JUDGMENT
M.M. Kumar, J.
1. This is plaintiffs petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution with a prayer for setting aside order dated 4.11.2004 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kapurthala dismissing his application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The plaintiff- petitioner has filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-respondents from interfering in his peaceful possession. The defendant-respondents who are his brother, brother’s wife and his father respectively. Alongwith the suit an application for interim stay was also filed. The trial Court vide order dated 11.8.2004 had granted interim stay but the lower Appellate Court has reversed the order on the principal ground that no interim order staying dispossession of a stranger to the property could be passed against the true owner. The view of the learned Appellate Court is discernible from paragraph 8 of the order which reads as under:-
“This fact has been admitted by the plaintiff-respondent is that the partition of the house in dispute over which the plaintiff claims his possession, was given to him by his father, who is admittedly the owner of the entire house. The contention of the plaintiff is that it is joint Hindu family property; whereas, the contention of the defendants is that it is self acquired property of the father of the plaintiff. Nothing has been brought on record by the plaintiff-respondent to prima facie show that it is the joint Hindu family property. Nothing has been brought on record to show the existence of joint Hindu family and its nucleus. Reliance can be placed upon Master Vijender Singh and Ors. v. Shri Ram Chander and Ors., 2003(1) Civil & Rent Judicial Reports 610 wherein it was held that when there was vague allegation about the nature of the property; no prima facie existence of any joint Hindu family. It was held that there was no prima facie case and injunction can not granted. Further more, it is well settled proposition of law that no injunction can be passed against true owner especially when the plaintiff has not brought on record anything to show that the property in dispute is the joint Hindu family property and not the self acquired property of his father-appellant No. 3. So the order passed by the lower Court is cryptic and perverse to law and is not sustainable. The order under appeal is set aside and the application U/o 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C. is dismissed. The instant appeal is accepted. However, any observation made in this order shall have no bearing to the merits of the case. Record of the lower court be returned and the appeal file be consigned to the record room.”
2. Mr. Rakesh Kumar, learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioner has argued that injunction can be granted even against true owner if possession of the plaintiff-petitioner is established by evidence. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Prataprai N. Kothari v. John Braganza, 1999(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 119 and Walter Louis Franklin (dead) through LRs. v. George Singh (dead) through LRs. 1997(2) R.C.R. (Civil) 41. The learned counsel has further submitted that the Appellate Court cannot interfere in the order of the trial Court as the order passed by the trial Court is a discretionary order and in the absence of any specific reason for reversing the order, no such interference by the Appellate Court is warranted. In support of his submission, the learned counsel has placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of Maman Chand v. Kamla, (1996-2)113 P.L.R. 147 and Man Singh v. H.S. Kohli (Harbhajan Singh Kohli) (19971) 115 P.L.R. 643. He has further urged that the matter is at preliminary stage and evidence with regard to the title or the nature of the property is yet to be adduced. On the ground that the defendant-respondent 3 is the true owner, no conclusion with regard to possession could be recorded.
3. After hearing the learned counsel at a considerable length. I find that the view taken by the learned Appellate Court does not suffer from any legal infirmity because the order of the trial Court has been reversed on a pure legal basis that no injunction could be issued against the true owner of the immovable property. It is not disputed before the Courts below that defendant-respondent 3, who is father of the plaintiff-petitioner, is the owner of the entire house. However, no documents have been placed on record by the plaintiff-petitioner showing that the nature of the property is Joint Hindu Family property or that he is a co-sharer in any manner. In the absence of such documents the status of the plaintiff-petitioner cannot be more than a mere licensee. It has further come on record that wife of the plaintiff-petitioner has already purchased a house on 7.8.2002 as is evident from paragraph 5 of the judgment of the learned trial Court. There is no illegality in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution as no manifest injustice has been caused to the plaintiff- petitioner. It is well settled that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court would interfere only in those cases where there is manifest injustice caused to the party invoking the jurisdiction. Reference in this regard could be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ouseph Mathus v. M.Abdul Khadir, (2002)1 S.C.C. 319 and Virendra Kashinath Ravat and Anr. v. Vinayak N. Joshi and Ors., (1999)1 S.C.C. 47.
4. The argument of the learned counsel that even against the true owner ad-interim injunction can be granted has failed to impress me because the judgments on which he has placed reliance itself show that the person who has been in possession can protect his possession by seeking injunction against any other person and not against the true owner. The aforementioned observations have been made in paragraph 11 of the judgment in Prataprai N. Kothari’s case (supra) to which reference has been made by the learned counsel. Similar is the position in respect of the other judgment. The other argument that jurisdiction of the Appellate Court to interfere in order of the trial Court is limited, would also not require any serious consideration because I find that the Appellate Court has interfered in the order of the trial Court purely on a legal basis that no injunction could be granted against the true owner. The plaintiff-petitioner admittedly is not the owner of the property and the property is owned by defendant-respondent 3 his father. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that the Appellate Court has interfered in order of the trial Court without reversing the findings of the trial Court.
5. The last argument that evidence has to be led has also failed to impress me because even with the suit, documents are attached to support the contention that there exists a prima facie case, and that the balance of convenience is also in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner. The plaintiff-petitioner always attempted to establish that he would suffer irreparable loss. On repeated questions asked by the Court, the learned counsel was not able to show any document with regard to the right of the plaintiff-petitioner in the disputed house which led to the belief that the plaintiff-petitioner has no document to support his plea. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel.
6. For the reasons aforementioned, this petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs. Any observation made by this Court shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on merits of the case. The cost is quantified at Rs. 5000/- which shall be paid by the trial Court to the defendant-respondents.