ORDER
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. The petitioner had initially joined service as a Driver with the Project Director under the Drought Prone Area Programme at Rohtak. This appointment was made vide order dated March 20, 1978. While the petitioner was working as such, the Commissioner, Rohtak Division, Rohtak, issued an order dated January 17, 1990 by which the petitioner was transferred “and posted as driver …….. on purely temporary basis in the pay scale of Rs. 1200-2040 + 200/- special pay”. It was specifically provided that “he will be on probation for a period of one year. In case, his work and conduct during the period is not found satisfactory, he would be sent back to his parent office or the probation period would be extended by the competent authority”.
2. On April 12, 1996 the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet. It was alleged that he had parked the car at an unsafe place and the keys of the car had not been given to any of the officials. It was further alleged that he had gone to his home and remained absent from September 4, 1995 to September 10, 1995 without any leave application. It was also alleged that a loss of about Rs. 6,000/- was caused. The petitioner had been given 15 days time to file the reply. However, before the day could even end, an order of his reversion was passed by which he was directed to be reverted to the parent office with immediate effect. A copy of the order passed by the Commissioner on April 12, 1996 has been produced as Annexure P-5. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed an appeal. This appeal was not decided. The petitioner then approached this Court through a writ petition. Directions for expeditious disposal of the appeal were given. In pursuance to these directions the Financial Commissioner vide his order dated November 6,1997 rejected the petitioner’s appeal. A copy of this order has been produced as Annexure P-8. The petitioner challenges the orders dated April 12, 1996 and November 6, 1997, copies of which have been produced as Annexures P-5 and P-8 respectively. He alleges that the order of reversion had been passed by way of penalty without affording any opportunity to him to even submit a reply to the charge-sheet. He further alleges that even the appellate order is based on the alleged misconduct which had not been established during any proceedings. Consequently, it is maintained that the petitioner has been punished unheard.
3. A written statement has been filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3. It has been inter alia averred that the post of Driver “was to be filled up by direct recruitment by sending the demand of the post to the Sub-ordinate Services Selection Board, Haryana ………..”. As the post had to be filled up urgently “the petitioner was appointed as Driver on transfer basis ………. However, “subsequently, the Government and the said Board refused to grant approval.” Thus, “this office was left with no option, but to repatriate him to his parent department i.e. District Rural Development Agency, Rohtak”.
4. A separate reply has also been filed on behalf of respondent No. 4. It has been inter alia averred that in compliance with the order of respondent No. 3 the petitioner has been allowed to join duty on April 12, 1996.
5. Counsel for the parties have been heard.
6. Mr. Ramesh Hooda, learned counsel for the petitioner, has made a two-fold submission. Firstly, it has been contended that the petitioner had completed the maximum period of probation as prescribed under the Rules. Thus, he shall be deemed to have been confirmed as a Driver. His reversion to respondent No.4 in the year 1996 was wholly arbitrary and against the rules. Secondly, the counsel has contended that the petitioner has been punished without being afforded a due and reasonable opportunity. The claim made on behalf of the petitioner has been controverted by the learned counsel for the respondents.
7. Admittedly, the conditions of service governing the petitioner are laid down in the Haryana Revenue Department Divisional Subordinate (Group ‘C’) Service Rules, 1988. Rule 10 of these Rules regulates probation. It inter alia provides that “the total period of probation including extension, if any, shall not exceed three years”. In the present case it is the admitted position that the petitioner had been appointed as a Driver in the office of the Commissioner, Rohtak Division, Rohtak, vide order dated January 17, 1998. Admittedly his appointment was on probation for a period of one year. No order of extension is even alleged to have been passed. In the written statement there is not even a suggestion that any adverse report was conveyed to him. It was after a lapse of more than six years that a charge-sheet dated April 12, 1996 was issued to him. Before he could have even been expected to submit a reply, the order of his repatriation was passed. When he appealed against the order the Appellate Authority rejected his claim vide order dated November 6, 1997 on the ground that “negligence on his part during 1995 floods was certainly an act of irresponsibility and the action of the Commissioner, Rohtak Division, to revert him to his parent office was quite justified”. Thus, it is clear that the order of reversion was justified only on the ground which was the real charge contained in the charge-sheet. Admittedly, no enquiry into this charge-sheet had been held. It was never found to have been proved. Yet this had been made the basis of the impugned action.
8. Faced with this situation, Mr. Amarjit Singh has contended that the petitioner’s appointment was contrary to the provisions of Rule 9 of the 1996 Rules. The contention is fallacious. Admittedly the appointment had been made in the year 1990. Rules of 1996 did not exist at that time. Question that the appointment is contrary to the 1996 Rules could not have arisen at that time. Thus, even this ground as sought to have been raised to justify the action cannot be sustained.
9. No other point has been raised.
10. In view of the above conclusion it is not necessary to examine the contention as to whether or not the petitioner has been confirmed in the office of the Commissioner, Rohtak Division, Rohtak. We are of the view that the impugned action was not just and fair. The petitioner was punished unheard. Therefore, the impugned orders dated April 12, 1996 and November 6, 1997, copies of which have been produced as Annexures P-5 and P-8, shall stand quashed.
11. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. However, the petitioner shall also be entitled to his costs which are assessed at Rs. 6,000/-.
12. Order accordingly.