JUDGMENT
Desai, J.
1. This appeal raises a question of general importance relating to the tenability of Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court (Bombay) against a judgment of a Single Judge in a appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).
2. On December 28 of 1865 Her Majesty, the Queen Victoria of England (as she then was) inter alia ordained vide Clause 15 that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court ……. from the judgment ……. of one Judge of the said High Court……. pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1915”).
Section 108 deals with the exercise of jurisdiction of Single Judge or Division Court and further authorises prescribing of rules for exercise of jurisdiction of Judges of the High Court – original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court.
Clause 16 of the Letters Patent has further ordained that the said High Court…… shall be a Court of Appeal from the Civil Courts of the Presidency of Bombay and from all other Courts subject to its superintendence, and shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in such cases as are subject to appeal to the said High Court by virtue of any laws or regulations now in force.
On introduction of the Constitution of India, the term ‘pursuant to Section 108 as indicated in Clause 15 is now to be read as ‘pursuant to Article 225 of the Constitution. This Article has preserved the jurisdiction of the existing High Court and the power of its Judges. However, the jurisdiction and powers are made subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the laws which arc for the lime being in force.
3. On July 1, 1924, the Act with a view to provide compensation to the workmen for in jurics sustained in an accident during the course of employment, came into being. Section 20 authorises the Stale Government to appoint a Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, as an authority for the purposes of the Act. Section 19 lays down that the Commissioner shall settle the dispute arising out of the proceedings under the Act. Section 30 provides for an appeal to the High Court against certain orders of the Commissioner. As per the relevant rules, such appeals are to be heard and decided by a Single Judge of the High Court.
The appellant-workman challenged the Award passed but the Commissioner under Section 19 by presenting an appeal under Section 30 of the Act to this Court. The learned Single Judge by decision dated 12th August 1983 dismissed the appeal. Since dissatisfied, the appellant-workman presented the instant Letters Patent Appeal.
4. S/Shri R.R. Jethalia, M.V. Deshpande, M.D. Shinde, P.V. Mandlik, S.V. Chandole and A.H. Kasliwal, the learned Members of the Bar, objected to the maintainability of this appeal, whereas S/Shri B.N. Bajpai, A.H. Joshi and A.B. Naik, the learned members of the Bar, asserted in support thereof.
According to the objectors, the Commissioner appointed under Section 20 of the Act is not a Court as contemplated by Clause 16 of the Letters Patent. As such, the resultant judgment delivered by the Single Judge under Section 30 of the Act could not be pursuant to Section 108 of the Act of 1915.
The supporters tried to counter by submitting that though the authority under the Act is styled as Commissioner, it has all the attributes of a Civil Court. The Commissioner, as per the provisions of the Act, decides the rights between the parties. Such decision is authoritative and enforceable. As such, the Commissioner is a Court and hence, the judgment under Section 30 of the Act is amenable to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Another ground of objection is that as per the scheme of the Act, the Legislature does not approve further appeal beyond the stage of Section 30 of the Act. As such, the Act itself creates a bar which abrogates the remedy laid down under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
According to the supporters, the Act does not specifically attach finality to decision rendered under Section 30 of the Act. Moreover, there is no express bar against a remedy under Clause 15. The intention of the Legislature is to minimise the scope of appeal. However, there is no intention to curtail the chances or number of appeals. The appeal, according to them, is, therefore maintainable.
The learned Members of the Bar have elaborately addressed on the aspects. Before we proceed to deal with the rival submissions, we record our appreciation for the assistance they have rendered with industry and learning.
5. The remedy of Letters Patent Appeal as per the scheme of Clause 15 read with Clause 16 and Section 108 of the Act of 1915 is available only when a Single Judge delivers a judgment in exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the High Court over the Civil Court.
Whether the Commissioner under the Act is a Civil Court was a question for a decision before this Court in the case of Smt. Rajivabi Osman Savi and Anr. v. Mackinon Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd. . The Court sought guidance from the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to in para 12 of its report. The Supreme Court in those cases was dealing with the question as to whether the Assistant Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Act, 1935, was a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Court Act. The Supreme Court, having regard to the provisions of Law, recorded a conclusion that the Assistant Registrar is a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Court Act. This Court placing reliance on the ratio of the Supreme Court answered the question in affirmative.
6. The question before the Supreme Court was of a different magnitude. The term ‘Court’ for the purposes of Contempt of Court Act differs in its purport and concept. The Court under that Act need not necessarily be a Court subject to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction as envisaged by Section 108 of the Act of 1915.
Reliance is placed on a decision of Punjab and HaryanaHigh Court in Smt. Shanti Devi and Ors. v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala and Ors. . However, this authority has considered the test of a term ‘judgment’. It is observed that an order in appeal under Section 110-D of Motor Vehicles Act satisfies the test of a ‘judgment’ as formulated in Shri Radhey Sham’s case in . It is, therefore, held that the decision of a Single Judge in appeal is a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. This Authority has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in case of Smt. Raziabi, cited supra.
Reliance is further placed on a decision in Ramchandra Goverdhan Pandit v. Charity Commissioner of State of Gujarat , wherein the Supreme Court was considering the scope of Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of a District Judge in an application presented under Section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act. It is observed there that though the proceedings are styled as an application, they are analogous with the appeal and, as such, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable.
Both these decisions as cited are of no assistance for adjudicating the question as involved in this appeal.
7. Our attention has been invited to a decision in Secretary of State v. Smt. Geeta W/o Imam Musalman and Ors. AIR 1939 Nagpur 122. This authority has considered and decided the questions as involved in this appeal. The Authority took into consideration the previous judgments on the subject of scope of the Letters Patent Appeal. It is held there that, “Where an award made by a Special Tribunal comes to the High Court in appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and a Judge of the High Court disposes of that matter, the resulting decision is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. There is only an award made pursuant to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and hence, Letters Patent Appeal does not lie.”
This Court in case of Smt. Raziabi, cited supra, has referred to this decision in para 14 of its report. In para 15, this Court made an observation that the Nagpur High Court has not discussed the other provisions of the Act. It has also made a mention that the Nagpur authority has not been followed by any other decision.
8. This Court in case of Smt. Raziabi particularly referred to the decision of the Supreme Court . The Supreme Court therein referred to the passage from Halsbury Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 9, Page 342. It has indicated that the term Court has acquired a meaning of the place where justice is administered and has further come to mean the person who exercises judicial function under the authority derived from Sovereign. It has further cautioned that, “all Tribunals are, however, not Court in the sense in which the term is here employed.” The Supreme Court has observed, “When a question, therefore, arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi- judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all attributes of a Court” .
According to us, it follows therefrom, that regard must be had to the intention and design of the Legislature, while creating and investing certain powers in the authority, as apparent from the various provisions of the Act.
This Court in case of Smt. Raziabi, cited supra, took pain to refer to certain provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, including Section 23, in paras 10 and 11 of its report and then deduced an inference in para 13 that the Commissioner is, to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do.
9. Section 23, as it originally came on the Statute Book, confers on the Commissioner, powers of the Civil Court for the purposes of taking evidence, enforcing attendance, production of documents and other material objects. By Amending Act No. V of 1929, it has added as thus:
“and the Commisssioner shall be deemed to be a Civil Court, for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
The addition as brought on the StatuteBook, did not find place either in reference or discussion in the judgment of this Court, cited supra. The addition thus made leaves no debate on the aspect about the status of a Commissioner under the Act. The Legislature though conferred certain powers of the Civil Court on the Commissioner, has not held it in that esteem excepting for a limited purpose. The deemed status of a Civil Court as conferred on the Commissioner being for a restrictive purpose, cannot have the applicability in general. The Legislature by incorporating the said provisions made its intention writ large. The Legislature in its wisdom and design did not intend that the Commissioner to suffer same or similar niceties of the Civil Court. This intention is explicit and in terms unequivocal.
This Court in case of Smt. Raziabi while considering nature of function of the Commissioner has not adverted to this pertinent aspect. The view as taken might be possible by by-passing the provisions which has been incorporated in 1929. The view thus taken is not in consonance with the express provision. It is derogatory to the legislative intention.
10. The Commissioner is charged with a statutory duty to settle the dispute which culminates in an award. Sections 10A and 10B of the Act empowers the Commissioner to require from the employer the statements and reports regarding fatal accidents. Section 18A provides for penalty in case of non-compliance. Prosecution thereof could be initiated only with previous sanction of the Commissioner. Section 31 provides that the payment of compensation could be recovered as an arrear of land revenue.
Section 32 authorises the Government to frame rules for carrying out the purpose of the Act.
Rules 35, 36and 37 provide for local inspection, entry in the factory premises and summary examination.
These could not be the attributes of the Civil Court, to which this Court in case of Smt. Raziabi has not adverted. As per the test laid down by the Supreme Court, referred to above, having
regard to the provision of the Act and Rules which are of definite indication and particularly the incorporation of a deemed status for a limited purpose under Section 23, we have no hesitation to record a conclusion that the Commissioner could not be a Civil Court as envisaged under Clause 16 of the Letters Patent. As such, the resultant judgment delivered by a Single Judge in an appeal under Section 30 of the Act would not be in pursuant to Section 108 of the Act of 1915 as envisaged under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. We, therefore, hold that the Letters Patent Appeal against such decision would not lie.
11. We then proceed to deal with the next question as to whether the scheme of the Act does approve further appeal beyond the stage of Section 30.
Appeal under Section 30 is to be decided and disposed as per the procedure and practice prescribed by the rules. As per the relevant rule, hearing and disposal of such appeal is entrusted to a Single Judge. The Supreme Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh and Ors. , laid down that the appeal disposed of by a Single Judge of the High Court and appeal from the judgment to the Division Bench thereof are different appeals. There are in law and fact different appeals – one given by the statute and other by Letters Patent.
Once an appeal as per the procedure and practice is decided by the Single Judge, then the remedy as provided under Section 30 of the Act is completely exhausted. Further appeal under Letters Patent is not continuation of an appeal under Section 30. The remedy as provided under Clause 15 is independent of one given by Section 30 of the Act.
Remedy under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is subject to the provisions of the Act. The Act, true it is, does not specifically attach finality to a decision in appeal under Section 30. It has also not created an express bar, analogous to Section 100A of the C.P.C., prohibiting further appeal.
12. The Supreme Court in case of South Asia Industries, cited supra, has laid down that if the appropriate Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication not taken away the right of appeal, an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It follows there from that the remedy of appeal under Clause 15 is available unless statute has created an embargo either expressly or by necessary implication. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshankar v. Dhirendrasinh Virbhadrasinghji Solanki and Ors. AIR S.C. 915, has held as regards to the Representation of People Act that, “having regard to the history of Legislation and limited nature of appeal expressly provided in Section 116A of the Act, it should be held any other right of appeal is taken away by necessary implication. Bearing the dictum as laid down, we propose to examine the scheme of the Act in this regard.
13. The Act is a social piece of legislation enacted with a view to provide speedy and expeditious remedy to the dependents of deceased or disabled workman. Section 30 has provided the only remedy against the order of Commissioner by way of an appeal, that too directly to the High Court. Such appeal as provided would He not against all orders but only against certain orders, enumerated therein. Further more, such appeal would He only when it involves a substantial question of law. Besides this, unlike for any appeal or Revision to the High Court, the period of limitation for an appeal under Section 30 of the Act is only 60 days.
14. The term ‘substantive question of law’ has been incorporated for the first time in 1976 in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure with explicit intention to curtail the scope of Second Appeal. This phraseology has, however, thoughtfully been used with definite significance in the Act way back in 1923. Moreover, the Act unlike the Code, is not merely a procedural statute. It is a substantive law and has constituted complete and exhaustive Code. Visualising the pertinent aspect such as (a) it is a social piece of legislation enacted to provide speedy and expeditious relief; (b) remedy of only appeal is directly to the High Court; (c) confining such remedy only against specified order and that too for a very restricted purpose, and (d) only when substantive question of law is involved, we find that intention of the Legislature is definite and certain. It is indicative of the design of mind that the parties to litigate on the subject only in bare minimum contingencies. The Act with its intents and purport conveys the strong resentment against further litigation than what is prescribed for limited purpose. Permitting to invoke Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be derogatory to the spirit of the Legislature.
The Act thus creates a bar by necessary and definite implication against any proceedings beyond the stage of Section 30 of the Act. The Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 against the decision of a Single Judge under Section 30 of the Act is, therefore, not maintainable.
15. In view of above discussion, we dismiss the appeal.