Delhi High Court High Court

Director Of Income Tax … vs Raunaq Education Foundation on 30 April, 2007

Delhi High Court
Director Of Income Tax … vs Raunaq Education Foundation on 30 April, 2007
Equivalent citations: (2007) 213 CTR Del 541, 2007 294 ITR 76 Delhi
Author: M B Lokur
Bench: M B Lokur, V Gupta


JUDGMENT

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1. The Revenue is aggrieved by an order dated 6th January, 2006 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench A in ITA No. 2590/Del/2002 relevant for the assessment year 1987-88 and ITA No. 2591/Del/2002 relevant for the assessment year 1998-99. The sole question that has arisen in this appeal is whether the assessed who is entitled to exemption under Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can claim the benefit thereof for the purpose of income deemed to be chargeable to tax under Section 68 of the Act. According to the Assessing Officer, the undisclosed income could not be exempted under Section 10(22) of the Act and the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the view taken by the Assessing Officer. On further appeal, the Tribunal considered the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act read with Section 2(24) and 2(45) as well as Section 10(22) of the Act and came to the conclusion that the use of the word ‘income’ in Sub-section (22) of Section 10 of the Act is wide enough to include deemed income under Section 68 of the Act. Learned Counsel for the assessed has drawn our attention to Orissa State Warehousing Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax wherein the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 10(29) of the Act which uses the expression ‘derived from’ which expression is missing in Section 10(22) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that the expression ‘derived from’ is intended to give a restrictive meaning to the word ‘income’ as used in Section 10(29) of the Act and, therefore, proceeding on that basis, the Supreme Court decided against the assessed.

2. We find that the words ‘derived from’ (or some other similar words) do not occur in Section 10(22) of the Act and, therefore, the word ‘income’ as occurring in Section 10(22) cannot be given restrictive meaning and must be given its natural meaning or the meaning ascribed to it in Section 2(24) of the Act.

3. It is well settled that exemption provision must be strictly construed but when it is found an exemption is available then it must be given its full play. This has recently been held by the Supreme Court in P.R. Prabhakar v. Commissioner of Income Tax in the following words:

It is now a well-settled principle of law that although the exemption provisions are to be construed strictly as regards the applicability thereof to the case of the assessed once it is found that the same is applicable, the same are required to be interpreted liberally. See Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand ; Government of India v. Indian Tobacco Association and Commissioner of Central Excise v. Hira Cement [2006] 6 RC 219 : .

It is also trite law that an exemption is to be granted unless it is expressly taken away. See Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority v. Union of India .

4. In view of the above, we do not find any infirmity in the decision of the Tribunal. No substantial question of law arises for consideration.

5. Dismissed.