation, the Governor can pass an order of removal. This has not been done in this case.
(B) Even though the absolute discretion is vested with the Governor in the matter of removal of the Chairman, the same has to be exercised in good faith and on relevant considerations based upon the materials. The satisfaction of the authority should not be based upon extraneous grounds such as mala fide etc. The very fact that no reason has been assigned in the matter of removal by the Governor would show that the Governor has not applied his mind and exercised discretionary power on the basis of objective materials.
(C) The doctrine of pleasure as vested under Article 310 of the Constitution has no application in the present case. In this case, the petitioner was appointed earlier by the then Government and he has been removed by the present Government with different political party in power. As such, the Governor acted at the instance of the political power and political reasons, which reflects mala fide. Therefore, the order is illegal.
4. In reply to the above submissions, the Advocate General would contend that the writ petition is not maintainable, as the Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to question the validity of the Articles of Association framed under the Companies Act. He would also contend that the absolute discretion used by the Governor has been properly exercised and in the absence of any material to show that there is mala fide, the order cannot be said to be illegal, especially when the order does not indicate any stigma cast on the person removed.
5. On behalf of both, several authorities have been cited. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and carefully considered the submissions made by either side. We have also given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions.
6. The first point relates to the validity of the vires of the Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation which gives power to the Governor to remove the Chairman at any time. The main objection with regard to maintainability of the petition has been raised by the learned Advocate General. According to him, Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the Articles of the Association which has been framed in terms of the provisions contained in the Indian Companies Act, 1966; if the petitioner desires to challenge the legality or Page 0172 propriety of the Articles of Association framed under the provisions of the Companies Act, he must have filed necessary application before the Registrar, Company Law Board, constituted under the Companies Act, 1966, and without doing so, the petitioner cannot challenge the vires of the Articles of Association, which is not a legislation, nor the orders passed by the State Government, in this writ petition, as it is not sustainable under the law.
7. We find force in the said submission. It is a settled law that the vires of Articles of Association of the Corporation cannot be challenged in the writ jurisdiction, as it is neither a legislation, nor it comes within the category of delegated legislation or an executive order passed by the State Government. In this context, it would be worthwhile to refer to some of the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court dealing with this point.
(A) In the case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Ors. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad and Ors. , the Supreme Court would observe as follows:
We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law….
The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society. They may be binding between the persons affected by them but they do not have the force of statute.
(B) In the case of Naresh Chandra Sanyal v. The Calcutta Stock Exchange Association Ltd. , the Supreme Court would make the following observations:
Subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, the Company and the members are bound by the provisions contained in the Articles of Association. The Articles regulate the internal management of the Company and define the powers of its officers. They also establish a contract between the Company and the members and between the members inter se. The contract governs the ordinary right and obligations incidental to membership in the Company.
(C) In the case of Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College Shamli and Ors. v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors. reported in (1976) 2 SCC 58, the Supreme Court would observe as follows:
On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is, therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service, can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer.
(D) In the case of R. Jagadeesh Kumar v. P. Srinivasan and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 Karnataka 420, the Karnataka High Court would observe as follows:
A writ would not lie in the nature of mandamus to the Stock Exchange which is a company registered under the Companies Act in respect of an action to expel a member from the company. The Stock Exchange in exercising its powers under the Articles of Association in the matter of admission or expulsion of members owes Page 0173 only a duty to that particular members and not to the public at large and does not discharge any public duty which is amenable to writ jurisdiction.
8. The observations referred to above would clearly indicate, as correctly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, that writ would not lie against the Article of the Articles of Association of the Corporation, when the same is neither a legislation passed by the State Government, nor it comes within the category of delegated legislation or executive instructions or orders issued by the State Government. The said Article has been framed in terms of the provisions contained in the Indian Companies Act, 1966, and the same regulates the internal management of the Corporation and they may be binding between the persons affected by them, yet they do not have the force of statute.
9. Hence, it has to be held that the challenge of the petitioner to the Article 35(e)(iv), one of the said Articles of Association, contending that it is ultra vires to the Article 14 of the Constitution of India through writ petition cannot be maintained, as the same does not fall under the category of legislation or executive orders. As such, the first prayer is not maintainable.
10. Even though the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while arguing the matter, would ultimately concede that the petitioner cannot challenge the vires of the Articles of Association of the Corporation framed under the Indian Companies Act under Article 226 of the Constitution, he strenuously submitted by way of pressing the second point to the effect that absolute discretion as referred to in Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation does not mean arbitrary discretion and in the absence of any objective material placed before the Governor, it cannot be said that the Governor exercised his jurisdiction in an objective manner and on this aspect, this petition may be allowed and order of removal can be set aside. Elaborating this point involving second prayer, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would raise contentions which could be summarized into following categories:
(a) The Governor shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and under the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. So the Governor takes decision of removal of Chairman only after the recommendation made by the Council of Ministers. In this case, the decision has not been taken by the Cabinet.
(b) The power conferred upon the Governor to remove the Chairman is based on absolute discretion as provided under Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association and this exercise of absolute discretion cannot be without any reasoning.
(c) When the discretionary power conferred upon the public authority, it is to be exercised in good faith and on relevant considerations. The satisfaction of the authority must be reflected in the order by giving reasons for the removal. There is no material placed before the Governor, nor the details of materials reflect in the order.
(d) The doctrine of pleasure as provided under Article 310 of the Constitution of India has got no application in the present case. The absolute discretionary power conferred upon the Governor under Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association is to be based upon public policy, public good and public interest. None of the above circumstances has been recorded in the order.
(e) Admittedly the petitioner has not been given any opportunity of show cause notice, nor was the petitioner heard before passing the impugned order. The Page 0174 principles of natural justice operates in the administrative functions also. Therefore, non-compliance of the same is illegal.
(f) Merely because of the fact that different political party is elected to power during the continuance of the petitioner on the post of Chairman, that itself does not confer any power upon the Governor for removal of the petitioner. The Governor merely acted on the advice of the Chief Minister under political compulsion, who assumed power recently.
11. Let us now deal with the above aspects one by one.
The first aspect would relate to the failure to obtain consent of the Council of Ministers as per the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. As pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, under Rule 15 of the Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, the matter mentioned in Rule 15 have to be discussed in the meeting of the Council of Ministers and then only on their recommendation, the Governor can take decision.
(i) Rule 15 of the Rules of Executive Business provides as follows:
All cases referred to in the Third Schedule shall be submitted to the Chief Minister through the Secretary to the Council (Cabinet Secretariat) after consideration by the Minister-in-charge, with a view to obtaining his orders for circulation of the case or for bringing it up for consideration at a meeting of the Council under Rule 6 or in case of extreme urgency the order of the Chief Minister shall be obtained for authorizing action in anticipation of the approval of the Council. Where the approval of the Council is anticipated, the concerned Department shall send a memorandum of consideration of the Council at a meeting within three weeks.
(ii) The bare perusal of the above Rule reveals that there must be discussion and decision by the Council of Ministers only with regard to the cases referred to Third Schedule. If the Third Schedule is looked at, it is clear that there are 33 items mentioned but none of the items would refer to any subject relating to the removal of the Chairman of the Corporation. Therefore, the alleged failure to place the file relating to removal of the Chairman before the Council of Ministers before sending it to the Governor would not be said to be a violation of Article 15. When the item in question does not relate to the matters covered in the Third Schedule, it is not obligatory on the part of the Government to have a discussion by the Cabinet and only after the ratification by the Cabinet, the matter has to be sent to the Governor. However, in this case, in the second written notes filed by the learned Advocate General, it is specifically stated that the matter relating to the petitioner’s removal was considered by the Cabinet and only after cabinet’s recommendation for removal, the matter was sent to the Governor, who passed the order of removal.
Therefore, there is no merit in this contention relating to first aspect.
12. With regard to the second aspect relating to the absolute discretion conferred upon the Governor as to how to be exercised, it is to be seen as to how the wordings in Article 35(e)(iv) are couched in the relevant provision. Now let us reproduce Article 35 of the Articles of Association of the Corporation, which reads thus:
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35. (a) All members of the Board including Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Director, Functional Director and Whole time Directors shall be appointed by Governor.
(b) Non official part time director may be appointed by the governor for a period not exceeding 3 years at a time without prejudice to the right of Governor to terminate at any time before his tenure.
(c) Directors shall be paid such remuneration/salary or allowances as the Governor from time to time determine subject to relevant provisions of the Act. Such reasonable remuneration as may be fixed by the Governor may be paid to any one or more of the Director for extra services rendered by him.
(d) The Chairman or M.D. or other Director shall exercise such powers in relation to affairs of the company as may be delegated to them by Board of Directors, and are not required to be done by the Board at the General meeting.
(e)(i) The Governor from time to time appoint one or more functional directors who shall be whole time employee of the company (ii) at any AGM all Directors except Chairman, Managing Director and whole time Director shall retire from office. The Chairman, Managing Director and whole time Directors shall retire on their ceasing to hold the office. A retiring Director shall be deemed to be re-appointed in the absence of any direction to the contrary. (iii) Part time nonofficial directors shall retire on completion of tenure of Directorship unless otherwise removed by Governor. (iv) The Governor may from time to time or at any time remove Chairman, Vice Chairman or part time Directors from office at his absolute discretion. Chairman, Vice Chairman and whole time Director may be removed from office in accordance with terms of the appointment or it no such terms have been specified on expiry of 3 months notice issued in writing by Governor or immediate effect or payment of pay in lieu of the notice period. (v) The Governor shall have right to fill any vacancy caused by removal, resignation, death or otherwise.
13. Under Article 35(a), all members of the Board including Chairman, Managing Director and all time Directors shall be appointed by the Governor. Article 35(b) provides for appointment of non-official part time Director for a period not exceeding 3 years and even before the expiry of tenure, he can be terminated by the Governor. Article 35(e)(i) would provide for appointment of functional Directors who shall be whole time employee. Article 35(e)(iii) would provide for the part time non-official Directors who shall retire on completion of tenure of directorship. It also provides for removal by the Governor in the meantime. Under Article 35(e)(iv), the Governor may remove Chairman and others at any time at his absolute discretion in accordance with the terms of the appointment or if no such term is specified, on expiry of 3 months’ notice and payment of pay in lieu of the notice period. Article 35(e)(v) provides for filling up any vacancy immediately after removal of the person confirmed for the post.
14. The above Articles would indicate that a period of three years has been fixed only with reference to the Directors and no period has been fixed for the tenure of the Chairman and Vice Chairman; on the other hand, Article 35(e)(iv) envisages that they can be removed by the Governor from time to tome or at any time at his absolute discretion. So Article 35(e)(iv) clearly says that appointment of the Chairman is made by the Governor under Article 35(a) and the said Chairman has to hold Page 0176 office till the pleasure of the Governor. Admittedly, there is no tenure prescribed in the appointment letter of the petitioner dated 26.10.2002. Let us refer to the appointment letter dated 26.10.2002, which reads as follows:
Government of Jharkhand
MINES AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
Notification No. 2035/M
Dated 26.10.02
His Excellency, the Governor of Jharkhand, has kindly consented to make following appointments in Board of Directors of Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation:
1.
Sri Deepak Prakash
Chairman
Ashok Kunj, P.O. Ashok
Nagar
Ranchi
2.
Sri A.D. Baijal
Non-official
Chief of Mines, Tisco
Part-time
Director
3.
Shri T.N. Mishra
Do
Retd. Director, Geology
4.
Sri Nandlal Rungta
Do
Runga Mines, Chaibasa
2. Shri Deepak Prakash, Chairman, will have the status of State Minister. His tenure of appointment will be at the pleasure of His Excellency until further orders.
3. The tenure of Non-official Part-time Directors will be for a period of maximum three years from the date of the notification. By the order of His Excellency, their appointment can be terminated prior to three years also.
4. This notification shall be effective with immediate effect.
15. The relevant Article of the Articles of Association of the Corporation as well as the appointment letter would show that though tenure has been prescribed for non-official part time Directors, no tenure has been prescribed so far as the Chairman is concerned. It is also specifically stated that the tenure of appointment shall be at the pleasure of the Governor till further orders. The removal order dated 4.5.2007 is as follows:
Government of Jharkhand
MINES AND GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT
Notification
No. M. G. (Misc.)-29/2002(Part)-63/M.C Ranchi dated 4.05.2007
In exercise of the powers vested under Article 35(e)(iv) of Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association of Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation, Shri Deepak Prakash, Chairman, Jharkhand State Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. is removed from the post of Chairman by giving three months’ pay in lieu of three months’ notice.
This Notification will be effective with immediate effect.
This order indicates that the power under Article 35(e)(iv) has been invoked by the Governor. So the removal by giving 3 months salary in lieu of three months notice. Thus, the appointment of the petitioner has been made in terms of Article 35(a) of the Articles of Association of the Corporation and similarly removal has been made in terms of Article 35(e)(iv) thereof.
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16. The above given details would indicate that the Governor has been given absolute discretion to appoint or to terminate the Chairman from time to time or at any time, especially when the tenure has not been fixed. This discretion, which is absolute, is given to the higher authority of the State. It cannot be merely stated that the discretion used by the Governor is not on the basis of objective materials but is mala fide under the political compulsion without any material whatsoever. Let us refer some decisions with reference to that.
(a) In the case of Chinta Lingam and Ors. v. Government of India and Ors. , the Supreme Court would make the following observations:
It may also be remembers that emphasis was laid in Pannalal Binjrajf v. Union of India (1957) SCR 233 on the power being vested not in any minor official but in top-ranking authority. It was said that though the power was discretionary but it was not necessarily discriminatory and abuse of power could not be easily assumed. There was moreover a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with rules of law.
(b) In the case of Organo Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. , the Supreme Court would make the following observations:
This Court has repeatedly laid it down that where the discretion to apply the provisions of a particular statute is left with the Government or one of the highest officers, it will be presumed that the discretion vested in such high authority will not be abused. The Government or such authority is in a position to have all the relevant and necessary information in relation to each kind of establishment, the nature of defaults made by the employer, and the necessity to decide whether the damages to be imposed should be exemplary or not….
There is always a presumption that public officials would discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the rules of law.
(c) In the case of V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Administration) reported in 1980 Supp SCC 249, the Supreme Court would make the following observations:
It is well settled that discretionary power is not the same thing as power to discriminate nor can the constitutional validity of a law be tested on the assumption that where a discretionary power is conferred on a high authority, the same may or would be exercised in a discriminatory manner.
17. In view of the above observations made by the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the absolute discretion vested with the Governor, the top-ranking authority of the State, who is presumed to perform any act honestly, has acted or obliged the Government for political reasons without any basis.
18. The third aspect would be in relation to the absence of the reasons mentioned in the order of removal. The reading of the order impugned would not indicate any stigma inflicted upon the petitioner. The petitioner originally was appointed in 2003 and has been removed in 2007, i.e. nearly after five years. Even though no period of time has been fixed for Chairman as fixed in other categories, he was allowed to work for a period of five years and is removed by the Governor, as indicated above, Page 0178 not only on the basis of his decision alone, but also on the basis of the recommendation of the State Government. Hence, it must be presumed that when the State Government sent the file for removal, the top-ranking authority of the State, namely the Governor, must be presumed to have gone through the file in entirety and passed the order of removal.
19. This means that the decision for removal has been taken by the Governor on the basis of the objective materials found in the file. In the absence of any material whatsoever, it cannot be said that the objective materials in the file have not been placed before the Governor or the same have not been looked into by the Governor. In other words, it cannot be presumed that the Governor has simply signed the order of removal without going through the file. Unless the petitioner makes out a case through the said material that the Governor did not at all apply his mind while exercising his discretion for passing the order of removal, it cannot be claimed that the absolute discretion has not been properly used. The absence of reasons in the order passed cannot be complained of, since the Article 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association would not provide for giving reasons for removal. Since the Governor has passed an order on the basis of the file sent by the Government with recommendation, it must be construed that the decision has been taken by the Governor for removal on the basis of materials placed before him. Therefore, this point has also no merit.
20. The other aspects, which have been argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, are with reference to the doctrine of pleasure and violation of principles of natural justice. Both these points can be considered together as they are interconnected.
21. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Article 310 of the Constitution of India has got no application in the present case and as such, opportunity of hearing must have been given to the petitioner by the Governor before passing the order of removal in consonance with the principles of natural justice.
22. This contention cannot be countenanced for the following reasons.
(A) Reading of Articles 35(a) and 35(e)(iv) of the Articles of Association would make it clear that both the appointment of the Chairman as well as removal is at the pleasure of the Governor. As per Article 35(a), the Chairman shall be appointed by the Governor. As per the Article 35(e)(iv), the Governor may from time to time or at any time, remove the Chairman from the office at this absolute discretion. These wordings contained in both the Articles would connote that the appointment of the petitioner as Chairman has been made at the pleasure of the Governor. This means the person concerned continues in the post so long as the pleasure of the Governor exists.
(B) As indicate above, the absolute discretion as contained in Article 35(e)(iv) under doctrine of pleasure was exercised by the Governor on the basis of the recommendation of the State Government, which was conveyed to the Governor along with the materials contained in the file. Therefore, it cannot be said that the doctrine of pleasure as incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution of India would not apply to this case. In this context, let us refer to some of the decisions of the Supreme Court.
(i) In the case of Om Narain Agarwal and Ors. v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur and Ors. , the Supreme Court Page 0179 has held that “When the doctrine of pleasure is applied, naturally the question relating to the violation of principles of natural justice would not arise.” The Supreme Court would observe as follows:
So far as nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government….
In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution, nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members.
(ii) In the case of Krishna S/O Bulaji Borate v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2001) 2 SCC 441, the Supreme Court would make the following observations:
The removal spoken of here neither casts any stigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of pleasure which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit….
Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving an opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then Sub-section (3) of Section 10 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing an order of removal under Section 10.
23. From the above decisions of the Supreme Court, the following mandates have emerged.
(a) The provisions that the person concerned shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government would not offend any Article of the Constitution, nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution.
(b) There is no question of any violation of the principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated member before his removal, nor removal under the pleasure doctrine puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated member.
(c) Removal neither casts any stigma, nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals that the doctrine pleasure is implicit in this section. Only when the stigma is cast, then the question of giving opportunity to such an incumbent would arise.
24. In view of the above, the doctrine of pleasure is applied in this case and as such, there is no question of invoking the principles of natural justice, as there is no stigma cast on the person concerned. In this case, admittedly, the Governor did not cast any stigma on the petitioner; on the other hand, the Governor passed the order of removal after allowing him to act for 5 years by exercising his discretion, that too on the recommendation of the State Government. As such, the question of Page 0180 hearing or opportunity and of recording reason in the order impugned would not at all arise especially when there is no adverse remark passed as against the person removed in the order of removal
25. Much have been said about the alleged political compulsion. It is vehemently contended that the petitioner was removed only on the recommendation of the Chief Minister to accommodate his own political men in that position and as such, the recommendation on political reason is mala fide and consequently the order of removal is illegal.
26. We are not very much impressed with this argument. There is no basis for making allegation of mala fide against the Governor and the Chief Minister.
In this context, it would be relevant to refer to one observation made by the Supreme Court in the case of Om Narain Agarwal and Ors. v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur and Ors. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 242, being quite relevant to be considered, which is as follows:
We are also not impressed with the argument that there would be a constant fear of removal at the will of the State Government and is bound to demoralize the nominated members in the discharge of their duties as a member in the Board. We do not find any justification for drawing such an inference, inasmuch as, such contingency usually arises only with the change of ruling party in the Government. Even the highest functionaries in the Government like the Governors, the Ministers, the Attorney-General and the Advocate General discharge their duties efficiently, though removal at the pleasure of the competent authority under the law, and it cannot be said that they are bound to become demoralized or remain under a constant fear of removal and as such do not discharge their functions in a proper manner during the period they remain in the office.
27. The above observation would clearly indicate that the change of nominated members with the change of the Government would not be a ground to hold that the removal is mala fide. In the absence of any adverse remarks or stigma passed or cast in the order of removal, the petitioner cannot complain of grievance when the Governor acts on the recommendation and advice of the State Government by using his absolute discretion in the light of the doctrine of pleasure.
28. In view of the discussion made above, none of the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner would impress us with reference to the points referred to above. Thus, the petition, which is not sustainable both under law and facts, is dismissed. No costs.
Amareshwar Sahay, J.
29. I agree.