JUDGMENT
K.C. Agrawal, C.J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 directed against the judgment passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Sikar passed in MACT Petition No. 84 of 1989 awarding Rs. 12,500/- to the appellants, who are the dependants of the deceased, Gulab Singh, having died in an accident in between a jeep bearing No. RRB 8505 and bus No. RRM 1082 on the 11th August, 1989. As a result of the two vehicles colliding, Gulab Singh, the husband of the appellant No. 1, and father of the appellant Nos. 2 to 4, driving the jeep aforesaid, received serious injuries and died in the hospital on being taken there for treatment. The claim of the appellants was that accident occurred due to the sole and exclusive negligence of the driver of the aforesaid bus belonging to the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’).
2. During the pendency of the claim petition an application under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act was moved for payment of Rs. 25,000/- as no fault compensation against the Corporation.
3. The application was contested by the Corporation, inter alia, on the ground that the accident occurred not due to the negligence of the driver of the Corporation but because of Gulab Singh, who was driving the jeep at the time of accident. The Corporation also alleged that as insurance company with which the jeep was insured, had not been impleaded as a party in the claim petition as well as in the application under Section 140 of the Act, the application was liable to be rejected on that ground. Alternatively, the plea taken was that no fault compensation was liable to be divided amongst the two joint tortfeasors and that the Corporation could be made liable to pay Rs. 12,500/- only and not Rs. 25,000/-.
4. The Tribunal held that the accident since had occurred because of a collision of the jeep as well as the bus of the Corporation, liability of no fault compensation payable under Section 140 of the Act had to be divided amongst them and the Corporation could be made liable to payment of only Rs. 12.500/-.
5. Aggrieved by this order, the present appeal has been filed.
6. Counsel for the appellants urged that under Section 140 of the Act, application for payment of no fault compensation could be filed by the appellants against any one of the joint tortfeasors and that the amount of Rs. 25,000/- could not be divided by directing payment of Rs. 12,500/- to the appellants.
7. Sub-section (3) of Section 140 of the Act which reads as under:
In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
provides that the application for claim compensation could be filed against any person and as such Rs. 25,000/- liable to be paid as no fault compensation could not be bifurcated or divided.
8. Section 140 of the Act provides for moving an application for payment of no fault compensation against any person. In a case of joint tortfeasors, where the liability on account of negligence of the drivers is on both the vehicles, the option would be that of the heirs of the deceased to file the application for compensation as against any one of them. The Tribunal appears to have committed an error in not maintaining a distinction in between a contributory negligence or composite negligence. The contributory negligence applies solely on the conduct of the injured or the deceased. It means that there has been an act of omission on his part which has materially contributed to the damage. Where a person is injured or his death occurs without any negligence on his part, but as a result of the combined effect of negligence of two persons, it is not a case of contributory negligence but it is a case of, what is known as, composite negligence.
9. In Law of Torts by Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, 21st Edn. at page 171, it is said:
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the damages caused from the tort. They may be sued jointly or separately. If sued jointly damages may be levied from all or either. Each is responsible for the injury sustained by his common act.
In a suit for composite negligence plaintiff is not entitled to a strict analysis of the proximate or immediate cause of the event to find out whom he can sue. Subject to the rules as to remoteness of damages, he is entitled to sue all or any of the negligent persons and it is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between those persons, though in any case he cannot recover on the whole more than his whole damage. He has a right to recover full amount of damages from any of the defendants.
10. In the case of composite negligence there is joint and separable liability and it is open to the claimants to claim damages from any or all of the joint tortfeasors. In such cases, the Tribunal has no authority to apportion the compensation between the tortfeasors. Though in the case of contributory negligence the Tribunal has to apportion the same and determine the extent of liability of the person who contributed. Consequently, the Tribunal erred in apportioning the amount awardable under Section 140 of the Act as no fault compensation. The Tribunal further incorrectly laid emphasis on the omission to implead the insurance company with which the jeep was insured.
11. The payment of no fault compensation under Section 140 of the Act is only an interim measure and it does not finally adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. If ultimately the person applying under this provision is found not entitled to no fault compensation, he would have to refund the same.
12. Counsel for the appellants also made a prayer for payment of interest on the amount awarded as no fault compensation. There being no provision in the Act, no interest is awardable. The Tribunal has power only that which was conferred on it. It was not a court acting while deciding a claim petition to which Code of Civil Procedure applied and interest could be awarded under Section 34 of the same. The legislature does not, to my mind, have any intention to award interest in these proceedings inasmuch as it was a provision made for giving immediate relief to the claimants and it was not thought appropriate that provision for payment of interest should also be made. Payment of no fault compensation being interim measure, it does not govern the rights of the parties fully and finally. Ultimately, the liability of payment of interest would be decided by the Tribunal at the time of passing of a final award. At that time it would make an appropriate order for payment of interest on the sum which is paid by way of no fault compensation also.
13. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside.
