ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The Writ Petition, as amended in W.P.M.P. No. 4380/2002, prays for a writ in the nature of mandamus declaring the order dated 22-11-1993 of the 1st respondent and also the reversion order dated 14-2-1994 of the 1st respondent-Corporation as illegal, void, unjust and further to direct the respondents to grant to the petitioner all appurtenant benefits of service relating to the promotion, higher scale of pay, increments in salary, retirement benefits etc., consequent upon such declaration and further reliefs.
2. It is stated in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition that the writ petitioner retired in the service of Life Insurance Corporation of India, in short hereinafter referred to as “Corporation” on 31-7-1994 at Vijayawada while working in the City Branch Office IV. It is also stated that originally he had entered into service in the Corporation in the year 1958 coming under the jurisdiction of 3rd respondent and during the course of his service for about 36 years, he had promotions to the grades of Higher Grade Assistant, Assistant Administrative Officer and also Administrative Officer and he had the necessary educational qualifications and he passed the examinations conducted by the Federation of Insurance Institutes, Bombay and thus his service record is excellent and unblemished. It is also stated that while he was working at Vijayawada, City Branch Office No. 2, Vijayawada he was promoted from the post of Assistant Administrative Officer to the post of Administrative Officer, vide order dated 12-2-1992 of the 3rd respondent and on his request he was retained at Vijayawada itself instead of transferring him to another place i.e., Rajahmundry vide letter dated 21-2-1992 of the 4th respondent and the promotion came into effect from the date of his assumption of charge of the higher post. It is also stated that the Corporation has its own Staff Regulations called L.I.C. of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, hereinafter referred to as “Regulations” in short. It is further stated by the writ petitioner that in view of Regulation 16, the cadre of Administrative Officer is Class-I cadre and the period of probation for the same is one year and the competent authority to extend the probation is the Chairman of the Corporation and the competent authority to revert to a lower position from higher position during the period of probation of service in the higher post is the Managing Director of the Corporation. It is further stated that the petitioner had successfully completed the period of probation by 22-2-1993 and he had joined the duty in higher cadre of Administrative Officer on 22-2-1992 and it was represented to him by respondents 3 and 4 that since he had completed the period of probation by 23-2-1992 automatically his services would stand confirmed in the higher cadre of Administrative Officer and accordingly he had been continuing to discharge in the said post discharging his duties to the best of his ability and sincerity. During the period of his service in the year 1993 there were two letters of commendation by paying complements to him regarding completion of certain bifurcation of records of the Branches well in time, adding that the Corporation was congratulating him for getting the work done smoothly and other complementary letters also had been narrated in the affidavit. It is further stated that to his shock he received a communication dated 20-12-1993 from the Branch Manager, City Branch No. 4 of the Corporation at Vijayawada to the effect that the Central Office extended the period of probation by one more year with effect from 22-2-1993 and it is also stated that even by the date of communication, he received an intimation in advance about his prospective retirement with effect from 31-7-1994. Consequent upon the receipt of the memo extending his probation period to the cadre of Administrative Officer he had submitted a representation-appeal dated 22-12-1993 to the 2nd respondent bringing to the notice of the said authority that the said extension is illegal, being contrary to Regulation 16(1) of the aforesaid Regulations and since the said appeal was in vain, he submitted a memorandum to the 1st respondent dated 15-8-1995 and had sent reminders and telegrams also and he had received a letter dated 20-11-1995 from the 4th respondent intimating that the competent authority had not found it possible to accord to his request. It is further stated that pending such protest against the extension of probationary period with retrospective effect as illegal, the petitioner received an office order dated 14-2-1994 from the Central Office, L.I.C. of India stating that he was reverted with immediate effect to the cadre of Assistant Administrative Officer under Regulation 16(2) of the said Regulations. It is stated that the said order is bad in law. It is further stated that he had preferred an appeal dated 15-3-1994 to the 1st respondent pointing out the illegality and there is no reply from the 1st respondent. Hence the petitioner submitted a memorial dated 15-8-1995 under Regulation 49 to the 1st respondent ventilating his grievances in the matter. It is further stated that the Regulations do not empower the extension of any probationary period with retrospective effect and no doubt several other details also had been specified how the impugned proceedings cannot be sustained.
3. The Corporation had filed a counter affidavit. It was specifically stated that that after the petitioner was reverted to his original post of Assistant Administrative Officer by the order dated 14-2-1994 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him for the financial irregularities committed by him during the period when the petitioner was on probation as Administrative Officer which resulted in monetary loss to the Corporation and the petitioner was issued a charge sheet and a regular enquiry as per Rules was held by appointing an Enquiry Officer, followed by an enquiry report, second show cause notice and finally the disciplinary authority taking a lenient view imposed two penalties on the petitioner i.e., censure and recovery of Rs.25,482-50 representing the pecuniary loss to the Corporation by its order dated 30-7-1994 and the petitioner accepted the order of the disciplinary authority imposing penalties and the amount was recovered from the retiral benefits due to the petitioner. It is also stated that the action of the Corporation is fully justified by the provisions of the Regulations aforesaid, and in particular Regulation No. 16. It is further stated that as per Regulation 16, the period of probation is one year with power to extend the same and the total period not exceeding two years. It is further stated that the petitioner was placed on probation with effect from 22-2-1992, the date on which he took charge in the promoted category and investigations revealed that during the first year of probation and the extended period of probation, the petitioner authorized and made excess payments to the tune of Rs. 34,367-90 in the first year on 5-8-1992, 15-10-1992, 6-1-1993 and 11-2-1993 and in the second year on 15-3-1993, 12-5-1993 and 19-5-1993. It is further stated that it had taken some time for the Corporation to detect the financial irregularities committed by the petitioner in the first year and when the final picture emerged the competent authority had decided to extend the period of probation by its order dated 22-11-1993 and hence it is not correct to state that the period of probation was extended retrospectively. It is further stated that till the total period of two years of probation is completed, the petitioner continues to be on probation and during the period of probation, the probationers may be terminated and Regulation 16(2) empowers the Corporation to revert the probationer without notice. It is further stated that the confirmation depends on satisfactory performance of work during the period of probation and the competent authority taking an over-all assessment of the performance of the petitioner, including the financial irregularities, decided to extend the period of probation and later by the order dated 14-2-1994 it was decided to revert the petitioner to his lower post. It is further stated that since the petitioner was involved in financial irregularities, it cannot be said that his performance during the probation period was satisfactory to have confirmation. It is further stated that the assumption that there will be an automatic confirmation after one year is not tenable. The letters of commendation are general in nature and do not confer any credit to the petitioner and receiving the salary in the cadre of Administrative Officer does not entitle the petitioner to earn confirmation and it is only an administrative action to facilitate the employee to get increase in salary. It is also stated that the appeals and the representations by the petitioner were considered by the competent higher authorities in all respects and they were rejected. It is also stated that the disciplinary proceedings had culminated in imposition of penalties and even the petitioner had accepted the said penalties. It is further stated that in the light of the facts and circumstances, the Writ Petition is devoid of merits.
4. A reply affidavit is filed by the writ petitioner again reiterating the stand taken by him in the main affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. However, the allegations made relating to certain financial irregularities had been admitted, but it is stated that it was after 14-2-1994. Certain details relating to the same also had been narrated in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the reply affidavit. It is also stated that the said financial loss was not due to any misconduct on his part and the amount was already recovered from him and also from the concerned Office Assistant Smt. R. Jaya Lalitha. It is further stated that the appointing authority was the Managing Director and to extend the period of probation again, the Chairman of the Corporation is the competent authority and to revert during the period of probation the competent authority is the Managing Director. It is also stated that the disciplinary action was initiated by the Zonal Manager of the Corporation and not by the competent authority and hence it is also bad in law and the writ petitioner had narrated several other details justifying his conduct in the reply affidavit.
5. Heard Sri V. Parabrahma Sastry, the learned counsel representing the writ petitioner and Sri D.V. Seetha Rama Murthy, the learned counsel representing the respondents-Corporation and also perused the material available on record.
6. Sri Parabrahma Sastry, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner had contended that the impugned orders are totally unsustainable inasmuch as they are not in conformity with Regulation 16 of the Regulations. The learned counsel further contended that the exercise of power to extend probation without any reason retrospectively was only with a view to revert the petitioner and it cannot be said to be bonafide and definitely it is malafide. Such power cannot be exercised at the sweet will and pleasure and definitely in the facts and circumstances of the case the said exercise of power in the present case is arbitrary and illegal. The learned counsel also had contended that the impugned orders were not made by the competent authorities and the principles which are applicable in the case of termination are applicable even in the case of reversions and even if the plain language of Regulation 16 is carefully read then at the best it may be only prospective and there cannot be retrospective extension as in this case and in any view of the matter, the impugned orders are bad in law. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on SHAMSHER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB , PAVANENDRA NARAYAN VARMA , WESTERN INDIA MATCH CO. Vs. WORKMEN , V.P. AHUJA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB AIR 200 SC 1080, SHIV KUMAR Vs. H.S.E.B., CHANDIGARH AIR 1988 SC 1673, BHASKAR Vs. ADMINISTRATOR, DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI .
7. Sri Seetha Rama Murthy, the learned counsel representing the Corporation on the contrary had contended that the power of extension of probation is discretionary and the competent authority will evaluate and assess and will arrive at a conclusion whether the probation has to be continued or not and hence there is no legal right as such to have automatic confirmation in such a case. Absolutely no allegations of malafides had been made and the fact that the enquiry was conducted into the financial irregularities also is not in dispute. Apart from these, when the power conferred on the authorities had been exercised in a particular way relating to the extension of probation, it cannot be interfered with by the writ Court, may be except in the cases of malafide action. The learned counsel also had drawn my attention to Regulation 16 of the Regulations and the language employed therein and had taken me through several details, which had been narrated in the counter affidavit. The learned counsel also pointed out that several of the aspects which had been raised in the reply affidavit had not been whispered at all in the main affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. The learned counsel also had placed reliance on KEDAR NATH BAHL Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS , UNION OF INDIA Vs. P.S. BHATT AIR 1981 SC 957, DAYARAM DAYAL Vs. STATE OF A.P. , STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. DHARAM SINGH, WASIM BEG Vs. STATE OF U.P. , INDIAN IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. Vs. DIPANKAR BHATTACHARYA 1990 (6) SLR 743, SOMNATH SAHU Vs. THE STATE OF ORISSA 1981 (2) SLR 550, HIGH COURT OF M.P. Vs. SATYANARAYAN JHAVAR , M/s. OSWAL PRESSURE DIE CASTING INDUSTRY Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER & ANOTHER 1998 (2) SUPREME 327, THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, MACHILIPATNAM AND OTHERS Vs. M. VENUGOPAL (DB) and LIC OF INDIA AND ANOTHER Vs. SHRI RAGHAVENDRA SESHAGIRI RAO KULKARNI .
8. Heard both the counsel and also perused the material available on record.
9. The principal question which had been elaborately argued by both the learned counsel is relating to the extension of probation of the petitioner vis–vis Regulation 16 of the Regulations. The factual aspects, as narrated in the respective pleadings, already had been dealt with supra. Regulation 16 of the Regulations reads as follows:
“(1) An employee promoted to a higher post shall be treated as on probation in the higher post for a period of one year in the case of promotions to posts belonging to Classes I and II and 6 months in other cases. Provided, however, that the competent authority may in its discretion extend the period of probation, but in no case shall the total period of probation exceed –
(a) in the case of promotions to posts belonging to
Classes I & II .. .. .. .. .. 2 years
(b) in other cases .. .. .. .. .. 1 year.
(2) An employee on probation shall be liable to be reverted without notice at any time.
(3) During the period of probation an employee retains his lien on his lower post and the period shall count as permanent service for all purposes.”
Schedule IV of the Regulations deal with competent authorities and under Regulations 16(1) and 16(2) the following authorities had been specified:
Reg. No. Nature of Power Authority Extent of power
16(1) To extend the period of Appointing Full
probation authority
Chairman In respect of all
employees of the
Cadre of AO and
above. Full
16(2) To revert during the Appointing Full
period of probation authority
_______________________________________________________
On the strength of these provisions, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner had strenuously contended that the impugned orders are without jurisdiction, illegal and are unsustainable.
10. On 22-11-1993, the following order was passed:
"In terms of Regulation 16 of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations 1960, the Competent Authority has directed that the period of probation of Shri D.R.K. Murthy, SR. No. 515205, AO, CBO - IV, Vijayawada, DO Masulipatnam, on promotion to the cadre of AO/BM be extended by one year w.e.f. 22.2.93".
On 14-2-1994, the following order was passed:
"Shri D.R.K. Murthy, SR. NO. 515205, AO, CBO-IV, Vijayawada, DO Masulipatnam, is reverted to the cadre of AAO under Regulation 16(2) of Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations 1960, with immediate effect and is allotted to South Central Zone.
Shri D.R.K. Murthy is exact place of posting as AAO in South Central Zone will be decided by the Zonal Manager, Hyderabad".
As can be seen from the Office Order dated 22-11-1993 it is specific that in terms of Regulation 16 of the Regulations, the competent authority had directed the extension of period of probation of Shri D.R.K. Murthy, SR. NO. 515205, AO, CBO-IV, Vijayawada, DO Masulipatnam on promotion to the cadre of AO/BM, by one year from 22-2-1993. No doubt, an attempt is made to assail these orders on the ground that the competent authorities specified in Schedule IV had not passed the said orders and hence the said orders are without jurisdiction. As can be seen from the very nature of the order, the impugned orders had been made at the instance of the competent authority. The main question which had been argued elaborately by the writ petitioner is that the power relating to the extension of probation without any reason, that too retrospectively, had been exercised only with a view to revert the writ petitioner and with a malafide intention and hence the same is bad. No doubt, the learned counsel had pointed out several circumstances and also certain complementary letters to show that the work of the petitioner was satisfactory and despite the same the impugned orders had been made. In the decision referred (2) supra, at page 529 it was held by the Apex Court as follows:
“Before considering the facts of the case before us one further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test needs to be cleared viz., what language in a termination order would amount to stigma ? Generally speaking when a probationer’s appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer’s appointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job”.
In PARSHOTAM LAL DHINGRA Vs. UNION OF INDIA it was held that the Courts have to perform a balancing act between denying a probationer any right to continue in service while at the same time granting him the right to challenge the termination of his service when the termination is by way of punishment. The above decision of the Apex Court (referred 18 supra) was well explained in BENJAMIN Vs. UNION OF INDIA 1967 (1) LLJ 718 (SC). Reference also can be made to the decision referred (1) supra, V.P. AHUJA Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB , KRISHNADEVARAJA EDUCATION TRUST Vs. L.A. BALAKRISHNA , H.F. SANGATI Vs. REGISTRAR GENERAL, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA , S.P. VASUDEVA Vs. STATE OF HARYANA , STATE OF U.P. Vs. KAUSHAL KISHORE SHUKLA , RADHE SHYAM GUPTA Vs. U.P. STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES CORPORATION LIMITED , DEEPTI PRAKASH BANERJEE Vs. SATYENDRA NATH BOSE NATIONAL CENTRE FOR BASIC SCIENCES, CALCUTTA and also CHANDRA PRAKASH SHAHI Vs. STATE OF U.P. .
11. In the decision referred (1) supra, the Apex Court at page 2205 held as follows:
“Before a probationer is confirmed the authority concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of termination of probation. If, on the other hand the probationer is faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated without following the provisions of Art.311(2) he can claim protection. In State of Bihar V. Gopi Kishore Prasad, it was said that if the Government proceeded against the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion on his honesty or competence his discharge would not have the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking the easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer”.
Strong reliance also was placed on the decisions (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) referred supra. The decisions on the aspect of the rights of the probationer to seek confirmation are too many and the principles in this regard also are well settled. In the decision referred (7) supra, it was held that where a person is appointed as a probationer in any post and the period of probation is specified it does not follow that at the end of the said specified period of probation he obtains confirmation automatically even if no order is passed in that behalf and unless the terms of appointment clearly indicate that confirmation would automatically follow at the end of specified period, or there is a specific service rule to that effect, the expiration of the probationary period does not necessarily lead to confirmation. In fact, the learned counsel representing the Corporation had placed strong reliance on the decisions (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (16) and (17) referred supra, only for the purpose of strengthening his proposition. The stand taken by the counsel for the Corporation is that it is no doubt true that there is some delay and in view of the facts and circumstances explained in detail in the counter affidavit, the delay had occurred and the mere fact that some formal complementary letters had been addressed, they will not confer any right on the writ petitioner to get automatic confirmation.
12. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner also had accepted the order of disciplinary authority imposing penalties and the amount had been recovered from the retiral benefits due to the petitioner. It is needless to mention that the confirmation depends on the satisfactory performance of the work during the period of probation and the competent authority taking an over-all assessment of the performance of the petitioner, including the financial irregularities, had decided to extend the period of probation and by this itself it cannot be inferred that the action is in any way malafide or was only made with retrospective effect with a view to revert the writ petitioner. In the light of the stand taken in the counter affidavit where all the facts had been narrated in detail and especially in the absence of any serious allegations of malafides against any particular Officer involved while making the impugned proceedings, it cannot be said that the impugned orders are either illegal or arbitrary or without jurisdiction. In the decision referred (15) supra, while dealing with the termination of service of a probationer it was held by the Apex Court that once it was found that the assessment made by the employer was supported by some material and was not malafide, it was not proper for the High Court to interfere and substitute its satisfaction with the satisfaction of the employer. Taking the over-all facts and circumstances into consideration and also the impugned orders which were made and especially in the absence of any serious allegations relating to malafides against the concerned Officers and also in the light of the fact that the penalties imposed on an enquiry had been accepted by the writ petitioner, it cannot be said that the power was exercised in extending the probation without any reason retrospectively only with a view to revert the writ petitioner. The Corporation had arrived at the said conclusion taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances and the over-all assessment of the work of the petitioner.
13. It is also pertinent to note that the writ petitioner had retired and however the writ petitioner has been fighting this litigation for the purpose of getting certain monetary benefits in the event of success in the Writ Petition. No doubt in the reply affidavit several other allegations had been made which are supplementary to the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition. In view of Regulation 16 and also the specific stand taken in the counter affidavit by the Corporation, I am of the opinion that the impugned orders were made in accordance with Regulation 16 only and hence it cannot be said that the impugned orders suffer from any illegality or legal infirmity warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
14. Hence, the Writ Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly the same is dismissed. But however, inasmuch as the Writ Petition had retired from service, this Court makes no order as to costs.