CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6918 of 2003 PETITIONER: Dev Singh RESPONDENT: Vs. Punjab Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/09/2003 BENCH: N.Santosh Hegde)B.P.Singh JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Arising out of S.L.P.©No.8462 of 2002)
SANTOSH HEGDE,J.
Leave granted.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
The appellant while serving as a Senior Assistant in the
respondent-Corporation was subjected to a disciplinary inquiry on
the ground that he was responsible for the misplacement of a file
which was entrusted to him, which according to the Corporation
amounted to a misconduct under By-Law 18 of The Punjab
Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. Service By Laws. In the
inquiry that was held pursuant to the above said charge, the
appellant was found guilty of the said misconduct and the
disciplinary authority as per his order dated 6th November, 2001
while confirming the finding of the Inquiry Officer found the case
to be a fit one in which a punishment of dismissal was called for
and accordingly he ordered the dismissal of the appellant from the
service of the Corporation with immediate effect. The appellant
challenged to the said order by way of a writ petition before the
Punjab and Haryana High Court which came to be dismissed by
the impugned order, hence, the appellant is in appeal before us.
Though learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the
finding of the Inquiry Officer on various grounds, having heard the
arguments in this regard and having perused the record, we find no
reason to disagree with the findings as to the misconduct
committed by the appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant, however, contended that
the appellant has been serving the Corporation since 1981 with
unblemished record and there was no earlier charge of misconduct
prior to the present charge. He also contended that the charge
against the appellant was that of misplacement of a file and no
motive was attached for such misplacement of file. In such a
situation to award the extreme punishment of dismissal according
to the learned counsel would not only amount to a disproportionate
punishment but also should disturb the conscience of this Court.
The learned counsel in support of his argument, that it is open to
the superior court to interfere with the quantum of punishment in a
given set of facts, has relied upon the judgments of this Court in
the case of Bhagat Ram vs. State of H.P (1983 2 SCC 442), Ranjit
Thakur vs. Union of India (1987 4 SCC 611) and U.P.State Road
Transport Corporation & Anr. vs. Mahesh Kumar Mishra & Ors.
(2000 3 SCC 450)
A perusal of the above judgments clearly shows that a court
sitting in appeal against a punishment imposed in the disciplinary
proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion on
penalty, however, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the
court, then the court would appropriately mould the relief either by
directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the
penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation its may make an
exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with
cogent reasons in support thereof. It is also clear from the above
noted judgments of this Court, if the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority is totally disproportionate to the misconduct
proved against the delinquent officer, then the court would
interfere in such a case.
Applying the said principles laid down by this Court in the
cases noted herein above, we see that in this case the appellant has
been serving the respondent Corporation for nearly 20 years with
unblemished service, before the present charge of misconduct was
levelled against him. The charge itself shows that what was alleged
against the appellant was of a misplacement of a file and there is
no allegation whatsoever that this file was either misplaced by the
appellant deliberately or for any collateral consideration. A reading
of the charge sheet shows that the misplacement alleged was not
motivated by any ulterior consideration and at the most could be an
act of negligence, consequent to which the appellant was unable to
trace the file again. The disciplinary authority while considering
the quantum of punishment came to the conclusion that the
misconduct of the nature alleged against the appellant should be
viewed very seriously to prevent such actions in future whereby
important and sensitive records could be lost or removed or
destroyed by the employee under whose custody the records are
kept. Therefore, he was of the opinion a deterrent punishment was
called for. Forgetting for a moment that no such allegation of
misplacing of important or sensitive record was made in the instant
case against the appellant and what he was charged of was
misplacement of a file importance or sensitiveness of which was
not mentioned in the charge sheet. Therefore, in our opinion, the
disciplinary authority was guided by certain facts which were not
on record, even otherwise, we are of the opinion that when the
Service By-Laws applicable to the Corporation under Service By-
Laws 17 provide various minor punishments, we fail to appreciate
why only maximum punishment available under the said By-laws
should be awarded on the facts of the present case. We think the
punishment of dismissal for mere misplacement of a file without
any ulterior motive is too harsh a punishment which is totally
disproportionate to the misconduct alleged and the same certainly
shocks our judicial conscience. Hence, having considered the basis
on which the punishment of dismissal was imposed on the
appellant and the facts and circumstances of this case, we think to
avoid further prolonged litigation it would be appropriate if we
modify the punishment ourselves. On the said basis, while
upholding the finding of misconduct against the appellant, we
think it appropriate that the appellant be imposed a punishment of
withholding of one increment including stoppage at the efficiency
bar in substitution of the punishment of dismissal awarded by the
disciplinary authority. We further direct that the appellant will not
be entitled to any back wages for the period of suspension.
However, he will be entitled to the subsistence allowance payable
upto the date of the dismissal order.
With the above modifications, this appeal is allowed, the
impugned order of the disciplinary authority in so far as it directs
the dismissal of the appellant, stands substituted as ordered by us
herein above.
The appeal is allowed partly.