IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P.No.992 of 2009
Deodatt @ Deodatt Singh. ... ... ...Petitioner(s)
-Versus-
The State of Jharkhand. ... ... ... ...Opp. Party
------------
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D.K.SINHA
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate.
Mr. Amit Kumar Tiwari, Advocate.
For the State: A.P.P.
-------------
06/ 22.06.2011
The petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashment of the
order dated 11.11.2008 by which cognizance of the offence was taken by the
Special Judge (Vigilance), Ranchi under Sections 161/162/120B of the Indian
Penal Code and under Sections 13(i) (d) (ii) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 against all the accused persons except one Sumant Singh, who was
not sent for trial for want of appropriate sanction on 11.11.2008 without
explaining the inordinate delay of 8 months. Neither the Investigating Officer
explained about the inordinate delay of about 16 years in submission of the
police report under Section 173 Code of Criminal Procedure nor the Special
Judge, Vigilance could be able to explain as to why cognizance of the offence
could be taken after about 7 months of the receipt of the charge-sheet and it
would be evident that the petitioners from the very beginning have been
denied the constitutional right of his speedy trial as guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of India.
In “Vakil Prasad Singh Vrs. The State of Bihar”, reported in
(2009) 3 S.C.C 355, the Apex Court held,
“Where the court comes to the conclusion that the
right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the
charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be
quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the
nature of offence and other relevant circumstances,
quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of
justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an
appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable
including fixation of time frame for conclusion of trial.”
It was further held,
“The power possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 is undoubtedly very wide but it has to be
exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real
and substantial justice for the administration of which alone
the courts exist. The inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to
whim or caprice. It is trite to state that the said powers have
to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only
where the court is convinced, on the basis of material on
record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be
an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of
justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed.”
2.
Mr. Mazumdar, learned Sr. Counsel submits that admittedly the petitioner is not
a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code and
sanction is required for the prosecution of a persons under Section 19 of the
P.C. Act, who are public servants but may be with the aid of Section 120B the
other persons may also be prosecuted and in that view of the matter the
sanction U/S 19 of the Special Act would be sine qua non. It was stated that
sanction was obtained for the prosecution of the accused persons and this fact
has got bearing in the cognizance order but the learned Special Judge while
taking cognizance of the offence on 11.11.2010 clearly admitted that the case
diary did not contain any sanction order for prosecution of the petitioner and
others except that Sumant Singh, Assistant in the Office of District Supply
Officer was not sent up for trial for want of sanction for his criminal prosecution.
On the fact, learned Sr. Counsel submitted that complicity of the petitioner
appears in paragraph No.65 and 68 of the case diary as also in the supervision
note of the Superintendent of Police as contained in paragraph No.169 of the
case diary. The simple allegation against the petitioner was that he had
prepared a Bank Draft of Rs.6,000/- with the aid of Sumant Singh in the name
of the son of the principal accused Uday Singh. There were certain procedure
for preparation of draft and in that regard printed application duly signed by the
applicant is filed with the amount in cash or by different modes and after
preparation of Demand Draft the same is delivered to the applicant after
obtaining his signature on the issue register of the Bank no investigation was
made by the Investigating Officer to ascertain as to whether draft of Rs.6,000/-
was prepared at the instance of the petitioner or other. Paragraphs Nos. 65
and 68 are the simple reproduction of F.I.R. which does not entail any offence,
much less alleged against the petitioner.
Heard Mr. Md. Hatim, learned A.P.P. appearing on behalf of the
State, who fairly concedes on the points of law which has been discussed on
behalf of the petitioner.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, relying
upon the decision of the Apex Court reported in (2009) 3 S.C.C. 355, referred
to here-in-before and the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner on the
point of law as well as on the facts, I find that the criminal proceeding of the
petitioner would tantamount to miscarriage of justice. This petition is allowed
and accordingly, the criminal proceeding of the petitioner including the order
dated 11.11.2008 by which cognizance of the offence was taken against the
petitioner- Deodatt @ Deodatt Singh are quashed.
[D.K.Sinha,J.]
P.K.S.