JUDGMENT
Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Although this appeal is not on final hearing board and the bail application is only on board but, since the counsel for the parties do not object to my finally deciding it, I propose doing so; especially because the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant is 6 months R.I. and he has already been in jail for nearly 1 month. In addition, I find that the paper book is ready; is attached to the bail application; and the record and proceedings have been received by this Court.
2. The appellant aggrieved by the Judgment and order dated 8-7-1992, passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Nasik in Sessions Case No. 101 of 1992, convicting and sentencing him to undergo 6 months R.I. and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- and in default to further undergo S.I. for one month, under section 324 I.P.C. has come in appeal before me.
3. Along with the appellant his wife Mangala Dinkar Kamble was also tried but, she was acquitted by the impugned judgment.
4. The prosecution case in brief is that on 8-12-1990, the informant Pandurang Ugale P.W. 1 was informed by his daughter Sarita that his son Janardhan had committed theft of Rs. 5/- from the house of the appellant. On 9-10-1990, there was a quarrel on this score between the informant’s wife and that of the appellant (acquitted accused Mangala). The informant who was a witness to the quarrel intervened in the same.
On 11-12-1990, at about 8.30-8.45 p.m. the appellant under the influence of alcohol started abusing the informant who resided in his vicinity. The appellant is said to have threatened the informant. After sometime, the informant came back to his house. It is alleged that while he was inside his house, the appellant threw a small pot containing kerosene on his person resulting in irritation in his eyes. While he was cleaning his eyes, the appellant threw a bola (a burning cotton ball) resulting in his catching fire and receiving injuries. The informant started saying ‘Vachwa Vachwa’. On that, P.W. 5 Ramakant Taskar and the informant’s wife P.W. 10 Anusayabai rushed to his rescue and tried to extinguish the fire.
5. After the incident, Eknath Shirsat and one Handore took the informant to Civil Hospital Sinnar where his injuries were examined by P.W. 11 Dr. Sunil More on the same day i.e. on 11-12-1990 at about 9.30 p.m. Dr. More gave first aid to the informant.
On 12-12-1990 P.W. 8 Dr. Sadanand Nayak of Civil Hospital, Nasik medically examined the informant and found on his person the following injuries:
Superficial to deep burns:
i) on face 9%
ii) left upper limb 9%
iii) upper chest and back 15%
iv) right upper limb 2%
It also appears that the informant was medically examined by P.W. 9 Dr. Suresh Vharade, the Chief Medical Officer of the Nagji Memorial Hospital. After being admitted in the hospital for some days he was discharged.
6. Going backwards, the F.I.R. of the incident was lodged by Pandurang Ugale some times on 11-12-1990. On the basis of the F.I.R. P.S.I. Dattatraya Madole P.W. 12 recorded Crime No. 167 of 1990 under section 307 read with 34 I.P.C. In the F.I.R. the appellant is named.
7. The investigation of the case was conducted by P.S.I. Dattatraya Madole. On 12-12-1990 he visited the spot of the incident, prepared panchanama Exhibit 16, seized some of the articles i.e. one brass pot, a can and one Godhadi which was burnt and recorded statements of the witnesses. He sent the seized articles to the Chemical Analyst. Finally, after completing the investigation he submitted the charge-sheet on 13-2-1991.
8. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions in the usual manner where a charge under section 307 read with 34 I.P.C. was framed against the appellant and his wife Mangala to which they pleaded not guilty.
9. In the trial Court as many as 12 witnesses were examined by the prosecution which also tendered and proved various exhibits. In defence no witness was examined by the appellant.
10. The learned trial Judge acquitted accused Mangala, the wife of the appellant for the reasons stated in paragraph 17 of the judgment, namely, that there was no evidence that she had in any manner shared the common intention with respect to the causing of injuries on the victim. However, the learned trial Judge believed the prosecution case vis-a-vis the appellant and convicted and sentenced him under section 324 I.P.C., in the manner stated above. Hence this appeal.
11. I have heard Mr. Awad for the appellant and Mrs. Jyoti S. Pawar for the State. I have also gone through the deposition of the witnesses examined in the trial Court, the material exhibits proved by the prosecution during trial; and the impugned judgment. After giving my anxious consideration to the matter I am of the opinion that the learned trial Judge was wholly justified in convicting the appellant under section 324 I.P.C. I however, feel that this is not a fit case for jail sentence and a sentence of fine alone would meet the ends of justice.
12. The short question in this appeal is as to whether the statement of the victim Pandurang Ugale P.W. 1 inspires confidence or not. After going through his statement I have no hesitation in answering this question in the affirmative. It is on the basis of the averments contained in examination-in-chief in his statement that I have set out the prosecution case in paragraph four of this judgment. In my view no useful purpose would be served by repeating it. The statement of this witness which is to the effect that the appellant threw a pot containing kerosene and bola (burning cotton ball), is corroborated by the nature of injuries received by him which I have set out extensively in paragraph five of this judgment. I am not prepared to believe that at the expense of exclusion of the real assailant the victim would have falsely nominated the appellant. Although the incident took place in the night time but since the victim and the appellant lived in immediate proximity of one another there was no question of any difficulty in the way of the victim in recognising the appellant.
Assurance is lent to the testimony of the victim by two other circumstances; firstly in the prompt F.I.R. of the incident which was lodged by the victim the appellant has been named as the villian who was responsible for inflicting the injuries on his person. Criminal courts attach great value to the lodging of a prompt F.I.R. because the same very largely minimises the possibility of false implication, of persons named therein and of embellishments in the prosecution case. This is singularly so in the instant case because the role of causing injuries to the victim has only been assigned to the appellant.
Secondly, the strong motive in this case also lends tremendous assurance to the Court. As mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment 3 or 4 days prior to the incident, the family of the appellant suspected the son of the victim of stealing Rs. 5/- from their house and there was a quarrel on this score between the wife of appellant and that of the informant.
13. The time-honoured principle, namely that evidence has to be weighed and not counted is contained in section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act which provides “no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact”. Since in my view, the evidence of the victim is implicitly reliable; is corroborated by medical evidence; and assurance is lent to it by some other circumstances also, by itself alone it is a very safe and sound basis for confirming the conviction of the appellant. Plurality of evidence is only a rule of prudence; necessary in a given case because of its peculiar features and not an inflexible requirement of law having universal application and in the present case there is certainly no necessity for the same. As I see it the learned trial Judge was wholly justified in convicting the appellant under section 324 I.P.C.
14. The only question which remains is that pertaining to the quantum of sentence. The learned Counsel for the appellant urged that the instant case does not warrant a jail sentence and if in place of the unserved portion of jail sentence some fine is imposed on the appellant, he would not consider the same to be enhancement of the sentence of the appellant. Initially, I was loath to accept this submission; not only because the learned A.P.P. vehemently opposed it but also because burn injuries on vital parts of the body of the victim have been caused by the appellant. However, I accepted this submission of counsel for the appellant because, I find that the substantive sentence is only 6 months R.I.; that the appellant has already been in jail for one month; that the incident took place more than 5 years ago; and that the learned trial Judge has mentioned in paragraph 19 of the Judgment that it appears that the appellant is a first offender. Considering all these circumstances, and bearing in mind that a sentence of 6 months R.I. cannot be said to have any deterrent effect on the appellant, I reduce the jail sentence of the appellant to the period already undergone by him. I however, provide that in place of the remaining portion of jail sentence the appellant would pay a fine of Rs. 3000/-. This would be in addition to the fine of Rs. 500/- imposed by the learned trial Judge. This fine of Rs. 3000/- and that of Rs. 500/- imposed by the trial Judge, if not already paid, would be paid by the appellant, within a period of 3 months from today.
15. The appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith unless wanted in some other crime. In case the fine is not paid within a period of 3 months, from today, he shall undergo the jail sentence imposed on him under section 324 I.P.C. by the learned trial Judge. The fine of Rs. 3000/- imposed on the appellant by me would be awarded as compensation to the complainant P.W. 1 Pandurang Bansi Ugale and in case the complainant is dead to his heirs. The trial Court would inform the complainant/his heirs, as the case may be, about this order.
16. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed and partly dismissed. Certified copy expedited.